POLITICS

Part I

We have now considered the varieties of the deliberative or supreme power in states, and the various arrangements of law-courtsand state offices, and which of them are adapted to different forms of government. We have also spoken of the destruction andpreservation of constitutions, how and from what causes they arise.

Of democracy and all other forms of government there are many kinds; and it will be well to assign to them severally the modes oforganization which are proper and advantageous to each, adding what remains to be said about them. Moreover, we ought toconsider the various combinations of these modes themselves; for such combinations make constitutions overlap one another, sothat aristocracies have an oligarchical character, and constitutional governments incline to democracies.

When I speak of the combinations which remain to be considered, and thus far have not been considered by us, I mean such asthese: when the deliberative part of the government and the election of officers is constituted oligarchically, and the law-courtsaristocratically, or when the courts and the deliberative part of the state are oligarchical, and the election to office aristocratical, orwhen in any other way there is a want of harmony in the composition of a state.

I have shown already what forms of democracy are suited to particular cities, and what of oligarchy to particular peoples, and towhom each of the other forms of government is suited. Further, we must not only show which of these governments is the best foreach state, but also briefly proceed to consider how these and other forms of government are to be established.

First of all let us speak of democracy, which will also bring to light the opposite form of government commonly called oligarchy. Forthe purposes of this inquiry we need to ascertain all the elements and characteristics of democracy, since from the combinations ofthese the varieties of democratic government arise. There are several of these differing from each other, and the difference is due totwo causes. One (1) has been already mentioned- differences of population; for the popular element may consist of husbandmen, orof mechanics, or of laborers, and if the first of these be added to the second, or the third to the two others, not only does thedemocracy become better or worse, but its very nature is changed. A second cause (2) remains to be mentioned: the variousproperties and characteristics of democracy, when variously combined, make a difference. For one democracy will have less andanother will have more, and another will have all of these characteristics. There is an advantage in knowing them all, whether a manwishes to establish some new form of democracy, or only to remodel an existing one. Founders of states try to bring together all theelements which accord with the ideas of the several constitutions; but this is a mistake of theirs, as I have already remarked whenspeaking of the destruction and preservation of states. We will now set forth the principles, characteristics, and aims of such states.

Part II

The basis of a democratic state is liberty; which, according to the common opinion of men, can only be enjoyed in such a state; thisthey affirm to be the great end of every democracy. One principle of liberty is for all to rule and be ruled in turn, and indeeddemocratic justice is the application of numerical not proportionate equality; whence it follows that the majority must be supreme,and that whatever the majority approve must be the end and the just. Every citizen, it is said, must have equality, and therefore in ademocracy the poor have more power than the rich, because there are more of them, and the will of the majority is supreme. This,then, is one note of liberty which all democrats affirm to be the principle of their state. Another is that a man should live as he likes.This, they say, is the privilege of a freeman, since, on the other hand, not to live as a man likes is the mark of a slave. This is thesecond characteristic of democracy, whence has arisen the claim of men to be ruled by none, if possible, or, if this is impossible, torule and be ruled in turns; and so it contributes to the freedom based upon equality.

Such being our foundation and such the principle from which we start, the characteristics of democracy are as follows the election ofofficers by all out of all; and that all should rule over each, and each in his turn over all; that the appointment to all offices, or to all butthose which require experience and skill, should be made by lot; that no property qualification should be required for offices, or only avery low one; that a man should not hold the same office twice, or not often, or in the case of few except military offices: that thetenure of all offices, or of as many as possible, should be brief, that all men should sit in judgment, or that judges selected out of allshould judge, in all matters, or in most and in the greatest and most important- such as the scrutiny of accounts, the constitution, andprivate contracts; that the assembly should be supreme over all causes, or at any rate over the most important, and the magistratesover none or only over a very few. Of all magistracies, a council is the most democratic when there is not the means of paying all thecitizens, but when they are paid even this is robbed of its power; for the people then draw all cases to themselves, as I said in theprevious discussion. The next characteristic of democracy is payment for services; assembly, law courts, magistrates, everybodyreceives pay, when it is to be had; or when it is not to be had for all, then it is given to the law-courts and to the stated assemblies, tothe council and to the magistrates, or at least to any of them who are compelled to have their meals together. And whereas oligarchyis characterized by birth, wealth, and education, the notes of democracy appear to be the opposite of these- low birth, poverty, meanemployment. Another note is that no magistracy is perpetual, but if any such have survived some ancient change in the constitution itshould be stripped of its power, and the holders should be elected by lot and no longer by vote. These are the points common to alldemocracies; but democracy and demos in their truest form are based upon the recognized principle of democratic justice, that allshould count equally; for equality implies that the poor should have no more share in the government than the rich, and should not bethe only rulers, but that all should rule equally according to their numbers. And in this way men think that they will secure equality andfreedom in their state.

