To the People of the State of New
York:
IT HAS been mentioned as one of the
advantages to be expected from the co-operation of the Senate, in the business
of appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the administration.
The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint.
A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so violent
or so general a revolution in the officers of the government as might be
expected, if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any station
had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new President
would be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a person more
agreeable to him, by the apprehension that a discountenance of the Senate
might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit upon himself.
Those who can best estimate the value of a steady administration, will
be most disposed to prize a provision which connects the official existence
of public men with the approbation or disapprobation of that body which,
from the greater permanency of its own composition, will in all probability
be less subject to inconstancy than any other member of the government.
To this union of the Senate with
the President, in the article of appointments, it has in some cases been
suggested that it would serve to give the President an undue influence
over the Senate, and in others that it would have an opposite tendency,
a strong proof that neither suggestion is true.
To state the first in its proper
form, is to refute it. It amounts to this: the President would have an
improper INFLUENCE OVER the Senate, because the Senate would have the power
of RESTRAINING him. This is an absurdity in terms. It cannot admit of a
doubt that the entire power of appointment would enable him much more effectually
to establish a dangerous empire over that body, than a mere power of nomination
subject to their control.
Let us take a view of the converse
of the proposition: "the Senate would influence the Executive." As I have
had occasion to remark in several other instances, the indistinctness of
the objection forbids a precise answer. In what manner is this influence
to be exerted? In relation to what objects? The power of influencing a
person, in the sense in which it is here used, must imply a power of conferring
a benefit upon him. How could the Senate confer a benefit upon the President
by the manner of employing their right of negative upon his nominations?
If it be said they might sometimes gratify him by an acquiescence in a
favorite choice, when public motives might dictate a different conduct,
I answer, that the instances in which the President could be personally
interested in the result, would be too few to admit of his being materially
affected by the compliances of the Senate. The POWER which can ORIGINATE
the disposition of honors and emoluments, is more likely to attract than
to be attracted by the POWER which can merely obstruct their course. If
by influencing the President be meant RESTRAINING him, this is precisely
what must have been intended. And it has been shown that the restraint
would be salutary, at the same time that it would not be such as to destroy
a single advantage to be looked for from the uncontrolled agency of that
Magistrate. The right of nomination would produce all the good of that
of appointment, and would in a great measure avoid its evils. Upon a comparison
of the plan for the appointment of the officers of the proposed government
with that which is established by the constitution of this State, a decided
preference must be given to the former. In that plan the power of nomination
is unequivocally vested in the Executive. And as there would be a necessity
for submitting each nomination to the judgment of an entire branch of the
legislature, the circumstances attending an appointment, from the mode
of conducting it, would naturally become matters of notoriety; and the
public would be at no loss to determine what part had been performed by
the different actors. The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the
President singly and absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good one would
lie entirely at the door of the Senate; aggravated by the consideration
of their having counteracted the good intentions of the Executive. If an
ill appointment should be made, the Executive for nominating, and the Senate
for approving, would participate, though in different degrees, in the opprobrium
and disgrace.
The reverse of all this characterizes
the manner of appointment in this State. The council of appointment consists
of from three to five persons, of whom the governor is always one. This
small body, shut up in a private apartment, impenetrable to the public
eye, proceed to the execution of the trust committed to them. It is known
that the governor claims the right of nomination, upon the strength of
some ambiguous expressions in the constitution; but it is not known to
what extent, or in what manner he exercises it; nor upon what occasions
he is contradicted or opposed. The censure of a bad appointment, on account
of the uncertainty of its author, and for want of a determinate object,
has neither poignancy nor duration. And while an unbounded field for cabal
and intrigue lies open, all idea of responsibility is lost. The most that
the public can know, is that the governor claims the right of nomination;
that TWO out of the inconsiderable number of FOUR men can too often be
managed without much difficulty; that if some of the members of a particular
council should happen to be of an uncomplying character, it is frequently
not impossible to get rid of their opposition by regulating the times of
meeting in such a manner as to render their attendance inconvenient; and
that from whatever cause it may proceed, a great number of very improper
appointments are from time to time made. Whether a governor of this State
avails himself of the ascendant he must necessarily have, in this delicate
and important part of the administration, to prefer to offices men who
are best qualified for them, or whether he prostitutes that advantage to
the advancement of persons whose chief merit is their implicit devotion
to his will, and to the support of a despicable and dangerous system of
personal influence, are questions which, unfortunately for the community,
can only be the subjects of speculation and conjecture.
