In the early 1950s the French colonial war in Indochina began to heat up considerably as the Communist Viet Minh, under the direction of their General Vo Nguyen Giap, attacked scattered French positions with devastating effect.  Then the French under General De Lattre regrouped and went after the Viet Minh whenever they appeared in concentrated formations.  The battles raged back and forth – with the Viet Minh this time taking the beating.

But the French were tiring of the expensive war effort at a time that the French economy at home was the greater priority.  Also in 1952 De Lattre grew ill and died.  And the Viet Minh, despite the pounding they had been receiving, showed no signs of giving up the struggle.

Giap now redirected his army away from attacks against the French positions in Vietnam and struck at French outposts in Laos.  Giap's goal there, as in all wars, was simply to wear down the French resolve to continue to hold onto its position in Indochina.

The French responded with their hitherto successful strategy of placing themselves deep in enemy territory, inviting the Viet Minh to come out to engage them directly.  In November 1953 they dropped 1800 paratroopers into the Dien Bien Phu valley, and waited, sending out patrols, but getting little solid resistance from the Viet Minh.  But Giap realized that the French had put themselves in a perilous position, surrounded by high hills from which artillery could be brought in to bombard the French position, including the airfields in the valley by which French supplies were flown in.  In March of 1954 the Viet Minh were ready for their artillery assault on the French.  What then broke out was reminiscent of the trench warfare of the First World War, artillery barrage and counter barrage.

But the French were cut off from resupply, the Viet Minh well dug in in the hills above Dien Bien Phu, and the monsoon weather had started, making it almost impossible to parachute supplies to the trapped French.

The battle itself lasted two months, resulting in a humiliating French surrender to the Viet Minh.  And the battle also coincided with the discussions being held in Geneva concerning the future of Indochina.  With the French loss at Dien Bien Phu, the French were ready to call it quits.

According to the final 1954 Geneva Accords, Vietnam was to be temporarily divided at the 17th parallel, the northern territory designated as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh and the southern portion designated as the State of Vietnam, under Bao Dai. Elections were to be held no later than July 1956 to unite the two Vietnams.

But in October of 1955, Bao Dai's prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem deposed the Emperor and proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam, with himself as president.  He then refused to hold the agreed-on elections in the south (actually the delegates of neither the United States nor the State of Vietnam had accepted the 1954 Geneva Accords).  Thus Vietnam would remain divided, much like Korea, except this time it was the Americans and not the Soviets that wanted the elections postponed.  It was clear that any national elections were likely to lead to a victory of the Communist leader, Ho Chi Minh, and it was thus also equally clear (to the Americans anyway) that the Vietnamese were not yet ready to make the "right" decision at the polling booth.  The elections needed to be held off until the Vietnamese truly understood the implications of their national vote.  They obviously were not there yet.  They needed a bit more enlightened guidance.

The Suez Canal had been built by French engineers back in the 1860s, with ownership shared by private French investors and by the Egyptian king.  But in 1875, because of a major financial crisis in Egypt, the king sold all his shares to the British government, which was very interested in the canal because it provided a direct link between Great Britain and the British Empire in India.  Indeed, it was so important to the British that they eventually placed themselves in the position as protector of the Egyptian government, and would continue in that role in the decades ahead – even into the beginning of the 1950s.

But economic hard times in Egypt at the beginning of the 1950s had produced widespread protesting in Egypt, leading to the dismissing of the king and his replacement by a military council, one that would eventually be led by the very ambitious Gamal Abdel Nasser – who took for himself not only the role of president of Egypt but potentially the leader of the entire Arab world.  After all, the divisions of that Arab world into the (fictional) nations of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, etc. had been designed by the European powers – and not the Arabs themselves – during a period of robust Western Imperialism, mostly just before or immediately after World War One, solely according to European power considerations.

Nasser however intended to unite that broader Arab world into a single United Arab Republic, under his own leadership of course.  But he had a contender for this leadership position in the form of the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri al-Said – who himself had the same ambitions as Nasser, and who also enjoyed a close working relationship with the British.

The British, now back under Conservative Party leadership, were again attempting to maintain something of a pivotal position in the Middle East.  Thus they had set up the Baghdad Pact in 1955, uniting al-Said's Iraq with Pakistan, Turkey, and Britain.  Nasser was invited to join, but suspected that to do so was to undermine his own position in the Arab world to the benefit of Nuri.  He thus refused to join, and drew Egypt away from the former close relationship it had long held with Britain.  In fact at this point, Nasser began to portray Britain as the Arab world's major stumbling block in its quest for collective unity and Arab national pride.  It would thus not be long before British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden would develop a passionate hostility towards Nasser.

At the same time, the French were growing increasingly hostile toward Nasser for his support of the Arab rebellion going on within Algeria (which at the time was considered an integral part of France itself).  And Israel was just as angry toward Nasser for his support of Palestinian fedayeen and their attacks on Israeli settlements, and for his refusal to allow Israeli ships – or any ships supplying goods to Israel – to pass through the Suez Canal.  Consequently, by early 1956, both France and Israel found themselves working closely together in their desire to neutralize Nasser.  The British would soon join them in this enterprise.

