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23.1
Immediately after the battle of Cannae and the capture and plunder of the
Roman camp, Hannibal moved out of Apulia into Samnium, in consequence of
an invitation he had received from a man named Statius Trebius, who promised
to hand over Compsa to him if he would visit the territory of the Hirpini.
Trebius was a native of Compsa, a man of note amongst his people, but his
influence was less than that of the faction of the Mopsii, a family which
owed its predominance to the favour and support of Rome. After the report
of the battle of Cannae had reached the town, and Trebius was telling everybody
that Hannibal was coming, the Mopsian party left the city. It was then
peacefully handed over to the Carthaginian and a garrison placed in it.
There Hannibal left all his booty and his baggage, and then forming his
army into two divisions, gave Mago the command of one and retained the
other himself. He gave Mago instructions to receive the submission of the
cities in the district which were revolting from Rome and to compel those
which were hanging back to revolt, whilst he himself marched through the
Campanian district towards the Lower Sea with the view of attacking Neapolis
so that he might have a city accessible from the sea. When he entered the
confines of Neapolis he placed some of his Numidians wherever he conveniently
could in ambuscade, for the roads are mostly deep, with many unseen windings.
The others he ordered to ride up to the gates driving ostentatiously before
them the plunder they had collected from the fields. As they appeared to
be a small and disorganised force, a troop of cavalry came out against
them, they were drawn on by the retreating Numidians into the ambuscade
and surrounded. Not a man would have escaped had not the proximity of the
sea, and some ships, mostly fishing vessels, which they saw not far from
the shore, afforded a means of escape to those who were good swimmers.
Several young nobles, however, were either taken or killed in the skirmish,
amongst them Hegeas, the commandant of the cavalry, who fell whilst following
the retreating foe too incautiously. The aspect of the walls deterred the
Carthaginian from attacking the city; they by no means offered facilities
for an assault.
23.2
From there he directed his march towards Capua. This city had become demoralised
by a long course of prosperity and the indulgence of Fortune, but most
of all by the universal corruption produced by the wild excesses of a populace
who exercised their liberty without any restraint. Pacuvius Calavius had
got the senate of Capua entirely in his own power and that of the populace.
He was a noble, and at the same time a favourite with the people, but he
had gained his influence and power by resorting to base practices. He happened
to be chief magistrate in the year in which the defeat at Trasumennus occurred,
and knowing the hatred which the populace had long felt towards the senate,
he thought it highly probable that they would seize their opportunity,
create a violent revolution, and, if Hannibal with his victorious army
should visit their neighbourhood, murder the senators and hand over Capua
to him. Bad as the man was, he was not utterly abandoned, since he preferred
to play the autocrat in a commonwealth which was constitutionally sound
rather than in one that was ruined, and he knew that no political constitution
could be sound where there was no council of state. He embarked on a plan
by which he could save the senate and at the same time render it completely
subservient to himself and to the populace. He summoned a meeting of the
senate and commenced his speech by saying that any idea of a revolt from
Rome would have been quite repugnant to him had it not been a necessity,
seeing that he had children by the daughter of Appius Claudius and had
given his own daughter in marriage to M. Livius in Rome. "But," he went
on, "there is a much more serious and formidable danger impending, for
the populace are not simply contemplating beginning their revolt from Rome
by banishing the senate from the city, they mean to murder the senators
and then hand over the city to Hannibal and the Carthaginians. It is in
my power to save you from this peril if you will put yourselves in my hands,
and, forgetting all our past quarrels, trust me." Overcome by their fears
they all placed themselves in his hands. "I will," he then said, "shut
you in your House, and whilst appearing myself to participate in their
act by approving of designs which I should in vain attempt to oppose, I
will discover a way of safety for you. Take any guarantee in this matter
which you please." When he had given the guarantee he went out and ordered
the doors to be fastened, and left a guard in the vestibule to prevent
any one from entering or leaving without his orders.
23.3
Next, he called an assembly of the people and addressed them thus: "You
have often wished, citizens of Capua, that you had the power to execute
summary justice on the unscrupulous and infamous senate. You can do so
now safely, and none can call you to account. You need not risk your lives
in desperate attempts to force the houses of individual senators guarded
as they are by their clients and slaves; take them as they now are, locked
up in the Senate-house, all by themselves, unarmed. Do not be in a hurry,
do nothing rashly. I will put you in a position to pass sentence of life
and death so that each of them in turn may pay the penalty he deserves.
But whatever you do see that you do not go too far in satisfying your feelings
of resentment, make the security and welfare of the State your first consideration.
For, as I understand it, it is these particular senators that you hate,
you do not want to go without a senate altogether; for you must either
have a king which is an abomination, or a senate, which is the only consultative
body that can exist in a free commonwealth. So you have to do two things
at once, remove the old senate and choose a fresh one. I shall order the
senators to be summoned one by one and I shall take your opinion as to
their fate, and whatever decision you arrive at shall be carried out. But
before punishment is inflicted on any one found guilty you must choose
a strong and energetic man to take his place as senator." He then sat down,
and after the names of the senators had been cast into the urn he ordered
the man whose name was drawn first to be brought out of the Senate-house.
As soon as they heard the name they all shouted that he was a worthless
scoundrel and richly deserved to be punished. Then Pacuvius said: "I see
clearly what you think of this man, in place of a worthless scoundrel you
must choose a worthy and honest man as senator. For a few minutes there
was silence as they were unable to suggest a better man. Then one of them,
laying aside his diffidence, ventured to suggest a name, and a greater
clamour than ever arose. Some said they had never heard of him, others
imputed to him shameful vices and humble birth, sordid poverty, and a low
class of occupation or trade. A still more violent demonstration awaited
the second and third senators who were summoned, and it was obvious that
while they intensely disliked the man, they had no one to put in his place.
It was no use mentioning the same names again and again, for it only led
to everything that was bad being said about them and the succeeding names
were those of people much more low born and unknown than those which were
first suggested. So the crowd dispersed saying to one another that the
evils they were best acquainted with were the easiest to bear.
23.4
The senate had to thank Pacuvius for its life, and it was much more under
his control than under that of the populace. By common consent he now wielded
supreme power and needed no armed support. Henceforth the senators, forgetting
their rank and independence, flattered the populace, saluted them courteously,
invited them as guests, received them at sumptuous banquets, undertook
their cases, always appeared on their side, and when they were trying suits
they always decided the actions in a way to secure the favour of the mob.
In fact, the proceedings in the senate were exactly as though it had been
a popular assembly. The city had always been disposed to luxury and extravagance,
not only through the weakness of the character of its citizens, but also
through the superabundance of the means of enjoyment and the incitements
to every kind of pleasure which land or sea could furnish, and now, owing
to the obsequiousness of the nobility and the licence of the populace,
it was becoming so demoralised that the sensuality and extravagance which
prevailed exceeded all bounds. They treated the laws, the magistrates,
the senate with equal contempt, and now after the defeat of Cannae they
began to feel contempt for the one thing which they had hitherto held in
some respect-the power of Rome. The only circumstances which prevented
them from immediately revolting were the old established right of intermarriage
which had led to many of their illustrious and powerful families becoming
connected with Rome and the fact that several citizens were serving with
the Romans. The strongest tie of this nature was the presence of three
hundred cavalry, from the noblest families in Capua, in Sicily, whither
they had been specially sent by the Roman authorities to garrison the island.
The parents and relatives of these troopers succeeded after much difficulty
in getting envoys sent to the Roman consul.
23.5
The consul had not yet started for Canusium; they found him and his scanty,
insufficiently armed force still at Venusia, an object calculated to arouse
the deepest compassion in trusty allies, and nothing but contempt amongst
arrogant and treacherous ones like the Campanians. The consul made matters
worse and increased the contempt felt for himself and his fortunes by revealing
too plainly and openly the extent of the disaster. When the envoys assured
him that the senate and people of Capua were much grieved that any mischance
had happened to the Romans and expressed their readiness to supply all
that was needed for the war, he replied: "In bidding us requisition from
you what we need for the war you have preserved the tone in which we speak
to allies instead of suiting your language to the actual state of our circumstances.
For what was left us at Cannae that we should wish what is lacking-as though
we still possessed something-to be made up by our allies? Are we to ask
you to furnish infantry as though we still possessed any cavalry? Are we
to say that we want money, as though that were the only thing we want?
Fortune has not even left us anything which we can supplement. Legions,
cavalry, arms, standards, men and horses, money, supplies-all have gone
either on the battlefield or when the two camps were lost the following
day. So then, men of Capua, you have not to help us in the war but almost
to undertake the war for us. Call to mind how once when your forefathers
were driven in hurried flight within their walls in dread of the Sidicine
as well as the Samnite we took them under our protection at Saticula, and
how the war which then commenced with the Samnites on your behalf was kept
up by us with all its changeful fortunes for nearly a century. Besides
all this you must remember that after you had surrendered we gave you a
treaty on equal terms, we allowed you to retain your own laws, and-what
was, before our defeat at Cannae at all events, the greatest privilege-we
granted our citizenship to most of you and made you members of our commonwealth.
Under these circumstances, men of Capua, you ought to realise that you
have suffered this defeat as much as we have, and to feel that we have
a common country to defend. It is not with the Samnites or the Etruscans
that we have to do; if they deprived us of our power it would still be
Italians who would hold it. But the Carthaginian is dragging after him
an army that is not even made up of natives of Africa, he has collected
a force from the furthest corners of the earth, from the ocean straits,
and the Pillars of Hercules, men devoid of any sense of right, destitute
of the condition, and almost of the speech of men. Savage and barbarous
by nature and habit, their general has made them still more brutal by building
up bridges and barriers with human bodies and-I shudder to say it-teaching
them to feed on human flesh. What man, if he were merely a native of Italy,
would not be horrified at the thought of looking upon men who feast upon
what it is impious even to touch as his lords and masters, looking to Africa
and above all to Carthage for his laws, and having to submit to Italy becoming
a dependency of the Numidians and the Moors? It will be a splendid thing,
men of Capua, if the dominion of Rome, which has collapsed in defeat, should
be saved and restored by your loyalty, your strength. I think that in Campania
you can raise 30,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry; you have already sufficient
money and corn. If you show a loyalty corresponding to your means Hannibal
will not feel that he has conquered or that the Romans are vanquished."
23.6
After this speech of the consul's, the envoys were dismissed. As they were
on their way home, one of their number, Vibius Virrius, told them that
the time had come when the Campanians could not only recover the territory
wrongfully taken from them by the Romans, but even achieve the dominion
over Italy. They could make a treaty with Hannibal on any terms they chose,
and there was no disputing the fact that when the war was over and Hannibal
after his conquest returned with his army to Africa, the sovereignty over
Italy would fall to the Campanians. They all agreed with what Virrius said,
and they gave such an account of their interview with the consul as to
make everybody think that the very name of Rome was blotted out. The populace
and a majority of the senate began at once to prepare for a revolt; it
was owing to the exertions of the senior members that the crisis was staved
off for a few days. At last the majority carried their point, and the same
envoys who had been to the Roman consul were now sent to Hannibal. I find
it stated in some annalists that before they started or it was definitely
decided to revolt, envoys were sent from Capua to Rome to demand as the
condition of their rendering assistance that one consul should be a Campanian,
and amidst the indignation which this demand aroused the envoys were ordered
to be summarily ejected from the Senate-house, and a lictor told off to
conduct them out of the City with orders not to remain a single day on
Roman territory. As, however, this demand is too much like one made by
the Latins in earlier times, and Caelius amongst others would not have
omitted to mention it without good reason, I will not venture to vouch
for the truth of the statement.
23.7
The envoys came to Hannibal and negotiated a peace with him on the following
terms: No Carthaginian commander or magistrate was to have any jurisdiction
over the citizens of Capua nor was any Campanian citizen to be obliged
to serve in any military or other capacity against his will; Capua was
to retain its own magistrates and its own laws; and the Carthaginian was
to allow them to choose three hundred Romans out of his prisoners of war
whom they were to exchange for the Campanian troopers who were serving
in Sicily. These were the terms agreed upon, but the Campanians went far
beyond the stipulations in their criminal excesses. The populace seized
officers in command of our allies and other Roman citizens, some whilst
occupied with their military duties, others whilst engaged in their private
business, and ordered them to be shut up in the baths on the presence of
keeping them in safe custody; unable to breathe owing to the heat and fumes
they died in great agony. Decius Magius was a man who, if his fellow-citizens
had been rational, would have gained very great authority with them. He
did his best to prevent these crimes and to stop the envoys from going
to Hannibal. When he heard that troops were being sent by Hannibal to garrison
the city, he protested most earnestly against their being admitted and
referred, as warning examples, to the tyranny of Pyrrhus and the wretched
servitude into which the Tarentines fell. After they were admitted he urged
that they should be expelled, or what was better, if the Capuans wished
to clear themselves by a deed which would be remembered from their guilt
in revolting from ancient allies and blood-relations, let them put the
Carthaginian garrison to death and be once more friends with Rome.
When this was reported to Hannibal-for there was no secrecy about Magius'
action-he sent to summon him to his camp. Magius sent a spirited refusal;
Hannibal, he said, had no legal authority over a citizen of Capua. The
Carthaginian, furious at the rebuff, ordered the man to be thrown into
chains and brought to him. Fearing, however, on second thoughts, that the
use of force might create a tumult and feelings once aroused might lead
to a sudden outbreak, he sent a message to Marius Blossius, the chief magistrate
of Capua, that he would be there on the morrow, and started with a small
escort for the city. Marius called the people together and gave public
notice that they should assemble in a body with their wives and children
and go to meet Hannibal. The whole population turned out, not because they
were ordered, but because the mob were enthusiastic in favour of Hannibal,
and were eager to see a commander famous for so many victories. Decius
Magius did not go to meet him, nor did he shut himself up at home, as this
might have implied a consciousness of guilt; he strolled leisurely about
the Forum with his son and a few of his clients, whilst the whole city
was in a state of wild excitement at seeing and welcoming Hannibal. When
he had entered the city Hannibal asked that the senate should be convened
at once. The leading Campanians, however, implored him not to transact
any serious business then, but to give himself up to the joyous celebration
of a day which had been made such a happy one by his arrival. Though he
was naturally impulsive in his anger, he would not begin with a refusal,
and spent most of the day in viewing the city.
