9.1
The following year (321 B.C.) was rendered memorable by the disaster which
befell the Romans at Caudium and the capitulation which they made there.
T. Veturius Calvinus and Spurius Postumius were the consuls. The Samnites
had for their captain-general that year C. Pontius, the son of Herennius,
the ablest statesman they possessed, whilst the son was their foremost
soldier and commander. When the envoys who had been sent with the terms
of surrender returned from their fruitless mission, Pontius made the following
speech in the Samnite council: "Do not suppose that this mission has been
barren of results. We have gained this much by it, whatever measure of
divine wrath we may have incurred by our violation of treaty obligations
has now been atoned for. I am perfectly certain that all those deities
whose will it was that we should be reduced to the necessity of making
the restitution which was demanded under the terms of the treaty, have
viewed with displeasure the haughty contempt with which the Romans have
treated our concessions. What more could we have done to placate the wrath
of heaven or soften the resentment of men than we have done? The property
of the enemy, which we considered ours by the rights of war, we have restored;
the author of the war, whom we could not surrender alive, we gave up after
he had paid his debt to nature, and lest any taint of guilt should remain
with us we carried his possessions to Rome. What more, Romans, do I owe
to you or to the treaty or to the gods who were invoked as witnesses to
the treaty? What arbitrator am I to bring forward to decide how far your
wrath, how far my punishment is to go? I am willing to accept any, whether
it be a nation or a private individual. But if human law leaves no rights
which the weak share with the stronger, I can still fly to the gods, the
avengers of intolerable tyranny, and I will pray them to turn their wrath
against those for whom it is not enough to have their own restored to them
and to be loaded also with what belongs to others, whose cruel rage is
not satiated by the death of the guilty and the surrender of their lifeless
remains together with their property, who cannot be appeased unless we
give them our very blood to suck and our bowels to tear. A war is just
and right, Samnites, when it is forced upon us; arms are blessed by heaven
when there is no hope except in arms. Since then it is of supreme importance
in human affairs what things men do under divine favour and what they do
against the divine will, be well assured that, if in your former wars you
were fighting against the gods even more than against men, in this war
which is impending you will have the gods themselves to lead you."
9.2
After uttering this prediction, which proved to be as true as it was reassuring,
he took the field and, keeping his movements as secret as possible, fixed
his camp in the neighbourhood of Caudium. From there he sent ten soldiers
disguised as shepherds to Calatia, where he understood that the Roman consuls
were encamped, with instructions to pasture some cattle in different directions
near the Roman outposts. When they fell in with any foraging parties they
were all to tell the same story, and say that the Samnite legions were
in Apulia investing Luceria with their whole force and that its capture
was imminent. This rumour had purposely been spread before and had already
reached the ears of the Romans; the captured shepherds confirmed their
belief in it, especially as their statements all tallied. There was no
doubt but that the Romans would assist the Lucerians for the sake of protecting
their allies and preventing the whole of Apulia from being intimidated
by the Samnites into open revolt. The only matter for consideration was
what route they would take. There were two roads leading to Luceria; one
along the Adriatic coast through open country, the longer one of the two
but so much the safer; the other and shorter one through the Caudine Forks.
This is the character of the spot; there are two passes, deep, narrow,
with wooded hills on each side, and a continuous chain of mountains extends
from one to the other. Between them lies a watered grassy plain through
the middle of which the road goes. Before you reach the plain you have
to pass through the first defile and either return by the same path by
which you entered or, if you go on, you must make your way out by a still
narrower and more difficult pass at the other end.
The Roman column descended into this plain from the first defile with
its overhanging cliffs, and marched straight through to the other pass.
They found it blocked by a huge barricade of felled trees with great masses
of rock piled against them. No sooner did they become aware of the enemy's
stratagem than his outposts showed themselves on the heights above the
pass. A hasty retreat was made, and they proceeded to retrace their steps
by the way they had come when they discovered that this pass also had its
own barricade and armed men on the heights above. Then without any order
being given they called a halt. Their senses were dazed and stupefied and
a strange numbness seized their limbs. Each gazed at his neighbour, thinking
him more in possession of his senses and judgment than himself. For a long
time they stood silent and motionless, then they saw the consuls' tents
being set up and some of the men getting their entrenching tools ready.
Though they knew that in their desperate and hopeless plight it would be
ridiculous for them to fortify the ground on which they stood still, not
to make matters worse by any fault of their own they set to work without
waiting for orders and entrenched their camp with its rampart close to
the water. While they were thus engaged the enemy showered taunts and insults
upon them, and they themselves in bitter mockery jeered at their own fruitless
labour. The consuls were too much depressed and unnerved even to summon
a council of war, for there was no place for either counsel or help, but
the staff-officers and tribunes gathered round them, and the men with their
faces turned towards their tents sought from their leaders a succour which
the gods themselves could hardly render them.
9.3
Night surprised them while they were lamenting over their situation rather
than consulting how to meet it. The different temperaments of the men came
out; some exclaimed: "Let us break through the barricades, scale the mountain
slopes, force our way through the forest, try every way where we can carry
arms. Only let us get at the enemy whom we have beaten for now nearly thirty
years; all places will be smooth and easy to a Roman fighting against the
perfidious Samnite." Others answered: "Where are we to go? How are we to
get there? Are we preparing to move the mountains from their seat? How
will you get at the enemy as long as these peaks hang over us? Armed and
unarmed, brave and cowardly we are all alike trapped and conquered. The
enemy will not even offer us the chance of an honourable death by the sword,
he will finish the war without moving from his seat." Indifferent to food,
unable to sleep, they talked in this way through the night. Even the Samnites
were unable to make up their minds what to do under such fortunate circumstances.
It was unanimously agreed to write to Herennius, the captain-general's
father, and ask his advice. He was now advanced in years and had given
up all public business, civil as well as military, but though his physical
powers were failing his intellect was as sound and clear as ever. He had
already heard that the Roman armies were hemmed in between the two passes
at the Caudine Forks, and when his son's courier asked for his advice he
gave it as his opinion that the whole force ought to be at once allowed
to depart uninjured. This advice was rejected and the courier was sent
back to consult him again. He now advised that they should every one be
put to death. On receiving these replies, contradicting each other like
the ambiguous utterances of an oracle, his son's first impression was that
his father's mental powers had become impaired through his physical weakness.
However, he yielded to the unanimous wish and invited his father to the
council of war. The old man, we are told, at once complied and was conveyed
in a wagon to the camp. After taking his seat in the council, it became
clear from what he said that he had not changed his mind, but he explained
his reasons for the advice he gave. He believed that by taking the course
he first proposed, which he considered the best, he was establishing a
durable peace and friendship with a most powerful people in treating them
with such exceptional kindness; by adopting the second he was postponing
war for many generations, for it would take that time for Rome to recover
her strength painfully and slowly after the loss of two armies. There was
no third course. When his son and the other chiefs went on to ask him what
would happen if a middle course were taken, and they were dismissed unhurt
but under such conditions as by the rights of war are imposed on the vanquished,
he replied: "That is just the policy which neither procures friends nor
rids us of enemies. Once let men whom you have exasperated by ignominious
treatment live and you will find out your mistake. The Romans are a nation
who know not how to remain quiet under defeat. Whatever disgrace this present
extremity burns into their souls will rankle there for ever, and will allow
them no rest till they have made you pay for it many times over."
9.4
Neither of these plans was approved and Herennius was carried home from
the camp. In the Roman camp, after many fruitless attempts had been made
to break out and they found themselves at last in a state of utter destitution,
necessity compelled them to send envoys to the Samnites to ask in the first
instance for fair terms of peace, and failing that to challenge them to
battle. Pontius replied that all war was at an end, and since even now
that they were vanquished and captured they were incapable of acknowledging
their true position, he should deprive them of their arms and send them
under the yoke, allowing them to retain one garment each. The other conditions
would be fair to both victors and vanquished. If they evacuated Samnium
and withdrew their colonists from his country, the Roman and the Samnite
would henceforth live under their own laws as sovereign states united by
a just and honourable treaty. On these conditions he was ready to conclude
a treaty with the consuls, if they rejected any of them he forbade any
further overtures to be made to him. When the result was announced, such
a universal cry of distress arose, such gloom and melancholy prevailed,
that they evidently could not have taken it more heavily if it had been
announced to them all that they must die on the spot. Then followed a long
silence. The consuls were unable to breathe a word either in favour of
a capitulation so humiliating or against one so necessary. At last L. Lentulus,
of all the staff-officers the most distinguished, both by his personal
qualities and the offices he had held, spoke: "I have often," he said,
"heard my father, consuls, say that he was the only one in the Capitol
who refused to ransom the City from the Gauls with gold, for the force
in the Capitol was not invested and shut in with fosse and rampart, as
the Gauls were too indolent to undertake that sort of work; it was therefore
quite possible for them to make a sortie involving, perhaps, heavy loss,
but not certain destruction. If we had the same chance of fighting, whether
on favourable or unfavourable ground, which they had of charging down upon
the foe from the Capitol, in the same way as the besieged have often made
sorties against their besiegers, I should not fall behind my father's spirit
and courage in the advice which I should give. To die for one's country
is, I admit, a glorious thing, and as concerns myself I am ready to devote
myself for the people and legions of Rome or to plunge into the midst of
the enemy. But it is here that I behold my country, it is on this spot
that all the legions which Rome possesses are gathered, and unless they
wish to rush to death for their own sakes, to save their honour, what else
have they that they can save by their death. 'The dwellings of the City,'
somebody may reply, ' and its walls, and that crowd of human beings who
form its population.' Nay, on the contrary, all these things are not saved,
they are handed over to the enemy if this army is annihilated. For who
will protect them? A defenceless multitude of non-combatants, I suppose;
as successfully as it defended them from the approach of the Gauls. Or
will they implore the help of an army from Veii with Camillus at its head
? Here and here alone are all our hopes, all our strength. If we save these
we save our country, if we give these up to death we desert and betray
our country. 'Yes,' you say, 'but surrender is base and ignominious.' It
is; but true affection for our country demands that we should preserve
it, if need be, by our disgrace as much as by our death. However great
then the indignity, we must submit to it and yield to the compulsion of
necessity, a compulsion which the gods themselves cannot evade! Go, consuls,
give up your arms as a ransom for that State which your ancestors ransomed
with gold!
