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 The matter of personal character Popular support for the war The military campaigns in the North (1775-1778) The military campaign moves South (1778-1781) The action in the West The battle at seaThe textual material on this webpage is drawn directly from my work America – The Covenant Nation © 2021, Volume One, pages 122-137. |
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Washington – the warrior
George Washington's appointment by the Continental Congress as commander of the newly authorized Continental Army proved to be a very Providential (as in Godly) choice. Whereas a number of experienced Patriot officers (having also previously served as officers in the British Army) coveted that position, Washington had not. He accepted the responsibility only because he understood that he was simply answering the call to duty – a call that came not just from men but also from God. He was living out his destiny. |
by Charles Willson
Peale
Washington and Lee University
Collection
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Washington, as sensitive as any of us to the
opinion of others, had taught himself at an early age to discipline his
feelings and move forward toward his calling regardless of the
obstacles (usually human) thrown before him. But he also knew that
there was a special hand on his life, a special place in the affairs of
Providence (the term for God frequently used at that time) that not
only protected him, but opened the way for him to move ahead in life.
He thus combined faith and personal discipline in a way that inspired
others. He sought honor by seeking first of all to be honorable. He was
highly demanding of integrity in himself – to be a man of honor.
As events were soon to demonstrate, he could be rather forgiving of the lack of honor in his associates (such as his colleagues Lee and Gates) who had given him little reason to expect much from them anyway. But he could be quite demanding of integrity of character and action when it came to those on whom he had come to confer his trust (like Arnold). Washington was unbending in his expectation of excellent behavior on the part of the men under his command. But these expectations were always accompanied by his equally strong sense of trust in these same men. This conferral of his trust was a powerful instrument that succeeded in getting the very best from others. The soldiers under his command seemed always to try eagerly and sacrificially to live up to that trust. This was leadership, true leadership, and a real blessing to a new nation trying to make its way forward into an unknown future. Washington would not need to bark orders to those around him to get them moving in the right direction. A simple word would be enough to get things moving. People would be moved to right behavior sometimes simply by his mere presence in their midst. This power of his almost wordless presence (which happened daily as he moved among his soldiers in the icy fields of Valley Forge) would prove in fact to be one of his greatest contributions to the American cause, not only in war but also in peace (such as his daily almost wordless contribution as chairman of the Constitutional Convention gathered in Philadelphia the summer of 1787 to write the new American Constitution). From where then did Washington draw such inner strength of character if it clearly was not the approval of others? In part it was almost something he seemed born with – a burning desire to succeed. But the success he sought was both social as well as personal: he was a man of incredible concern for the welfare of others. And he seemed to have some well-cultivated instinct for doing things right – right not only as social convention demanded, but at an even deeper level, what he understood God or Providence required of him. Washington was faithful in his time spent quietly in private prayer with God and in his attendance in Sunday worship (although not necessarily regular in this latter matter), fully convinced that there was no other way to secure goodness and Truth for his world, personally and socially. His sense of personal responsibility arose greatly from that powerful sense of divine appointment. He lived and served, as he saw things, fully in service to God and country – by God's will. How that special relationship he had with God in the midst of this crushing responsibility is well illustrated in the Diary and Remembrances of a Presbyterian Minister Rev. Nathaniel Randolph Snowden who recorded a conversation he had with Isaac Potts of Valley Forge, Pennsylvania (at whose home Washington was residing that winter): I was riding with him (Mr. Potts) near Valley Forge, where the army lay during the war of the Revolution. Mr. Potts was a Senator in our state and a Whig. I told him I was agreeably surprised to find him a friend to his country as the Quakers were mostly Tories. He said, It was so and I was a rank Tory once, for I never believed that America could proceed against Great Britain whose fleets and armies covered the land and ocean. But something very extraordinary converted me to the good faith.