23.8
He stayed with two brothers, Sthenius and Pacuvius, men distinguished for
their high birth and wealth. Pacuvius Calavius, whom we have already mentioned,
the leader of the party which brought the city over to the Carthaginians,
brought his young son to the house. The youth was closely attached to Decius
Magius, and had stood up most resolutely with him for the alliance with
Rome and against any terms with the Carthaginians, and neither the changing
over of the city to the other side nor the authority of his father had
been able to shake his resolution. Pacuvius dragged him away from Magius'
side and now sought to obtain Hannibal's pardon for the youth by intercessions
rather than by any attempts at exculpation. He was overcome by the father's
prayers and tears and went so far as to order him to be invited to a banquet
to which none were to be admitted but his hosts and Vibellius Taureas,
a distinguished soldier. The banquet began early in the day, and was not
at all in accordance with Carthaginian customs or military discipline,
but as was natural in a city, still more in a house full of wealth and
luxury, the table was furnished with every kind of dainty and delicacy.
Young Calavius was the only one who could not be persuaded to drink, though
his hosts and occasionally Hannibal invited him; he excused himself on
the ground of health, and his father alleged as a further reason his not
unnatural excitement under the circumstances. It was nearly sunset when
the guests rose. Young Calavius accompanied his father out of the banquet
chamber and when they had come to a retired spot in the garden behind the
house, he stopped and said: "I have a plan to propose to you, father, by
which we shall not only obtain pardon for the Romans for our offence in
revolting to Hannibal, but also possess much more influence and prestige
in Capua than we have ever done before." When his father asked him in great
surprise what his plan was, he threw his toga back from his shoulder and
showed him a sword belted on to his side. "Now," he said, "this very moment
will I ratify our treaty with Rome in Hannibal's blood. I wanted you to
know first, in case you would rather be away when the deed is done."
23.9
The old man, beside himself with terror at what he saw and heard, as though
he were actually witnessing the act his son had spoken of, exclaimed: "I
pray and beseech you, my son, by all the sacred bonds which unite parents
and children, not to insist upon doing and suffering everything that is
horrible before your father's eyes. It is only a few hours ago that we
pledged our faith, swearing by all the gods and joining hand to hand, and
do you want us, when we have just separated after friendly talk, to arm
those hands, consecrated by such a pledge, against him? Have you risen
from the hospitable board to which you were invited by Hannibal with only
two others out of all Capua that you may stain that board with your host's
blood? I, your father, was able to make Hannibal friendly towards my son,
am I powerless to make my son friendly towards Hannibal? But let nothing
sacred hold you back, neither the plighted word, nor religious obligation,
nor filial affection; dare infamous deeds, if they do not bring ruin as
well as guilt upon us. But what then? Are you going to attack Hannibal
single-handed? What of that throng of free men and slaves with all their
eyes intent on him alone? What of all those right hands? Will they hang
down listlessly during that act of madness? Armed hosts cannot bear even
to gaze on the face of Hannibal, the Roman people dread it, and will yon
endure it? Though other help be lacking, will you have the courage to strike
me, me your father, when I interpose myself to protect Hannibal? And yet
it is through my breast that you must pierce his. Suffer yourself to be
deterred here rather than vanquished there. Let my prayers prevail with
you as they have already to-day prevailed for you." By this time the youth
was in tears, and seeing this, the father flung his arms round him, clung
to him with kisses, and persisted in his entreaties until he made his son
lay aside his sword and give his word that he would do nothing of the kind.
Then the son spoke: "I must pay to my father the dutiful obedience which
I owe to my country. I am indeed grieved on your account for you have to
bear the guilt of a threefold betrayal of your country; first when you
instigated the revolt from Rome, secondly when you urged peace with Hannibal,
and now once more when you are the one let and hindrance in the way of
restoring Capua to the Romans. Do you, my country, receive this sword with
which I armed myself in your defence when I entered the stronghold of the
enemy." With these words he flung the sword over the garden wall into the
public road, and to allay all suspicions returned to the banqueting room.
23.10
The following day there was a full meeting of the senate to hear Hannibal.
At first his tone was very gracious and winning; he thanked the Capuans
for preferring his friendship to alliance with Rome, and amongst other
magnificent promises he assured them that Capua would soon be the head
of all Italy and that Rome, in common with all the other nationalities,
would have to look to her for their laws. Then his tone changed. There
was one man, he thundered, who was outside the friendship of Carthage and
the treaty they had made with him, a man that was not, and ought not to
be called a Campanian-Decius Magius. He demanded his surrender and asked
that this matter should be discussed and a decision arrived at before he
left the House. They all voted for surrendering the man, though a great
many thought that he did not deserve such a cruel fate and felt that a
long step had been taken in the abridgment of their rights and liberties.
On leaving the Senate-house Hannibal took his seat on the magistrates'
tribunal and ordered Decius Magius to be arrested, brought before him,
and put on his defence, alone and unbefriended. The high spirit of the
man was still unquelled, he said that by the terms of the treaty this could
not be insisted on, but he was at once placed in irons and ordered to be
conducted to the camp, followed by a lictor. As long as his head was uncovered
he was incessantly haranguing and shouting to the crowds round him: "You
have got the liberty, you Campanians, that you asked for. In the middle
of the Forum, in the broad daylight, with you looking on, I a man second
to none in Capua am being hurried off in chains to death. Could any greater
outrage have been committed if the city had been taken? Go and meet Hannibal,
decorate your city, make the day of his arrival a public holiday that you
may enjoy the spectacle of this triumph over a fellow-citizen! As the mob
appeared to be moved by these outbursts, his head was muffled up and orders
were given to hurry him more quickly outside the city gate. In this way
he was brought into the camp and then at once put on board a ship and sent
to Carthage. Hannibal's fear was that if any disturbance broke out in Capua
in consequence of such scandalous treatment the senate might repent of
having surrendered their foremost citizen, and if they sent to ask for
his restoration he would either offend his new allies by refusing the first
request they made, or, if he granted it, would have in Capua a fomenter
of disorder and sedition. The vessel was driven by a storm to Cyrenae which
was then under a monarchy. Here Magius fled for sanctuary to the statue
of King Ptolemy, and his guards conveyed him to the King of Alexandria.
After he had told him how he had been thrown into chains by Hannibal in
defiance of all treaty rights, he was liberated from his fetters and permission
accorded to him to go to Rome or Capua, whichever he preferred. Magius
said that he would not be safe at Capua, and as there was at that time
war between Rome and Capua, he would be living in Rome more like a deserter
than a guest. There was no place where he would sooner live than under
the rule of the man whom he had known as the champion and asserter of his
freedom.
23.11
During these occurrences Q. Fabius Pictor returned home from his mission
to Delphi. He read the response of the oracle from a manuscript, in which
were contained the names of the gods and goddesses to whom supplications
were to be made, and the forms to be observed in making them. This was
the closing paragraph: "If ye act thus, Romans, your estate will be better
and less troubled, your republic will go forward as ye would have it, and
the victory in the war will belong to the people of Rome. When your commonwealth
is prosperous and safe send to Pythian Apollo a gift from the gains you
have earned and honour him with your substance out of the plunder, the
booty, and the spoils. Put away from you all wanton and godless living."
He translated this from the Greek as he read it, and when he had finished
reading he said that as soon as he left the oracle he offered sacrifice
with wine and incense to all the deities who were named, and further that
he was instructed by the priest to go on board wearing the same laurel
garland in which he had visited the oracle and not to lay it aside till
he got to Rome. He stated that he had carried out all his instructions
most carefully and conscientiously, and had laid the garland on the altar
of Apollo. The senate passed a decree that the sacrifices and intercessions
which were enjoined should be carefully performed at the earliest opportunity.
During these occurrences in Rome and Italy, Mago, Hamilcar's son, had
arrived at Carthage with the news of the victory of Cannae. He had not
been sent by his brother immediately after the battle, but had been detained
for some days in receiving into alliance Bruttian communities as they successively
revolted. When he appeared before the senate he unfolded the story of his
brother's successes in Italy, how he had fought pitched battles with six
commanders-in-chief, four of whom were consuls and two a Dictator and his
Master of Horse, and how he had killed about 200,000 of the enemy and taken
more than 50,000 prisoners. Out of four consuls two had fallen, of the
two survivors one was wounded and the other, after losing the whole of
his army, had escaped with fifty men. The Master of the Horse, whose powers
were those of a consul, had been routed and put to flight, and the Dictator,
because he had never fought an action, was looked upon as a matchless general.
The Bruttians and Apulians, with some of the Samnite and Lucanian communities,
had gone over to the Carthaginians. Capua, which was not only the chief
city of Campania, but now that the power of Rome had been shattered at
Cannae was the head of Italy, had surrendered to Hannibal. For all these
great victories he felt that they ought to be truly grateful and public
thanksgivings ought to be offered to the immortal gods.
23.12
As evidence that the joyful tidings he brought were true, he ordered a
quantity of gold rings to be piled up in the vestibule of the Senate-house,
and they formed such a great heap that, according to some authorities,
they measured more than three modii; the more probable account, however,
is that they did not amount to more than one modius. He added by way of
explanation, to show how great the Roman losses had been, that none but
knights, and amongst them only the highest in rank, wore that ornament.
The main purport of his speech was that the nearer Hannibal's chances were
of bringing the war to a speedy close the more need there was to render
him every possible assistance; he was campaigning far from home, in the
midst of a hostile country; vast quantities of corn were being consumed
and much money expended, and all those battles, whilst they destroyed the
armies of the enemy, at the same time wasted very appreciably the forces
of the victor. Reinforcements, therefore, must be sent, money must be sent
to pay the troops, and supplies of corn to the soldiers who had done such
splendid service for Carthage. Amidst the general delight with which Mago's
speech was received, Himilco, a member of the Barcine party, thought it
a favourable moment for attacking Hanno. "Well, Hanno," he began, "do you
still disapprove of our commencing a war against Rome? Give orders for
Hannibal to be surrendered, put your veto upon all thanksgivings to the
gods after we have received such blessings, let us hear the voice of a
Roman senator in the Senate-house of Carthage?"
Then Hanno spoke to the following effect: "Senators, I would have kept
silence on the present occasion, for I did not wish on a day of universal
rejoicing to say anything which might damp your happiness. But as a senator
has asked me whether I still disapprove of the war we have commenced against
Rome, silence on my part would show either insolence or cowardice; the
one implies forgetfulness of the respect due to others, the other of one's
own self-respect. My reply to Himilco is this: I have never ceased to disapprove
of the war, nor shall I ever cease to censure your invincible general until
I see the war ended upon conditions that are tolerable. Nothing will banish
my regret for the old peace that we have broken except the establishment
of a new one. Those details which Mago has proudly enumerated make Himilco
and the rest of Hannibal's caucus very happy; they might make me happy
too, for a successful war, if we choose to make a wise use of our good
fortune, will bring us a more favourable peace. If we let this opportunity
slip, when we are in a position to offer rather than submit to terms of
peace, I fear that our rejoicing will become extravagant and finally turn
out to be groundless. But even now, what is it that you are rejoicing at?
'I have slain the armies of the enemy; send me troops.' What more could
you ask for, if you had been defeated? 'I have captured two of the enemy's
camps, filled, of course, with plunder and supplies; send me corn and money.'
What more could you want if you had been despoiled, stripped of your own
camp? And that I may not be the only one to be surprised at your delight-for
as I have answered Himilco, I have a perfect right to ask questions in
my turn-I should be glad if either Himilco or Mago would tell me, since,
you say, the battle of Cannae has all but destroyed the power of Rome and
the whole of Italy is admittedly in revolt, whether, in the first place,
any single community of the Latin nation has come over to us, and, secondly,
whether a single man out of the thirty-five Roman tribes has deserted to
Hannibal." Mago answered both questions in the negative. "Then there are
still," Hanno continued, "far too many of the enemy left. But I should
like to know how much courage and confidence that vast multitude possess."
23.13
Mago said he did not know. "Nothing," replied Hanno, "is easier to find
out. Have the Romans sent any envoys to Hannibal to sue for peace? Has
any rumour reached your ears of any one even mentioning the word 'peace'
in Rome?" Again Mago replied in the negative. "Well, then," said Hanno,
"we have as much work before us in this war as we had on the day when Hannibal
first set foot in Italy. Many of us are still alive who can remember with
what changeful fortunes the first Punic war was fought. Never did our cause
appear to be prospering more by sea and land than immediately before the
consulship of C. Lutatius and A. Postumius. But in their year of office
we were utterly defeated off the Aegates. But if (which heaven forfend!)
fortune should now turn to any extent, do you hope to obtain when you are
defeated a peace which no one offers to give you now that you are victorious?
If any one should ask my opinion about offering or accepting terms of peace
I would say what I thought. But if the question before us is simply whether
Mago's demands should be granted, I do not think that we are concerned
with sending supplies to a victorious army, much less do I consider that
they ought to be sent if we are being deluded with false and empty hopes."
Very few were influenced by Hanno's speech. His well-known dislike of the
Barcas deprived his words of weight and they were too much preoccupied
with the delightful news they had just heard to listen to anything which
would make them feel less cause for joy. They fancied that if they were
willing to make a slight effort the war would soon be over. A resolution
was accordingly passed with great enthusiasm to reinforce Hannibal with
4000 Numidians, 40 elephants, and 500 talents of silver. Bostar also was
sent with Mago into Spain to raise 20,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry to
make good the losses of the armies in Italy and Spain.