9.5
The consuls left to confer with Pontius. When the victor began to insist
upon a treaty, they told him that a treaty could not possibly be made without
the orders of the people nor without the fetials and the usual ceremonial.
So that the convention of Claudium did not, as is commonly believed and
as even Claudius asserts, take the form of a regular treaty. It was concluded
through a sponsio, i.e. by the officers giving their word of honour to
observe the conditions. For what need would there have been in the case
of a treaty for any pledge from the officers or for any hostages, since
in concluding a treaty the imprecation is always used: "By whosesoever
default it may come about that the said conditions are not observed, may
Jupiter so smite that people as this swine is now struck by the fetials."
The consuls, the staff-officers, the quaestors, and the military tribunes
all gave their word on oath, and all their names are extant today, whereas
if a regular treaty had been concluded no names but those of the two fetials
would have survived. Owing to the inevitable delay in arranging a treaty,
600 equites were demanded as hostages to answer with their lives if the
terms of the capitulation were not observed. Then a definite time was fixed
for surrendering the hostages and sending the army, deprived of its arms,
under the yoke. The return of the consuls with the terms of surrender renewed
the grief and distress in the camp. So bitter was the feeling that the
men had difficulty in keeping their hands off those "through whose rashness,"
they said, "they had been brought into that place and through whose cowardice
they would have to leave it in a more shameful plight than they had come.
They had had no guides who knew the neighbourhood, no scouts had been thrown
out, they had fallen blindly like wild animals into a trap." There they
were, looking at each other, gazing sadly at the armour and weapons which
were soon to be given up, their right hands which were to be defenceless,
their bodies which were to be at the mercy of their enemies. They pictured
to themselves the hostile yoke, the taunts and insulting looks of the victors,
their marching disarmed between the armed ranks, and then afterwards the
miserable progress of an army in disgrace through the cities of their allies,
their return to their country and their parents, whither their ancestors
had so often returned in triumphal procession. They alone, they said, had
been defeated without receiving a single wound, or using a single weapon,
or fighting a single battle, they had not been allowed to draw the sword
or come to grips with the enemy; courage and strength had been given them
in vain. While they were uttering these indignant protests, the hour of
their humiliation arrived which was to make everything more bitter for
them by actual experience than they had anticipated or imagined. First
of all they were ordered to lay down their arms and go outside the rampart
with only one garment each. The first to be dealt with were those surrendered
as hostages who were taken away for safe keeping. Next, the lictors were
ordered to retire from the consuls, who were then stripped of their paludamenta.
This aroused such deep commiseration amongst those who a short time ago
had been cursing them and saying that they ought to be surrendered and
scourged, that every man, forgetting his own plight, turned away his eyes
from such an outrage upon the majesty of state as from a spectacle too
horrible to behold.
9.6
The consuls were the first to be sent, little more than half-clothed, under
the yoke, then each in the order of his rank was exposed to the same disgrace,
and finally, the legionaries one after another. Around them stood the enemy
fully armed, reviling and jeering at them; swords were pointed at most
of them, and when they offended their victors by showing their indignation
and resentment too plainly some were wounded and even killed. Thus were
they marched under the yoke. But what was still harder to bear was that
after they had emerged from the pass under the eyes of the foe though,
like men dragged up from the jaws of hell, they seemed to behold the light
for the first time, the very light itself, serving only to reveal such
a hideous sight as they marched along, was more gloomy than any shape of
death. They could have reached Capua before nightfall, but not knowing
how their allies would receive them, and kept back by a feeling of shame,
they all flung themselves, destitute of everything, on the sides of the
road near Capua. As soon as news of this reached the place, a proper feeling
of compassion for their allies got the better of the inborn disdain of
the Campanian; they immediately sent to the consuls their own insignia
of office, the fasces and the lictors, and the soldiers they generously
supplied with arms, horses, clothes, and provisions. As they entered Capua
the senate and people came out in a body to meet them, showed them all
due hospitality, and paid them all the consideration to which as individuals
and as members of an allied state they were entitled. But all the courtesies
and kindly looks and cheerful greetings of their allies were powerless
to evoke a single word or even to make them lift up their eyes and look
in the face the friends who were trying to comfort them. To such an extent
did feelings of shame make their gloom and despondency all the heavier,
and constrain them to shun the converse and society of men. The next day
some young nobles were commissioned to escort them to the frontier. On
their return they were summoned to the Senate-house, and in answer to inquiries
on the part of the older senators they reported that they seemed to be
much more gloomy and depressed than the day before; the column moved along
so silently that they might have been dumb; the Roman mettle was cowed;
they had lost their spirit with their arms; they saluted no man, nor did
they return any man's salutation; not a single man had the power to open
his mouth for fear of what was coming; their necks were bowed as if they
were still beneath the yoke. The Samnites had won not only a glorious victory
but a lasting one; they had not only captured Rome as the Gauls had done
before them, but, what was a still more warlike exploit, they had captured
the Roman courage and hardihood.
9.7
While this report was being made and listened to with the greatest attention,
and the name and greatness of Rome were being mourned over as though lost
for ever, in the council of her faithful allies, Ofillius Calavius, the
son of Ovus, addressed the senators. He was a man of high birth and with
a distinguished career and now venerable for his age. He is reported to
have said: "The truth is far otherwise. That stubborn silence, those eyes
fixed on the ground, those ears deaf to all consolation, that shame-faced
shrinking from the light, are all indications of a terrible resentment
fermenting in their hearts which will break out in vengeance. Either I
know nothing of the Roman character or that silence will soon call forth
amongst the Samnites cries of distress and groans of anguish. The memory
of the capitulation of Caudium will be much more bitter to the Samnites
than to the Romans. Whenever and wherever they meet each side will be animated
by its own courage and the Samnites will not find the Caudine Forks everywhere.
Rome was now aware of its disaster. The first information they received
was that the army was blockaded, then came the more gloomy news of the
ignominious capitulation. Immediately on receiving the first intelligence
of the blockade they began to levy troops, but when they heard that the
army had surrendered in such a disgraceful way, the preparations for relieving
them were abandoned, and without waiting for any formal order the whole
City presented the aspect of public mourning. The booths round the Forum
were shut up; all public business in the Forum ceased spontaneously before
the proclamation closing it was made; the senators laid aside their purple
striped tunics and gold rings; the gloom amongst the citizens was almost
greater than that in the army. Their indignation was not confined to the
generals or the officers who had made the convention, even the innocent
soldiers were the objects of resentment, they said they would not admit
them into the City. But this angry temper was dispelled by the arrival
of the troops; their wretched appearance awoke commiseration amongst the
most resentful. They did not enter the City like men returning in safety
after being given up for lost, but in the guise and with the expression
of prisoners. They came late in the evening and crept to their homes, where
they kept themselves so dose that for some days not one of them would show
himself in public or in the Forum. The consuls shut themselves up in privacy
and refused to discharge any official functions with the exception of one
which was wrung from them by a decree of the senate, namely, the nomination
of a Dictator to conduct the elections. They nominated Q. Fabius Ambustus,
with P. Aelius Paetus as Master of the Horse. Their appointment was found
to be irregular, and they were replaced by M. Aemilius Papus as Dictator
and L. Valerius Flaccus as Master of the Horse. Even they, however, were
not allowed to conduct the elections; the people were dissatisfied with
all the magistrates of that year, and so matters reverted to an interregnum.
Q. Fabius Maximus and M. Valerius Corvus were successively interreges,
and
the latter held the consular elections. Q. Publilius Philo and L. Papirius
Cursor-the latter for the second time-were returned. The choice was universally
approved, for all knew there were no more brilliant generals at that day.
9.8
They entered upon the active duties of their office on the very day of
their election, for so had the senate decreed, and after disposing of the
business connected with their accession to office, they proceeded at once
to introduce the subject of the capitulation of Caudium. Publilius, who
was the presiding consul, called upon Spurius Postumius to speak. He rose
in his place with just the same expression that he had worn when passing
under the yoke, and began: "Consuls, I am quite aware that I have been
called upon to speak first, not because I am foremost in honour, but because
I am foremost in disgrace and hold the position not of a senator but of
a man on his trial who has to meet the charge not only of an unsuccessful
war but also of an ignominious peace. Since, however, you have not introduced
the question of our guilt or punishment, I shall not enter upon a defence
which in the presence of men not unacquainted with the mutability of human
fortunes would not be a very difficult one to undertake. I will state in
a few words what I think about the question before us, and you will be
able to judge from what I say whether it was myself or your legions that
I spared when I pledged myself to the convention, however shameful or however
necessary it was. This convention, however, was not made by the order of
the Roman people, and therefore the Roman people are not bound by it, nor
is anything due to the Samnites under its terms beyond our own persons.
Let us be surrendered by the fetials, stripped and bound; let us release
the people from their religious obligations if we have involved them in
any, so that without infringing any law human or divine we may resume a
war which will be justified by the law of nations and sanctioned by the
gods. I advise, that in the meantime the consuls enrol and equip an army
and lead it forth to war, but that they do not cross the hostile frontier
until all our obligations under the terms of surrender have been discharged.