Part III

Next comes the question, how is this equality to be obtained? Are we to assign to a thousand poor men the property qualifications offive hundred rich men? and shall we give the thousand a power equal to that of the five hundred? or, if this is not to be the mode,ought we, still retaining the same ratio, to take equal numbers from each and give them the control of the elections and of thecourts?- Which, according to the democratical notion, is the juster form of the constitution- this or one based on numbers only?Democrats say that justice is that to which the majority agree, oligarchs that to which the wealthier class; in their opinion the decisionshould be given according to the amount of property. In both principles there is some inequality and injustice. For if justice is the willof the few, any one person who has more wealth than all the rest of the rich put together, ought, upon the oligarchical principle, tohave the sole power- but this would be tyranny; or if justice is the will of the majority, as I was before saying, they will unjustlyconfiscate the property of the wealthy minority. To find a principle of equality which they both agree we must inquire into theirrespective ideas of justice.

Now they agree in saying that whatever is decided by the majority of the citizens is to be deemed law. Granted: but not without somereserve; since there are two classes out of which a state is composed- the poor and the rich- that is to be deemed law, on whichboth or the greater part of both agree; and if they disagree, that which is approved by the greater number, and by those who have thehigher qualification. For example, suppose that there are ten rich and twenty poor, and some measure is approved by six of the richand is disapproved by fifteen of the poor, and the remaining four of the rich join with the party of the poor, and the remaining five ofthe poor with that of the rich; in such a case the will of those whose qualifications, when both sides are added up, are the greatest,should prevail. If they turn out to be equal, there is no greater difficulty than at present, when, if the assembly or the courts are divided,recourse is had to the lot, or to some similar expedient. But, although it may be difficult in theory to know what is just and equal, thepractical difficulty of inducing those to forbear who can, if they like, encroach, is far greater, for the weaker are always asking forequality and justice, but the stronger care for none of these things.