23.14
As usual, however, in seasons of prosperity, these measures were executed
with great remissness and dilatoriness. The Romans, on the other hand,
were kept from being dilatory by their native energy and still more by
the necessities of their position. The consul did not fail in any single
duty which he had to perform, nor did the Dictator show less energy. The
force now available comprised the two legions which had been enrolled by
the consuls at the beginning of the year, a levy of slaves and the cohorts
which had been raised in the country of Picenum and Cisalpine Gaul. The
Dictator decided to still further increase his strength by adopting a measure
to which only a country in an almost hopeless state could stoop, when honour
must yield to necessity. After duly discharging his religious duties and
obtaining the necessary permission to mount his horse, he published an
edict that all who had been guilty of capital offences or who were in prison
for debt and were willing to serve under him would by his orders be released
from punishment and have their debts cancelled. 6000 men were raised in
this way, and he armed them with the spoils taken from the Gauls and which
had been carried in the triumphal procession of C. Flaminius. He then started
from the City with 25,000 men. After taking over Capua, and making another
fruitless appeal to the hopes and fears of Neapolis, Hannibal marched into
the territory of Nola. He did not at once treat it in a hostile manner
as he was not without hope that the citizens would make a voluntary surrender,
but if they delayed, he intended to leave nothing undone which could cause
them suffering or terror. The senate, especially its leading members, were
faithful supporters of the Roman alliance, the populace as usual were all
in favour of revolting to Hannibal; they conjured up the prospect of ravaged
fields and a siege with all its hardships and indignities; nor were there
wanting men who were actively instigating a revolt. The senate were afraid
that if they openly opposed the agitation they would not be able to withstand
the popular excitement, and they found a means of putting off the evil
day by pretending to go with the mob. They represented that they were in
favour of revolting to Hannibal, but nothing was settled as to the conditions
on which they were to enter into a new treaty and alliance. Having thus
gained time, they sent delegates in great haste to Marcellus Claudius the
praetor, who was with his army at Casilinum, to inform him of the critical
position of Nola, how their territory was in Hannibal's hand, and the city
would be in the possession of the Carthaginians unless it received succour.
and how the senate, by telling the populace that they might revolt when
they pleased. had made them less in a hurry to do so. Marcellus thanked
the delegates and told them to adhere to the same policy and postpone matters
till he arrived. He then left Casilinum for Caiatia and from there he marched
across the Vulturnus, through the districts of Saticula and Trebia, over
the hills above Suessula, and so arrived at Nola.
23.15
On the approach of the Roman praetor the Carthaginian evacuated the territory
of Nola and marched down to the coast close to Neapolis, as he was anxious
to secure a seaport town to which there might be a safe passage for ships
coming from Africa. When, however, he learnt that Neapolis was held by
a Roman officer, M. Junius Silanus, who had been invited by the Neapolitans,
he left Naples, as he had left Nola, and went to Nuceria. He spent some
time in investing the place, often attacking it, and often making tempting
proposals to the chief men of the place and to the leaders of the populace,
but all to no purpose. At last famine did its work, and he received the
submission of the town, the inhabitants being allowed to depart without
arms and with one garment apiece. Then, to keep up his character of being
friendly to all the Italian nationalities except the Romans, he held out
honours and rewards to those who consented to remain in his service. Not
a single man was tempted by the prospect; they all dispersed, wherever
they had friends, or wherever each man's fancy led him, amongst the cities
of Campania, mainly Nola and Neapolis. About thirty of their senators,
and, as it happened, their principal ones, endeavoured to enter Capua,
but were refused admission because they had closed their gates against
Hannibal. They accordingly went on to Cumae. The plunder of Nuceria was
given to the soldiers, the city itself was burnt.
Marcellus retained his hold on Nola quite as much by the support of
its leading men as by the confidence he felt in his troops. Fears were
entertained as to the populace and especially L. Bantius. This enterprising
young man was at that time almost the most distinguished among the allied
cavalry, but the knowledge that he had attempted revolt and his fear of
the Roman praetor were driving him on to betray his country or, if he found
no means of doing that, to become a deserter. He had been discovered lying
half-dead on a heap of bodies on the field of Cannae, and after being taken
the utmost care of, Hannibal sent him home loaded with presents. His feelings
of gratitude for such kindness made him wish to place the government of
Nola in the hands of the Carthaginian, and his anxiety and eagerness for
a revolution attracted the observation of the praetor. As it was necessary
either to restrain the youth by punishment or to win him by kindness, the
praetor chose the latter course, preferring to secure such a brave and
enterprising youth as a friend rather than to lose him to the enemy. He
invited him to come and see him and spoke to him most kindly. "You can
easily understand," he told him, "that many of your countrymen are jealous
of you, from the fact that not a single citizen of Nola has pointed out
to me your many distinguished military services. But the bravery of a man
who has served in a Roman camp cannot be hidden. Many of your fellow-soldiers
tell me what a young hero you are, and how many perils and dangers you
have undergone in defence of the safety and honour of Rome. I am told that
you did not give up the struggle on the field of Cannae until you were
buried almost lifeless, beneath a falling mass of men and horses and arms.
May you long live to do still more gallant deeds! With me you will gain
every honour and reward, and you will find that the more you are in my
company the more will it lead to your profit and promotion." The young
man was delighted with these promises. The praetor made him a present of
a splendid charger and authorised the quaestor to pay him 500 silver coins;
he also instructed his lictors to allow him to pass whenever he wished
to see him.
23.16
The high-spirited youth was so completely captivated by the attention Marcellus
paid him that for the future none among the allies of Rome gave her more
efficient or more loyal help. Hannibal once more moved his camp from Nuceria
to Nola, and when he appeared before its gates the populace again began
to look forward to revolting. As the enemy approached Marcellus retired
within the walls, not because he feared for his camp, but because he would
not give any opportunity to the large number of citizens who were bent
on betraying their city. Both armies now began to prepare for battle; the
Romans before the walls of Nola and the Carthaginians in front of their
camp. Slight skirmishes took place between the city and the camp with varying
success, as the generals would not prohibit their men from going forward
in small parties to offer defiance to the enemy nor would they give the
signal for a general action. Day after day the two armies took up their
respective stations in this way, and during this time the leading citizens
of Nola informed Marcellus that nocturnal interviews were taking place
between the populace and the Carthaginians, and that it had been arranged
that when the Roman army had passed out of the gates they should plunder
their baggage and kits, then close the gates and man the walls so that
having become masters of their city and government they might forthwith
admit the Carthaginians instead of the Romans.
On receiving this information Marcellus warmly thanked the Nolan senators
and made up his mind to try the fortune of a battle before any disturbances
arose in the city. He formed his army into three divisions and stationed
them at the three gates which faced the enemy, he ordered the baggage to
follow close behind, and the camp-servants, sutlers, and disabled soldiers
were to carry stakes. At the centre gate he posted the strongest part of
the legions and the Roman cavalry, at the two on either side he stationed
the recruits, the light infantry, and the cavalry of the allies. The Nolans
were forbidden to approach the walls or gates and a special reserve was
placed in charge of the baggage to prevent any attack upon it whilst the
legions were engaged in the battle. In this formation they remained standing
inside the gates. Hannibal had his troops drawn up for battle, as he had
had for several days, and remained in this position till late in the day.
At first it struck him with surprise that the Roman army did not move outside
the gates and that not a single soldier appeared on the walls. Then, supposing
that the secret interviews had been betrayed and that his friends were
afraid to move, he sent back a portion of his troops to their camp with
orders to bring all the appliances for attacking the town as soon as possible
to the front of the line. He felt fairly confident that if he attacked
them whilst thus hesitating the populace would raise some disturbance in
the town. Whilst his men were hurrying up to the front ranks, each to his
allotted task, and the whole line was approaching the walls, Marcellus
ordered the gates to be suddenly flung open, the attack sounded, and the
battle shout raised; the infantry, followed by the cavalry, were to attack
with all the fury possible. They had already carried enough confusion and
alarm into the enemies' centre when P. Valerius Flaccus and C. Aurelius,
divisional commanders, burst out from the other two gates and charged.
The sutlers and camp-servants and the rest of the troops who were guarding
the baggage joined in the shouting, and this made the Carthaginians, who
had been despising the fewness of their numbers, think that it was a large
army. I would hardly venture to assert, as some authorities do, that 2800
of the enemy were killed, and that the Romans did not lose more than 500.
But whether the victory was as great as that or not, I do not think that
an action more important in its consequences was fought during the whole
war, for it was more difficult for those who conquered to escape being
defeated by Hannibal than it was afterwards to conquer him.
23.17
As there was no hope of his getting possession of Nola, Hannibal withdrew
to Acerrae. No sooner had he departed than Marcellus shut the gates and
posted guards to prevent any one from leaving the city. He then opened
a public inquiry in the forum into the conduct of those who had been holding
secret interviews with the enemy. Above seventy were found guilty of treason
and beheaded and their property confiscated. Then, after handing the government
over to the senate, he left with his entire force and took up a position
above Suessula, where he encamped. At first the Carthaginian tried to persuade
the men of Acerrae to make a voluntary surrender, but when he found that
their loyalty remained unshaken he made preparations for a siege and an
assault. The Acerrans possessed more courage than strength, and when they
saw that the blockade was being carried round their walls and that it was
hopeless to attempt any further defence, they decided to escape before
the enemies' line of circumvallation was closed, and stealing away in the
dead of night through any unguarded gaps in the earthworks they fled, regardless
of roads or paths, as chance or design led them. They escaped to those
cities of Campania which they had every reason to believe had not changed
their allegiance. After plundering and burning Acerrae Hannibal marched
to Casilinum in consequence of information he received of the Dictator's
march on Capua with his legions. He was apprehensive that the proximity
of the Roman army might create a counter-revolution in Capua. At that time
Casilinum was held by 500 Praenestines with a few Roman and Latin troops,
who had gone there when they heard of the disaster at Cannae. The levy
at Praeneste had not been completed by the appointed day, and these men
started from home too late to be of use at Cannae. They reached Casilinum
before news of the disaster arrived, and, joined by Romans and allies,
they advanced in great force. Whilst on the march they heard of the battle
and its result and returned to Casilinum. Here, suspected by the Campanians
and fearing for their own safety, they passed some days in forming and
evading plots. When they were satisfied that Capua was in revolt and that
Hannibal would be admitted, they massacred the townsmen of Casilinum at
night and took possession of the part of the city on this side of the Vulturnus-the
river divides the city in two-and held it as a Roman garrison. They were
joined also by a cohort of Perusians numbering 460 men who were driven
to Casilinum by the same intelligence that sent the Praenestines there
a few days previously. The force was quite adequate for the small circuit
of walls, protected, too, as they were on one side by the river, but the
scarcity of corn made even that number appear too large.
23.18
When Hannibal was now not far from the place he sent on in advance a troop
of Gaetulians under an officer named Isalca, to try and get a parley with
the inhabitants and persuade them by fair words to open their gates and
admit a Carthaginian detachment to hold the town. If they refused, they
were to use force and make an attack, wherever it seemed feasible, on the
place. When they approached the walls the town was so silent that they
thought it was deserted, and taking it for granted that the inhabitants
had fled through fear they began to force the gates and break down the
bars. Suddenly the gates were thrown open and two cohorts which had been
standing inside ready for action dashed out and made a furious charge,
utterly discomfiting the enemy. Maharbal was sent with a stronger force
to their assistance, but even he was unable to withstand the impetuosity
of the cohorts. At last Hannibal pitched his camp before the walls, and
made preparations for assaulting the little town and its small garrison
with the combined strength of his entire army. After completing the circle
of his investing lines he began to harass and annoy the garrison, and in
this way lost some of his most daring soldiers who were hit with missiles
from the wall and turrets. On one occasion when the defenders were taking
the aggressive in a sortie he nearly cut them off with his elephants and
drove them in hasty flight into the city; the loss, considering their numbers,
was quite severe enough, and more would have fallen had not night intervened.
The next day there was a general desire to begin the assault. The enthusiasm
of the men had been kindled by the offer of a "mural crown" of gold and
also by the way in which the general himself remonstrated with the men
who had taken Saguntum for their slackness in attacking a little fortress
situated in open country, and also reminded them one and all of Cannae,
Trasumennus, and the Trebia. The vineae were brought up and mines commenced,
but the various attempts of the enemy were opposed with equal strength
and skill by the defenders, the allies of Rome; they created defences against
the vineae, intercepted their mines with counter-mines, and met all their
attacks above ground or below with steady resistance until at last Hannibal
for very shame gave up his project. He contented himself with fortifying
his camp and leaving a small force to defend it, so that it might not be
supposed that the siege was entirely abandoned; after which he settled
in Capua as his winter quarters.
There he kept his army under shelter for the greater part of the winter.
A long and varied experience had inured that army to every form of human
suffering, but it had not been habituated to or had any experience of ease
and comfort. So it came about that the men whom no pressure of calamity
had been able to subdue fell victims to a prosperity too great and pleasures
too attractive for them to withstand, and fell all the more utterly the
more greedily they plunged into new and untried delights. Sloth, wine,
feasting, women, baths, and idle lounging, which became every day more
seductive as they became more habituated to them, so enervated their minds
and bodies that they were saved more by the memory of past victories than
by any fighting strength they possessed now. Authorities in military matters
have regarded the wintering at Capua as a greater mistake on the part of
Hannibal than his not marching straight to Rome after his victory at Cannae.
For his delay at that time might be looked upon as only postponing his
final victory but this may be considered as having deprived him of the
strength to win victory. And it certainly did look as if he left Capua
with another army altogether; it did not retain a shred of its former discipline.
A large number who had become entangled with women went back there, and
as soon as they took to tents again and the fatigue of marching and other
military toils had to be endured their strength and spirits alike gave
way just as though they were raw recruits. From that time all through the
summer campaign a large number left the standards without leave, and Capua
was the only place where the deserters sought to hide themselves.