And you, immortal gods, I pray and beseech, that as it was not your will
that the consuls Sp. Postumius and T. Veturius should wage a successful
war against the Samnites, you may at least deem it enough to have witnessed
us sent under the yoke and compelled to submit to a shameful convention,
enough to witness us surrendered, naked and in chains, to the enemy, taking
upon our heads the whole weight of his anger and vengeance! May it be in
accordance with your will that the legions of Rome under fresh consuls
should wage war against the Samnites in the same way in which all wars
were waged before we were consuls!" When he finished speaking, such admiration
and pity were felt for him that they could hardly think that it was the
same Sp. Postumius who had concluded such a disgraceful peace. They viewed
with the utmost sadness the prospect of such a man suffering at the hands
of the enemy such terrible punishment as he was sure to meet with, enraged
as they would be at the rupture of the peace. The whole House expressed
in terms of the highest praise their approval of his proposal. They were
beginning to vote on the question when two of the tribunes of the plebs,
L. Livius and Q. Maelius, entered a protest which they afterwards withdrew.
They argued that the people as a whole would not be discharged from their
religious obligation by this surrender unless the Samnites were placed
in the same position of advantage which they held at Caudium. Further,
they said they did not deserve any punishment for having saved the Roman
army by undertaking to procure peace, and they urged as a final reason
that as they, the tribunes, were sacrosanct and their persons inviolable
they could not be surrendered to the enemy or exposed to any violence.
9.9
To this Postumius replied: "In the meanwhile, surrender us, whom no inviolability
protects and whose surrender will violate no man's conscience. Afterwards
you will surrender those 'sacrosanct ' gentlemen also as soon as their
year of office expires, but if you take my advice you will see that before
they are surrendered they are scourged in the Forum by way of paying interest
for a punishment that will have been delayed. Why, who is so ignorant of
fetial law as not to see that these men are saying this, not because it
represents the fact but to prevent their being surrendered? I do not deny,
senators, that where the pledged words of men are held to possess a binding
force only second to the sanctions of religion, then such undertakings
as we have given are as sacred as formal treaties. But I do say that without
the express order of the people nothing can be ratified which can bind
the people. Suppose the Samnites, in the same spirit of insolent pride
in which they extorted this capitulation from us, had compelled us to recite
the formula for the surrender of cities, would you say, tribunes, that
the Roman people was surrendered and that this City with its shrines and
temples, its territory, and its waters had become the property of the Samnites?
I say no more about surrender because what we are considering is the pledge
we gave in the capitulation. Well now, suppose we had given a pledge that
the Roman people would abandon this City, would burn it, would no longer
have its own magistrates and senates and laws, but would live under the
rule of kings. 'Heaven forbid!' you say. Yes, but the binding force of
a capitulation is not lightened by the humiliating nature of its terms.
If the people can be bound by any article, it can by all. The point which
some consider important, namely whether it is a consul or a Dictator or
a praetor who has given the undertaking is of no weight whatever. The Samnites
themselves made this clear, for it was not enough for them that the consuls
pledged themselves, they compelled the staff-officers, the quaestors, and
the military tribunes to do the same.
"Now no one need say to me, 'Why did you pledge yourself in that way,
seeing that a consul has no right to do so and you were not in a position
to promise them a peace of which you could not guarantee the ratification,
or to act on behalf of the people when they had given you no mandate to
do so?' Nothing that happened at Caudium, senators, was dictated by human
prudence; the gods deprived both the enemy's commanders and your own of
their senses. We did not exercise sufficient caution in our various movements,
they in their folly threw away a victory when they had won through our
folly. They hardly felt safe on the very ground which gave them their victory,
such a hurry were they in to agree to any conditions if only they could
deprive of their arms men who were born to arms. If they had been in their
senses, would they have had any difficulty in sending envoys to Rome whilst
they were fetching an old man from his home to advise them? Was it impossible
for them to enter into negotiations with the senate and with the people
about securing peace and making a treaty? It is a three days' journey for
lightly-equipped horsemen, and in the meantime there would have been an
armistice until the envoys returned bringing either peace or the certainty
of their victory. Then and then only would there have been a binding agreement,
because we should have made it by order of the people. But you would not
have made such an order, nor should we have given such a pledge. It was
not the will of heaven that there should be any other result than this,
namely, that the Samnites should be vainly deluded by a dream too delightful
for their minds to grasp, that the same Fortune which had imprisoned our
army should also release it, that an illusory victory should be rendered
futile by a still more illusory peace, and that stipulations should be
brought in, binding on none but those who actually made them. For what
share have you, senators, what share has the people in this business? Who
can call you to account, who can say that you have deceived him? The enemy?
You have given no pledge to the enemy. Any fellow-citizen? You have not
empowered any fellow-citizen to give a pledge on your behalf. You are not
in any way involved with us, for you have given us no mandate; you are
not answerable to the Samnites, for you have had no dealings with them.
It is we who are answerable, pledged as debtors and quite able to discharge
the debt in respect of what is our own, which we are prepared to pay, that
is, our own persons and lives. On these let them wreak their vengeance,
for these let them sharpen their swords and their rage. As for the tribunes,
you ought to consider whether it is possible for them to be surrendered
at once, or whether it ought to be deferred, but as for us, T. Veturius
and the rest of you who are concerned, let us in the meantime offer these
worthless lives of ours in discharge of our bond, and by our deaths set
free the arms of Rome for action."
9.10
Both the speech and the speaker produced a great impression on all who
heard him, including the tribunes, who were so far influenced by what they
had heard that they formally placed themselves at the disposal of the senate.
They immediately resigned their office and were handed over to the fetials
to be conducted with the rest to Caudium. After the senate had passed their
resolution, it seemed as though the light of day was once more shining
on the State. The name of Postumius was in all men's mouths, he was extolled
to the skies, his conduct was put on a level with the self-sacrifice of
P. Decius and other splendid deeds of heroism. It was through his counsel
and assistance, men said, that the State had found its way out of a dishonourable
and guilty peace; he was exposing himself to the rage of the enemy and
all the tortures they could inflict as an expiatory victim for the Roman
people. All eyes were turned to arms and war; "shall we ever be allowed,"
they exclaimed, "to meet the Samnites in arms?" Amidst this blaze of angry
excitement and thirst for vengeance, a levy was made and nearly all re-enlisted
as volunteers. Nine legions were formed out of the former troops, and the
army marched to Caudium. The fetials went on in advance, and on arriving
at the city gate they ordered the garment to be stripped off from those
who had made the capitulation and their arms to be tied behind their backs.
As the apparitor, out of respect for Postumius' rank, was binding his cords
loosely, "Why do you not," he asked, "draw the cord tight that the surrender
may be made in due form?" When they had entered the council chamber and
reached the tribunal where Pontius was seated, the fetial addressed him
thus: "Forasmuch as these men have, without being ordered thereto by the
Roman people, the Quirites, given their promise and oath that a treaty
shall be concluded and have thereby been guilty of high crime and misdemeanour,
I do herewith make surrender to you of these men, to the end that the Roman
people may be absolved from the guilt of a heinous and detestable act."
As the fetial said this Postumius struck him as hard as he could with his
knee, and in a loud voice declared that he was a Samnite citizen, that
he had violated the law of nations in maltreating the fetial who, as herald,
was inviolable, and that after this the Romans would be all the more justified
in prosecuting the war.
9.11
Pontius replied: "I shall not accept this surrender of yours nor will the
Samnites regard it as valid. Why do you not, Spurius Postumius, if you
believe in the existence of gods, either cancel the whole agreement or
abide by what you have pledged yourself to. The Samnite people have a right
to all those whom it held in its power, or in their stead it has a right
to make peace with Rome. But why do I appeal to you? You are keeping your
word as far as you can and rendering yourself as prisoner to your conqueror.
I appeal to the Roman people. If they are dissatisfied with the convention
of the Caudine Forks, let them place their legions once more between the
passes which imprisoned them. Let there be no fraudulent dealing on either
side, let the whole transaction be annulled, let them resume the arms which
they delivered up at the capitulation, let them return to that camp of
theirs, let them have everything that they had on the eve of their surrender.
When that is done, then let them take a bold line and vote for war, then
let the convention and the peace agreed to be repudiated. Let us carry
on the war with the same fortune and on the same ground which we held before
any mention was made of peace; the Roman people will not then have any
occasion to blame their consuls for pledges they had no right to give,
nor shall we have any reason to charge the Roman people with any breach
of faith.
"Will you never be at a loss for reasons why, after defeat, you should
not abide by your agreements? You gave hostages to Porsena, afterwards
you stole them away. You ransomed your city from the Gauls with gold, whilst
they were in the act of receiving the gold they were cut down. You made
peace with us on condition of our restoring your captured legions, you
are now making that peace null and void. You always cloak your dishonest
dealing under some specious pretext of right and justice. Does the Roman
people not approve of its legions being saved at the cost of a humiliating
peace? Then let it keep its peace to itself, only let it restore to the
victor its captured legions. Such action would be in accord with the dictates
of honour, with the faith of treaties, with the solemn proceedings of the
fetials. But that you should secure what you stipulated for, the safety
of thousands of your countrymen, whilst I am not to secure the peace which
I stipulated for when I released them-is this what you Aulus Cornelius
and you fetials call acting according to the law of nations? "As to those
men whom you make believe to surrender I neither accept them nor do I regard
them as surrendered, nor do I hinder them from returning to their countrymen,
who are bound by a convention, the violation of which brings down the wrath
of all the gods whose majesty is being trifled with. True, Spurius Postumius
has just struck the herald fetial with his knee, then wage war! Of course
the gods will believe that Postumius is a Samnite citizen not a Roman,
and that it is by a Samnite citizen that a Roman herald has been maltreated,
and that for that reason you are justified in making war upon us. It is
sad to think that you feel no shame in exposing this mockery of religion
to the light of day, and that old men of consular rank should invent excuses
for breaking their word which even children would think beneath them. Go,
lictor, remove the bonds from the Romans, let none of them be hindered
from departing where they please." Thus set free they returned to the Roman
camp, their personal obligations and possibly those of the State having
been discharged.