Washington's understanding of the challenge before him
Indeed the appointment of Washington as the commander of the Continental Army was a Providential choice1 also because he understood the way that Americans would have to fight the huge English military machine better than anyone else around him. He understood two things: 1) to engage the huge English army not directly, but indirectly, using the element of surprise (Indian style) and 2) remember that wars are not won in one great battle, but instead through the staying power of one side willing to fight on longer than the enemy. Battles bring the victor immediate glory. And a great number of the men, especially other generals in the American army, were eager to attain that glory. They were primarily focused on the next battle, eager to get a chance to gain glory. Victory was not only extremely thrilling in its moment of arrival (a kind of military high), it gave the victors greatly enhanced status with others. However, Washington well understood that while victory in battle may bring glory, it does not necessarily win wars. And his sense of duty always made very clear to him that he was called to win a war, not gain impressive victories in battle. This may seem puzzling to many even today. Aren't the victories in battle what ultimately win wars? Maybe – and maybe not. What actually wins wars is a breaking of the enemy's desire, for whatever reason, to continue the conflict. Wars are won when one side or the other is ready to call it quits. Thus wars are fundamentally about morale, not about military mechanics. Certainly a victory in a particular battle improves the level of morale of one or the other side in a war. But it generally takes more than one, or even several, military victories to reshape morale to the extent that one side or the other is willing to call it quits. Warriors usually have great staying power – and a loser in battle can put this particular defeat behind him with the hope of a possible win in the next round of the conflict. So in the end, a war is won on the staying power of the contenders, not just the military brilliance of one or another army and its commanders.
Washington's strategy
Thus while generals in the various armies under Washington's command seemed out to win battles – and the glory such battles earned them – Washington was doggedly committed to winning the war, regardless of the fortunes of battle. Washington knew that his primary function was to keep his army of rebels (or Whigs or Patriots) intact and still troublesome to the English (even if it was never fully victorious on the battlefield) – until England tired of the game and was ready to call it quits and let the Americans go freely on their way again. Washington's inability to win the big one year after year drew much criticism from others, especially other generals who coveted the dignity of Washington's top position over the Continental Army. Consequently, they frequently lobbied with the Continental Congress behind Washington's back to have him replaced (by themselves of course). But Washington seemed unruffled by these endeavors of some of his associates. He was given a war to win. And by the grace of God he was determined to fulfill his duty.
Ethical troubles behind Washington's back
So, character and understanding combined in Washington to produce exactly the kind of leadership that the Patriots would need to get through this war successfully. But other generals lacked that same character. And from time to time America paid a big price for these individuals' quest for praise and honor – at the cost of true wisdom and eventually even their own success. In their quest for glory they put themselves at the center of their devotion and lost sight of the bigger agenda, the one which Washington was clearly following. They became like gods in their own eyes, seeking all glory and honor for themselves. Thus they failed to grasp the higher calling on America, the one that God had placed before them, and the one that Washington was attempting to answer. And God was with him. But as for the others, God gave them over to the depravity of their own logic. And they at some point self-destructed, sadly taking a lot of American morale or spirit with them. ...their thinking became futile and their foolish hearts were darkened. Although they claimed to be wise, they became fools and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images made to look like mortal man ... (Romans 1:21-23 NIV)
General Charles Lee
General Lee was one of those individuals. He had once been an officer in the British army and considered himself more experienced and thus a better candidate than Washington for the top position. As next in command under Washington he had never been particularly supportive of Washington's military efforts. Washington tolerated him and even accorded Lee proper commanding privileges, though he was aware of Lee's maneuvering behind his back. Also Lee was rather skillfully uncooperative as second in command, more than once leaving Washington without his required support, thereby putting Washington at an ever greater disadvantage in facing the enemy. At one point his purposeful dawdling with his troops ironically gave the British the opportunity to capture Lee and imprison him – until a prisoner exchange could be arranged. Washington was not pleased to have him back. But he said and did nothing to undercut Lee. Eventually it was a near catastrophe in a key battle (Monmouth) caused by Lee's lack of the right kind of military instincts that finally gave Washington the opportunity to rid himself of this nuisance. However Lee fought back before the Continental Congress because of his removal from command by Washington. But this thankfully only worsened Lee's case before the members of the Congress, who were beginning to catch on to Washington's real importance as the glue keeping their army together. 1It