23.19
However, when the mild weather came, Hannibal led his army out of their
winter quarters and marched back to Casilinum. Although the assault had
been suspended, the uninterrupted investment had reduced the townsfolk
and the garrison to the extremity of want. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus
was in command of the Roman camp, as the Dictator had to leave for Rome
to take the auspices afresh. Marcellus was equally anxious to assist the
besieged garrison, but he was detained by the Vulturnus being in flood,
and also by the entreaties of the people of Nola and Acerrae who feared
the Campanians in case the Romans withdrew their protection. Gracchus simply
watched Casilinum, for the Dictator had given strict orders that no active
operations should be undertaken in his absence. He therefore kept quiet,
though the reports from Casilinum might easily have been too much for any
man's patience. It was stated as a fact that some, unable to endure starvation
any longer, had flung themselves from the walls, others had stood there
unarmed and exposed their defenceless bodies to the missiles of the enemy.
These tidings sorely tried his patience, for he durst not fight against
the Dictator's orders, and he saw that he would have to fight if he were
seen getting corn into the place, and there was no chance of getting it
in without being seen. He gathered in a supply of corn from all the fields
round and filled a number of casks with it, and then sent a messenger to
the chief magistrate at Casilinum asking him to pick up the casks which
the river carried down. The next night, while all were intently watching
the river, after their hopes had been raised by the Roman messenger, the
casks floated down in the middle of the stream; and the corn was divided
in equal shares amongst them all. The same thing happened on the two following
days; they were sent off by night and reached their destination; so far
they had escaped the notice of the enemy. Then, owing to the perpetual
rain, the river became more rapid than usual and the cross currents carried
the casks to the bank which the enemy were guarding. They caught sight
of them as they stuck amongst the osier beds which grew on the bank and
a report was made to Hannibal in consequence of which greater caution was
observed and a closer watch was kept, so that nothing could be sent by
the Vulturnus to the city without being detected. Nuts, however, were scattered
on the river from the Roman camp; these floated down the mid-stream and
were caught in baskets. At last things came to such a pitch that the inhabitants
tried to chew the leather straps and hides which they tore from their shields,
after softening them in boiling water, nor did they refuse mice and other
animals; they even dug up from the bottom of their walls grass and roots
of all sorts. When the enemy had ploughed up all the grass outside the
walls they sowed it with rape, which made Hannibal exclaim: "Am I to sit
here before Casilinum until these seeds have grown?" and whereas he had
never allowed any terms of surrender to be mentioned in his hearing, he
now consented to proposals for the ransom of all the freeborn citizens.
The price agreed upon was seven ounces of gold for each person. When their
liberty was guaranteed they surrendered, but were kept in custody till
all the gold was paid, then in strict observance of the terms they were
released. This is much more likely to be true than that after they had
left cavalry were sent after them and put them all to death. The great
majority were Praenestines. Out of the 570 who formed the garrison not
less than half had perished by sword and famine, the rest returned in safety
to Praeneste with their commanding officer, M. Anicius, who had formerly
been a notary. To commemorate the event his statue was set up in the forum
of Praeneste, wearing a coat of mail with a toga over it and having the
head veiled. A bronze plate was affixed with this inscription: "Marcus
Anicius has discharged the vow he made for the safety of the garrison of
Casilinum." The same inscription was affixed to the three images standing
in the temple of Fortune.
23.20
The town of Casilinum was given back to the Campanians, and a garrison
of 700 men from Hannibal's army was placed in it in case the Romans should
attack it after Hannibal's departure. The senate decreed that double pay
and an exemption for five years from further service should be granted
to the Praenestine troops. They were also offered the full Roman citizenship,
but they preferred not to change their status as citizens of Praeneste.
There is more obscurity as to what happened to the Perusians, as there
is no light thrown upon it by any monument of their own or any decree of
the senate. The people of Petelia, who alone of all the Bruttii had remained
friendly to Rome, were now attacked not only by the Carthaginians, who
were overrunning that district, but also by the rest of the Bruttii who
had adopted the opposite policy. Finding themselves helpless in the presence
of all these dangers, they sent envoys to Rome to ask for support. The
senate told them that they must look after themselves, and on hearing this
they broke into tears and entreaties and flung themselves on the floor
of the vestibule. Their distress excited the deep sympathy of both senate
and people, and the praetor, M. Aemilius asked the senators to reconsider
their decision. After making a careful survey of the resources of the empire,
they were compelled to admit that they were powerless to protect their
distant allies. They advised the envoys to return home and now that they
had proved their loyalty to the utmost they must adopt such measures as
their present circumstances demanded. When the result of their mission
was reported to the Petelians, their senate was so overcome by grief and
fear that some were in favour of deserting the city and seeking refuge
wherever they could, others thought that as they had been abandoned by
their old allies they had better join the rest of the Bruttii and surrender
to Hannibal. The majority, however, decided that no rash action should
be taken, and that the question should be further debated. When the matter
came up the next day a calmer tone prevailed and their leading statesmen
persuaded them to collect all their produce and possessions from the fields
and put the city and the walls into a state of defence.
23.21
About this time despatches arrived from Sicily and Sardinia. The one sent
from T. Otacilius, the propraetor commanding in Sicily, was read in the
senate. It stated in effect that P. Furius had reached Lilybaeum with his
fleet; that he himself was seriously wounded and his life in great danger;
that the soldiers and sailors had no pay or corn given them from day to
day, nor was there any means of procuring any, and he strongly urged that
both should be sent as soon as possible, and that, if the senate agreed,
one of the new praetors should be sent to succeed him. The despatch from
A. Cornelius Mammula dealt with the same difficulty as to pay and corn.
The same reply was sent to both; there was no possibility of sending either,
and they were instructed to make the best arrangements they could for their
fleets and armies. T. Otacilius sent envoys to Hiero, the one man whom
Rome could fall back upon, and received in reply as much money as he needed
and a six months' supply of corn. In Sicily the allied cities sent generous
contributions. Even in Rome, too, the scarcity of money was felt and a
measure was carried by M. Minucius, one of the tribunes of the plebs, for
the appointment of three finance commissioners. The men appointed were:
L. Aemilius Papus, who had been consul and censor; M. Atilius Regulus,
who had been twice consul, and L. Scribonius Libo, one of the tribunes
of the plebs. Marcus and Caius Atilius, two brothers, were appointed to
dedicate the temple of Concord which L. Manlius had vowed during his praetorship.
Three new pontiffs were also chosen-Q. Caecilius Metellus, Q. Fabius Maximus,
and Q. Fulvius Flaccus-in the place of P. Scantinius who had died, and
of L. Aemilius Paulus, the consul, and Q. Aelius Paetus, both of whom fell
at Cannae.
23.22
When the senate had done their best-so far as human wisdom could do so-to
make good the losses which Fortune had inflicted in such an uninterrupted
series of disasters, they at last turned their attention to the emptiness
of the Senate-house and the small number of those who attended the national
council. There had been no revision of the roll of the senate since L.
Aemilius and C. Flaminius were censors, though there had been such heavy
losses amongst the senators during the last five years on the field of
battle, as well as from the fatalities and accidents to which all are liable.
In compliance with the unanimous wish, the subject was brought forward
by the praetor, M. Aemilius, in the absence of the Dictator, who after
the loss of Casilinum had rejoined the army. Sp. Carvilius spoke at considerable
length about the dearth of senators, and also the very small number of
citizens from whom senators could be chosen. He went on to say that for
the purpose of filling up the vacancies, and also of strengthening the
union between the Latins and Rome, he should strongly urge that the full
citizenship be granted to two senators out of each Latin city, to be approved
by the senate, and that these men should be chosen into the senate in the
place of those who had died. The senate listened to these proposals with
quite as much impatience as they had previously felt at the demand of the
Latins. A murmur of indignation went through the House. T. Manlius in particular
was heard asserting that there was even still one man of the stock to which
that consul belonged who once in the Capitol threatened that he would kill
with his own hand any Latin whom he saw sitting in the senate. Q. Fabius
Maximus declared that no proposal had ever been mooted in the senate at
a more inopportune time than this; it had been thrown out at a moment when
the sympathies of their allies were wavering and their loyalty doubtful,
and it would make them more restless than ever; those rash inconsiderate
words uttered by one man ought to be stifled by the silence of all men.
Whatever secret or sacred matter had at any time imposed silence on that
House, this most of all must be concealed, buried, forgotten, considered
as never having been uttered. All further allusion to the subject was accordingly
suppressed. It was ultimately decided to nominate as Dictator a man who
had been censor before, and was the oldest man living who had held that
office, in order that the roll of senators might be revised. C. Terentius
was recalled to nominate the Dictator. Leaving a garrison in Apulia he
returned to Rome by forced marches, and the night after his arrival nominated,
in accordance with ancient custom M. Fabius Buteo to act as Dictator for
six months without any Master of the Horse.
23.23
Accompanied by his lictors, Fabius mounted the rostra and made the following
speech: "I do not approve of there being two Dictators at the same time,
a thing wholly unprecedented, nor of there being a Dictator without a Master
of the Horse, nor of the censorial powers being entrusted to one individual
and that for the second time, nor of the supreme authority being placed
in the hands of a Dictator for six months unless he has been created to
wield executive powers. These irregularities may perhaps be necessary at
this juncture, but I shall fix a limit to them. I shall not remove from
the roll any of those whom C. Flaminius and L. Aemilius, the last censors,
placed on it, I shall simply order their names to be transcribed and read
out, as I do not choose to allow the power of judging and deciding upon
the reputation or character of a senator to rest with any single individual.
I shall fill up the places of those who are dead in such a way as to make
it clear that preference is given to rank and not to persons." After the
names of the old senate had been read out, Fabius began his selection.
The first chosen were men who, subsequent to the censorship of L. Aemilius
and C. Flaminius, had filled a curule office, but were not yet in the senate,
and they were taken according to the order of their previous appointments.
They were followed by those who had been aediles, tribunes of the plebs,
or quaestors. Last of all came those who had not held office, but had the
spoils of an enemy set up in their houses or had received a "civic crown."
In this way names were added to the senatorial roll, amidst general approbation.
Having completed his task he at once laid down his Dictatorship and descended
from the rostra as a private citizen. He ordered the lictors to cease their
attendance and mingled with the throng of citizens who were transacting
their private business, deliberately idling his time away in order that
he might not take the people out of the Forum to escort him home. The public
interest in him, however, did not slacken through their having to wait,
and a large crowd escorted him to his house. The following night the consul
made his way back to the army, without letting the senate know, as he did
not want to be detained in the City for the elections.
23.24
The next day the senate, on being consulted by M. Pomponius, the praetor,
passed a decree to write to the Dictator, asking him, if the interests
of the State permitted, to come to Rome to conduct the election of fresh
consuls. He was to bring with him his Master of the Horse and M. Marcellus,
the praetor, so that the senate might learn from them on the spot in what
condition the affairs of the Republic were, and form their plans accordingly.
On receiving the summons they all came, after leaving officers in command
of the legions. The Dictator spoke briefly and modestly about himself;
he gave most of the credit to Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, his Master
of the Horse, and then gave notice of the elections. The consuls elected
were L. Postumius for the third time-he was elected in his absence, as
he was then administering the province of Gaul-and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus,
Master of the Horse, and at that time curule aedile also. Then the praetors
were elected. They were M. Valerius Laevinus, for the second time, Appius
Claudius Pulcher, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, and Q. Mucius Scaevola. After the
various magistrates had been elected the Dictator returned to his army
in winter quarters at Teanum. The Master of the Horse was left in Rome;
as he would be entering upon office in a few days, it was desirable for
him to consult the senate about the enrolment and equipment of the armies
for the year.
While these matters were engrossing attention a fresh disaster was announced,
for Fortune was heaping one disaster upon another this year. It was reported
that L. Postumius, the consul elect, and his army had been annihilated
in Gaul. There was a wild forest called by the Gauls Litana, and through
this the consul was to conduct his army. The Gauls cut through the trees
on both sides of the road in such a way that they remained standing as
long as they were undisturbed, but a slight pressure would make them fall.
Postumius had two Roman legions, and he had also levied a force from the
country bordering on the Upper Sea, sufficiently large to bring the force
with which he entered the hostile territory up to 2s,000 men. The Gauls
had posted themselves round the outskirts of the forest, and as soon as
the Roman army entered they pushed the sawn trees on the outside, these
fell upon those next to them, which were tottering and hardly able to stand
upright, until the whole mass fell in on both sides and buried in one common
ruin arms and men and horses. Hardly ten men escaped, for when most of
them hail been crushed to death by the trunks or broken branches of the
trees, the remainder, panic-struck at the unexpected disaster, were killed
by the Gauls who surrounded the forest. Out of the whole number only very
few were made prisoners, and these, whilst trying to reach a bridge over
the river, were intercepted by the Gauls who had already seized it. It
was there that Postumius fell whilst fighting most desperately to avoid
capture. The Boii stripped the body of its spoils and cut off the head,
and bore them in triumph to the most sacred of their temples. According
to their custom they cleaned out the skull and covered the scalp with beaten
gold; it was then used as a vessel for libations and also as a drinking
cup for the priest and ministers of the temple. The plunder, too, which
the Gauls secured was as great as their victory, for although most of the
animals had been buried beneath the fallen trees, the rest of the booty,
not having been scattered in flight, was found strewn along the whole line
where the army lay.
23.25
When the news of this disaster arrived the whole community was in such
a state of alarm that the shops were shut up and a solitude like that of
night pervaded the City. Under these circumstances the senate instructed
the aediles to make a round of the City and order the citizens to re-open
their shops and lay aside the aspect of public mourning. Ti. Sempronius
then convened the senate, and addressed them in a consolatory and encouraging
tone. "We," he said, "who were not crushed by the overthrow at Cannae must
not lose heart at smaller calamities. If we are successful, as I trust
we shall be, in our operations against Hannibal and the Carthaginians,
we can safely leave the war with the Gauls out of account for the present;
the gods and the Roman people will have it in their power to avenge that
act of treachery. It is with regard to the Carthaginians and the armies
with which the war is to be carried on that we have now to deliberate and
decide." He first gave details as to the strength of infantry and cavalry,
and the proportion in each of Roman and allied troops, which made up the
Dictator's army; Marcellus followed with similar details as to his own
force. Then inquiry was made of those who were acquainted with the facts
as to the strength of the force with C. Terentius Varro in Apulia. No practical
method suggested itself for bringing up the two consular armies to sufficient
strength for such an important war. So in spite of the justifiable resentment
which was generally felt they decided to discontinue the campaign in Gaul
for that year. The Dictator's army was assigned to the consul. It was decided
that those of Marcellus' troops who were involved in the flight from Cannae
should be transported to Sicily to serve there as long as the war continued
in Italy. All the least efficient in the Dictator's army were also to be
removed there, no period of service being fixed in their case, except that
they must each serve out their time. The two legions raised in the City
were allocated to the other consul who should succeed L. Postumius; and
it was arranged that he should be elected as soon as favourable auspices
could be obtained. The two legions in Sicily were to be recalled at the
earliest possible moment, and the consul to whom the legions from the City
had been assigned was to take out of those what men he required. C. Terentius
had his command extended for another year, and no reduction was to be made
in the army with which he was protecting Apulia.