9.12
The Samnites clearly saw that instead of the peace which they had so arrogantly
dictated, a most bitter war had commenced. They not only had a foreboding
of all that was coming but they almost saw it with their eyes; now when
it was too late they began to view with approval the two alternatives which
the elder Pontius had suggested. They saw that they had fallen between
the two, and by adopting a middle course had exchanged the secure possession
of victory for an insecure and doubtful peace. They realised that they
had lost the chance of doing either a kindness or an injury, and would
have to fight with those whom they might have got rid of for ever as enemies
or secured for ever as friends. And though no battle had yet given either
side the advantage, men's feelings had so changed that Postumius enjoyed
a greater reputation amongst the Romans for his surrender than Pontius
possessed amongst the Samnites for his bloodless victory. The Romans regarded
the possibility of war as involving the certainty of victory, whilst the
Samnites looked upon the renewal of hostilities by the Romans as equivalent
to their own defeat. In the meantime, Satricum revolted to the Samnites.
(The latter made a sudden descent on Fregellae and succeeded in occupying
it in the night, assisted, there is no doubt, by the Satricans. Mutual
fear kept both the Samnites and the Fregellans quiet till daylight, with
the return of light the battle began. For some time the Fregellans held
their ground, for they were fighting for their hearths and homes and the
noncombatant population assisted them from the roofs of the houses. At
length the assailants gained the advantage by adopting a ruse. A proclamation
was made that all who laid down their arms should depart unhurt, and the
defenders did not interfere with the crier who made it. Now that there
were hopes of safety they fought with less energy and in all directions
arms were thrown away. Some, however, showed more determination and made
their way fully armed through the opposite gate. Their courage proved a
better protection than the timid credulity of the others, for these were
hemmed in by the Samnites with a ring of fire, and in spite of their cries
for mercy were burnt to death. After arranging their respective commands,
the consuls took the field. Papirius marched into Apulia as far as Luceria,
where the equites who had been given as hostages at Caudium were interned;
Publilius remained in Samnium to oppose the legions who had been at Caudium.
His presence made the Samnites uncertain how to act; they could not march
to Luceria for fear of exposing themselves to a rear attack, nor did they
feel satisfied to remain where they were, as Luceria might in the meantime
be lost. They decided that the best course would be to try their fortune
and hazard a battle with Publilius.
9.13
Accordingly they drew up their forces for action. Before engaging them
Publilius thought he ought to address a few words to his men, and ordered
the Assembly to be sounded. There was such an eager rush, however, to the
general's tent, and such loud shouts were raised in all directions as the
men clamoured to be led to battle, that none of the general's address was
heard; the memory of their recent disgrace was quite enough of itself to
stimulate every man to fight. They strode rapidly into battle, urging the
standard-bearers to move faster, and, to avoid any delay in having to hurl
their javelins, they flung them away as if at a given signal and rushed
upon the enemy with naked steel. There was no time for the commander's
skill to be shown in maneuvering his men or posting his reserves, it was
all carried through by the enraged soldiers, who charged like madmen. The
enemy were not only routed, they did not even venture to stay their flight
at their camp, but went in scattered parties in the direction of Apulia.
Eventually they rallied and reached Luceria in a body. The same rage and
fury which had carried the Romans through the midst of the enemy hurried
them on to the Samnite camp, and more carnage took place there than on
the battle-field. Most of the plunder was destroyed in their excitement.
The other army under Papirius had marched along the coast and reached Arpi.
The whole of the country through which he passed was peaceably disposed,
an attitude which was due more to the injuries inflicted by the Samnites
than to any services which the Romans had rendered. For the Samnites used
to live at that day in open hamlets among the mountains, and they were
in the habit of making marauding incursions into the low country and the
coastal districts. Living the free open-air life of mountaineers themselves
they despised the less hardy cultivators of the plains who, as often happens,
had developed, a character in harmony with their surroundings. If this
tract of country had been on good terms with the Samnites, the Roman army
would either have failed to reach Arpi or they would have been unable to
obtain provisions on their route, and so would have been cut off from supplies
of every kind. Even as it was, when they had advanced to Luceria both besieged
and besiegers were suffering from scarcity of provisions. The Romans drew
all their supplies from Arpi but in very small quantities, for, as the
infantry were all employed in outpost and patrol duty and in the construction
of the siege-works, the cavalry brought the corn from Arpi in their haversacks,
and sometimes when they encountered the enemy they were compelled to throw
these away so as to be free to fight. The besieged, on the other hand,
were obtaining their provisions and reinforcements from Samnium. But the
arrival of the other consul, Publilius, with his victorious army led to
their being more closely invested. He left the conduct of the siege to
his colleague that he might be free to intercept the enemy's convoys on
all sides. When the Samnites, who were encamped before Luceria, found that
there was no hope of the besieged enduring their privations any longer,
they were compelled to concentrate their whole strength and offer battle
to Papirius.
9.14
Whilst both sides were making their preparations for battle, a deputation
from Tarentum appeared on the scene with a peremptory demand that both
the Samnites and the Romans should desist from hostilities. They threatened
that whichever side stood in the way of a cessation of arms, they would
assist the other side against them. After hearing the demands which the
deputation advanced and apparently attaching importance to what they had
said, Papirius replied that he would communicate with his colleague. He
then sent for him and employed the interval in hastening the preparations
for battle. After talking over the matter, about which there could be no
two opinions, he displayed the signal for battle. Whilst the consuls were
engaged in the various duties, religious and otherwise, which are customary
before a battle, the Tarentines waited for them, expecting an answer, and
Papirius informed them that the pullarius had reported that the auspices
were favourable and the sacrifice most satisfactory. "You see," he added,
"that we are going into action with the sanction of the gods." He then
ordered the standards to be taken up, and as he marched his men on to the
field he expressed his contempt for a people of such egregious vanity,
that whilst quite incapable of managing their own affairs, owing to domestic
strife and discord, they thought themselves justified in prescribing to
others how far they must go in making peace or war. The Samnites, on the
other hand, had given up all thoughts of fighting, either because they
were really anxious for peace or because it was their interest to appear
so, in order to secure the goodwill of the Tarentines. When they suddenly
caught sight of the Romans drawn up for battle, they shouted that they
should act according to the instructions of the Tarentines; they would
neither go down into the field nor carry their arms outside their rampart,
they would rather let advantage be taken of them and bear whatever chance
might bring them than be thought to have flouted the peaceful advice of
Tarentum. The consuls said that they welcomed the omen, and prayed that
the enemy might remain in that mood so as not even to defend their rampart.
Advancing in two divisions up to the entrenchments, they attacked them
simultaneously on all sides. Some began to fill up the fosse, others tore
down the abattis on the rampart and hurled the timber into the fosse. It
was not their native courage only, but indignation and rage as well which
goaded them on, smarting as they were from their recent disgrace. As they
forced their way into the camp, they reminded one another that there were
no Forks of Caudium there, none of those insuperable defiles where deceit
had won an insolent victory over incaution, but Roman valour which neither
rampart nor fosse could check. They slew alike those who fought and those
who fled, armed and unarmed, slaves and freemen, young and old, men and
beasts. Not a single living thing would have survived had not the consuls
given the signal to retire, and by stern commands and threats driven the
soldiers who were thirsting for blood out of the enemy's camp. As the men
were highly incensed at this interruption to a vengeance which was so delightful,
it was necessary to explain to them on the spot why they were prevented
from carrying it further. The consuls assured them that they neither had
yielded nor would yield to any man in showing their hatred of the enemy,
and as they had been their leaders in the fighting so they would have been
foremost in encouraging their insatiable rage and vengeance. But they had
to consider the 600 equites who were being detained as hostages in Luceria,
and to take care that the enemy, despairing of any quarter for themselves,
did not wreak their blind rage on their captives, and destroy them before
they perished themselves. The soldiers quite approved and were glad that
their indiscriminate fury had been checked; they admitted that they must
submit to anything rather than endanger the safety of so many youths belonging
to the noblest families in Rome.
9.15
The soldiers were dismissed to quarters, and a council of war was held
to decide whether they should press on the siege of Luceria with their
whole force or whether Publilius with his army should visit the Apulians
and ascertain their intentions, about which there was considerable doubt.
The latter was decided upon, and the consul succeeded in reducing a considerable
number of their towns in one campaign, whilst others were admitted into
alliance. Papirius, who had remained behind to prosecute the siege of Luceria,
soon found his expectations realised, for as all the roads by which supplies
could be brought in were blocked, the Samnite garrison in Luceria was so
reduced by famine that they sent to the Roman consul an offer to restore
the hostages, for whose recovery the war had been undertaken, if he would
raise the siege. He replied that they ought to have consulted Pontius,
at whose instigation they had sent the Romans under the yoke, as to what
terms he thought ought to be imposed on the vanquished. As, however, they
preferred that equal terms should be fixed by the enemy rather than proposed
by themselves, he told the negotiators to take back word to Luceria that
all the arms, baggage, and beasts of burden together with the non-combatant
population were to be left behind; the soldiers he should send under the
yoke and leave them one garment apiece. In doing this, he said, he was
subjecting them to no novel disgrace but simply retaliating upon them one
which they had themselves inflicted. They were compelled to accept these
terms and 7000 men were sent under the yoke. An enormous amount of booty
was found in Luceria, all the arms and standards which had been taken at
Caudium, and what created the greatest joy of all-they recovered the equites,
the hostages whom the Samnites had placed there for security. Hardly any
victory that Rome ever won was more noteworthy for the sudden change that
it wrought in the circumstances of the republic, especially if, as I find
stated in some annals, Pontius, the son of Herennius, the Samnite captain-general,
was sent under the yoke with the rest, to expiate the disgrace he had inflicted
on the consuls. I am not, however, so much surprised that uncertainty should
exist with regard to this point as I am that any doubt should be felt as
to who really captured Luceria; whether, that is to say, it was Lucius
Cornelius, acting as Dictator, with L. Papirius Cursor as Master of the
Horse, who achieved those successes at Caudium and afterwards-at Luceria,
and as the one man who avenged the stem on Roman honour celebrated what
I am inclined to think was, with the exception of that of F. Camillus,
the most justly earned triumph that any down to that day had enjoyed, or
whether the glory of that distinction should be attributed to the consuls
and especially to Papirius. There is a further mistake here owing to doubts
as to whether at the next consular elections Papirius Cursor was re-elected
for the third time in consequence of his success at Luceria, together with
Q. Aulius Corretanus for the second time, or whether the name should really
be L. Papirius Mugilanus.