was also a wise human choice, because he was a Virginian and his
appointment made this more than just a New England rebellion, as it was
up to that point. |
New York, Metropolitan Museum
of Art
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General Horatio Gates
General Gates, the hero of Saratoga, was another one of those individuals. He too had been a British officer and too believed himself to be the better candidate for the top position. Washington's amazing success at Trenton at the end of 1776 ended temporarily Gates's lobbying before Congress for Washington's job. Gates was however eventually sent to take command of the Northern Department. This put him directly in the position of having to face the British at Saratoga in 1777. Saratoga was a success and Gates the hero of the battle, though his fainthearted ways had not been the cause of the victory. That honor truly belonged to others, including Benedict Arnold, whose insubordinate attack on the British had moved the morale considerably from the British to the American side in this drawn-out battle. But in his self-promoting report on the victory at Saratoga, Gates did not bother even to mention Arnold's role. Gates then soon joined a secret effort of a number of top officers in the Continental Army to have their supporters in Congress remove Washington from command (the Conway Cabal). This effort fell apart when it was exposed publicly. Gates apologized to Washington and survived politically. When two years later, as the Americans were facing terrible losses in the Southern war, the hero of Saratoga was given command of the Southern District. But the job proved greater than his real abilities – and at Camden, South Carolina (1780), Gates' army was crushed by the British. Gates was relieved of command, retired, but then recalled from retirement (1782) to rejoin Washington – where he may have been part of another plot (1783) to have Washington removed. But by then the war was actually over. |
Philadelphia, Independence
Hall
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General Benedict Arnold
General Arnold was another individual caught up in the maneuvering of Congress in its politically inspired distribution of military commands and military honors. But Arnold's situation was quite different from Lee and Gates in that the maneuvering in Congress seemed, as with Washington, to be aimed against Arnold, a man who was in fact one of the most capable of America's generals. Arnold was constantly passed over in Congress for promotions in favor of others, who often took credit for Arnold's unheralded actions (such as Gates at Saratoga). At one point, Congress even reprimanded Arnold for owing it money – though he had exhausted most of his own personal fortunes on behalf of the American war effort. However, lacking Washington's moral and spiritual self-discipline, Arnold gradually sunk into a deep bitterness and, encouraged by his young pro-British or Tory Philadelphia bride, Peggy Shippen, he decided to switch his services to the British side of the war. He was planning, as the newly appointed commander (appointed by a trusting Washington) of the key fortress at West Point, to turn the strategic site on the Hudson River over to the British. But his plans were discovered and the plot foiled (1780). However, he was able to make his own escape down the Hudson to British lines. He was soon given command of a British army unit and caused considerable destruction to the American cause with his raids in Virginia and in his home state of Connecticut. After the war, living in England as an expatriate, he was met by the English with rather mixed emotions. And he himself began to have regrets about his betrayal. Sadly, his last request as he approached death in 1801 was that he be buried not in his British but rather in his American officer's uniform. |
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The Americans themselves were greatly divided on the rebellion
Dark days lay ahead for the Americans. These dark days would also test the character and spirit of all the colonials, civilians as well as soldiers. By no means were all colonials supportive of this rebellion. A large number of the colonials (estimates vary from 15 percent to 30 percent, with most of those concentrated in the southern colonies) were opposed to the rebellion. As Tories or Loyalists, they stood with their king on the issues. To be sure, an even larger number (estimates from 35 percent to 45 percent) of the colonials were active supporters of the rebellion (strong in New England and the Middle Colonies). As Whigs or Patriots, they filled the ranks of the militia – or as civilians provided (supposedly) support in supplies or finances to the war effort. And the rest, who were quite numerous themselves, were rather neutral, tending to go with whichever side seemed at the moment to have the upper hand. Sadly some of the Whigs or Patriots supposedly supporting the independence effort proved to be rather unreliable in backing the Patriot soldiers in their attempt to defend that independence. Many were quick to sell agricultural goods to the British army in return for hard currency while their own armies starved. Also, the states, loud in their support of the idea of independence, were amazingly unwilling to come up with the financial support necessary to pay even the minimum amount needed to feed, arm and clothe the Patriot armies, a matter of huge frustration to Washington, and to the other officers and soldiers sacrificing their fortunes and lives in support of the independence effort. The clergy and minority groups in the war