23.26
Whilst these preparations were going on in Italy, the war in Spain was
being carried on with as much energy as ever and, so far, in favour of
the Romans. The two Scipios, Publius and Cnaeus, had divided their forces
between them, Cnaeus was to operate on land and Publius by sea. Hasdrubal,
the Carthaginian commander, did not feel himself strong enough in either
arm, and kept himself safe by taking up strong positions at a distance
from the enemy; until, in response to his many earnest appeals for reinforcements,
4000 infantry and 1000 cavalry were sent to him from Africa. Then, recovering
his confidence, he moved nearer the enemy, and gave orders for the fleet
to be put into readiness to protect the islands and the coast. In the very
middle of his preparations for a fresh campaign he was dismayed by news
of the desertion of the naval captains. After they had been heavily censured
for their cowardice in abandoning the fleet at the Ebro they had never
been very loyal either to their general or to the cause of Carthage. These
deserters had started an agitation amongst the tribe of the Tartesii and
had induced several cities to revolt, and one they had actually taken by
storm. The war was now diverted from the Romans to this tribe, and Hasdrubal
entered their territories with an invading army. Chalbus, a distinguished
general amongst them, was encamped with a strong force before the walls
of a city which he had captured a few days before, and Hasdrubal determined
to attack him. He sent forward skirmishers to draw the enemy into an engagement
and told off a part of his cavalry to lay waste the surrounding country
and pick up stragglers. There was confusion in the camp and panic and bloodshed
in the fields, but when they had regained the camp from all directions
their fears so suddenly left them that they became emboldened, not only
to defend their camp, but even to take the aggressive against the enemy.
They burst in a body out of their camp, executing war dances after their
manner, and this unexpected daring on their part carried terror into the
hearts of the enemy, who had shortly before been challenging them. Hasdrubal
thereupon withdrew his force to a fairly lofty hill, which was also protected
by a river which served as a barrier. He retired his skirmishers and his
scattered cavalry also to this same position. Not, however, feeling sufficiently
protected by either hill or river he strongly entrenched himself. Several
skirmishes took place between the two sides who were alternately frightening
and fearing each other, and the Numidian trooper proved to be no match
for the Spaniard, nor were the darts of the Moor very effective against
the ox-hide shields of the natives, who were quite as rapid in their movements
and possessed more strength and courage.
23.27
When they found that though they rode up to the Carthaginian lines they
could not entice the enemy into action, whilst an attack upon the camp
was a far from easy matter, they successfully assaulted the town of Ascua,
where Hasdrubal had stored his corn and other supplies on entering their
territories, and became masters of all the country round. Now there was
no longer any discipline amongst them, whether on the march or in camp.
Hasdrubal soon became aware of this, and seeing that success had made them
careless, he urged his men to attack them whilst they were scattered away
from their standards; he himself meanwhile descended from the hill and
marched with his men in attack formation straight to their camp. News of
his approach was brought by men rushing in from the look-out stations and
outposts and there was a general call to arms. As each man seized his weapons
he hurried with the others into battle, without order or formation, or
word of command or standards. The foremost of them were already engaged,
whilst others were still running up in small groups and some had not yet
left the camp. Their reckless daring, however, at first checked the enemy,
but soon, finding that whilst loose and scattered themselves, they were
charging an enemy in close formation, and that their scanty numbers imperilled
their safety, they looked round at one another, and as they were being
repulsed in every direction they formed a square. Standing close together
with their shields touching they were gradually driven into such a close
mass that they had hardly room to use their weapons, and for a great part
of the day were simply cut down by the enemy who completely surrounded
them. A very few cut their way out and made for the woods and hills. The
camp was abandoned in the same panic and the whole tribe made their surrender
the following day. But they did not remain quiet long, for just after this
battle an order was received from Carthage for Hasdrubal to lead his army
as soon as he could into Italy. This became generally known throughout
Spain and the result was that there was a universal feeling in favour of
Rome. Hasdrubal at once sent a despatch to Carthage pointing out what mischief
the mere rumour of his departure had caused, and also that if he did really
leave Spain it would pass into the hands of the Romans before he crossed
the Ebro. He went on to say that not only had he neither a force nor a
general to leave in his place, but the Roman generals were men whom he
found it difficult to oppose even when his strength was equal to theirs.
If, therefore, they were at all anxious to retain Spain they should send
a man with a powerful army to succeed him, and even though all went well
with his successor he would not find it an easy province to govern.
23.28
Although this despatch made a great impression on the senate, they decided
that as Italy demanded their first and closest attention, the arrangements
about Hannibal and his forces must not be altered. Himilco was sent with
a large and well-appointed army and an augmented fleet to hold and defend
Spain by sea and land. As soon as he had brought his military and naval
forces across he formed an entrenched camp, hauled his ships up on the
beach and surrounded them with a rampart. After providing for the safety
of his force he started with a picked body of cavalry, and marching as
rapidly as possible, and being equally on the alert whether passing through
doubtful or through hostile tribes, succeeded in reaching Hasdrubal. After
laying before him the resolutions and instructions of the senate and being
in his turn shown in what way the war was to be managed in Spain, he returned
to his camp. He owed his safety most of all to the speed at which he travelled,
for he had got clear of each tribe before they had time for any united
action. Before Hasdrubal commenced his march, he levied contributions on
all the tribes under his rule, for he was quite aware that Hannibal had
secured a passage through some tribes by paying for it, and had obtained
his Gaulish auxiliaries simply by hiring them. To commence such a march
without money would hardly bring him to the Alps. The contributions were
therefore hurriedly called in and after receiving them he marched down
to the Ebro. When the resolutions of the Carthaginians and Hasdrubal's
march were reported to the Roman generals, the two Scipios at once put
aside all other matters and made preparations to meet him at the outset
with their joint forces and stop his further progress. They believed that
if Hannibal, who single-handed was almost too much for Italy, were joined
by such a general as Hasdrubal and his Spanish army it would mean the end
of the Roman empire. With so much to make them anxious they concentrated
their forces at the Ebro and crossed the river. They deliberated for some
considerable time as to whether they should meet him, army against army,
or whether it would be enough for them to hinder his proposed march by
attacking the tribes in alliance with the Carthaginians. The latter plan
seemed the best, and they made preparations for attacking a city which
from its proximity to the river was called Hibera, the wealthiest city
in that country. As soon as Hasdrubal became aware of this, instead of
going to the assistance of his allies he proceeded to attack a city which
had recently put itself under the protection of Rome. On this the Romans
abandoned the siege which they had begun and turned their arms against
Hasdrubal himself.
23.29
For some days they remained encamped at a distance of about five miles
from each other, and though frequent skirmishes took place there was no
general action. At last on the same day, as though by previous agreement,
the signal was given on both sides and they descended with their entire
forces on to the plain. The Roman line was in three divisions. Some of
the light infantry were posted between the leading ranks of the legions,
the rest amongst those behind; the cavalry closed the wings. Hasdrubal
strengthened his centre with his Spaniards, on the right wing he posted
the Carthaginians, on the left the Africans and the mercenaries, the Numidian
horse he stationed in front of the Carthaginian infantry, and the rest
of the cavalry in front of the Africans. Not all the Numidian horse, however,
were on the right wing, but only those who were trained to manage two horses
at the same time like circus-riders and, when the battle was at the hottest,
were in the habit of jumping off the wearied horse on to the fresh one,
such were the agility of the riders and the docility of the horses.
These were the dispositions on each side, and whilst the two armies
were standing ready to engage, their commanders felt almost equally confident
of victory, for neither side was much superior to the other either in the
numbers or the quality of the troops. With the men themselves it was far
otherwise. Though the Romans were fighting far away from their homes their
generals had no difficulty in making them realise that they were fighting
for Italy and for Rome. They knew that it hung upon the issue of that fight
whether they were to see their homes again or not, and they resolutely
determined either to conquer or to die. The other army possessed nothing
like the same determination, for they were most of them natives of Spain
and would rather be defeated in Spain than win the victory and be dragged
to Italy. At the first onset, almost before they had hurled their javelins,
the centre gave ground, and when the Romans came on in a tremendous charge
they turned and fled. The brunt of the fighting now fell upon the wings;
the Carthaginians pressed forward on the right, the Africans on the left,
and slowly wheeling round attacked the advancing Roman infantry on both
flanks. But the whole force had now concentrated on the centre, and forming
front in both directions beat back the attack on their flanks. So two separate
actions were going on. The Romans, having already repulsed Hasdrubal's
centre, and having the advantage as regarded both the numbers and the strength
of their men, proved themselves undoubtedly superior on both fronts. A
very large number of the enemy fell in these two attacks, and had not their
centre taken to hasty flight almost before the battle began, very few would
have survived out of their whole army. The cavalry took no part whatever
in the fighting, for no sooner did the Moors and Numidians see the centre
of the line giving way than they fled precipitately, leaving the wings
exposed, and even driving the elephants before them. Hasdrubal waited to
see the final issue of the battle and then escaped out of the slaughter
with a few followers. The camp was seized and plundered by the Romans.
This battle secured for Rome all the tribes who were wavering and deprived
Hasdrubal of all hopes of taking his army to Italy or even of remaining
with anything like safety in Spain. When the contents of the despatch from
the Scipios was made known in Rome, the gratification felt was not so much
on account of the victory as that Hasdrubal's march into Italy was at an
end.
23.30
During these incidents in Spain, Petelia in Bruttium was taken by Himilco,
one of Hannibal's lieutenants, after a siege which lasted several months.
That victory cost the Carthaginians heavy losses in both killed and wounded,
for the defenders only yielded after they had been starved out. They had
consumed all their corn and eaten every kind of animal whether ordinarily
used as food or not, and at last kept themselves alive by eating leather
and grass and roots and the soft bark of trees and leaves picked from shrubs.
It was not until they had no longer strength to stand on the walls or to
bear the weight of their armour that they were subdued. After the capture
of Petelia the Carthaginian marched his army to Consentia. The defence
here was less obstinate and the place surrendered in a few days. About
the same time an army of Bruttians invested the Greek city of Croton. At
one time this city had been a military power, but it had been overtaken
by so many and such serious reverses that its whole population was now
reduced to less than 2000 souls. The enemy found no difficulty in gaining
possession of a city so denuded of defenders; the citadel alone was held,
after some had sought refuge there from the massacre and confusion which
followed the capture of the city. Locri also went over to the Bruttians
and Carthaginians after the aristocracy of the city had betrayed the populace.
The people of Rhegium alone in all that country remained loyal to the Romans
and kept their independence to the end.
The same change of feeling extended to Sicily and even the house of
Hiero did not altogether shrink from deserting Rome. Gelo, the eldest son
of the family, treating with equal contempt his aged father and the alliance
with Rome, after the defeat of Cannae, went over to the Carthaginians.
He was arming the natives and making friendly overtures to the cities in
alliance with Rome and would have brought about a revolution in Sicily
had he not been removed by the hand of death, a death so opportune that
it cast suspicion even on his father. Such were the serious occurrences
in Italy, Africa, Sicily, and Spain during the year (216 B.C.). Towards
the close of the year Q. Fabius Maximus asked the senate to allow him to
dedicate the temple of Venus Erycina which he had vowed when Dictator.
The senate passed a decree that Tiberius Sempronius the consul-elect should
immediately upon his entering office propose a resolution to the people
that Q. Fabius be one of the two commissioners appointed to dedicate the
temple. After the death of M. Aemilius Lepidus, who had been augur and
twice consul, his three sons, Lucius, Marcus, and Quintus, celebrated funeral
games in his honour for three days and exhibited twenty-two pairs of gladiators
in the Forum. The curule aediles, C. Laetorius and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus,
consul elect, who during his aedileship had been Master of the Horse, celebrated
the Roman Games; the celebration lasted three days. The Plebeian Games
given by the aediles Marcus Aurelius Cotta and Marcus Claudius Marcellus
were solemnised three times. The third year of the Punic war had run its
course when Ti. Sempronius entered on his consulship on March 15. The praetors
were Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who had been previously censor and twice consul,
and M. Valerius Laevinus; the former exercised jurisdiction over citizens,
the latter over foreigners. App. Claudius Pulcher had the province of Sicily
allotted to him, Q. Mucius Scaevola that of Sardinia. The people made an
order investing M. Marcellus with the powers of a proconsul, because he
was the only one out of the Roman commanders who had gained any successes
in Italy since the disaster at Cannae.
23.31
The first day the senate met for business at the Capitol they passed a
decree that the war-tax for that year should be doubled, and that half
the whole amount should be collected at once to furnish pay for all the
soldiers, except those who had been present at Cannae. As regarded the
armies they decreed that Ti. Sempronius should fix a day on which the two
City legions were to muster at Cales, and that they should march from there
to Claudius' camp above Suessula. The legions there, mostly made up from
the army which fought at Cannae, were to be transferred by App. Claudius
Pulcher to Sicily and the legions in Sicily were to be brought to Rome.
