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 Protecting West Europe from an aggressive Communist Russia The Cold War in Asia Deep social-spiritual challenges at home in America New international challenges in the later '50s |
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Soviet Russia's quest for security
For Soviet Russia’s Stalin the matter of what happens after Germany is defeated is quite simple: the Soviet Red Army is in occupation of nearly all of Eastern Europe – offering him and his people a sense of security that they have never felt since Russia began opening up to Western culture in the 1500s. There is no way, despite the promises he made to hold ‘free’ elections throughout Eastern Europe, that Stalin (who is personally massively paranoid anyway) is going to allow any but the most Moscow-dependent (even Stalin-dependent) regimes to be ‘elected’ to high office in those countries that his Red Army now controls. In one country after another Stalinist ‘puppets’ appeared at the head of each of the new governments of Eastern Europe. The Iron Curtain descends on Europe
When in March of 1946 Churchill, then no longer in office as British Prime Minister, came to America on a mission to warn the country in his ‘Iron Curtain’ speech of a growing danger coming from Stalin’s ambitions he found a very receptive audience with Truman (who agreed heartily with Churchill). Churchill stated: From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an "iron curtain" has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow. But a very Idealistic American press at that time responded quite differently to this speech. They were shocked that Churchill would talk so openly in such a hostile manner about our Russian or Soviet Communist friends. Stalin intends to spread Communism in other ways
But Stalin's pressures did not stop with the Eastern European countries under his military control. He takes up support of a Communist insurrection in Greece and begins putting pressure on neighboring Turkey to extend the Soviet Russian sphere of influence all the way to the Mediterranean Sea. At the same time Stalin begins to look further West, to France, Italy. Belgium and other Western European countries where local Communist parties are rather large political organizations. He directs the Communist Parties in France and Italy to get themselves in a position of greater political control over their nation’s politics by joining with the other French and Italian parties in forming ‘Popular Front’ coalition governments. Then when that strategy failed to yield results, Stalin decides that it is time for these Communist parties to end their cooperation with the post-war 'United Front' coalitions governing these countries. Instead he directs these Communist parties to begin a program of labor uprisings in order to destabilize these same governments. Stalin's goal is to force these Western governments to come under Communist domination, which he in turn can control from Moscow. From his own assessment of the current situation in a war-torn, hungry and unemployed Europe, the time is ripe for just such a workers' 'Revolution.' The United Nations ... and residual Idealism in American foreign policy
How much Truman really expected Russian cooperation in an increasingly divided United Nations is hard to say... though it probably was not much. Americans, however, became increasingly incensed that the Soviets kept vetoing measures in the United Nations Security Council (the only part of the United Nations where forceful international policies could be ordered). Each Soviet veto was viewed as a measure of depravity of the Soviet position. Actually it was the natural response of a major power that sensed that the membership of the United Nations was for the most part an American ally of one sort or another and thus pretty much lined up against Soviet political interests everywhere. The Soviets might have wanted to pull out of the organization altogether but did not, figuring that it was better to stay in the organization where the Russians at least had veto power than to leave the organization to the Americans to rally the rest of the world in opposing Soviet political interests. The "containment" of Communism
American President Truman had no intention of starting up a shooting war with Russia. But he also had no intention of letting Stalin expand his influence much beyond a theoretical line drawn around the Soviet Russian position as it was at the war's end in mid 1945. In short, he planned to ‘contain’ Soviet influence (an idea carefully laid out for him in an 'anonymous' article in Foreign Affairs' by the State Department's Moscow expert, George Kennan). But it looked pretty much as if America was going to have to undertake this task of containing the Soviets all by itself. Though "victorious" in the war, France and England were suffering from major war weariness after the war. Under their post-war Labour Government, the British were quickly backing away from the larger global responsibilities that once were considered theirs. In 1947 the Labour government surrendered English control over South Asia (India/Pakistan) and in 1948 backed out of the Middle East – to let the Jews and Arabs sort out their differences over Palestine. Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech. An early warning about this problem ... and danger to world peace ... occurred in March of 1946 when Churchill, then no longer in office as British Prime Minister, came to America on a mission to warn the country in his ‘Iron Curtain’ speech of a growing danger coming from Stalin’s ambitions he found a very receptive audience with Truman (who agreed heartily with Churchill). Churchill stated:
In effet he was appealing to Truman for America to take up Britain's old role of "balancer of power" on the European continent. America needed to understand Stalin's broken promises about free elections in Europe as a gauntlet thrown down in challenge at the feet of his former allies ... as Stalin having established an "Iron Curtain" between East and West Europe, on the one side lurking Communist tyranny, on the other flourishing the Democratic "Free World." But a very Idealistic American press at that time responded quite differently to this speech. They were shocked that Churchill would talk so openly in such a hostile manner about our Russian or Soviet Communist friends. They still saw the post-war peace in the idealistic terms that Roosevelt himself had laid out for Americans to expect. A slowly growing awareness of problems with Stalin's Russia. But by 1947 it was beginning slowly to dawn on a number of Americans how right Churchill was about this growing problem with Stalin's Russia. By this time it was becoming increasingly clear that 'Stalinists' now ruled in most of the Eastern European countries behind the "Iron Curtain." These countries had become in effect Soviet "satellite" countries, drawing their political direction entirely from Moscow. The Truman Doctrine
Truman's first action against this Soviet expansionism occurred in 1947 when Stalin began to pursue a long-standing Russian goal of securing a position in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to give his navy free exit from its bottled-up position in the Black Sea ... and in fact to control events throughout that entire region. Stalin's plan became clear to the rest of the world with his move to take over Greece through Communist insurrection ... and with his threats aimed at Turkey in order for them to surrender Turkey's sovereign rights over the Dardanelles passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Stalin wanted Russia, not Turkey, to hold those rights. Sensing the dangers this expansion of Russian power in the Eastern Mediterranean posed to the free flow of Western commerce to Asia through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal (and thus to the economies of Western or "Free" Europe), Truman made it clear that America was not going to let Russian expansion happen. Without designating Russia or any particular nation as the villain, Truman announced clearly however that America would directly aid Greece in its putting down any insurrection aimed at overthrowing the legitimate government of that country ... and would support Turkey in maintaining its military strength – and thus its national sovereignty. This move to take up the traditional role of Britain as balancer and stabilizer of power in the Mediterranean Truman had now made official American policy. He had established a major post-war principle directing American diplomatic and military programming, a principle that the world came to term "The Truman Doctrine." The Marshall Plan
At the same time Truman realized that the terrible economic conditions facing the Western European countries not yet under Soviet domination presented the Soviets with further opportunities for Soviet expansion through Moscow-directed workers' uprisings. The agitation of the large French and Italian Communist Parties was clearly taking place under the direction of Stalin. The goal of destabilizing those governments was clear ... and Truman knew that it was going to be up to America to block that effort. And the best response America could take in meeting this Communist challenge would be to help these West European countries get back on their feet economically as soon as possible. In stark contrast to the war-destroyed societies of Europe, America emerged from the war with its economy roaring (Europeans were buying American goods to rebuild their own countries), wealth spreading to even the working classes, and a new sense of personal and national empowerment. By freely extending additional dollars (flowing in large numbers back to America for the purchase of capital equipment needed to rebuild Europe) to European countries they could now easily purchase these much needed economic goods, helping the economies of both Europe and the United States. Thus it was that the 'Marshall Plan' was put into operation in 1948 – offering grants (not loans, but outright grants) of billions of dollars to Europe to help it recover. The Marshall Plan was a huge success (1948-1952). It helped Europe recover quickly, it broke the back of the Communist strategy in West Europe, indeed it united these countries (including even the Western half of Germany) in a strong economic and military bond that Russia would not be able to dismantle ... and it kept American factories booming and employment full. The Cold War intensifies