Part IV

Of the four kinds of democracy, as was said in the in the previous discussion, the best is that which comes first in order; it is also theoldest of them all. I am speaking of them according to the natural classification of their inhabitants. For the best material ofdemocracy is an agricultural population; there is no difficulty in forming a democracy where the mass of the people live by agricultureor tending of cattle. Being poor, they have no leisure, and therefore do not often attend the assembly, and not having the necessariesof life they are always at work, and do not covet the property of others. Indeed, they find their employment pleasanter than the caresof government or office where no great gains can be made out of them, for the many are more desirous of gain than of honor. Aproof is that even the ancient tyrannies were patiently endured by them, as they still endure oligarchies, if they are allowed to workand are not deprived of their property; for some of them grow quickly rich and the others are well enough off. Moreover, they have thepower of electing the magistrates and calling them to account; their ambition, if they have any, is thus satisfied; and in somedemocracies, although they do not all share in the appointment of offices, except through representatives elected in turn out of thewhole people, as at Mantinea; yet, if they have the power of deliberating, the many are contented. Even this form of government maybe regarded as a democracy, and was such at Mantinea. Hence it is both expedient and customary in the aforementioned type ofdemocracy that all should elect to offices, and conduct scrutinies, and sit in the law-courts, but that the great offices should be filledup by election and from persons having a qualification; the greater requiring a greater qualification, or, if there be no offices for whicha qualification is required, then those who are marked out by special ability should be appointed. Under such a form of governmentthe citizens are sure to be governed well (for the offices will always be held by the best persons; the people are willing enough toelect them and are not jealous of the good). The good and the notables will then be satisfied, for they will not be governed by menwho are their inferiors, and the persons elected will rule justly, because others will call them to account. Every man should beresponsible to others, nor should any one be allowed to do just as he pleases; for where absolute freedom is allowed, there isnothing to restrain the evil which is inherent in every man. But the principle of responsibility secures that which is the greatest good instates; the right persons rule and are prevented from doing wrong, and the people have their due. It is evident that this is the bestkind of democracy, and why? Because the people are drawn from a certain class. Some of the ancient laws of most states were, allof them, useful with a view to making the people husbandmen. They provided either that no one should possess more than a certainquantity of land, or that, if he did, the land should not be within a certain distance from the town or the acropolis. Formerly in manystates there was a law forbidding any one to sell his original allotment of land. There is a similar law attributed to Oxylus, which is tothe effect that there should be a certain portion of every man's land on which he could not borrow money. A useful corrective to theevil of which I am speaking would be the law of the Aphytaeans, who, although they are numerous, and do not possess much land,are all of them husbandmen. For their properties are reckoned in the census; not entire, but only in such small portions that even thepoor may have more than the amount required.

Next best to an agricultural, and in many respects similar, are a pastoral people, who live by their flocks; they are the best trained ofany for war, robust in body and able to camp out. The people of whom other democracies consist are far inferior to them, for their lifeis inferior; there is no room for moral excellence in any of their employments, whether they be mechanics or traders or laborers.Besides, people of this class can readily come to the assembly, because they are continually moving about in the city and in theagora; whereas husbandmen are scattered over the country and do not meet, or equally feel the want of assembling together. Wherethe territory also happens to extend to a distance from the city, there is no difficulty in making an excellent democracy orconstitutional government; for the people are compelled to settle in the country, and even if there is a town population the assemblyought not to meet, in democracies, when the country people cannot come. We have thus explained how the first and best form ofdemocracy should be constituted; it is clear that the other or inferior sorts will deviate in a regular order, and the population which isexcluded will at each stage be of a lower kind.

The last form of democracy, that in which all share alike, is one which cannot be borne by all states, and will not last long unless wellregulated by laws and customs. The more general causes which tend to destroy this or other kinds of government have been prettyfully considered. In order to constitute such a democracy and strengthen the people, the leaders have been in the habit including asmany as they can, and making citizens not only of those who are legitimate, but even of the illegitimate, and of those who have onlyone parent a citizen, whether father or mother; for nothing of this sort comes amiss to such a democracy. This is the way in whichdemagogues proceed. Whereas the right thing would be to make no more additions when the number of the commonalty exceedsthat of the notables and of the middle class- beyond this not to go. When in excess of this point, the constitution becomes disorderly,and the notables grow excited and impatient of the democracy, as in the insurrection at Cyrene; for no notice is taken of a little evil,but when it increases it strikes the eye. Measures like those which Cleisthenes passed when he wanted to increase the power of thedemocracy at Athens, or such as were taken by the founders of popular government at Cyrene, are useful in the extreme form ofdemocracy. Fresh tribes and brotherhoods should be established; the private rites of families should be restricted and convertedinto public ones; in short, every contrivance should be adopted which will mingle the citizens with one another and get rid of oldconnections. Again, the measures which are taken by tyrants appear all of them to be democratic; such, for instance, as the licensepermitted to slaves (which may be to a certain extent advantageous) and also that of women and children, and the aflowingeverybody to live as he likes. Such a government will have many supporters, for most persons would rather live in a disorderly than ina sober manner.

