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To
the People of the State of New York:
AFTER
an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the subsisting federal
government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for
the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending
in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety
and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire
in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently
remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country,
by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether
societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government
from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend
for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any
truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety
be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong
election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered
as the general misfortune of mankind.
This
idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to
heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for
the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious
estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations
not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to
be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations
affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions,
not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits,
and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery
of truth.
Among
the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have
to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain
class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution
of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under
the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of
men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of
their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation
from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than
from its union under one government.
It
is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I
am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately
the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might
subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candor will
oblige us to admit that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions;
and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its
appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources,
blameless at least, if not respectable--the honest errors of minds led
astray by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so
powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment,
that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well
as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This
circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation
to those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in
any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might
be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who
advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists.
Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other
motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those
who support as those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there
not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged
than that intolerant spirit which has, at all times, characterized political
parties. For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at
making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured
by persecution.
And
yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have already
sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all former cases
of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant passions
will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we
shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness
of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the
loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives.
An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be
stigmatized as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile
to the principles of liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to
the rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of the head
than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretense and artifice, the
stale bait for popularity at the expense of the public good. It will be
forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love,
and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit
of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally
forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to the security of
liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment,
their interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more
often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people
than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency
of government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much
more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter, and
that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest
number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people;
commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.
In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of them, that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth. I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting particulars: THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY. In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention. It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State, and one, which it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole. [1] This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address. PUBLIUS. 1. The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held out in several of the late publications against the new Constitution. |
Miles
H. Hodges