The Berlin Blockade. In 1948 Stalin decided that it was time to squeeze America, Britain and France out of their occupational sectors in the former German capital city Berlin. The economic recovery of West Berlin (under the administration of these three occupying powers) stood in stark contrast to the devastation and gloom existing in the East Berlin sector under Soviet administration. So Stalin shut down land routes (highway and railroad) to West Berlin through the East German occupation zone controlled by Russia (Berlin was located deep within East German territory). But Truman refused to be cowed by such pressure – and decided to use the air corridors to bring in needed West Berlin supplies. It proved to be a very expensive operation for America (imagine flying coal into Berlin by plane in order to get the city through the cold of winter!). But it proved to be an even greater embarrassment to Stalin who, after a year of American defiance, finally backed down and reopened the land routes. But by this time East-West feelings were very bitter. NATO. Thus in 1949 Truman signed America's first-ever military alliance agreement with France, England, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Canada. Through the creation of a permanent military organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Truman agreed to commit American troops to an on-going presence in Europe as a 'front-line' against any possible Soviet military expansion into West Europe. These troops numbered only in the thousands would not be sufficient to stop the full force of a Soviet invasion. But they would be a signal to Stalin that such an attempt would bring the full wrath of American force against Russia - for having attacked America's soldiers in Europe. In short, these soldiers stationed in Europe would serve as a 'trip-wire' guaranteeing a full-scale American response to any Soviet military engagements in West Europe. Nuclear deterrence. Backing up the threat of American retaliation was always the implicit threat of the use of nuclear weapons such as America used against Japan in 1945. The possession of these awesome weapons gave America a strong sense of security when contemplating trouble with any new rising power wanting to take over the world. But then in 1949 the Soviets exploded their own atomic bomb. Now the nuclear threat worked both against as well as for American power. American attitudes about the bomb went directly from happy confidence to terrible fear as they realized that atomic weapons could now be used on them How could this be that the Soviets came up with their own nuclear force so quickly? Immediately suspicions were aroused that Russia got some inside help from Americans with Communist sympathies, traitors working within sensitive government bureaus. Paranoia now added to the fear stirred up by the Soviet nuclear explosion. Cold War ideology
By the end of the 1940s every significant political development around the world got drawn into this Cold War rivalry. The possession of nuclear weapons by both powers continued to make direct military conflict unthinkable. Thus the rivalry took on a highly symbolic or ideological nature: Stalin’s Soviet Russia stood in defense of international Communism (which it did not actually itself practice) and America stood in defense of international Democracy (which America also practiced more in name than in fact). Communism and Democracy become battle symbols – potent battle symbols. For the next few decades the biggest international question that would be heard whenever a new political development occurred was: is this event going to promote Democracy ... or does it involve the advancement of Communism? The issues themselves were always far more complex than this ideological dualism. But those were the terms by which every political and diplomatic challenge would be analyzed and ‘resolved’ by most Americans nonetheless. |
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China goes "Communist"
The situation in China became the first such example of America's envisioning major events around this Cold-War ideological dualism. At war’s end China, though ‘victorious’ in its war with Japan, nonetheless was deeply divided politically within. Chiang’s Chinese Republican government had been greatly compromised in the eyes of the Chinese by his reliance on foreigners (primarily Americans) and warlords in his effort to preserve his government in the face of the Japanese wartime occupation of coastal China. Mao’s Chinese Communists did not contribute much to the effort to expel the Japanese – but nonetheless remained untainted by the stigma of political humiliation such as Chiang suffered. American advisors at war’s end attempted to get the two Chinese groups to work together. But there was only mutual hatred linking the two – and by 1947 China had fallen into the state of intense civil war. Diplomatic and military advisors urged cautious support of Chiang ... but above all no direct involvement in