9.16
The authorities are agreed that the remainder of the war was conducted
by the consuls. Aulius finished the campaign against the Frentanians in
one battle. Their routed army fled to their city, and after giving hostages
the consul received their surrender. The other consul was equally fortunate
in his campaign against the Satricans. Though admitted to Roman citizenship
they had revolted to the Samnites after the Caudine disaster and allowed
them to garrison their city. But when the Roman army was close to their
walls they sent an urgent request, couched in very humble terms, for peace.
The consul replied that unless they handed over the Samnite garrison or
put them to death they were not to go to him again. The severity of this
reply created more terror amongst them than the actual presence of the
Roman army. They repeatedly asked him by what means he thought that such
a small and weak body as they were could attempt to use force against a
strong and well-armed garrison. He told them to seek counsel from those
through whose advice they had admitted the garrison in the first instance.
After having with some difficulty obtained his permission to consult their
senate, they returned to the city. There were two parties in the senate:
the leaders of the one were the authors of the revolt from Rome, the other
consisted of loyal citizens. Both, however, were equally anxious that every
effort should be made to induce the consul to grant peace. As the Samnite
garrison were not in the least prepared to stand a siege, they intended
to evacuate the city the following night. The party who had introduced
them thought it would be quite sufficient to let the consul know at what
hour and by what gate they would leave; the others who had been all along
opposed to their coming actually opened the gate to the consul that very
night and admitted his troops into the city. The Samnites were unexpectedly
attacked by a force concealed in the woods through which they were marching
whilst the shouts of the Romans were resounding in all parts of the city;
by this double act of treachery the Samnites were slain and Satricum captured
within the space of one short hour and the consul became complete master
of the situation. He ordered a strict inquiry to be made as to who were
responsible for the revolt, and those who were found to be guilty were
scourged and beheaded. The Satricans were deprived of their arms and a
strong garrison was placed in the city.
The writers who tell us that it was under Papirius that Luceria was
recovered and the Samnites sent under the yoke, go on to inform us that
after the capture of Satricum he returned to Rome to celebrate his triumph.
And indeed he was, undoubtedly, a man deserving of all praise for his soldierly
qualities, distinguished as he was not only by intellectual force but also
by his physical prowess. He was especially noted for his swiftness of foot,
which gave him his cognomen; he is stated to have beaten all those of his
own age in racing. Owing either to his great strength or the amount of
exercise he took he had an enormous appetite. Under no commander did either
horse or foot find service harder, for he himself never knew what it was
to be tired. On one occasion the cavalry ventured to ask him to excuse
them some of their fatigue duty in consideration of their having fought
a successful action. He replied: "That you may not say I never excuse you
anything, I excuse you from rubbing your horses' backs when you dismount."
He was as much of a martinet to the allies of Rome as he was to his own
countrymen. The commander of the Praenestine detachment had shown a lack
of courage in bringing his men up from the rear into the fighting line.
Papirius, walking in front of his tent, ordered him to be called up, and
on his appearance told the lictor to get the axe ready. The Praenestine,
on hearing this, stood paralysed with fear. "Come, lictor," said Papirius,
"cut out this root; it is in the way of people as they walk." After almost
frightening him to death with this threat, he dismissed him with a fine.
No age has been more prolific in great and noble characters than the one
in which he lived, and even in that age there was no one whose single arm
did more to sustain the commonwealth. Had Alexander the Great, after subjugating
Asia, turned his attention to Europe, there are many who maintain that
he would have met his match in Papirius.
9.17
Nothing can be thought to be further from my aim since I commenced this
task than to digress more than is necessary from the order of the narrative
or by embellishing my work with a variety of topics to afford pleasant
resting-places, as it were, for my readers and mental relaxation for myself.
The mention, however, of so great a king and commander induces me to lay
before my readers some reflections which I have often made when I have
proposed to myself the question, "What would have been the results for
Rome if she had been engaged in war with Alexander? "The things which tell
most in war are the numbers and courage of the troops, the ability of the
commanders, and Fortune, who has such a potent influence over human affairs,
especially those of war. Any one who considers these factors either separately
or in combination will easily see that as the Roman empire proved invincible
against other kings and nations, so it would have proved invincible against
Alexander. Let us, first of all, compare the commanders on each side. I
do not dispute that Alexander was an exceptional general, but his reputation
is enhanced by the fact that he died while still young and before he had
time to experience any change of fortune. Not to mention other kings and
illustrious captains, who afford striking examples of the mutability of
human affairs, I will only instance Cyrus, whom the Greeks celebrate as
one of the greatest of men. What was it that exposed him to reverses and
misfortunes but the length of his life, as recently in the case of Pompey
the Great? Let me enumerate the Roman generals-not all out of all ages
but only those with whom as consuls and Dictators Alexander would have
had to fight-M. Valerius Corvus, C. Marcius Rutilus, C. Sulpicius, T. Manlius
Torquatus, Q. Publilius Philo, L. Papirius Cursor, Q. Fabius Maximus, the
two Decii, L. Volumnius, and Manlius Curius. Following these come those
men of colossal mould who would have confronted him if he had first turned
his arms against Carthage and then crossed over into Italy later in life.
Every one of these men was Alexander's equal in courage and ability, and
the art of war, which from the beginning of the City had been an unbroken
tradition, had now grown into a science based on definite and permanent
rules. It was thus that the kings conducted their wars, and after them
the Junii and the Valerii, who expelled the kings, and in later succession
the Fabii, the Quinctii, and the Cornelii. It was these rules that Camillus
followed, and the men who would have had to fight with Alexander had seen
Camillus as an old man when they were little more than boys.
Alexander no doubt did all that a soldier ought to do in battle, and
that is not his least title to fame. But if Manlius Torquatus had been
opposed to him in the field, would he have been inferior to him in this
respect, or Valerius Corvus, both of them distinguished as soldiers before
they assumed command? Would the Decii, who, after devoting themselves,
rushed upon the enemy, or Papirius Cursor with his vast physical courage
and strength? Would the clever generalship of one young man have succeeded
in baffling the whole senate, not to mention individuals, that senate of
which he, who declared that it was composed of kings, alone formed a true
idea? Was there any danger of his showing more skill than any of those
whom I have mentioned in choosing the site for his camp, or organising
his commissariat, or guarding against surprises, or choosing the right
moment for giving battle, or disposing his men in line of battle and posting
his reserves to the best advantage? He would have said that it was not
with Darius that he had to do, dragging after him a train of women and
eunuchs, wrapped up in purple and gold, encumbered with all the trappings
of state. He found him an easy prey rather than a formidable enemy and
defeated him without loss, without being called to do anything more daring
than to show a just contempt for the idle show of power. The aspect of
Italy would have struck him as very different from the India which he traversed
in drunken revelry with an intoxicated army; he would have seen in the
passes of Apulia and the mountains of Lucania the traces of the recent
disaster which befell his house when his uncle Alexander, King of Epirus,
perished.
9.18
I am speaking of Alexander as he was before he was submerged in the flood
of success, for no man was less capable of bearing prosperity than he was.
If we look at him as transformed by his new fortunes and presenting the
new character, so to speak, which he had assumed after his victories, it
is evident he would have come into Italy more like Darius than Alexander,
and would have brought with him an army which had forgotten its native
Macedonia and was rapidly becoming Persian in character. It is a disagreeable
task in the case of so great a man to have to record his ostentatious love
of dress; the prostrations which he demanded from all who approached his
presence, and which the Macedonians must have felt to be humiliating, even
had they been vanquished, how much more when they were victors; the terribly
cruel punishments he inflicted; the murder of his friends at the banquet-table;
the vanity which made him invent a divine pedigree for himself. What, pray,
would have happened if his love of wine had become stronger and his passionate
nature more violent and fiery as he grew older? I am only stating facts
about which there is no dispute. Are we to regard none of these things
as serious drawbacks to his merits as a commander? Or was there any danger
of that happening which the most frivolous of the Greeks, who actually
extol the Parthians at the expense of the Romans, are so constantly harping
upon, namely, that the Roman people must have bowed before the greatness
of Alexander's name-though I do not think they had even heard of him-and
that not one out of all the Roman chiefs would have uttered his true sentiments
about him, though men dared to attack him in Athens, the very city which
had been shattered by Macedonian arms and almost well in sight of the smoking
ruins of Thebes, and the speeches of his assailants are still extant to
prove this?