M. Claudius Marcellus was sent to take command of the army which had been
ordered to assemble at Cales and he received orders to conduct it to Claudius'
camp. Ti. Maecilius Croto was sent by App. Claudius to take over the old
army and conduct it to Sicily. At first people waited in silent expectation
for the consul to hold an Assembly for the election of a colleague, but
when they saw that M. Marcellus, whom they particularly wished to have
as consul this year after his brilliant success as praetor, was kept out
of the way, murmurs began to be heard in the Senate-house. When the consul
became aware of this he said, "It is to the interest of the State, senators,
that M. Claudius has gone into Campania to effect the exchange of armies,
and it is equally to the interest of the State that notice of election
should not be given until he has discharged the commission entrusted to
him and returned home, so that you may have for your consul the man whom
the circumstances of the republic call for and whom you most of all wish
for." After this nothing more was said about the election till Marcellus
returned.
Meanwhile the two commissioners were appointed for the dedication of
temples: T. Otacilius Crassus dedicated the temple to Mens, Q. Fabius Maximus
the one to Venus Erycina. Both are on the Capitol, separated only by a
water channel. In the case of the three hundred Campanian knights, who
after loyally serving their time in Sicily had now come to Rome, a proposal
was made to the people that they should receive the full rights of Roman
citizenship and should be entered on the roll of the burghers of Cumae,
reckoning from the day previous to the revolt of the Campanians from Rome.
The main reason for this proposal was their declaration that they did not
know to what people they belonged, as they had abandoned their old country
and had not yet been admitted as citizens into that to which they had returned.
On Marcellus' return from the army notice was given of the election of
a consul in the place of L. Postumius. Marcellus was elected by a quite
unanimous vote in order that he might take up his magistracy at once. Whilst
he was assuming the duties of the consulship thunder was heard; the augurs
were summoned and gave it as their opinion that there was some informality
in his election. The patricians spread a report that as that was the first
time that two plebeian consuls were elected together, the gods were showing
their displeasure. Marcellus resigned his office and Q. Fabius Maximus
was appointed in his place; this was his third consulship. This year the
sea appeared to be on fire; at Sinuessa a cow brought forth a colt; the
statues in the temple of Juno Sospita at Lanuvium sweated blood and a shower
of stones fell round the temple. For this portent there were the usual
nine days' religious observances; the other portents were duly expiated.
23.32
The consuls divided the armies between them; the army at Teanum which M.
Junius the Dictator had been commanding passed to Fabius, Sempronius took
command of the volunteer slaves there and 25,000 troops furnished by the
allies; the legions which had returned from Sicily were assigned to M.
Valerius the praetor; M. Claudius was sent to the army which was in camp
above Suessa to protect Nola; the praetors went to their respective provinces
in Sicily and Sardinia. The consuls issued a notice that whenever the senate
was summoned the senators and all who had the right of speaking in the
senate should meet at the Capena gate. The praetors whose duty it was to
hear cases set up their tribunals near the public bathing place and ordered
all litigants to answer to their recognisances at that place, and there
they administered justice during the year. In the meanwhile the news was
brought to Carthage that things had gone badly in Spain and that almost
all the communities in that country had gone over to Rome. Mago, Hannibal's
brother, was preparing to transport to Italy a force of 12,000 infantry,
1500 cavalry, and 20 elephants, escorted by a fleet of 60 warships. On
the receipt of this news, however, some were in favour of Mago, with such
a fleet and army as he had, going to Spain instead of Italy, but whilst
they were deliberating there was a sudden gleam of hope that Sardinia might
be recovered. They were told that "there was only a small Roman army there,
the old praetor, A. Cornelius, who knew the province well, was leaving
and a fresh one was expected; the Sardinians, too, were tired of their
long subjection, and during the last twelve months the government had been
harsh and rapacious and had crushed them with a heavy tax and an unfair
exaction of corn. Nothing was wanting but a leader to head their revolt.
"This report was brought by some secret agents from their leaders, the
prime mover in the matter being Hampsicora, the most influential and wealthy
man amongst them at that time. Perturbed by the news from Spain, and at
the same time elated by the Sardinian report, they sent Mago with his fleet
and army to Spain and selected Hasdrubal to conduct the operations in Sardinia,
assigning to him a force about as large as the one they had furnished to
Mago.
After they had transacted all the necessary business in Rome the consuls
began to prepare for war. Ti. Sempronius gave his soldiers notice of the
date when they were to assemble at Sinuessa, and Q. Fabius, after previously
consulting the senate, issued a proclamation warning every one to convey
the corn from their fields into the fortified cities by the first day of
the following June, all those who failed to do so would have their land
laid waste, their farms burnt, and they themselves would be sold into slavery.
Even the praetors who had been appointed to administer the law were not
exempted from military duties. It was decided that Valerius should be sent
to Apulia to take over the army from Terentius: when the legions came from
Sicily he was to employ them mainly for the defence of that district and
send the army of Terentius under one of his lieutenants to Tarentum. A
fleet of twenty-five vessels was also supplied him for the protection of
the coast between Brundisium and Tarentum. A fleet of equal strength was
assigned to Q. Fulvius, the praetor in charge of the City, for the defence
of the coast near Rome. C. Terentius, as proconsul, was commissioned to
raise a force in the territory of Picenum to defend that part of the country.
Lastly, T. Otacilius Crassus was despatched to Sicily, after he had dedicated
the temple of Mens, with full powers as propraetor to take command of the
fleet.
23.33
This struggle between the most powerful nations in the world was attracting
the attention of all men, kings and peoples alike, and especially of Philip,
the King of Macedon, as he was comparatively near to Italy, separated from
it only by the Ionian Sea. When he first heard the rumour of Hannibal's
passage of the Alps, delighted as he was at the outbreak of war between
Rome and Carthage, he was still undecided, till their relative strength
had been tested, which of the two he would prefer to have the victory.
But after the third battle had been fought and the victory rested with
the Carthaginians for the third time, he inclined to the side which Fortune
favoured and sent ambassadors to Hannibal. Avoiding the ports of Brundisium
and Tarentum which were guarded by Roman ships, they landed near the temple
of Juno Lacinia. Whilst traversing Apulia on their way to Capua they fell
into the midst of the Roman troops who were defending the district, and
were conducted to Valerius Laevinus, the praetor, who was encamped near
Luceria. Xenophanes, the head of the legation, explained, without the slightest
fear or hesitation, that he had been sent by the king to form a league
of friendship with Rome, and that he was conveying his instructions to
the consuls and senate and people. Amidst the defection of so many old
allies, the praetor was delighted beyond measure at the prospect of a new
alliance with so illustrious a monarch, and gave his enemies a most hospitable
reception. He assigned them an escort, and pointed out carefully what route
they should take, what places and passes were held by the Romans and what
by the enemy. Xenophanes passed through the Roman troops into Campania
and thence by the nearest route reached Hannibal's camp. He made a treaty
of friendship with him on these terms: King Philip was to sail to Italy
with as large a fleet as possible-he was, it appears, intending to fit
out two hundred ships-and ravage the coast, and carry on war by land and
sea to the utmost of his power; when the war was over the whole of Italy,
including Rome itself, was to be the possession of the Carthaginians and
Hannibal, and all the plunder was to go to Hannibal; when the Carthaginians
had thoroughly subdued Italy they were to sail to Greece and make war upon
such nations as the king wished; the cities on the mainland and the islands
lying off Macedonia were to form part of Philip's kingdom.
23.34
These were, in effect, the terms on which the treaty was concluded between
the Carthaginian general and the King of Macedon. On their return the envoys
were accompanied by commissioners sent by Hannibal to obtain the king's
ratification of the treaty: they were Gisgo, Bostar, and Mago. They reached
the spot near the temple of Juno Lacinia, where they had left their ship
moored in a hidden creek, and set sail for Greece. When they were out to
sea they were descried by the Roman fleet which was guarding the Calabrian
coast. Valerius Flaccus sent some light boats to chase and bring back the
strange vessel. At first the king's men attempted flight, but finding that
they were being overhauled they surrendered to the Romans. When they were
brought before the admiral of the fleet he questioned them as to who they
were, where they had come from, and whither they were sailing. Xenophanes,
who had so far been very lucky, began to make up a tale; he said that he
had been sent by Philip to Rome and had succeeded in reaching M. Valerius,
as he was the only person he could get to safely; he had not been able
to go through Campania as it was beset by the enemy's troops. Then the
Carthaginian dress and manner of Hannibal's agents aroused suspicion, and
on being questioned their speech betrayed them. Their comrades were at
once taken aside and terrified by threats, a letter from Hannibal to Philip
was discovered, and also the articles of agreement between the King of
Macedon and the Carthaginian general. When the investigation was completed,
it seemed best to carry the prisoners and their companions as soon as possible
to the senate at Rome or to the consuls, wherever they were. Five of the
swiftest ships were selected for the purpose and L. Valerius Antias was
placed in charge of the expedition with instructions to distribute the
envoys amongst the ships under guard and to be careful that no conversation
was allowed amongst them or any communication of plans.
During this time A. Cornelius Mammula on leaving his province made a
report on the condition of Sardinia. All, he said, were contemplating war
and revolt; Q. Mucius, who had succeeded him, had been affected by the
unhealthy climate and impure water and had fallen into an illness which
was tedious rather than dangerous, and would make him for some considerable
time unfit to bear the responsibilities of war. The army, too, which was
quartered there, though strong enough for the occupation of a peaceable
province, was quite inadequate for the war which seemed likely to break
out. The senate made a decree that Q. Fulvius Flaccus should raise a force
of 5000 infantry and 400 cavalry and arrange for its immediate transport
to Sardinia, and further that he should send whom he considered the most
suitable man, invested with full powers, to conduct operations until Mucius
recovered his health. He selected T. Manlius Torquatus, who had been twice
consul as well as censor, and during his consulship had subdued the Sardinians.
About the same time a Carthaginian fleet which had been despatched to Sardinia
under the command of Hasdrubul, surnamed "the Bald," was caught in a storm
and driven on the Balearic Isles. So much damage was caused, not only to
the rigging but also to the hulls, that the vessels were hauled ashore
and a considerable time was spent in repairing them.
23.35
In Italy the war had been less vigorously conducted since the battle of
Cannae; for the strength of the one side was broken and the temper of the
other enervated. Under these circumstances the Campanians made an attempt
by themselves to become masters of Cumae. They first tried persuasion,
but as they could not succeed in inducing them to revolt from Rome, they
decided to employ stratagem. All the Campanians held a sacrificial service
at stated intervals at Hamae. They informed the Cumans that the Campanian
senate was going there, and they asked the Cuman senate also to be present
in order to come to a common understanding, so that both peoples might
have the same allies and the same enemies. They also promised that they
would have an armed force there, to guard against any danger from either
Romans or Carthaginians. Although the Cumans suspected a plot, they made
no difficulty about going, for they thought that by thus consenting they
would be able to conceal a maneuver of their own. The consul Tiberius Sempronius
had in the meanwhile purified his army at Sinuessa, the appointed rendezvous,
and after crossing the Vulturnus pitched his camp near Liternum. As there
was nothing for them to do in camp, he put his men through frequent war
maneuvers to accustom the recruits, most of whom were volunteer slaves,
to follow the standards and know their places in the ranks when in action.
In carrying out these exercises, the general's main object-and he had given
similar instructions to the officers-was that there should be no class-feeling
in the ranks, through the slaves being twitted with their former condition;
the old soldiers were to regard themselves as on a perfect equality with
the recruits, the free men with the slaves; all to whom Rome had entrusted
her standards and her arms were to be regarded as equally honourable, equally
well-born; Fortune had compelled them to adopt this state of things, and
now that it was adopted she compelled them to acquiesce to it. The soldiers
were quite as anxious to obey these instructions as the officers were to
enforce them, and in a short time the men had become so fused together
that it was almost forgotten what condition of life each man had been in
before he became a soldier.
While Gracchus was thus occupied messengers from Cumae informed him
of the proposals made by the Campanians a few days previously and of their
reply, and that the festival was to be held in three days' time, when not
only the whole senate would be there but also the Campanian army in camp.
Gracchus gave the Cumans orders to remove everything from their fields
into the city and to remain within their walls, whilst he himself moved
his camp to Cumae the day before the Campanians were to perform their sacrifice.
Hamae was about three miles distant. The Campanians had already, as arranged,
assembled there in large numbers and not far away Marius Alfius, the "Medixtuticus"
(the chief magistrate of the Campanians), was secretly encamped with 14,000
troops, but he was more intent on making preparations for the sacrifice
and the stratagem he was to execute during its performance than on fortifying
his camp or any other military duty. The ceremonial took place at night
and was over by midnight. Gracchus thought this the best time for his purpose,
and after stationing guards at the camp gate to prevent any one from conveying
information of his design, he ordered his men to refresh themselves and
get what sleep they could at four o'clock in the afternoon so that they
might be ready to assemble round the standards as soon as it was dark.
About the first watch he ordered the advance to be made and the army marched
in silence to Hamae, which they reached at midnight. The Campanian camp,
as might be expected during a nocturnal festival, was negligently guarded,
and he made a simultaneous attack on all sides of it. Some were slain whilst
stretched in slumber, others whilst returning unarmed after the ceremony.
In the confusion and terror of the night more than 2000 men were killed,
including their general, Marius Alfius, and 34 standards seized.
23.36
After getting possession of the enemies' camp with a loss of less than
100 men, Gracchus speedily retired, fearing an attack from Hannibal, who
had his camp at Tifata, overlooking Capua. Nor were his anticipations groundless.
No sooner had the news of the disaster reached Capua than Hannibal, expecting
to find at Hamae an army, composed mostly of raw recruits and slaves, wildly
delighted at their victory, despoiling their vanquished foes and carrying
off the plunder, hurried on with all speed past Capua, and ordered all
the Campanian fugitives he met to be escorted to Capua and the wounded
to be carried there in wagons. But when he got to Hamae he found the camp
abandoned, nothing was to be seen but the traces of the recent slaughter
and the bodies of his allies lying about everywhere. Some advised him to
march straight to Cumae and attack the place. Nothing would have suited
his wishes better for, after his failure to secure Neapolis, he was very
anxious to get possession of Cumae that he might have one maritime city
at all events. As, however, his soldiers in their hurried march had brought
nothing with them beyond their arms he returned to his camp on Tifata.
