To the People of the State of New
York:
IT MAY be contended, perhaps, that
instead of OCCASIONAL appeals to the people, which are liable to the objections
urged against them, PERIODICAL appeals are the proper and adequate means
of PREVENTING AND CORRECTING INFRACTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. It will be
attended to, that in the examination of these expedients, I confine myself
to their aptitude for ENFORCING the Constitution, by keeping the several
departments of power within their due bounds, without particularly considering
them as provisions for ALTERING the Constitution itself. In the first view,
appeals to the people at fixed periods appear to be nearly as ineligible
as appeals on particular occasions as they emerge.
If the periods be separated by short
intervals, the measures to be reviewed and rectified will have been of
recent date, and will be connected with all the circumstances which tend
to vitiate and pervert the result of occasional revisions. If the periods
be distant from each other, the same remark will be applicable to all recent
measures; and in proportion as the remoteness of the others may favor a
dispassionate review of them, this advantage is inseparable from inconveniences
which seem to counterbalance it. In the first place, a distant prospect
of public censure would be a very feeble restraint on power from those
excesses to which it might be urged by the force of present motives. Is
it to be imagined that a legislative assembly, consisting of a hundred
or two hundred members, eagerly bent on some favorite object, and breaking
through the restraints of the Constitution in pursuit of it, would be arrested
in their career, by considerations drawn from a censorial revision of their
conduct at the future distance of ten, fifteen, or twenty years? In the
next place, the abuses would often have completed their mischievous effects
before the remedial provision would be applied. And in the last place,
where this might not be the case, they would be of long standing, would
have taken deep root, and would not easily be extirpated. The scheme of
revising the constitution, in order to correct recent breaches of it, as
well as for other purposes, has been actually tried in one of the States.
One of the objects of the Council of Censors which met in Pennsylvania
in 1783 and 1784, was, as we have seen, to inquire, "whether the constitution
had been violated, and whether the legislative and executive departments
had encroached upon each other. " This important and novel experiment in
politics merits, in several points of view, very particular attention.
In some of them it may, perhaps, as a single experiment, made under circumstances
somewhat peculiar, be thought to be not absolutely conclusive. But as applied
to the case under consideration, it involves some facts, which I venture
to remark, as a complete and satisfactory illustration of the reasoning
which I have employed. First. It appears, from the names of the gentlemen
who composed the council, that some, at least, of its most active members
had also been active and leading characters in the parties which pre-existed
in the State.
Secondly. It appears that the same
active and leading members of the council had been active and influential
members of the legislative and executive branches, within the period to
be reviewed; and even patrons or opponents of the very measures to be thus
brought to the test of the constitution. Two of the members had been vice-presidents
of the State, and several other members of the executive council, within
the seven preceding years. One of them had been speaker, and a number of
others distinguished members, of the legislative assembly within the same
period.
Thirdly. Every page of their proceedings
witnesses the effect of all these circumstances on the temper of their
deliberations. Throughout the continuance of the council, it was split
into two fixed and violent parties. The fact is acknowledged and lamented
by themselves. Had this not been the case, the face of their proceedings
exhibits a proof equally satisfactory. In all questions, however unimportant
in themselves, or unconnected with each other, the same names stand invariably
contrasted on the opposite columns. Every unbiased observer may infer,
without danger of mistake, and at the same time without meaning to reflect
on either party, or any individuals of either party, that, unfortunately,
PASSION, not REASON, must have presided over their decisions. When men
exercise their reason coolly and freely on a variety of distinct questions,
they inevitably fall into different opinions on some of them. When they
are governed by a common passion, their opinions, if they are so to be
called, will be the same.
Fourthly. It is at least problematical,
whether the decisions of this body do not, in several instances, misconstrue
the limits prescribed for the legislative and executive departments, instead
of reducing and limiting them within their constitutional places.
Fifthly. I have never understood
that the decisions of the council on constitutional questions, whether
rightly or erroneously formed, have had any effect in varying the practice
founded on legislative constructions. It even appears, if I mistake not,
that in one instance the contemporary legislature denied the constructions
of the council, and actually prevailed in the contest. This censorial body,
therefore, proves at the same time, by its researches, the existence of
the disease, and by its example, the inefficacy of the remedy. This conclusion
cannot be invalidated by alleging that the State in which the experiment
was made was at that crisis, and had been for a long time before, violently
heated and distracted by the rage of party. Is it to be presumed, that
at any future septennial epoch the same State will be free from parties?
Is it to be presumed that any other State, at the same or any other given
period, will be exempt from them? Such an event ought to be neither presumed
nor desired; because an extinction of parties necessarily implies either
a universal alarm for the public safety, or an absolute extinction of liberty.
Were the precaution taken of excluding from the assemblies elected by the
people, to revise the preceding administration of the government, all persons
who should have been concerned with the government within the given period,
the difficulties would not be obviated. The important task would probably
devolve on men, who, with inferior capacities, would in other respects
be little better qualified. Although they might not have been personally
concerned in the administration, and therefore not immediately agents in
the measures to be examined, they would probably have been involved in
the parties connected with these measures, and have been elected under
their auspices.
PUBLIUS. |