However lofty our ideas of this man's greatness, still it is the greatness
of one individual, attained in a successful career of little more than
ten years. Those who extol it on the ground that though Rome has never
lost a war she has lost many battles, whilst Alexander has never fought
a battle unsuccessfully, are not aware that they are comparing the actions
of one individual, and he a youth, with the achievements of a people who
have had 800 years of war. Where more generations are reckoned on one side
than years on the other, can we be surprised that in such a long space
of time there have been more changes of fortune than in a period of thirteen
years ? Why do you not compare the fortunes of one man with another, of
one commander with another? How many Roman generals could I name who have
never been unfortunate in a single battle! You may run through page after
page of the lists of magistrates, both consuls and Dictators, and not find
one with whose valour and fortunes the Roman people have ever for a single
day had cause to be dissatisfied. And these men are more worthy of admiration
than Alexander or any other king. Some retained the Dictatorship for only
ten or twenty days; none held a consulship for more than a year; the levying
of troops was often obstructed by the tribunes of the plebs; they were
late, in consequence, in taking the field, and were often recalled before
the time to conduct the elections; frequently, when they were commencing
some important operation, their year of office expired; their colleagues
frustrated or ruined their plans, some through recklessness, some through
jealousy; they often had to succeed to the mistakes or failures of others
and take over an army of raw recruits or one in a bad state of discipline.
Kings are free from all hindrances; they are lords of time and circumstance,
and draw all things into the sweep of their own designs. Thus, the invincible
Alexander would have crossed swords with invincible captains, and would
have given the same pledges to Fortune which they gave. Nay, he would have
run greater risks than they, for the Macedonians had only one Alexander,
who was not only liable to all sorts of accidents but deliberately exposed
himself to them, whilst there were many Romans equal to Alexander in glory
and in the grandeur of their deeds, and yet each of them might fulfil his
destiny by his life or by his death without imperilling the existence of
the State.
9.19
It remains for us to compare the one army with the other as regards either
the numbers or the quality of the troops or the strength of the allied
forces. Now the census for that period gives 250,000 persons. In all the
revolts of the Latin league ten legions were raised, consisting almost
entirely of city troops. Often during those years four or five armies were
engaged simultaneously in Etruria, in Umbria (where they had to meet the
Gauls as well), in Samnium, and in Lucania. Then as regards the attitude
of the various Italian tribes-the whole of Latium with the Sabines, Volscians,
and Aequi, the whole of Campania, parts of Umbria and Etruria, the Picentines,
the Marsi, and Paeligni, the Vestinians and Apulians, to which we should
add the entire coast of the western sea, with its Greek population, stretching
from Thurii to Neapolis and Cumae, and from there as far as Antium and
Ostia-all these nationalities he would have found to be either strong allies
of Rome or reduced to impotence by Roman arms. He would have crossed the
sea with his Macedonian veterans, amounting to not more than 30,000 men
and 4000 cavalry, mostly Thracian. This formed all his real strength. If
he had brought over in addition Persians and Indians and other Orientals,
he would have found them a hindrance rather than a help. We must remember
also that the Romans had a reserve to draw upon at home, but Alexander,
warring on a foreign soil, would have found his army diminished by the
wastage of war, as happened afterwards to Hannibal. His men were armed
with round shields and long spears, the Romans had the large shield called
the scutum, a better protection for the body, and the javelin, a much more
effective weapon than the spear whether for hurling or thrusting. In both
armies the soldiers fought in line rank by rank, but the Macedonian phalanx
lacked mobility and formed a single unit; the Roman army was more elastic,
made up of numerous divisions, which could easily act separately or in
combination as required. Then with regard to fatigue duty, what soldier
is better able to stand hard work than the Roman?
If Alexander had been worsted in one battle the war would have been
over; what army could have broken the strength of Rome, when Caudium and
Cannae failed to do so? Even if things had gone well with him at first,
he would often have been tempted to wish that Persians and Indians and
effeminate Asiatics were his foes, and would have confessed that his former
wars had been waged against women, as Alexander of Epirus is reported to
have said when after receiving his mortal wound he was comparing his own
fortune with that of this very youth in his Asiatic campaigns. When I remember
that in the first Punic war we fought at sea for twenty-four years, I think
that Alexander would hardly have lived long enough to see one war through.
It is quite possible, too, that as Rome and Carthage were at that time
leagued together by an old-standing treaty, the same apprehensions might
have led those two powerful states to take up arms against the common foe,
and Alexander would have been crushed by their combined forces. Rome has
had experience of a Macedonian war, not indeed when Alexander was commanding
nor when the resources of Macedon were still unimpaired, but the contests
against Antiochus, Philip, and Perses were fought not only without loss
but even without risk. I trust that I shall not give offence when I say
that, leaving out of sight the civil wars, we have never found an enemy's
cavalry or infantry too much for us, when we have fought in the open field,
on ground equally favourable for both sides, still less when the ground
has given us an advantage. The infantry soldier, with his heavy armour
and weapons, may reasonably fear the arrows of Parthian cavalry, or passes
invested by the enemy, or country where supplies cannot be brought up,
but he has repulsed a thousand armies more formidable than those of Alexander
and his Macedonians, and will repulse them in the future if only the domestic
peace and concord which we now enjoy remains undisturbed for all the years
to come.
9.20
M. Foslius Flaccina and L. Plautius Venox were the next consuls. In this
year several communities amongst the Samnites made overtures for a fresh
treaty. These deputations, when admitted to an audience, prostrated themselves
on the ground, and their humble attitude influenced the senate in their
favour. Their prayers, however, were by no means so efficacious with the
Assembly, to which they had been referred by the senate. Their request
for a treaty was refused, but after they had spent several days in appealing
to individual citizens, they succeeded in obtaining a two years' truce.
In Apulia, too, the people of Teanum and Canusium, tired of the constant
ravages which they had suffered, gave hostages and surrendered to the consul,
L. Plautius. It was in this year also that prefects were first appointed
for Capua and a code of laws given to that city by the praetor, L. Furius.
Both these boons were granted in response to a request from the Campanians
themselves as a remedy for the deplorable state of things brought about
by civic discord. Two new tribes were formed, the Ufentine and the Falernian.
As the power of Apulia was declining, the people of Teate came to the new
consuls, C. Junius Bubulcus and Q. Aemilius Barbula, to negotiate for a
treaty. They gave a formal undertaking that throughout Apulia peace would
be maintained towards Rome, and the confident assurances they gave led
to a treaty being granted, not, however, as between two independent states;
they were to acknowledge the suzerainty of Rome. After the subjugation
of Apulia-for Forentum, also a place of considerable strength, had been
captured by Junius-an advance was made into Lucania, and the consul, Aemilius,
surprised and captured the city of Nerulum. The order introduced into Capua
by the adoption of Roman institutions had become generally known amongst
the states in alliance with Rome, and the Antiates asked for the same privilege;
as they were without a fixed code of laws or any regular magistrates of
their own. The patrons of the colony were commissioned by the senate to
draw out a system of jurisprudence. Not only the arms of Rome but her laws
were spreading far and wide.
9.21
At the termination of their year of office the consuls did not hand the
legions over to their successors, Sp. Nautius. and M. Popilius, but to
the Dictator, L. Aemilius. In conjunction with M. Fulvius, the Master of
the Horse, he commenced an attack on Saticula, and the Samnites at once
seized this opportunity to renew hostilities. The Romans were threatened
by a double danger; the Samnites, after getting a large army together,
had entrenched themselves not far from the Roman camp in order to relieve
their blockaded allies, whilst the Saticulans suddenly flung their gates
open and made a tumultuous attack on the Roman outposts. The two bodies
of combatants, each relying more on the help of the other than on its own
strength, united in a regular attack on the Roman camp. Though both sides
of the camp were attacked, the Dictator kept his men free from panic, owing
to his having selected a position which could not easily be turned, and
also because his men presented two fronts. He directed his efforts mainly
against those who had made the sortie, and drove them back, without much
trouble, behind their walls. Then he turned his whole strength against
the Samnites. Here the fighting was more sustained and the victory was
longer in coming, but when it did come it was decisive. The Samnites were
driven in disorder to their camp, and after extinguishing all the camp
fires they departed silently in the night, having abandoned all hope of
saving Saticula. By way of retaliation they invested Plistica, a city in
alliance with Rome.
9.22
The year having expired, the war was thenceforward carried on by the Dictator,
Q. Fabius, whilst the new consuls, like their predecessors, remained in
Rome. Fabius marched with reinforcements to Saticula to take over the army
from Aemilius. The Samnites did not remain before Plistica; they had called
up fresh troops from home, and trusting to their numbers they fixed their
camp on the same ground as in the previous year and endeavoured to distract
the Romans from their siege operations by a series of harassing attacks.
This made the Dictator all the more determined to press the siege, as he
considered that the reduction of the place would largely affect the character
of the war; he treated the Samnites with comparative indifference, and
merely strengthened the pickets on that side of the camp to meet any attack
that might be made. This emboldened the Samnites; they rode up to the rampart
day after day and allowed the Romans no rest. At last they almost got within
the gates of the camp, when Q. Aulius, the Master of the Horse, without
consulting the Dictator, charged them furiously from the camp with the
whole of his cavalry and drove them off. Though this was only a desultory
conflict, Fortune influenced it so largely that she inflicted a signal
loss on both sides and brought about the deaths of both commanders. First,
the Samnite general, indignant at being repulsed and put to flight from
the ground over which he had ridden with such confidence, induced his cavalry
by entreaties and encouragement to renew the combat. Whilst he was conspicuous
amongst them as he urged on the fighting, the Master of the Horse levelled
his lance and spurred his horse against him with such force that with one
thrust he hurled him from his saddle dead. His men were not, as often happens,
dismayed at their leader's fall. All who were round him flung their missiles
on Aulius, who had incautiously ridden on amongst them, but they allowed
the dead general's brother to have the special glory of avenging his death.
In a frenzy of grief and rage he dragged the Master of the Horse out of
his saddle and slew him. The Samnites, amongst whom he had fallen, would
have secured the body had not the Romans suddenly leaped from their horses,
on which the Samnites were obliged to do the same. A fierce infantry fight
raged round the bodies of the two generals in which the Roman was decidedly
superior; the body of Aulius was rescued, and amidst mingled demonstrations
of grief and joy the victors carried it into camp. After losing their leader
and seeing the unfavourable result of the trial of strength in the cavalry
action, the Samnites considered it useless to make any further efforts
on behalf of Saticula and resumed the siege of Plistica. A few days later
Saticula surrendered to the Romans and Plistica was carried by assault
by the Samnites.