Part V

The mere establishment of a democracy is not the only or principal business of the legislator, or of those who wish to create such astate, for any state, however badly constituted, may last one, two, or three days; a far greater difficulty is the preservation of it. Thelegislator should therefore endeavor to have a firm foundation according to the principles already laid down concerning thepreservation and destruction of states; he should guard against the destructive elements, and should make laws, whether written orunwritten, which will contain all the preservatives of states. He must not think the truly democratical or oligarchical measure to be thatwhich will give the greatest amount of democracy or oligarchy, but that which will make them last longest. The demagogues of ourown day often get property confiscated in the law-courts in order to please the people. But those who have the welfare of the state atheart should counteract them, and make a law that the property of the condemned should not be public and go into the treasury butbe sacred. Thus offenders will be as much afraid, for they will be punished all the same, and the people, having nothing to gain, willnot be so ready to condemn the accused. Care should also be taken that state trials are as few as possible, and heavy penaltiesshould be inflicted on those who bring groundless accusations; for it is the practice to indict, not members of the popular party, butthe notables, although the citizens ought to be all attached to the constitution as well, or at any rate should not regard their rulers asenemies.

Now, since in the last and worst form of democracy the citizens are very numerous, and can hardly be made to assemble unless theyare paid, and to pay them when there are no revenues presses hardly upon the notables (for the money must be obtained by aproperty tax and confiscations and corrupt practices of the courts, things which have before now overthrown many democracies);where, I say, there are no revenues, the government should hold few assemblies, and the law-courts should consist of many persons,but sit for a few days only. This system has two advantages: first, the rich do not fear the expense, even although they are unpaidthemselves when the poor are paid; and secondly, causes are better tried, for wealthy persons, although they do not like to be longabsent from their own affairs, do not mind going for a few days to the law-courts. Where there are revenues the demagogues shouldnot be allowed after their manner to distribute the surplus; the poor are always receiving and always wanting more and more, forsuch help is like water poured into a leaky cask. Yet the true friend of the people should see that they be not too poor, for extremepoverty lowers the character of the democracy; measures therefore should be taken which will give them lasting prosperity; and asthis is equally the interest of all classes, the proceeds of the public revenues should be accumulated and distributed among its poor,if possible, in such quantities as may enable them to purchase a little farm, or, at any rate, make a beginning in trade or husbandry.And if this benevolence cannot be extended to all, money should be distributed in turn according to tribes or other divisions, and inthe meantime the rich should pay the fee for the attendance of the poor at the necessary assemblies; and should in return beexcused from useless public services. By administering the state in this spirit the Carthaginians retain the affections of the people;their policy is from time to time to send some of them into their dependent towns, where they grow rich. It is also worthy of agenerous and sensible nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and give them the means of going to work. The example of thepeople of Tarentum is also well deserving of imitation, for, by sharing the use of their own property with the poor, they gain their goodwill. Moreover, they divide all their offices into two classes, some of them being elected by vote, the others by lot; the latter, that thepeople may participate in them, and the former, that the state may be better administered. A like result may be gained by dividingthe same offices, so as to have two classes of magistrates, one chosen by vote, the other by lot.

Enough has been said of the manner in which democracies ought to be constituted.

Part VI

From these considerations there will be no difficulty in seeing what should be the constitution of oligarchies. We have only to reasonfrom opposites and compare each form of oligarchy with the corresponding form of democracy.

The first and best attempered of oligarchies is akin to a constitutional government. In this there ought to be two standards ofqualification; the one high, the other low- the lower qualifying for the humbler yet indispensable offices and the higher for the superiorones. He who acquires the prescribed qualification should have the rights of citizenship. The number of those admitted should besuch as will make the entire governing body stronger than those who are excluded, and the new citizen should be always taken out ofthe better class of the people. The principle, narrowed a little, gives another form of oligarchy; until at length we reach the mostcliquish and tyrannical of them all, answering to the extreme democracy, which, being the worst, requires vigilance in proportion to itsbadness. For as healthy bodies and ships well provided with sailors may undergo many mishaps and survive them, whereas sicklyconstitutions and rotten ill-manned ships are ruined by the very least mistake, so do the worst forms of government require thegreatest care. The populousness of democracies generally preserves them (for e state need not be much increased,since there isno necessity tha number is to democracy in the place of justice based on proportion); whereas the preservation of an oligarchyclearly depends on an opposite principle, viz., good order.