The clergy were themselves divided. The priests of the Church of England assigned to parishes in America rather naturally supported the Tory cause and simply retreated to England when the war broke out. However, Congregationalist and Presbyterian pastors typically were strongly supportive of the move to independence, their support at times even active on the battlefield (often commanding militia units themselves), so active that the Tories referred to them as the Black Regiment (clergy wore black robes, though certainly not in battle!). A favorite story about the involvement of the clergy in the war arose from an event that occurred in 1780, when Presbyterian pastor James Caldwell (whose wife had been killed by Hessian troops when he was away) found the same Hessians soon returning to his village of Springfield, New Jersey. When fighting broke out and the Patriots ran out of paper wadding for their muskets, he ripped out pages of his church's hymnbooks, Watts's Psalms and Hymns, and passed them to the soldiers, shouting,"Put Watts into them, boys! Give them Watts!" On the political front, clergy took major positions of leadership. One of these was John Witherspoon, a Scottish Presbyterian pastor who came to the colonies in 1768 to take the presidency of the College of New Jersey (the future Princeton University). Under his presidency the college became a breeding-ground for young leaders of the movement for independence, he himself then becoming a delegate to the Continental Congress debating such independence. Then as an official of the denomination, he called on fellow Presbyterian ministers to speak out boldly on the matter of American independence. And in 1776 he had the opportunity to sign the Declaration of Independence, the only clergyman (and college president) to do so.2 There were few Catholics in the colonies (mostly concentrated in Maryland and southern Pennsylvania). Their position had always been precarious, and the war at first did not change things. But the alliance with Catholic France helped Catholics serve the Patriot cause. But so did the leadership of the Carroll family, prominent Catholics in Maryland. One of them, Father John Carroll,3 in fact a Jesuit priest, early on was asked to represent the Patriot cause to the French Canadians, in the hope of being able to ally with the Canadians in the move to American independence. John's brother, Daniel, was a signer of the Articles of Confederation and later the Constitution of the United States, and a cousin Charles was a signer of the Declaration of Independence and eventually a U.S. senator representing Maryland. The Carrolls, like Jefferson, were understandably strong supporters of the idea of separating religion from the affairs of civil government. For a while, Protestant animosity towards Catholics would subside as a result of the Carrolls' role in securing American independence and subsequently its Republic. For the German communities, mostly located along the Pennsylvanian and North Carolinian western frontiers, the situation was one that also required much caution. Lutherans were split, some supporting the Patriot cause, others remaining Loyalists, because in coming out of Germany they had found life in English America so much more hospitable and felt that a spirit of gratitude towards English authority for this better life was required of them. Then there were the German Pietists, small groups of pacifists, such as the Protestant Moravians (recently brought there from Germany by Count Nikolaus von Zinzendorf) who found themselves torn as to which way to go in this battle. They were, after all, pacifists. Zinzendorf and the Moravians
The young Saxon nobleman Zinzendorf in the 1720s had taken in Protestant Bohemian and Moravian refugees escaping Catholic persecution in their homeland (today's Czech Republic), a persecution that reached back to the days of the Czech Reformer Jan Hus (burned at the stake by Church authorities in 1415) when their religious reform movement (Unitas Fratrum) got started. Zinzendorf created a retreat center for these Moravians called Herrenhut. But sectarian controversies that developed within Herrenhut and also with the German world around it compelled Zinzendorf to focus his efforts in developing a true spirit of Christian unity, resulting in an amazing Moravian pacifism – and an equally amazing commitment to Christian mission work (the 1730s) under the most difficult of conditions, especially among the African slaves of the Caribbean (but also elsewhere). It was their missionary work that first brought them to Georgia in 1735, to be part of the philanthropic project that Georgia was announced to be. They did not succeed greatly in that endeavor – except to influence profoundly a young John Wesley, who took up many of the Moravian approaches to ministry in his own subsequent work in England. In 1741, the Moravians moved on to Pennsylvania, finally establishing a successful mission station there at Bethlehem and then soon at nearby Nazareth. From there they sent missions to many other parts of the English colonies, most notably Salem (now Winston-Salem) in North Carolina. Now in the 1770s their pacifism made things difficult for themselves as their newly adopted country chose sides in this growing conflict between the colonies and their English king. The Moravians attempted to stay neutral, but over time, and quite gradually, found themselves supporting the Patriot cause. 2After the war, he would be the one to call together and lead the first national Presbyterian General Assembly. 3Father
John Carroll would become the first Catholic bishop in the United
States and also found Georgetown College in 1789 along the |
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Keesee and Sidwell, p. 118
| Meanwhile
Washington, who had taken command of the Continental Army at Boston,
realized that the British pullout from Boston meant trouble further
south along the New England coast. He decided to pull his army
out of
Boston and reposition it in New York, on Long Island just opposite
Manhattan. But the British army arrived by ship in huge numbers
and
maneuvered Washington's army back into an encirclement along the
Brooklyn Heights (August, 1776). Washington and his men were
trapped.