The next day, yielding to the importunities of the Campanians, he marched
back to Cumae with all the necessary appliances for attacking the city,
and after effectually devastating the neighbourhood, fixed his camp at
the distance of one mile from the place. Gracchus still remained in occupation
of Cumae, more because he was ashamed to desert the allies who were imploring
his protection and that of the Roman people than because he felt sufficiently
assured as to his army. The other consul, Fabius, who was encamped at Cales,
did not venture to cross the Vulturnus; his attention was occupied first
with taking fresh auspices and then with the portents which were being
announced one after another, and which the soothsayers assured him would
be very difficult to avert.
23.37
Whilst these causes kept Fabius from moving, Sempronius was invested, and
the siege works were now actually in operation. A huge wooden tower on
wheels had been brought up against the walls and the Roman consul constructed
another still higher upon the wall itself, which was fairly high and which
served as a platform, after he had placed stout beams across. The besieged
garrison protected the walls of the city by hurling stones and sharpened
stakes and other missiles from their tower; at last when they saw the other
tower brought up to the walls they flung blazing brands over it and caused
a large fire. Terrified by the conflagration the crowd of soldiers in it
flung themselves down and at the same moment a sortie was made from two
of the gates, the outposts of the enemy were overpowered and driven in
flight to their camp, so that for that day the Carthaginians were more
like a besieged than a besieging force. As many as 1300 Carthaginians were
killed and 59 taken prisoners who had been surprised while standing careless
and unconcerned round the walls or at the outposts, and least of all fearing
a sortie. Before the enemy had time to recover from their panic Gracchus
gave the signal to retire and withdrew with his men inside the walls. The
following day, Hannibal, expecting that the consul, elated with his success,
would be prepared to fight a regular battle, formed his line on the ground
between his camp and the city; when, however, he saw that not a single
man moved from his usual post of defence and that no risks were being taken
through rash confidence, he returned to Tifata without accomplishing anything.
Just at the time when the siege of Cumae was raised Ti. Sempronius, surnamed
"Longus," fought a successful action with the Carthaginian Hanno at Grumentum
in Lucania. Over 2000 were killed, 280 men and 41 military standards were
captured. Driven out of Lucania, Hanno retreated to Bruttium. Amongst the
Hirpini, also, three towns which had revolted from Rome, Vercellium, Vescellium,
and Sicilinum, were retaken by the praetor M. Valerius, and the authors
of the revolt beheaded. Over 5000 prisoners were sold, the rest of the
booty was presented to the soldiers, and the army marched back to Luceria.
23.38
During these incidents amongst the Lucanians and Hirpini, the five ships
which were carrying the Macedonian and Carthaginian agents to Rome, after
sailing almost round the whole of Italy in their passage from the upper
to the lower sea were off Cumae, when Gracchus, uncertain whether they
belonged to friends or foes, sent vessels from his own fleet to intercept
them. After mutual questionings those on board learnt that the consul was
at Cumae. The vessels accordingly were brought into the harbour and the
prisoners were brought before the consul and the letters placed in his
hands. He read the letters of Philip and Hannibal through and sent everything
under seal by land to the senate, the agents he ordered to be taken by
sea. The letters and the agents both reached Rome the same day, and when
it was ascertained that what the agents said in their examination agreed
with the letters, the senate were filled with very gloomy apprehensions.
They recognised what a heavy burden a war with Macedon would impose upon
them at a time when it was all they could do to bear the weight of the
Punic war. They did not, however, so far give way to despondency as not
to enter at once upon a discussion as to how they could divert the enemy
from Italy by themselves commencing hostilities against him. Orders were
given for the agents to be kept in chains and their companions to be sold
as slaves; they also decided to equip twenty vessels in addition to the
twenty-five which P. Valerius Flaccus already had under his command. After
these had been fitted out and launched, the five ships which had carried
the agents were added and thirty vessels left Ostia for Tarentum. Publius
Valerius was instructed to place on board the soldiers which had belonged
to Varro's army and which were now at Tarentum under the command of L.
Apustius, and with his combined fleet of fifty-five vessels he was not
only to protect the coast of Italy but try to obtain information about
the hostile attitude of Macedon. If Philip's designs should prove to correspond
to the captured despatches and the statements of the agents, he was to
write to Marcus Valerius, the praetor, to that effect and then, after placing
his army under the command of L. Apustius, go to the fleet at Tarentum
and sail across to Macedonia at the first opportunity and do his utmost
to confine Philip within his own dominions. A decree was made that the
money which had been sent to Appius Claudius in Sicily to be returned to
King Hiero should now be devoted to the maintenance of the fleet and the
expenses of the Macedonian war, and it was conveyed to Tarentum through
L. Antistius. Two hundred thousand modii of wheat and barley were sent
at the same time by King Hiero.
23.39
While these various steps were being taken, one of the captured ships which
were on their way to Rome escaped during the voyage to Philip, and he then
learnt that his agents had been captured together with his despatches.
As he did not know what understanding they had come to with Hannibal, or
what proposals Hannibal's agents were bringing to him, he despatched a
second embassy with the same instructions. Their names were Heraclitus,
surnamed Scotinus, Crito of Boeotia, and Sositheus the Magnesian. They
accomplished their mission successfully, but the summer passed away before
the king could attempt any active measures. So important was the seizure
of that one ship with the king's agents on board in delaying the outbreak
of the war which now threatened Rome! Fabius at last succeeded in expiating
the portents and crossed the Vulturnus; both consuls now resumed the campaign
round Capua. Combulteria, Trebula, and Austicula, all of which had revolted
to Hannibal, were successfully attacked by Fabius, and the garrisons which
Hannibal had placed in them as well as a large number of Campanians were
made prisoners. At Nola, the senate were on the side of the Romans, as
they had been the year before, and the populace, who were on the side of
Hannibal, were hatching secret plots for the murder of the aristocrats
and the betrayal of the city. To prevent them from carrying out their intentions
Fabius marched between Capua and Hannibal's camp on Tifata and established
himself in Claudius' camp overlooking Suessula. From there he sent M. Marcellus,
who was propraetor, with the force under his command to occupy Nola.
23.40
The active operations in Sardinia which had been dropped owing to the serious
illness of Q. Mucius were resumed under the direction of T. Manlius. He
hauled ashore his war-ships and furnished the seamen and rowers with arms,
so that they might be available for service on land; with these and the
army he had taken over from the praetor he made up a force of 22,000 infantry
and 1200 cavalry. With this combined force he invaded the hostile territory
and fixed his camp at no great distance from Hampsicora's lines. Hampsicora
himself happened to be absent; he had paid a visit to the Pelliti-Sardinians
in order to arm the younger men amongst them so as to increase his own
strength. His son Hostus was in command and in the impetuosity of youth
he rashly offered battle, with the result that he was defeated and put
to flight. 3000 Sardinians were killed in that battle and 800 taken alive;
the rest of the army after wandering in their flight through fields and
woods heard that their general had fled to a place called Cornus, the chief
town of the district, and thither they directed their flight. That battle
would have finished the war had not the Carthaginian fleet under Hasdrubal,
which had been driven by a storm down to the Balearic Isles, arrived in
time to revive their hopes of renewing the war. When Manlius heard of its
arrival he retired upon Carales, and this gave Hampsicora an opportunity
of forming a junction with the Carthaginian. Hasdrubal disembarked his
force and sent the ships back to Carthage, and then, under Hampsicora's
guidance, proceeded to harry and waste the land belonging to the allies
of Rome. He would have gone as far as Carales if Manlius had not met him
with his army and checked his widespread ravages. At first the two camps
faced each other, with only a small space between; then small sorties and
skirmishes took place with varying results; at last it came to a battle,
a regular action, which lasted for four hours. For a long time the Carthaginians
made the issue doubtful, the Sardinians, who were accustomed to defeat,
being easily beaten, but at last when they saw the whole field covered
with dead and flying Sardinians they too gave way, but when they turned
to flee the Roman wing which had routed the Sardinians wheeled round and
hemmed them in. Then it was more of a massacre than a battle. 12,000 of
the enemy, Sardinians and Carthaginians, were slain, about 3700 were made
prisoners, and 27 military standards were captured.
23.41
What more than anything else made the battle glorious and memorable was
the capture of the commander-in-chief, Hasdrubal, and also of Hanno and
Mago, two Carthaginian nobles. Mago was a member of the house of Barca,
a near relative of Hannibal; Hanno had taken the lead in the Sardinian
revolt and was unquestionably the chief instigator of the war. The battle
was no less famous for the fate which overtook the Sardinian generals;
Hampsicora's son, Hostus, fell on the field, and when Hampsicora, who was
fleeing from the carnage with a few horsemen, heard of his son's death,
he was so crushed by the tidings, coming as it did on the top of all the
other disasters, that in the dead of night, when none could hinder his
purpose, he slew himself with his own hand. The rest of the fugitives found
shelter as they had done before in Cornus, but Manlius leading his victorious
troops against it effected its capture in a few days. On this the other
cities which had espoused the cause of Hampsicora and the Carthaginians
gave hostages and surrendered to him. He imposed upon each of them a tribute
of money and corn; the amount was proportioned to their resources and also
to the share they had taken in the revolt. After this he returned to Carales.
There the ships which had been hauled ashore were launched, the troops
he had brought with him were re-embarked, and he sailed for Rome. On his
arrival he reported to the senate the complete subjugation of Sardinia,
and made over the money to the quaestors, the corn to the aediles, and
the prisoners to Q. Fulvius, the praetor.
During this time T. Otacilius had crossed with his fleet from Lilybaeum
to the coast of Africa and was ravaging the territory of Carthage, when
rumours came to him that Hasdrubal had recently sailed from the Balearic
Isles to Sardinia. He set sail for that island and fell in with the Carthaginian
fleet returning to Africa. A brief action followed on the high seas in
which Otacilius took seven ships with their crews. The rest dispersed in
a panic far and wide, as though they had been scattered by a storm. It
so happened at this time that Bomilcar arrived at Locri with reinforcements
of men and elephants and also with supplies. Appius Claudius intended to
surprise him, and with this view he led his army hurriedly to Messana as
though he were going to make a circuit of the province, and finding the
wind and tide favourable, crossed over to Locri. Bomilcar had already left
to join Hanno in Bruttium and the Locrians shut their gates against the
Romans; Appius after all his efforts achieved no results and returned to
Messana. This same summer Marcellus made frequent excursions from Nola,
which he was holding with a garrison, into the territory of the Hirpini
and in the neighbourhood of Samnite Caudium. Such utter devastation did
he spread everywhere with fire and sword that he revived throughout Samnium
the memory of her ancient disasters.
23.42
Both nations sent envoys simultaneously to Hannibal, who addressed him
thus: "We have been the enemies of Rome, Hannibal, from very early times.
At first we fought her in our own might as long as our arms, our strength,
sufficed to protect us. When we could trust them no more we took our place
by the side of King Pyrrhus; when we were abandoned by him we were compelled
to accept terms of peace and by those terms we stood for almost fifty years,
down to the time of your arrival in Italy. It was your conspicuous courtesy
and kindness towards our fellow-countrymen who were your prisoners and
whom you sent back to us, quite as much as your courage and success, which
have so won our hearts that as long as you, our friend, are safe and prosperous
we should not fear-I do not say the Romans, but-even the wrath of heaven,
if I may say so without irreverence. But, good heavens! while you are not
only safe and victorious but actually here amongst us, when you could almost
hear the shrieks of our wives and children and see our blazing houses,
we have suffered such repeated devastations this summer that it would seem
as if M. Marcellus and not Hannibal had been the victor at Cannae, and
as if the Romans had good cause to boast that you have only strength enough
for one blow, and that like a bee that has left its sting you are now inert
and powerless. For a hundred years we have been at war with Rome and no
general, no army from without, has come to our aid save for the two years
when Pyrrhus used our soldiers to increase his strength rather than use
his strength to defend us. I will not boast of our successes-the two consuls
with their armies whom we sent under the yoke, and all the other fortunate
or glorious events which we can recall. The trials and sufferings we then
went through can be recounted with less bitter feelings than those which
are happening today. Then great Dictators with their Masters of the Horse
would invade our borders, two consuls and two consular armies found it
necessary to act together against us, and they took every precaution, careful
scouting, reserves duly posted, their army in order of battle, when they
ravaged our country; now we are the prey of a solitary propraetor and a
small garrison at Nola! They do not even march in military detachments,
but they scour the whole of our country like brigands and more carelessly
than if they were roaming about on Roman ground. The reason is simply this:
you do not defend us, and our soldiery who could protect us if they were
at home are all serving under your standards. I should be utterly ignorant
of you and your army if I did not think it an easy task for the man, by
whom to my knowledge so many Roman armies have been routed and laid low,
to crush these plunderers of our country while they are roving about in
disorder and wandering wherever any one is led by hopes of plunder, however
futile such hopes may be. They will be the prey of a few Numidians, and
you will relieve both us and Nola of its garrison if only you count the
men whom you thought worthy of your alliance still worthy of your protection."
23.43
To all this Hannibal replied: "You Samnites and Hirpini are doing everything
at once; you point out your sufferings and ask for protection and complain
of being unprotected and neglected. But you ought to have first made your
representations, then asked for protection, and if you did not obtain it
then only should you have complained that you had sought help in vain.
I shall not lead my army into the country of the Hirpini and Samnites because
I do not want to be a burden to you, but I shall march into those districts
belonging to the allies of Rome which are nearest to me. By plundering
these I shall satisfy and enrich my soldiers and shall frighten the enemy
sufficiently to make him leave you alone. As to the war with Rome, if Trasumennus
was a more famous battle than the Trebia, if Cannae was more famous than
Trasumennus, I shall make even the memory of Cannae fade in the light of
a greater and more brilliant victory." With this reply and with munificent
presents he dismissed the envoys, and then leaving a somewhat small detachment
on Tifata marched with the rest of his army to Nola, whither Hanno also
came with the reinforcements he had brought from Carthage and the elephants.