Part VII

As there are four chief divisions of the common people- husbandmen, mechanics, retail traders, laborers; so also there are fourkinds of military forces- the cavalry, the heavy infantry, the light armed troops, the navy. When the country is adapted for cavalry, thena strong oligarchy is likely to be established. For the security of the inhabitants depends upon a force of this sort, and only rich mencan afford to keep horses. The second form of oligarchy prevails when the country is adapted to heavy infantry; for this service isbetter suited to the rich than to the poor. But the light-armed and the naval element are wholly democratic; and nowadays, where theyare numerous, if the two parties quarrel, the oligarchy are often worsted by them in the struggle. A remedy for this state of things maybe found in the practice of generals who combine a proper contingent of light-armed troops with cavalry and heavy-armed. And thisis the way in which the poor get the better of the rich in civil contests; being lightly armed, they fight with advantage against cavalryand heavy being lightly armed, they fight with advantage against cavalry and heavy infantry. An oligarchy which raises such a forceout of the lower classes raises a power against itself. And therefore, since the ages of the citizens vary and some are older andsome younger, the fathers should have their own sons, while they are still young, taught the agile movements of light-armed troops;and these, when they have been taken out of the ranks of the youth, should become light-armed warriors in reality. The oligarchyshould also yield a share in the government to the people, either, as I said before, to those who have a property qualification, or, asin the case of Thebes, to those who have abstained for a certain number of years from mean employments, or, as at Massalia, tomen of merit who are selected for their worthiness, whether previously citizens or not. The magistracies of the highest rank, whichought to be in the hands of the governing body, should have expensive duties attached to them, and then the people will not desirethem and will take no offense at the privileges of their rulers when they see that they pay a heavy fine for their dignity. It is fitting alsothat the magistrates on entering office should offer magnificent sacrifices or erect some public edifice, and then the people whoparticipate in the entertainments, and see the city decorated with votive offerings and buildings, will not desire an alteration in thegovernment, and the notables will have memorials of their munificence. This, however, is anything but the fashion of our modernoligarchs, who are as covetous of gain as they are of honor; oligarchies like theirs may be well described as petty democracies.Enough of the manner in which democracies and oligarchies should be organized.

Part VIII

Next in order follows the right distribution of offices, their number, their nature, their duties, of which indeed we have already spoken.No state can exist not having the necessary offices, and no state can be well administered not having the offices which tend topreserve harmony and good order. In small states, as we have already remarked, there must not be many of them, but in larger theremust be a larger number, and we should carefully consider which offices may properly be united and which separated.

First among necessary offices is that which has the care of the market; a magistrate should be appointed to inspect contracts and tomaintain order. For in every state there must inevitably be buyers and sellers who will supply one another's wants; this is the readiestway to make a state self-sufficing and so fulfill the purpose for which men come together into one state. A second office of a similarkind undertakes the supervision and embellishment of public and private buildings, the maintaining and repairing of houses androads, the prevention of disputes about boundaries, and other concerns of a like nature. This is commonly called the office of CityWarden, and has various departments, which, in more populous towns, are shared among different persons, one, for example,taking charge of the walls, another of the fountains, a third of harbors. There is another equally necessary office, and of a similar kind,having to do with the same matters without the walls and in the country- the magistrates who hold this office are called Wardens ofthe country, or Inspectors of the woods. Besides these three there is a fourth office of receivers of taxes, who have under their chargethe revenue which is distributed among the various departments; these are called Receivers or Treasurers. Another officer registersall private contracts, and decisions of the courts, all public indictments, and also all preliminary proceedings. This office again issometimes subdivided, in which case one officer is appointed over all the rest. These officers are called Recorders or SacredRecorders, Presidents, and the like.