The only thing Washington could do was to try to slip undetected by
night across the East River into Manhattan in order to escape this
trap. However, there was virtually no hope of being able to
rescue more
than a small portion of his army before the British would awaken to the
program and shut him down. But he had no alternative. And then
came a
mysterious fog which covered the East River and hid his escape –
lasting miraculously until mid-morning, allowing Washington to get
nearly his whole army away to safety. Clearly this was understood
by all Americans as an incredible intervention on God's part.
But of course wars are not won merely by escaping the enemy. But for Washington, this seemed to be his only recourse – again and again. He got his army out of another potential trap in Manhattan – but lost two strategic American forts and over 3,000 troops taken prisoner by the British in the process. New York City would remain in British hands until the end of the war. Depression
Washington then retreated through New Jersey and crossed into Pennsylvania, the onset of winter and the tradition by which armies rested in the winter rather than fight – giving Washington some reprieve from continuing British pressure. Morale was low. People were deserting nearby Philadelphia, fearing a British attack on the city. Washington's Continental Army was down to about 5,000 soldiers, and that number was dwindling fast. Worse, a good number of them had their terms of enlistment running out at the end of December. At the same time, facing the Americans was – or was soon to be – a growing British Army of over 30,000 troops. Things were looking tragically grim for Washington. These are the times that try men's souls. Trenton (December 25-26, 1776)
To break the mood of depression, Washington decided to conduct a surprise attack on the Hessian troops serving the British at Trenton on the night of Christmas, when the Hessians hopefully would be sleeping off heavy Christmas celebrations. It was a daring maneuver: an ice-filled Delaware River to cross and then a nine-mile march south to Trenton in the dead of a dark, freezing, rainy-snowy night. But Washington seemed unshaken by the high risk of it all. His confidence, which came from a serene higher sense of things, inspired a similar confidence in his men. The attack, and a secondary assault ordered by Washington on another British unit posted nearby, succeeded brilliantly, with little loss of American life (two killed) and yet 1,000 Hessians killed or captured (though a number of American soldiers died in the following days from disease and exhaustion caused by the wintery effort). Princeton (January 3, 1777)
His amazing victory (many said miraculous victory) was soon followed up by another – also stunning – victory against a British unit sent to retake Trenton. Washington abandoned Trenton, but defeated this English relieving force at nearby Princeton. At first the battle looked as if it were going to be another disaster for the Americans. But Washington managed to rally his troops and turn a retreat into an attack – routing instead the British. It was another humiliating defeat for the British. These two victories of Trenton and Princeton were strategically small militarily, but morale-wise they were huge boosts to the American effort. Few soldiers abandoned Washington at this critical juncture. Indeed, many men now signed up to serve under Washington. The Continental Army remained a viable fighting machine. |
the night of December 25, 1776 – by Emanuel Leutze
New York, Metropolitan Museum
of Art
Historical Society of
Pennsylvania
The two small victories at Trenton and then Princeton proved to be major moral boosters
for his dwindling army ... keeping it from disintegrating
(sketches by a Bavarian
officer serving in the British army)
collection of Mrs. John
Nicholas Brown
collection of Mrs. John Nicholas
Brown
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The Battle of Saratoga (September-October 1777)
The British had a plan to knock the Northern colonies out of the war by breaking the vital line of communications between New England and the Middle Colonies at New York, along the upper Hudson River. They planned to bring a large part of their army occupying New York City up the Hudson River to meet two other British armies coming South from Canada. But things immediately began to go wrong for the British. Colonial militia used every trick in the book to slow up the movement of the British groups descending from Canada. And a section of the British army was overrun (1,000 men killed, wounded or captured) at Bennington in August. Another British group returned to Canada when their Indian allies abandoned them upon hearing that Arnold was commanding the colonials opposing them. Meanwhile the British commander in New York City, William Howe, sent his men not up the Hudson but off on an expedition to capture Philadelphia. Finally in September the remnants of the British army (6,000 soldiers under General John Burgoyne) met the Americans (8,000 soldiers under General Gates) at Saratoga, New York. The results of a hard-fought encounter were at first inconclusive and the situation settled into a stalemate. Burgoyne kept waiting for British reinforcements – which never came. Meanwhile in the American ranks, which were actually growing at this time, friction had grown between Gates and his subordinate commander (but militarily aggressive) Arnold, and a jealous Gates sidelined Arnold, forcing him into a largely inactive role. When battle resumed in October the British were forced slowly to give ground. Then Arnold disobeyed Gates and led a charge on the weakening British line – firing up the American lines which in turn delivered yet another crippling blow to the British. Surrounded and exhausted, now certain that he would receive no aid from Howe, Burgoyne finally surrendered his entire British army to Gates. Gates thus became the "hero of Saratoga," an irritated Gates endeavoring to make sure that Arnold's role in the victory would go unnoticed by Congress. The French join the war on the American side (February 1778)