Encamping at no great distance, he found out, on inquiry, that everything
was very different from the impression he had received from the envoys.
No one who watched Marcellus' proceedings could ever say that he trusted
to Fortune or gave the enemy a chance through his rashness. Hitherto his
plundering expeditions had been made after careful reconnoitring, with
strong supports for the marauding parties and a secure retreat. Now when
he became aware of the enemy's approach, he kept his force within the fortifications
and ordered the senators of Nola to patrol the ramparts and keep a sharp
lookout all round and find out what the enemy were doing.
Hanno had come close up to the walls, and, seeing amongst the senators
Herennius Bassus and Herius Pettius, asked for an interview with them.
Having obtained permission from Marcellus they went out to him. He addressed
them through an interpreter. After magnifying the merits and good fortune
of Hannibal and dwelling upon the decaying strength and greatness of Rome,
he went on to urge that even if Rome were what she once had been, still
men who knew by experience how burdensome the Roman government was to their
allies and with what indulgence Hannibal had treated all those of his prisoners
who belonged to any Italian nation must surely prefer the alliance and
friendship of Carthage to those of Rome. If both the consuls and their
two armies had been at Nola, they would still be no more a match for Hannibal
than they were at Cannae, how then could one praetor with a few raw soldiers
defend the place? It was of more importance to them whether the town were
taken or surrendered than it was to Hannibal; he would get possession of
it in any case as he had got possession of Capua and Nuceria. But what
a difference there was between the fate of Capua and that of Nola, they
knew best, situated as they were midway between the two places. He did
not want to prophesy what would happen to the city if it were captured;
he preferred to pledge his word that if they would give up Marcellus and
his garrison and the city of Nola no one but themselves should dictate
the terms on which they would become allies and friends of Hannibal.
23.44
Herennius Bassus briefly replied that the friendship between Rome and Nola
had now lasted many years, and up to that day neither party had had any
reason to regret it. If they had wished to change their allegiance when
the change came in their fortunes, it was too late to do so now. If they
had thought of surrendering to Hannibal would they have asked for a Roman
garrison? They were in perfect accord with those who had come to protect
them, and they would continue to be so to the last. This interview destroyed
any expectations Hannibal might have formed of securing Nola by treachery.
He therefore drew his lines completely round the town so that a simultaneous
attack might be made on all sides. When Marcellus saw that he was close
up to the ramparts, he drew up his men inside one of the gates and then
burst out in a fierce tumultuous charge. A few were overthrown and killed
in the first shock, but as men ran up into the fighting line and the two
sides became more equalised, the contest was beginning to be a severe one,
and few battles would have been more memorable had not a very heavy storm
of rain and wind separated the combatants. They retired for that day after
only a brief encounter but in a state of great exasperation, the Romans
to the city, the Carthaginians to their camp. Of the latter not more than
thirty fell in the first attack; the Romans lost fifty. The rain fell without
any intermission all through the night and continued till the third hour
of the following day, so, though both sides were eager for battle, they
remained that day within their lines. The following day Hannibal sent part
of his force on a plundering expedition in the Nolan territory. No sooner
was Marcellus aware of it than he formed his line of battle, nor did Hannibal
decline the challenge. There was about a mile between his camp and the
city, and within that space-it is all level ground round Nola-the armies
met. The battle shout raised on both sides brought back the nearest amongst
the cohorts who had been sent off to plunder; the Nolans, too, on the other
side, took their place in the Roman line. Marcellus addressed a few words
of encouragement and thanks to them, and told them to take their station
amongst the reserve and help to carry the wounded from the field, they
were to keep out of the fighting unless they received the signal from him.
23.45
The battle was obstinately contested; the generals encouraged the men,
and the men fought to the utmost of their strength. Marcellus urged his
men to press vigorously on those whom they had vanquished only three days
ago, who had been driven in flight from Cumae, and whom he had himself,
with another army, defeated the year before. "All his forces," he said,
"are not in the field, some are roving through the land bent on plunder,
whilst those who are fighting are enervated by the luxury of Capua and
have worn themselves out through a whole winter's indulgence in wine and
women and every kind of debauchery. They have lost their force and vigour,
they have dissipated that strength of mind and body in which they surmounted
the Alpine peaks. The men who did that are mere wrecks now; they can hardly
bear the weight of their armour on their limbs while they fight. Capua
has proved to be Hannibal's Cannae. All soldierly courage; all military
discipline, all glory won in the past, all hopes for the future have been
extinguished there." By showing his contempt for the enemy, Marcellus raised
the spirits of his men. Hannibal, on the other hand, reproached his own
men in much more severe terms. "I recognise," he said, "the same arms and
standards here which I saw and used at the Trebia, at Trasumennus, and
finally at Cannae, but not the same soldiers. It is quite certain that
I led one army into winter quarters at Capua and marched out with quite
a different one. Are you, whom two consular armies never withstood, hardly
able now to hold your own against a subordinate officer, with his one legion
and its contingent of allies? Is Marcellus to challenge us with impunity
a second time with his raw recruits and Nolan supports? Where is that soldier
of mine who dragged the consul, C. Flaminius, from his horse and struck
off his head? Where is the one who slew L. Paulus at Cannae? Has the sword
lost its edge; have your right hands lost their power? Or has any other
miracle happened? Though but few yourselves, you have been wont to vanquish
an enemy that far outnumbered you; now you can hardly stand up against
a force far smaller than your own. You used to boast, tongue-valiant as
you are, that you would take Rome by storm if any one would lead you. Well,
I want you to try your courage and your strength in a smaller task. Carry
Nola; it is a city in a plain, with no protection from river or from sea.
When ye have loaded yourselves with the plunder of such a wealthy city
as this, I will lead you or follow you wherever you wish."
23.46
Neither his censures nor his promises had any effect in strengthening the
morale of his men. When they began to fall back in all directions the spirits
of the Romans rose, not only because of their general's cheering words,
but also because the Nolans raised encouraging shouts and fired them with
the glow of battle, until the Carthaginians fairly turned to flee and were
driven to their camp. The Romans were anxious to storm the camp, but Marcellus
marched them back to Nola amid the joyous congratulations even of the populace
who had before been more inclined to the Carthaginians. More than 5000
of the enemy were killed that day and 600 made prisoners, 18 military standards
were taken and two elephants; four had been killed in the battle. The Romans
had less than a thousand killed. The next day was spent by both sides in
burying those killed in battle, under an informal truce. Marcellus burnt
the spoils taken from the enemy in fulfilment of a vow to Vulcan. Three
days later, owing, I fancy, to some disagreement or in hope of more liberal
pay, 272 troopers, Numidians and Spaniards, deserted to Marcellus. The
Romans often availed themselves of their brave and loyal help in the war.
At its close a gift of land was made in Spain to the Spaniards and in Africa
to the Numidians as a reward for their valour.
Hanno was sent back into Bruttium with the force he had brought, and
Hannibal went into winter quarters in Apulia and encamped in the neighbourhood
of Arpi. As soon as Q. Fabius heard that Hannibal had left for Apulia,
he had a quantity of corn from Nola and Neapolis conveyed into the camp
above Suessula, and after strengthening its defences and leaving a force
sufficient to hold the position through the winter months, he moved his
own camp nearer to Capua and laid waste its territory with fire and sword.
The Campanians had no confidence whatever in their strength, but they were
at last compelled to come out of their gates into the open and form an
entrenched camp in front of the city. They had 6000 men under arms, the
infantry were absolutely useless, but the mounted men were more efficient,
so they kept harassing the enemy by cavalry skirmishes. There were several
Campanian nobles serving as troopers, amongst them Cerrinus Vibellius,
surnamed Taurea. He was a citizen of Capua and by far the finest soldier
in the Campanian horse, so much so indeed that when he was serving with
the Romans there was only one Roman horseman that enjoyed an equal reputation,
and that was Claudius Asellus. Taurea had for a long time been riding up
to the enemy's squadrons to see if he could find this man, and at last
when there was a moment's silence he asked where Claudius Asellus was.
"He has often," he said, "argued with me about our respective merits, let
him settle the matter with the sword, and if he is vanquished yield me
the spolia opima, or if he is the victor take them from me."
23.47
When this was reported to Asellus in the camp, he only waited till he could
ask the consul whether he would be allowed, against the regulations, to
fight his challenger. Permission being granted he at once armed himself
and, riding in front of the outposts, called Taurea by name and told him
to meet him wherever he pleased. The Romans had already gone out in crowds
to watch the duel, and the Campanians had not only lined the rampart of
their camp, but had gathered in large numbers on the fortifications of
the city. After a great flourish of words and expressions of mutual defiance
they levelled their spears and spurred their horses. As there was plenty
of space they kept evading each other's thrusts and the fight went on without
either being wounded. Then the Campanian said to the Roman: "This will
be a trial of skill between the horses and not their riders unless we leave
the open and go down into this hollow lane. There will be no room for swerving
aside there, we shall fight at close quarters." Almost before the words
were out of his mouth, Claudius leaped his horse into the lane, and Taurea,
bolder in words than deeds, shouted, "Never be an ass in a ditch," and
this expression became a rustic proverb. After riding some distance along
the lane and finding no opponent, Claudius got into the open and returned
to camp, saying strong things about the cowardice of his adversary. He
was welcomed as victor with cheers and congratulations by his comrades.
In the accounts of this duel on horseback some annalists record an additional
circumstance-how far there is any truth in it each must judge for himself,
but it is at least remarkable. They say that Claudius went in pursuit of
Taurea who fled to the city, and galloped in through one open gate and
out through another unhurt, the enemy standing dumbfounded at the extraordinary
sight.
23.48
After this incident the Roman camp was undisturbed; the consul even shifted
his camp further away that the Campanians might complete their sowing,
and he did not inflict any injury on their land until the corn was high
enough in the blade to yield fodder. Then he carried it off to Claudius'
camp above Suessula and built huts for his men to winter in there. M. Claudius,
the proconsul, received orders to keep a force at Nola sufficient to protect
the place and send the rest of his troops to Rome to prevent their being
a burden to the allies and an expense to the republic. And Ti. Gracchus,
having marched his legions from Cumae to Luceria in Apulia, sent the praetor,
M. Valerius, to Brundisium with the army he had had at Luceria, and gave
him orders to protect the coast of the Sallentine territory and to make
such provision as might be necessary with regard to Philip and the Macedonian
war. Towards the end of the summer in which the events we have been describing
occurred, despatches from P. and Cn. Scipio arrived, giving an account
of the great successes they had achieved, but also stating that money to
pay the troops was needed, as also clothing and corn for the army, whilst
the seamen were destitute of everything. As regarded the pay, if the treasury
were low they (the Scipios) would devise some means by which they could
obtain it from the Spaniards, but all the other things must in any case
be sent from Rome, otherwise they could neither keep their army nor the
province. When the despatches had been read there was no one present who
did not admit that the statements were true and the demands fair and just.
But other considerations were present to their minds-the enormous land
and sea forces they had to keep up; the large fleet that would have to
be fitted out if the war with Macedon went forward; the condition of Sicily
and Sardinia, which before the war had helped to fill the treasury and
were now hardly able to support the armies which were protecting those
islands; and, above all, the shrinkage in the revenue. For the war-tax
from which the national expenditure was met had diminished with the number
of those who paid it after the destruction of the armies at Trasumennus
and at Cannae, and if the few survivors had to pay at a very much higher
rate, they too, would perish, though not in battle. If, therefore, the
State could not be upheld by credit it could not stand by its own resources.
After thus reviewing the position of affairs the senate decided that Fulvius,
one of the praetors, should appear before the Assembly and point out to
the people the pressing needs of the State and ask those who had augmented
their patrimonies by making contracts with the government to extend the
date of payment for the State, out of which they had made their money,
and contract to supply what was needed for the army in Spain on condition
that as soon as there was money in the treasury they should be the first
to be paid. After making this proposal, the praetor fixed a date for making
the contracts for the supply of clothing and corn to the army in Spain,
and for furnishing all that was required for the seamen.
23.49
On the appointed day three syndicates appeared, consisting each of nineteen
members, prepared to tender for the contracts. They insisted on two conditions-one
was that they should be exempt from military service whilst they were employed
on this public business, and the other that the cargoes they shipped should
be insured by the government against storm or capture. Both demands were
conceded, and the administration of the State was carried on with private
money. Such were the moral tone and lofty patriotism which pervaded all
ranks of society! As the contracts had been entered into from a generous
and noble spirit, so they were executed with the utmost conscientiousness;
the soldiers received as ample supplies as though they had been furnished,
as they once were, from a rich treasury. When these supplies reached Spain,
the town of Iliturgi, which had gone over to the Romans, was being attacked
by three Carthaginian armies under Hasdrubal, Mago, and Hannibal, the son
of Bomilcar. Between these three camps the Scipios forced their way into
the town after hard fighting and heavy losses. They brought with them a
quantity of corn, of which there was a great scarcity, and encouraged the
townsfolk to defend their walls with the same courage that they saw the
Roman army display when fighting on their behalf. Then they advanced to
attack the largest of the three camps, of which Hasdrubal was in command.
The other two commanders and their armies saw that the decisive struggle
would be fought there and they hastened to its support. As soon as they
had emerged from their camps the fighting began. There were 60,000 of the
enemy engaged that day and about 16,000 Romans. And yet the victory was
such a crushing one that the Romans slew more than their own number of
the enemy, made prisoners of more than 3000, captured somewhat less than
1000 horses, 59 military standards, 7 elephants, 5 having been killed in
the battle, and got possession of the three camps-all in that one day.
After the siege of Iliturgi was thus raised, the Carthaginian armies marched
to attack Intibili. They had repaired their losses out of that province
which, above all others, was eager for fighting, if only plunder and money
were to be got out of it, and which, too, abounded in young men. A pitched
battle was again fought with the same result for both sides. Over 13,000
of the enemy were killed, more than 2000 made prisoners, 42 standards and
9 elephants were also taken. And now nearly all the tribes of Spain went
over to Rome, and the successes gained in Spain that summer were far greater
than those in Italy.
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