9.23
The seat of war was now changed; the legions were marched from Samnium
and Apulia to Sora. This place had revolted to the Samnites after putting
the Roman colonists to death. The Roman army marched thither with all speed
to avenge the death of their countrymen and to re-establish the colony.
No sooner had they arrived before the place than the reconnoitring parties
who had been watching the different routes brought in reports one after
another that the Samnites were following and were now at no great distance.
The consul marched to meet the enemy, and an indecisive action was fought
at Lautulae. The battle was put a stop to, not by the losses or flight
of either side but by night, which overtook the combatants while still
uncertain whether they were victors or vanquished. I find in some authorities
that this battle was unfavourable to the Romans, and that Q. Aulius, the
Master of the Horse, fell there. C. Fabius was appointed Master of the
Horse in his place and came with a fresh army from Rome. He sent orderlies
in advance to consult the Dictator as to where he should take up his position
and also as to the time and mode of attacking the enemy. After becoming
thoroughly acquainted with the Dictator's plans, he halted his army in
a place where he was well concealed. The Dictator kept his men for some
days confined to their camp, as though he were enduring a siege rather
than conducting one. At last he suddenly displayed the signal for battle.
Thinking that brave men were more likely to have their courage stimulated
when all their hopes depended upon themselves, he kept the arrival of the
Master of the Horse and the fresh army concealed from his soldiers, and
as though all their prospects of safety depended upon their cutting their
way out, he said to his men: "We have been caught in a position where we
are shut in, and we have no way out unless we can open one by our victorious
swords. Our standing camp is sufficiently protected by its entrenchments,
but it is untenable owing to want of provisions; all the places from which
supplies could be obtained have revolted, and even if the people were willing
to help us the country is impassable for convoys. I shall not cheat your
courage by leaving a camp here into which you can retire, as you did on
the last occasion, without winning the victory. Entrenchments are to be
protected by arms, not arms by entrenchments. Let those who think it worth
their while to prolong the war hold their camp as a place of retreat; we
must have regard to nothing but victory. Advance the standards against
the enemy, and when the column is clear of the camp those who have been
told off for the purpose will set it on fire. What you lose, soldiers,
will be made up to you in the plunder of all the surrounding cities which
have revolted." The Dictator's words, pointing to the dire necessity to
which they were reduced, produced intense excitement, and rendered desperate
by the sight of the burning camp-although the Dictator had only ordered
some spots nearest to them to be set on fire-they charged like madmen,
and at the first onset threw the enemy into confusion. At the same moment
the Master of the Horse seeing the burning camp in the distance-the agreed
signal-attacked the enemy in the rear. Thus hemmed in, the Samnites fled
in all directions, each as best he could. A vast number, who had crowded
together in their panic and were so close to one another that they could
not use their weapons, were killed between the two armies. The enemy's
camp was captured and plundered, and the soldiers, loaded with spoil, were
marched back to their own camp. Even their victory did not give them so
much pleasure as the discovery that with the exception of a small part
spoilt by fire their camp was unexpectedly safe.
9.24
They then returned to Sora, and the new consuls, M. Poetilius and C. Sulpicius,
took over the army from the Dictator Fabius, after a large proportion of
the veterans had been sent home and new cohorts brought up as reinforcements.
Owing, however, to the difficulties presented by the position of the city,
no definite plan of attack was yet formed; a long time would be needed
to reduce it by famine, and to attempt to storm it would involve considerable
risk. In the midst of this uncertainty a Soran deserter left the town secretly
and made his way to the Roman sentinels, whom he requested to conduct him
at once to the consuls. On being brought before them he undertook to betray
the place into their hands. When questioned as to the means by which he
would carry out his undertaking, he laid his proposals before them and
they appeared quite feasible. He advised them to remove their camp, which
was almost adjoining the walls, to a distance of six miles from the town,
this would lead to less vigilance on the part of those who were on outpost
duty during the day and sentry duty at night. The following night, after
some cohorts had been ordered to conceal themselves in some wooded spots
close under the town, he conducted a picked body of ten men by a steep
and almost inaccessible path into the citadel. Here a quantity of missile
weapons had been collected, far more than would be required for the men
who had been brought there, and in addition there were large stones, some
lying about as is usual in craggy places, others piled in heaps by the
townsmen to use for the defence of the place. When he had posted the Romans
here and had pointed out to them a steep and narrow path leading up from
the town, he said to them: "From this ascent even three armed men could
keep back a multitude however large. You are ten in number, and what is
more you are Romans, and the bravest of them. You have the advantage of
position and you will be helped by the night, which by its obscurity makes
everything look more terrible. I will now spread panic everywhere; you
devote yourselves to holding the citadel." Then he ran down and created
as great a tumult as he possibly could, shouting: "To arms, citizens! Help,
help! The citadel has been seized by the enemy, hasten to its defence!"
He kept up the alarm as he knocked at the doors of the principal men, he
shouted it in the ears of all whom he met, of all who rushed out terror-struck
into the streets. The panic which one man had started was carried by numbers
through the city. The magistrates hurriedly sent men up to the citadel
to find out what had happened, and when they heard that it was held by
an armed force, whose numbers were grossly exaggerated, they gave up all
hopes of recovering it. All quarters of the city were filled with fugitives;
the gates were burst open by people who were only half awake and mostly
without arms, and through one of these the Roman cohorts, roused by the
shouting, rushed in and slew the frightened crowds who were thronging the
streets. Sora was already captured when in the early dawn the consuls appeared
and accepted the surrender of those whom Fortune had spared from the nocturnal
massacre. Amongst these two hundred and twenty-five were sent in chains
to Rome as they were universally admitted to have been the instigators
of the murder of the colonists and the revolt which followed. The rest
of the population were left uninjured and a garrison was stationed in the
town. All those taken to Rome were scourged and beheaded to the great satisfaction
of the plebs, who felt it to be a matter of supreme importance that those
who had been sent out in such large numbers as colonists should be safe
wherever they were.
9.25
After leaving Sora the consuls extended the war to the cities and fields
of Ausonia, for the whole country had become restless owing to the presence
of the Samnites after the battle of Lautulae. Plots were being hatched
everywhere throughout Campania, even Capua was not free from disaffection,
and it was found upon investigation that the movement had actually reached
some of the principal men in Rome. It was, however, as in the case of Sora,
through the betrayal of her cities that Ausonia fell under the power of
Rome. There were three cities-Ausona, Menturnae, and Vescia-which some
twelve young men belonging to the principal families there had mutually
agreed to betray to the Romans. They came to the consuls and informed them
that their people had long been looking forward to the arrival of the Samnites,
and after they had heard of the battle of Lautulae, they looked upon the
Romans as vanquished and many of the younger men had volunteered to serve
with the Samnites. After the Samnites, however, had been driven out of
their country they were wavering between peace and war, afraid to close
their gates to the Romans lest they should provoke a war and yet determined
to close them if a Roman army approached their city. In this state of indecision
they would fall an easy prey. Acting on their advice, the Romans moved
their camp into the neighbourhood of these cities, and at the same time
soldiers were despatched, some fully armed, to occupy concealed positions
near the walls, others in ordinary dress, with swords hidden under their
togas, were to enter the cities through the open gates at the approach
of daylight. As soon as the latter began to attack the guards the signal
was given for the others to rush from their ambush. Thus the gates were
secured, and the three towns were captured at the same time and by the
same stratagem. As the generals were not there to direct the attack, there
was no check upon the carnage which ensued, and the nation of the Ausonians
was exterminated, just as if they had been engaged in an internecine war,
though there was no certain proof of their having revolted.
9.26
During this year the Roman garrison at Luceria was treacherously betrayed,
and the Samnites became masters of the place. The traitors did not go long
unpunished. A Roman army was not far away, and the city, which lay in a
plain, was taken at the first assault. The Lucerines and Samnites were
put to death, no quarter being given, and such deep indignation was felt
at Rome that when the question of sending fresh colonists to Luceria was
under discussion in the senate many voted for the complete destruction
of the city. Not only the bitter feeling towards a people who had been
twice subdued but also the distance from Rome made them shrink from banishing
their countrymen so far from home. However, the proposal to despatch colonists
was adopted; 2500 were sent. Whilst disloyalty was thus manifesting itself
everywhere, Capua also became the centre of intrigues amongst some of her
principal men. When the matter came up in the senate, there was a general
feeling that it ought to be dealt with at once. A decree was passed authorising
the immediate opening of a court of inquiry, and C. Maenius was nominated
Dictator to conduct the proceedings. M. Foslius was appointed Master of
the Horse. The greatest alarm was created by this step, and the Calavii,
Ovius, and Novius, who had been the ringleaders, did not wait to be denounced
to the Dictator, but placed themselves beyond the reach of prosecution
by what was undoubtedly a self-inflicted death. As there was no longer
any matter for investigation at Capua, the inquiry was directed to those
who were suspected in Rome. The decree was interpreted as authorising an
inquiry, not in regard to Capua especially, but generally in respect of
all who had formed cabals and conspiracies against the republic, including
the secret leagues entered into by candidates for office. The inquiry began
to embrace a wider scope both with respect to the nature of the alleged
offences and the persons affected, and the Dictator insisted that the authority
vested in him as criminal judge was unlimited. Men of high family were
indicted, and no one was allowed to appeal to the tribunes to arrest proceedings.
When matters had gone thus far, the nobility-not only those against whom
information was being laid, but the order as a whole-protested that the
charge did not lie on the patricians, to whom the path to honours always
lay open, unless it was obstructed by intrigue, but on the novi homines.