the civil war. This was something that only the Chinese themselves could successfully sort out. So America largely stayed out of the Chinese Civil War. But by early 1949 it was clear that Mao and his Communists – not Chiang and his "democratic" Nationalists – were the clear winners in China. Americans were shocked. By this time Americans were not viewing this as a local or Chinese national issue – but as a key part of the intense Cold War between Communism and Democracy. China’s new Communist government was identified in American minds as part of the great evil of International Communism that threatened the Free World in spreading its doctrines through conspiracy and social upheaval. But not willing to take on Communist China directly, America simply moved to quarantine China diplomatically – acting as if China no longer existed except on the island of Taiwan (offshore from the Chinese mainland) where Chiang and his ‘democratic’ followers took refuge. This isolation would last for over 20 years But it actually helped Mao greatly in his efforts to remake China along his own ideological lines. Because of the boycott he could do so without any further intervention from outside powers. That even included Communist Russia – although the West failed to take note of Mao’s ‘exceptionalism’ within the so-called Communist bloc. War in Korea intensifies the Cold War
The outbreak of the Korean War (1950), when the Communist northern half of the country invaded without warning the undefended southern "Democratic" half, brought the first shots fired between the two sides of the Cold War. Truman was able to line up the United Nations behind the American side (the Russians had been boycotting meetings because of the UN's unwillingness to recognize Mao’s government as the real government of China). The "U.N." troops (largely American) were able to stem the flow south of the North Korean troops, reverse the course, and push back through North Korea – almost up to the Chinese border. At this point Mao sent Chinese "volunteers" (he did not want to find himself officially fighting "UN" troops at the same time he was seeking UN membership) up against advancing the Americans. American general MacArthur began holding press conferences indicating how he was ready to invade China to liberate it from Communism, even to nuke the Chinese if necessary. This flew directly in the face of Truman's policy of moving cautiously and merely "containing" Communism, not falling into (a probably highly destructive) military crusade against it. Recognizing in MacArthur not only an egotistical but also a highly insubordinate general wanting to direct American foreign policy his way, Truman (very correctly) fired him. But back home MacArthur was viewed as the hero – Truman as a coward ... if not almost a traitor ... feeding the frenzy that at that time had many Americans believing that they were being led to destruction by Communists or at least by individuals in high places "soft" on Communism. Truman was right, of course, for clearly America was not ready for a foreign war against the full weight of the Chinese who were coming to view Mao with deeper reverence for his boldness against the imperialist West, America in particular. In any case, the Chinese threw the Americans back to the middle line of Korea – and a stalemate set in. |
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Sen. McCarthy's "Red Scare" (1950-1955)
– and the alienating of the American intellectual At this point a loud, accusatory voice in the US Senate became even louder, as Sen. McCarthy moved to whip up American fury at "treachery" in high places. McCarthy accused (without any specific details) the American diplomatic corps, then the American civilian government in general, and then finally even the US military, of being loaded with Communists who were secretly subverting America. A huge Red Scare was thus set loose – which turned in every direction. The Red Scare hit especially hard America’s "intellectuals," many of whom had long been suspected of harboring Communist sympathies. Many authors, playwrights, journalists, professors, etc., had held (since the 1930s) "fancy" ideas about the need for social reform – ideas which seemed overly critical, even unpatriotic, even treasonous, to fiercely patriotic middle class Vets. The Vets therefore were (with McCarthy’s help) easily led to believe that this class of intellectuals formed a conspiratorial group seeking to overthrow the nation and everything it stood for. Needless to say, the intellectuals did all that they could do to fight back. For example, Miller’s play, The Crucible, ostensibly slamming the witch-hunting instincts of the late 17th century American Puritans, was actually a thinly disguised slam against the "witch-hunting" Vets of the 1950s. But for the time being the Vet middle class held the high ground. (Thus Miller’s play would get little notice in the 1950s – but would become an iconic battle standard in the massive cultural war which exploded in the 1960s). The making of the "Boomer" generation