Next to these comes an office of which the duties are the most necessary and also the most difficult, viz., that to which is committedthe execution of punishments, or the exaction of fines from those who are posted up according to the registers; and also the custodyof prisoners. The difficulty of this office arises out of the odium which is attached to it; no one will undertake it unless great profits areto be made, and any one who does is loath to execute the law. Still the office is necessary; for judicial decisions are useless if theytake no effect; and if society cannot exist without them, neither can it exist without the execution of them. It is an office which, being sounpopular, should not be entrusted to one person, but divided among several taken from different courts. In like manner an effortshould be made to distribute among different persons the writing up of those who are on the register of public debtors. Somesentences should be executed by the magistrates also, and in particular penalties due to the outgoing magistrates should beexacted by the incoming ones; and as regards those due to magistrates already in office, when one court has given judgement,another should exact the penalty; for example, the wardens of the city should exact the fines imposed by the wardens of the agora,and others again should exact the fines imposed by them. For penalties are more likely to be exacted when less odium attaches tothe exaction of them; but a double odium is incurred when the judges who have passed also execute the sentence, and if they arealways the executioners, they will be the enemies of all.

In many places, while one magistracy executes the sentence, another has the custody of the prisoners, as, for example, 'the Eleven'at Athens. It is well to separate off the jailorship also, and try by some device to render the office less unpopular. For it is quite asnecessary as that of the executioners; but good men do all they can to avoid it, and worthless persons cannot safely be trusted withit; for they themselves require a guard, and are not fit to guard others. There ought not therefore to be a single or permanent officerset apart for this duty; but it should be entrusted to the young, wherever they are organized into a band or guard, and differentmagistrates acting in turn should take charge of it.

These are the indispensable officers, and should be ranked first; next in order follow others, equally necessary, but of higher rank,and requiring great experience and fidelity. Such are the officers to which are committed the guard of the city, and other militaryfunctions. Not only in time of war but of peace their duty will be to defend the walls and gates, and to muster and marshal the citizens.In some states there are many such offices; in others there are a few only, while small states are content with one; these officers arecalled generals or commanders. Again, if a state has cavalry or light-armed troops or archers or a naval force, it will sometimeshappen that each of these departments has separate officers, who are called admirals, or generals of cavalry or of light-armedtroops. And there are subordinate officers called naval captains, and captains of light-armed troops and of horse; having othersunder them: all these are included in the department of war. Thus much of military command.

But since many, not to say all, of these offices handle the public money, there must of necessity be another office which examinesand audits them, and has no other functions. Such officers are called by various names- Scrutineers, Auditors, Accountants,Controllers. Besides all these offices there is another which is supreme over them, and to this is often entrusted both the introductionand the ratification of measures, or at all events it presides, in a democracy, over the assembly. For there must be a body whichconvenes the supreme authority in the state. In some places they are called 'probuli,' because they hold previous deliberations, but ina democracy more commonly 'councillors.' These are the chief political offices.

Another set of officers is concerned with the maintenance of religion priests and guardians see to the preservation and repair of thetemples of the Gods and to other matters of religion. One office of this sort may be enough in small places, but in larger ones thereare a great many besides the priesthood; for example, superintendents of public worship, guardians of shrines, treasurers of thesacred revenues. Nearly connected with these there are also the officers appointed for the performance of the public sacrifices,except any which the law assigns to the priests; such sacrifices derive their dignity from the public hearth of the city. They aresometimes called archons, sometimes kings, and sometimes prytanes.

These, then, are the necessary offices, which may be summed up as follows: offices concerned with matters of religion, with war,with the revenue and expenditure, with the market, with the city, with the harbors, with the country; also with the courts of law, with therecords of contracts, with execution of sentences, with custody of prisoners, with audits and scrutinies and accounts of magistrates;lastly, there are those which preside over the public deliberations of the state. There are likewise magistracies characteristic ofstates which are peaceful and prosperous, and at the same time have a regard to good order: such as the offices of guardians ofwomen, guardians of the law, guardians of children, and directors of gymnastics; also superintendents of gymnastic and Dionysiaccontests, and of other similar spectacles. Some of these are clearly not democratic offices; for example, the guardianships ofwomen and children- the poor, not having any slaves, must employ both their women and children as servants.