Meanwhile, Eisenhower's America was focused intensely on the ongoing Cold War with Soviet Russia, deeply concerned that the Soviets were going to make a move to insert themselves in the heart of the Middle East.  For Eisenhower's Secretary of State Dulles, this concern to keep the Soviets contained also was passionate, almost obsessive.

The Americans wanted to build a NATO-like military defense organization focused on the Middle East, and like the British had tried to entice Nasser to join, recognizing him to be of central importance to any plan to unite the Arab world against Soviet expansion.  But when Nasser could not secure military arms purchases from America (because of an earlier agreement among America, Britain, and France to minimize Arab-Israeli tensions by cutting back on arms sales to the Middle East), in September of 1955 he purchased Soviet arms through Soviet-controlled Czechoslovakia, irritating Dulles and Eisenhower greatly.

Soon after this, trouble also erupted between America and Egypt over the financing of the construction of the very expensive Aswan High Dam along the upper Nile River.  This project was deeply important to Nasser as a means of providing Egypt with both hydroelectric power and flood control protecting farms and industries along the Lower Nile.  America had been supplying funds for this venture with the expectation of drawing Nasser into the American political orbit.  But when in May of 1956 Nasser extended official recognition to Mao's Communist China, this angered Eisenhower so much that he cut off funding for the project.  Eisenhower expected that Nasser would then turn to the Soviets for financial assistance, but find in doing so that the Soviets would not be able to grant funding equal to the loss of the previous American support.  This then should drive Nasser back into the arms of the Americans

But instead Nasser decided in late July of 1956 to grab the one money-maker he had at hand, the Suez Canal, still owned by British and other foreign financial interests.  This immediately spun the diplomatic world into a round of debate as to how to respond to Nasser's actions – in violation of a number of international laws, but more importantly with a number of political implications for Britain, France, Israel, and even Iraq.  For instance, Iraqi King Faisal and Prime Minister Nuri urged immediate military action.  But the British Parliament was divided between those also wanting such action, and those who insisted that Nasser's actions did not warrant military attack.  Also the English dominions Canada, Australia and New Zealand were very lukewarm on the idea of a military response to Nasser.  To Australia and New Zealand, the Panama Canal was much more important to their national interests than the Suez Canal.  The French on the other hand were a bit more united (except the French Communists) around the idea of a military countermove, for Nasser needed to be curbed, not just for his actions concerning the canal but for his support of the Algerian Arab nationalists who were trying to split the Algerian Department from the rest of France (which had millions of non-Arab Frenchmen living there, plus many Algerian Arabs who also saw themselves as French first and foremost).

Eisenhower urged his European allies merely to proceed cautiously in their response to the crisis, something that upset French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, who expected stronger support from America – especially since, out of loyalty to NATO, he had passed up an offer from the Soviets to cease their support of the Algerian Arab nationalists if the French were to drop out of NATO. This weak response of Eisenhower seemed to indicate to the French that they were going to have to respond to Nasser on their own, with or without American support.

For the next couple of months America held the upper hand in trying to get its allies and Nasser to come to some kind of diplomatic solution to the crisis. Eisenhower was hoping to mobilize the broader world opinion against Nasser as a way of forcing him to return control of the canal to its European owners. Eisenhower even proposed some kind of international authority controlling this strategic canal. Meanwhile the British and the French quietly went along with all the diplomatic maneuvering, mostly to give themselves the time necessary to prepare themselves for a military move on the canal (they were actually working together in their military planning, including also Israel).

Finally, with winter coming on and with pressure mounting from fellow members of the British Parliament calling on the Anthony Eden Government to do something soon, the decision was made to hit Egypt hard.  With the Israelis on October 29th coming across the Sinai Desert from the East, the British subsequently (November 1st) attacked Egypt by air from their bases in nearby Cyprus and from navy ships offshore from Alexandria.  Then British and French paratroopers were dropped several days later near the Canal in order to seize it (November 5th). The Egyptians were quickly overwhelmed, their casualties greatly outnumbering (about 100 to one) French and British casualties.  Militarily, the action was an immediate and grand success.

But politically the action was a grand disaster.  Members of the British Opposition (Labour and Liberals) protested loudly concerning the sheer imperialism of the action.  And the move itself was not widely popular with the British public.  In fact, a huge public demonstration took place in London in opposition to the action.

The Americans were also irritated greatly by the action, because the British and French seizing of the Suez Canal took place the very next day after the Soviet invasion in Hungary.  America was trying to score major diplomatic or simply ideological points against the Soviets for their brutal crushing of the Hungarian national spirit.  But the behavior of its allies Britain and France in Egypt looked much the same, thus undercutting deeply this diplomatic opportunity to score huge ideological points concerning Soviet bullying of smaller nations.

Furthermore, any support America might have been willing to show its allies Britain and France Eisenhower knew would merely alienate the Arab world all the more, even possibly drive that world into the arms of the Soviet Russians.

Khrushchev, naturally, was deeply pleased by this English and French action, because it diverted world public opinion away from his heavy-handed move against Hungary.  In fact the early action in late October and the first days of November by the Israelis, French, and English in Egypt helped him immensely to come to the decision to undertake that move in Hungary.  Thus it was that on the 4th of November he had sent those 2,500 tanks and 120,000 soldiers to Budapest to crush the Hungarian rebellion.