Because of the depth of the Red Scare in America, a fateful decision in the early 1950s was made by Vet parents, concerned about the possible susceptibilities of their ‘Boomer’ children ("Boomer": from the baby 'boom' which followed the end of the war) to the subtle appeals of totalitarian Communism. As an antidote to the appeals of authoritarian Communism, the Vet parents were determined to train their Boomer youth in the art of careful challenge of all voices posing as authority. "Think for yourself ... and thereby remain free" was the general theme. The Vets were very careful not to impose on their Boomer children any values of their own (that would itself constitute a form of the very authoritarianism that they were teaching the youth instinctively to challenge) – supposing that their own well disciplined middle class values would come as by nature, of their own, to the free-thinking minds of their Boomer children. The Vet’s great faith that democracy
is the natural instinct of any free individual The Vets did not realize that their own Christian, free-market, patriotic, hard-working, self-sacrificing, "democratic" American middle class values had come to themselves through much trial and tribulation – and were not simply the ‘natural’ inclinations of a "free" people everywhere. [This conceptual mistake will be repeated constantly as a kind of hallmark of American "democratic" foreign policy – and will produce one diplomatic-military disaster after another in the conduct of American foreign policy – even up to today] Vet parents would soon discover (during the late 1960s when their Boomer children entered young adulthood) that what is partly ‘natural’ to human nature are selfish, greedy, lazy, rebellious character traits – such as are observable in the behavior of toddlers and small children who have not yet been taught good social conduct. But because of the Vets' naive belief that their own social values were merely instinctive human values of any truly free people, a highly disciplined sense of commitment to solid social behavior (characteristic of the Vet generation) was not passed on to the Boomer youth. Instead a sense of the heroic importance of being free, "doing your own thing"” challenging all authority – was primarily what the Boomers received as social training in the 1950s. When this strange moral ideal was combined with the fact that Boomers were raised in unprecedented material prosperity ... and that their parents felt the need to give their children "everything they didn't have growing up," a bizarre generation was created. Boomers would find it virtually impossible to connect emotionally and socially to anything larger than "self" and all its expected 'entitlements' (things not worked for but instead freely received as a matter of what life naturally owed them): marriages would not survive stress or boredom, no loyalties would unite workers to their jobs, no sense of community spirit would arise ... and patriotism itself would be mocked as being beneath the dignity of the Boomer. This error of upbringing would soon come to haunt the 1960s – and the years thereafter – as Boomers moved up in society and begin to leave their peculiar cultural mark on American society (and to some extent the world) – passing these Boomer values on as well to their own children, the Gen-Xers, a confused generation set adrift by their Boomer parents' lack of any particular social ideals (except the ideal of having no ideals larger than self)! Also: the Vets' sense of "corporatism"
Another key feature of the strong Vet middle class culture was the deep trust that the Vet generation placed in corporate life – to the point of agreeing that all of life would function better using corporate-style processes. Although the Vets presumed themselves to be highly Christian (church attendance was at an all-time high) the Vet approach to God and Christ tended to run along the idea that "God helps those who help themselves." Though Vets would hold deep personal trust in God’s love and grace, when it came to social trust, Vets were great believers in the "rational" organizing and management of life. The Vet sincerely believed that although America’s wartime victory was undoubtedly the results of God’s great help, the Vet saw that help as having been transacted through the massive military-industrial complex which organized millions of Americans into an effective fighting machine. The Vets’ loyalties to such organizational logic were virtually unshakeable. |
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The post-Stalinist Cold War takes on new dimensions