With this stunning defeat of a large British army by a clearly effective American army, the French King Louis XVI lost all hesitation and openly declared himself an ally of the Americans (the French, along with the Spanish and Dutch, had previously been quietly slipping support to the American rebels). British General Howe had indeed taken the American capital of Philadelphia in September (1777). But that achievement seemed less significant to the French than the American capture of 6,000 British soldiers in October. Thus in February (1778) America and France became wartime allies. The loss of Philadelphia (1777)
For Washington, things had not gone well. He was not part of the glory of Saratoga. Instead he had been trying to follow and anticipate Howe's moves in removing his troops from New York. Howe's intent finally became clear in August when Howe moved by water up the Chesapeake in the direction of Philadelphia. Washington tried to block the advance of the larger army, but was outflanked at Brandywine (September) and thus forced to allow Howe to enter Philadelphia virtually unopposed. Then a stalemate set in as Washington tried unsuccessfully to capture the Germantown garrison just north of Philadelphia (October). And then the British tried, equally unsuccessfully, to take Washington at White Marsh (December). |
south of Saratoga – October
7, 1777
Fort Ticonderoga
Museum
United States Architect
of the Capitol
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Wintering at Valley Forge (1777-1778)
At this point it was time for the armies to move into winter quarters. It would be another very trying time for Washington's Continental Army. Of the 10,000 troops that went into winter quarters at Valley Forge just outside Philadelphia, 2,500 of them would die there of cold, hunger and disease before the next spring arrived. But it would be a very different army that would finally emerge from the experience. Mere survival that winter, not to mention success in the next year's military campaign, would require discipline. And the troops got just that from the experience. Military training from Prussian Baron von Steuben and spiritual discipline from the pious rigor Washington maintained in his own life and the same discipline he expected of his men (including daily prayers) brought a quite disciplined army back into service in the late spring of 1778. |
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Monmouth (June 28, 1778)
With the French in the war, the British decided to abandon Philadelphia and return their troops to New York, fearing a French naval assault on that city. Howe resigned and General Henry Clinton took over as commander of the British armies in America. All the way from Philadelphia back to New York City, Washington shadowed Clinton's march. Finally, as the British troops passed the Monmouth Court House, Washington saw an opportunity and ordered a surprise attack on the rear of Clinton's army. The arrogant and temperamental General Lee originally had refused the honor of commanding a small military unit ordered by Washington to lead the attack – but changed his mind when he saw how glad Washington was that he had said no, and subsequently requested command of the forward attack force. But Lee lost heart in the midst of the battle when British General Charles Cornwallis counterattacked. Without consulting Washington, Lee ordered a retreat – which turned into a rout. Washington came upon the fleeing Americans, took direct command, and quickly reorganized his men for a counterattack. The battle raged back and forth until nightfall, when both sides were forced to break off the fight. That night Clinton slipped his men away to continue their march to New York City. For Washington this was not the victory he had hoped for, though it finally allowed him to get rid of the troublesome General Lee, who was disgraced by his actions. But it did prove that under proper command his disciplined troops were fully capable of taking on directly an equally manned and equipped British army. This would also be the last major battle in the American North (although smaller battles would continue in the Middle Colonies). |
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Keesee and Sidwell, p. 124
| Failing
to get any traction in the North, the British decided to move their
activities to the South, where it was hoped that a large number of
pro-British American Tories might help deliver that part of colonial
America over to the British forces. The British were assured that with
the show of a few British victories in the South, the Tories would come
out in huge numbers in support of the British effort. But making that
happen proved to be more difficult than the British at first had hoped.