Oddly enough, both America and Russia brought resolutions before the United Nations Security Council calling for an immediate ceasefire in Egypt – and for an Israeli, British and French withdrawal from Egypt ... with both resolutions vetoed by the British and French.³

Meanwhile, with the Suez Crisis dragging on, Eisenhower took an even stronger stance against America's British and French allies, worried that this event gave the Soviets the opportunity to move into Egypt as Nasser's new friend and protector, even to come out threatening the West with Soviet nuclear reprisals if Israel, Britain and France did not immediately withdraw from Egypt.  NATO commitments would necessarily draw America into such a war, something that Eisenhower wanted to avoid at all costs.  Fearing just such a scenario (Eisenhower truly believed that Khrushchev was just crazy enough to do exactly that), Eisenhower now put huge pressure, including threats of economic reprisals, if the British and French did not immediately pull back from the Egyptian venture.

Facing such enormous pressure, Eden's British Government finally capitulated, and was forced to acknowledge what America itself demanded: British (and French) recognition that Nasser's Egypt was indeed now the owner of their canal.

In the end only the Soviet Russians and Nasser's Egypt gained from this event. Russia had moved quickly to pose itself as the Arabs' best international friend.  And Nasser now became the Arab hero of the Middle East for his standing up to the European imperialists.

America meanwhile, because of its Israeli-Arab neutrality, gained no new advance of its position in the Middle East through its behavior in this crisis.  Eisenhower's attempt to look like the friend of the Arabs failed to impress the Arab world, which now looked more to the Soviets as their friend in their efforts to get out from under European domination.  At the same time Eisenhower's heavy hand against his British and French allies weakened tremendously the appearance of NATO as a solidly-united military front lined up against Soviet expansion.⁴

And America's allies were hugely embarrassed both at home and abroad.  The whole thing was very demoralizing to America's European allies – who were already suffering from a deep sense of loss of national dignity.

And perhaps most importantly, it allowed the Soviets to deflect the hostility that the world otherwise would have felt towards the Soviets in reaction to their brutal behavior in Hungary.  Indeed, at a deeper level, it reminded the world that even under Khrushchev, the Soviets were still a major superpower, one that the world needed to respect in order to survive and thrive.

³This strange alliance between America and Soviet Russia over this issue – at the expense of America's traditional allies Britain and France – stung Europe deeply, especially the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer who was very bitter about America lining itself up with the Soviets.  Further, Adenauer now grew uneasy about trusting America to come to Europe's aid (as required by NATO).  All of this influenced deeply the German decision to draw closer to France in a special European relationship – one that would grow even deeper between Germany and France after De Gaulle took over France in 1958.

⁴Basically all NATO members had placed themselves under what they thought was the promise of American backing in the conduct of their own national diplomacy, as part of their willingness to give over much of their military sovereignty to the American-directed military alliance.  That idea included the former great powers France and Britain as well as the other NATO members.

Although America never admitted it, America's relations with its neighbors to the South in Latin America had much the same quality as Europe's imperial positions in Asia and Africa.  America went from a paternalistic instinct to protect its neighbors from the meddling of European powers (the Monroe Doctrine) to a paternalistic interest itself in seeing its neighbors join America in exemplifying New World Democracy, such as America believed that it itself exemplified.

But there would always be a number of problems behind this policy, most importantly that America's neighbors had their own approach to political life and resented America's high-handed involvement in their affairs.  There were exceptions to this of course, particularly among ambitious local politicians who would form some kind of economic-political alliance with America in order to promote their own political careers locally.  Usually this came in the form of a working alliance with an American industry based in their country (such as the United Fruit Company in Guatemala, Honduras, and elsewhere, or various sugar companies in Cuba), these American companies heavily invested in the local economy.  American companies themselves looked to these select officials for protection of their investments in that country, and made sure that these officials had all the backing that money and the U.S. Marines (sent often to these countries to straighten things out) could offer.

Of course, this virtually unlimited American support inevitably led to local dictatorship, and massive economic and political (and military) corruption that accompanied such dictatorship.  This usually would end up eventually as a huge embarrassment to America, although mostly America avoided looking too closely at what was going on locally so as to dodge this problem.  In places like neighboring Cuba this situation would grow so bad that the Mafia moved in to run the gambling, prostitution and drug rings that dictator Fulgencio Batista allowed to develop in Cuba, because it brought him such vast income personally.

There would be local rebellions against such corrupt systems led by populist leaders, at which point the U.S. government itself had to decide which side of the contest it would take.  Usually it took the side of the dictators, who supposedly represented the stability that sound economics (i.e. the profitability of the American companies invested in that country) demanded.

Then in the 1950s, with the rise of Soviet Russian ambitions and the Cold War scare at home in America, such populist rebellions were easily interpreted as opening the doors of the country to the grave dangers of Communism.  At this point Eisenhower took the attitude that such rebellions must be stopped at all cost, lest Communism secure a foothold in the Western Hemisphere.