Stalin's death (1953). By the early 1950s the Cold War had stalemated in Europe to a point where both the Americans and Soviet Russians and their allies had achieved something of a balance of power there. But confusion following Stalin’s death in 1953 erupted within the upper reaches of Soviet Russian authority: who was it now that commanded the Soviet system? Revolt in East Berlin. In mid-1953 workers in East Berlin saw in Stalin's death the opportunity to go on strike against their Communist leaders. But their hopes for freedom from Communist oppression were crushed by Soviet tanks. However, things did free up a bit in Germany for several years after the revolt The rise of Khrushchev. Eventually (by 1956) it became clear to the outside world that Khrushchev was in charge, he having staked his claim to Communist leadership on the basis of some sort of "new look" which he had formulated for International Communism – and which he had convinced the Central Committee to support. By denouncing Stalin’s harsh means of holding the Soviet orbit together, Khrushchev hoped to make Communism more appealing as a "voluntary" program – attracting simply on the merits of its ideological superiority over crass "capitalism." With the military dimension of the Cold War supposedly downgraded, observers begin to talk hopefully of a new "thaw" in the Cold War. The Hungarian uprising (1956)
Khrushchev's attempt to put a new face on Soviet Communism was misunderstood in Hungary as an invitation for the satellite nations of East Europe to freely choose their destinies. In late 1956 students went on strike in Hungary – encouraged in part by Khrushchev’s announcement of a new look to Communism – and in part by Dulles’ vow that America stood ready to help the subject peoples of the Soviet bloc throw off their oppressors. But in the end America did nothing – and Khrushchev sent in Soviet soldiers and tanks to end the uprising. This was however a huge embarrassment to him and his ‘new look.’ His heavy hand however did succeed in putting things back in good Soviet order in Hungary. But Khrushchev indicated that he was still intending to follow his new policy (whatever exactly that might have meant at that point!). The Suez Crisis
In the midst of the Hungarian uprising, the Suez Crisis erupted – much to the pleasure of Russia and the intense displeasure of America. Egyptian President Nasser had seized – or "nationalized" – the Suez Canal to pay for his Aswan Dam project. England and France invaded Egypt to take the Canal back from Nasser (Israel joined them in the invasion). None of this played well in the American policy book. Americans were incensed that their West European allies would be so "imperialistic," undercutting America's ideological argument that the Soviets are by their instinctive nature always imperialists endangering the freedoms of the nations everywhere – while the West under American leadership is the defender of just such national freedom. Americans had been hoping to score huge ideological points against the Soviets for their cruel suppression of Hungarian freedom. And here – at the very same time (October 1956) as the Hungarian crisis – America's European friends are acting in exactly the same way in Egypt. Thus Americans and Russians oddly stood together in opposing the French, British and Israeli invasion of Nasser’s Egypt. America's allies were thus stunned at this American "intervention" in matters long thought to be those of the old European powers. In the end no one benefited from this fiasco – except Russia which moved quickly to pose itself as the Arabs' best international friend. And Egyptian President (and dictator) Nasser now became the Arab hero of the Middle East for his "standing up" to the European imperialists. America meanwhile, because of its Israeli-Arab "neutrality," gained no new political credits among the Arabs despite its opposition to English, French and Israeli imperialism. In this matter, only Russia was the one to come out the big winner. Overall, America's allies were hugely embarrassed and humiliated – both at home and abroad. The whole matter was very demoralizing to America’s European allies – who were already suffering from a deep sense of loss of national dignity. Sputnik
In 1957 the Soviets launched into orbit the first satellite (Sputnik I) – indicating that the Soviets now possessed the means to deliver virtually unstoppable nuclear weapons – a fact that Americans noted with horror. Then in the fall of 1957 the Soviets launched Sputnik II with a dog aboard – intensifying the American horror – and shame at having fallen behind in the technological race with the Soviets. In 1958 Eisenhower created NASA and the space race was now fully underway. De Gaulle returns to power
Accompanying the humiliation in Egypt, and following on the humiliation from the loss of their colonies in Southeast Asia a few years earlier, the French found themselves facing an Arab rebellion in Algeria, a land considered by France as an integral part of the nation (much as Americans viewed Alaska and Hawaii). In 1958, with France spinning out of control politically, De Gaulle was called out of retirement and asked to set up a new French government (the 5th Republic). There was high hope that he could resolve the widening civil war between those calling for the creation of an Arab Algeria (FLN) and those desiring a continuing French Algeria (OAS) ... as well as just in general restore France's sagging national pride. America's "life-style" diplomacy
Meanwhile America continued to press its case to the world for cultural leadership – on the basis of the ability of its "Christian-Capitalist-Democracy" system to deliver material blessings for the average worker. In his visit to Moscow in 1959, Vice-President Nixon makes this point clear to Khrushchev in the "Kitchen Debate." |
Miles
H. Hodges