Early British and Tory (or Loyalist) failures in the South (1776-1778)
From the very beginning of the war things went terribly wrong for the British and their Tory Loyalists in the South. The British governors in the South had been trying to form Tory militia since the outbreak of the conflict in early 1775. Plans were also to bring Redcoats to the Carolinas to join up with Southern Tories. But Whig or Patriot militia were also forming rapidly in the South. Hearing of British plans to land a force of Redcoats in the Carolinas, both sides, Whigs and Tories, began to mobilize in anticipation of this event. Both sides met at Moore's Creek Bridge (North Carolina) in February of 1776 – and the Tories were soundly defeated by the Patriots. Though the conflict was small in scale (less than 1,000 on each side) the result of the conflict was the tremendous quieting of Tory sympathies in the South. The British now had to depend largely on their own forces. Unable to find a secure landing in North Carolina for the soldiers and supplies necessary to support their effort to crush the Southern rebellion, they turned toward the major southern seaport of Charleston. But they mistakenly landed their soldiers on Sullivan Island, and thus tried to subdue the defending American fort by ship's canon rather than troop assault across deep waters. But the palmetto logs forming the American outer defenses easily took the shelling – and the fort proved impregnable. Thus the British simply called off the attack on Charleston – and pretty much the entire southern effort. British Florida, protected by the British fort at St. Augustine, remained in British hands – and became a place of refuge for Tories fleeing the reprisals of the Southern Patriots. But the British seemed unable to acquire any advantage from this strategic position (partly due to political squabbles within the British upper political circles). Eventually British Florida would be able to contribute to the war, but not with the impact that it originally would have had on the war if it had been able to get going earlier. With the failure of the British to gain what should have been a much easier victory in the South, they lost the valuable strategic advantage they had – and probably the war itself. If they had taken the South out of the war in its early days it would have undoubtedly collapsed the entire colonial rebellion. But they let that opportunity slip from their hands. Indeed, for the next two years the Tory or Loyalist position in the South only worsened as British support failed to appear and as Patriots did their best to drive the Loyalists out of the area. The British now focus their war effort on the South (1778)
Then after the Battle of Monmouth, with the growing awareness of the
British that they would not be able to make much further progress in
the North, British attention turned decidedly to the South. Once again,
the hope was to seize a southern seaport in order to offload soldiers
and supplies for a major southern offensive. Savannah
The target this time was Savannah. It was defended only by some 700 Patriots and thus easily taken in December by a British force of 3,500 troops arriving by sea, even before 2,000 British troops coming up from Florida had a chance to assist in the action. The British now had a seaport available to begin bringing in soldiers and supplies to knock the South out of the war. Savannah would continue to serve the British well in that capacity. A French and Patriot effort to retake the city the following year (October 1779) failed miserably, resulting in the loss of about 1,000 French and Patriots killed, wounded or captured. Charleston
Things then seemed to go from bad to much worse for the Patriots when British General Clinton directed a joint land and sea offensive of around 14,000 troops and ninety ships against the city of Charleston, defended by a force only about a third that size. British General Charles Cornwallis, who was commanding the land force, was soon able to cut off the land routes in and out of the city and then begin the assault on the city itself. As the weeks went by it became apparent to the American commander Lincoln that the city could not hold out and a decision was made simply to surrender the city and the 5,000 American troops protecting it. It was the worst American military defeat of the war – and sent a shock wave through the colonies. |
British Commander in the
Southern Campaign
American
commander of the fort at Sullivan's Island outside of Charleston
National Park Service
The Capitol
|
Camden