Every mere council of appointment,
however constituted, will be a conclave, in which cabal and intrigue will
have their full scope. Their number, without an unwarrantable increase
of expense, cannot be large enough to preclude a facility of combination.
And as each member will have his friends and connections to provide for,
the desire of mutual gratification will beget a scandalous bartering of
votes and bargaining for places. The private attachments of one man might
easily be satisfied; but to satisfy the private attachments of a dozen,
or of twenty men, would occasion a monopoly of all the principal employments
of the government in a few families, and would lead more directly to an
aristocracy or an oligarchy than any measure that could be contrived. If,
to avoid an accumulation of offices, there was to be a frequent change
in the persons who were to compose the council, this would involve the
mischiefs of a mutable administration in their full extent. Such a council
would also be more liable to executive influence than the Senate, because
they would be fewer in number, and would act less immediately under the
public inspection. Such a council, in fine, as a substitute for the plan
of the convention, would be productive of an increase of expense, a multiplication
of the evils which spring from favoritism and intrigue in the distribution
of public honors, a decrease of stability in the administration of the
government, and a diminution of the security against an undue influence
of the Executive. And yet such a council has been warmly contended for
as an essential amendment in the proposed Constitution.
I could not with propriety conclude
my observations on the subject of appointments without taking notice of
a scheme for which there have appeared some, though but few advocates;
I mean that of uniting the House of Representatives in the power of making
them. I shall, however, do little more than mention it, as I cannot imagine
that it is likely to gain the countenance of any considerable part of the
community. A body so fluctuating and at the same time so numerous, can
never be deemed proper for the exercise of that power. Its unfitness will
appear manifest to all, when it is recollected that in half a century it
may consist of three or four hundred persons. All the advantages of the
stability, both of the Executive and of the Senate, would be defeated by
this union, and infinite delays and embarrassments would be occasioned.
The example of most of the States in their local constitutions encourages
us to reprobate the idea.
The only remaining powers of the
Executive are comprehended in giving information to Congress of the state
of the Union; in recommending to their consideration such measures as he
shall judge expedient; in convening them, or either branch, upon extraordinary
occasions; in adjourning them when they cannot themselves agree upon the
time of adjournment; in receiving ambassadors and other public ministers;
in faithfully executing the laws; and in commissioning all the officers
of the United States.
Except some cavils about the power
of convening EITHER house of the legislature, and that of receiving ambassadors,
no objection has been made to this class of authorities; nor could they
possibly admit of any. It required, indeed, an insatiable avidity for censure
to invent exceptions to the parts which have been excepted to. In regard
to the power of convening either house of the legislature, I shall barely
remark, that in respect to the Senate at least, we can readily discover
a good reason for it. AS this body has a concurrent power with the Executive
in the article of treaties, it might often be necessary to call it together
with a view to this object, when it would be unnecessary and improper to
convene the House of Representatives. As to the reception of ambassadors,
what I have said in a former paper will furnish a sufficient answer.
We have now completed a survey of
the structure and powers of the executive department, which, I have endeavored
to show, combines, as far as republican principles will admit, all the
requisites to energy. The remaining inquiry is: Does it also combine the
requisites to safety, in a republican sense, a due dependence on the people,
a due responsibility? The answer to this question has been anticipated
in the investigation of its other characteristics, and is satisfactorily
deducible from these circumstances; from the election of the President
once in four years by persons immediately chosen by the people for that
purpose; and from his being at all times liable to impeachment, trial,
dismission from office, incapacity to serve in any other, and to forfeiture
of life and estate by subsequent prosecution in the common course of law.
But these precautions, great as they are, are not the only ones which the
plan of the convention has provided in favor of the public security. In
the only instances in which the abuse of the executive authority was materially
to be feared, the Chief Magistrate of the United States would, by that
plan, be subjected to the control of a branch of the legislative body.
What more could be desired by an enlightened and reasonable people?
PUBLIUS. |