If things were not bad enough, they got even worse for the Patriots when Gates, the supposed genius of Saratoga, was sent to take over the Southern Department. Believing himself to be something of a brilliant military leader, he decided on the strategy of a direct assault against Cornwallis's well-seasoned army. Gates was commanding a larger army – but poorly organized and mostly inexperienced. In August (1780), at Camden, South Carolina, the two sides met. The results for the Patriots were terrible. Gates's militia troops broke ranks and fled, leaving now only 800 Continentals to face 2,000 British troops. Colonel Banastre Tarleton's cavalry charge quickly scattered even these Patriot troops. The battle was quickly over. The losses for the Americans were enormous (the loss of over 2,000 men), not only numerically but also morale-wise. |
by Sir Joshua Reynolds
London, National
Gallery
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Waxhaws
The war in the South now turned into a very nasty guerrilla-style action as British troops under Tarleton had earlier moved into the rural interior seeking to break the last of the Patriot resistance with a harsh strategy of burning out Patriot farms and towns as they went. At the battle of Waxhaws, South Carolina (May 1780) the troops of "Bloody Tarleton" had even cut down several hundred Patriot soldiers after they had surrendered. But Patriot partisans (led by such men as Francis Marion, the "Swamp Fox") fought back all the more relentlessly. And Tarleton's tactics ultimately succeeded only in driving many American neutrals into the ranks of vengeful Patriots. King's Mountain
In October (1780) at King's Mountain, North Carolina, a Patriot army of around 900 surrounded and destroyed a Tory or Loyalist army of about 1,400 – also crushing once again Southern Loyalists' enthusiasm for open military support of the British regulars. The war in the South now began to turn in favor of the Patriots.
Cowpens
Then things also turned quite badly for the British regulars. Tarleton had been sent out by Cornwallis to chase down Patriots under the command of Nathanael Greene (who had taken over the Southern Department from Gates). At Cowpens (January 1781), along the flooded Broad River, Tarleton, after a hard forced march of his men in pursuit of retreating American forces, met an American unit under one of Greene's most able commanders, Daniel Morgan. But Morgan had set up a skillful trap for Tarleton – and the brash Tarleton sent his men straight into it. Tarleton's men were soon surrounded – and annihilated. Tarleton and a handful of his cavalry were able to escape. But the rest of Tarleton's force was destroyed, including some of Cornwallis's best regiments. Guildford Court House
Cornwallis was now desperate for a win to undo the catastrophes he had experienced at King's Mountain and Cowpens. He headed north after Greene's army, to try to wipe it out in a decisive blow that might swing the advantage back to the British. Greene and Cornwallis met at Guilford Court House, North Carolina, in May – and Cornwallis's army of only 2,000 men indeed succeeded in defeating Greene's army, which was twice the size of his. Greene was forced to retreat and leave the field of battle to Cornwallis. But Greene was also able to give Cornwallis the slip. And though Greene had lost the battle, his army was still quite intact. However, Cornwallis's victory had come at a huge cost in British casualties that he could not afford. Nonetheless Cornwallis persisted in his effort to try to chase down Greene and his Continental Army, only to have Greene constantly give him the slip. The effect on Cornwallis's troops was exhausting. |
Nathanael Greene (1783) – by Charles Willson Peale
He was given the Southern command after Gates' failure at Camden
London, National
Gallery
The Battle of King's Mountain (October 7, 1780), in which Patriot troops destroyed an army
of Loyalist troops collapsing Loyalist support for the British ...
an important turning point in the war in the South
Here he is treating a British officer to a meal of potatoes (by John Blake White)
Old Print Shop
Cornwallis's troops managed to defeat an American force under Greene twice his size.
It looked like a huge British victory. But Greene escaped with his army still intact. And it
cost Cornwallis heavily in terms of troops and supplies that he could ill-afford to lose.
And he would exhaust himself further trying (unsuccessfully) to run down
Greene and his army.
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Keesee and Sidwell, p. 123