They even asserted that the Dictator and the Master of the Horse were more
fit to be put upon their trial than to act as inquisitors in cases where
this charge was brought, and they would find that out as soon as they had
vacated their office.
Under these circumstances, Maenius, more anxious to clear his reputation
than to retain his office, came forward in the Assembly and addressed it
in the following terms: "You are all cognisant, Quirites, of what my life
has been in the past, and this very office which has been conferred upon
me is a testimony to my innocence. There are men amongst the nobility-as
to their motives it is better that you should form your own opinion than
that I, holding the office I do, should say anything without proof-who
tried their utmost to stifle this inquiry. When they found themselves powerless
to do this they sought to shelter themselves, patricians though they were,
behind the stronghold of their opponents, the tribunician veto, so as to
escape from trial. At last, driven from that position, and thinking any
course safer than that of trying to prove their innocence, they have directed
their assaults against us, and private citizens have not been ashamed to
demand the impeachment of the Dictator. Now, that gods and men alike may
know that in trying to avoid giving an account of themselves these men
are attempting the impossible, and that I am prepared to answer any charge
and meet my accusers face to face, I at once resign my Dictatorship. And
if the senate should assign the task to you, consuls, I beg that you will
begin with M. Foslius and myself, so that it may be conclusively shown
that we are protected from such charges, not by our official position,
but by our innocence." He then at once laid down his office, followed by
the Master of the Horse. They were the first to be tried before the consuls,
for so the senate ordered, and as the evidence given by the nobles against
them completely broke down, they were triumphantly acquitted. Even Publilius
Philo, a man who had repeatedly filled the highest offices as a reward
for his services at home and in the field, but who was disliked by the
nobility, was put on his trial and acquitted. As usual, however, it was
only whilst this inquisition was a novelty that it had strength enough
to attack illustrious names; it soon began to stoop to humbler victims,
until it was at length stifled by the very cabals and factions which it
had been instituted to suppress.
9.27
The rumour of these proceedings, and, still more, the expectation of a
Campanian revolt, which had already been secretly organised recalled the
Samnites from their designs in Apulia. They marched to Caudium, which from
its proximity to Capua would make it easy for them, if the opportunity
offered, to wrest that city from the Romans. The consuls marched to Caudium
with a strong force. For some time both armies remained in their positions
on either side of the pass, as they could only reach each other by a most
difficult route. At length the Samnites descended by a short detour through
open country into the flat district of Campania, and there for the first
time they came within sight of each other's camp. There were frequent skirmishes,
in which the cavalry played a greater part than the infantry, and the Romans
had no cause to be dissatisfied with these trials of strength, nor with
the delay which was prolonging the war. The Samnite generals, on the other
hand, saw that these daily encounters involved daily losses, and that the
prolongation of the war was sapping their strength. They decided, therefore,
to bring on an action. They posted their cavalry on the two flanks of their
army with instructions to keep their attention on their camp, in case it
were attacked, rather than on the battle, which would be safe in the hands
of the infantry. On the other side, the consul Sulpicius directed the right
wing Poetilius the left. The Roman right was drawn up in more open order
than usual, as the Samnites opposed to them were standing in thinly extended
ranks in order either to surround the enemy or to prevent themselves from
being surrounded. The left, which was in a much closer formation, was further
strengthened by a rapid maneuver of Poetilius, who suddenly brought up
into the fighting line the cohorts which were usually kept in reserve,
in case the battle was prolonged. He then charged the enemy with his full
strength. As the Samnite infantry were shaken by the weight of the attack
their cavalry came to their support, and riding obliquely between the two
armies were met by the Roman cavalry who charged them at a hard gallop
and threw infantry and cavalry alike into confusion, until they had forced
back the whole line in this part of the field. Sulpicius was taking his
part with Poetilius in encouraging the men in this division, for on hearing
the battle-shout raised he had ridden across from his own division, which
was not yet engaged. Seeing that the victory was no longer doubtful here
he rode back to his post with his 1200 cavalry, but he found a very different
condition of things there, the Romans had been driven from their ground
and the victorious enemy were pressing them hard. The presence of the consul
produced a sudden and complete change, the courage of the men revived at
the sight of their general, and the cavalry whom he had brought up rendered
an assistance out of all proportion to their numbers, whilst the sound,
followed soon by the sight of the success on the other wing, re-animated
the combatants to redouble their exertions. From this moment the Romans
were victorious along the whole line, and the Samnites abandoning all further
resistance, were all killed or taken prisoners, with the exception of those
who succeeded in escaping to Maleventum, now called Beneventum. Their loss
in prisoners and slain is stated by the chroniclers to have amounted to
30,000.
9.28
After this great victory the consuls advanced to Bovianum, which they proceeded
to invest. They remained there in winter quarters until C. Poetilius, who
had been named Dictator with M. Foslius as Master of the Horse, took over
the army from the new consuls, L. Papirius Cursor, consul for the fifth
time, and C. Junius Bubulcus, for the second time. On learning that the
citadel of Fregellae had been captured by the Samnites, he raised the siege
of Bovianum and marched to Fregellae. The place was retaken without fighting,
for the Samnites evacuated it in the night, and after leaving a strong
garrison there, the Dictator returned to Campania with the main object
of recovering Nola. At his approach the whole of the Samnite population
and the native peasantry retired within the walls. After examining the
position of the city, he gave orders for all the buildings outside the
wall-and there was a considerable population in the suburbs-to be destroyed
in order to render the approach easier. Not long afterwards, Nola was taken,
either by the Dictator or by the consul, C. Junius, for both accounts are
given. Those who give the credit of the capture to the consul state that
Atina and Calatia were also taken by him, and they explain the appointment
of Poetilius by saying that he was nominated Dictator for the purpose of
driving in the nail on the outbreak of an epidemic. Colonies were sent
out this year to Suessa and Pontia; Suessa had belonged to the Auruncans,
and the island of Pontia had been inhabited by the Volscians, as it lay
off their coast. The senate also authorised the settlement of a colony
at Interamna on the Casinus, but it fell to the succeeding consuls, M.
Valerius and P. Decius, to appoint the commissioners and send out the colonists
to the number of 4000.
9.29
The Samnite war was now drawing to a close, but before the senate could
dismiss it entirely from their thoughts there was a rumour of war on the
side of Etruria. With the one exception of the Gauls, no nation was more
dreaded at that time, owing to their proximity to Rome and their vast population.
One of the consuls remained in Samnium to finish the war, the other, P.
Decius, was detained in Rome by serious illness, and on instructions from
the senate, nominated C. Junius Bubulcus Dictator. In view of the seriousness
of the emergency the Dictator compelled all who were liable for service
to take the military oath, and used his utmost endeavours to have arms
and whatever else was required in readiness. Notwithstanding the great
preparations he was making, he had no intention of assuming the aggressive,
and had quite made up his mind to wait until the Etruscans made the first
move. The Etruscans were equally energetic in their preparations, and equally
reluctant to commence hostilities. Neither side went outside their own
frontiers. This year (312 B.C.) was signalised by the censorship of Appius
Claudius. His claim to distinction with posterity rests mainly upon his
public works, the road and the aqueduct which bear his name. He carried
out these undertakings single-handed, for, owing to the odium he incurred
by the way he revised the senatorial lists and filled up the vacancies,
his colleague, thoroughly ashamed of his conduct, resigned. In the obstinate
temper which had always marked his house, Appius continued to hold office
alone. It was owing to his action that the Potitii, whose family had always
possessed the right of ministering at the Ava Maxima of Hercules, transferred
that duty to some temple servants, whom they had instructed in the various
observances. There is a strange tradition connected with this, and one
well calculated to create religious scruples in the minds of any who would
disturb the established order of ceremonial usages. It is said that though
when the change was made there were twelve branches of the family of the
Potitii comprising thirty adults, not one member, old or young, was alive
twelve months later. Nor was the extinction of the Potitian name the only
consequence; Appius himself some years afterwards was struck with blindness
by the unforgetting wrath of the gods.
9.30
The consuls for the following year were C. Junius Bubulcus (for the third
time) and Q. Aemilius Barbula (for the second time). At the beginning of
their year of office they laid a complaint before the Assembly touching
the unscrupulous way in which vacancies in the senate had been filled up,
men having been passed over who were far superior to some who had been
selected, whereby the whole senatorial order had been sullied and disgraced.
They declared that the selection had been made solely with a view to popularity
and out of sheer caprice, and that no regard whatever had been paid to
the good or bad characters of those chosen. They then gave out that they
should ignore them altogether, and at once proceeded to call over the names
of the senators as they appeared on the roll before Appius Claudius and
C. Plautius were made censors. Two official posts were for the first time
this year placed at the disposal of the people, both of a military character.
One was the office of military tribune; sixteen were henceforth appointed
by the people for the four legions; these had hitherto been selected by
the Dictators and consuls, very few places being left to the popular vote.
L. Atilius and C. Marcius, tribunes of the plebs, were responsible for
that measure. The other was the post of naval commissioner; the people
were to appoint two to superintend the equipment and refitting of the fleet.
This provision was due to M. Decius, a tribune of the plebs. An incident
of a somewhat trifling character occurred this year which I should have
passed over did it not appear to be connected with religious customs. The
guild of flute-players had been forbidden by the censors to hold their
annual banquet in the temple of Jupiter, a privilege they had enjoyed from
ancient times. Hugely disgusted, they went off in a body to Tibur, and
not one was left in the City to perform at the sacrificial rites. The senate
were alarmed at the prospect of the various religious ceremonies being
thus shorn of their due ritual, and they sent envoys to Tibur, who were
to make it their business to see that the Romans got these men back again.
The Tiburtines promised to do their best, and invited the musicians into
the Senate-house, where they were strongly urged to return to Rome. As
they could not be persuaded to do so, the Tiburtines adopted a ruse quite
appropriate to the character of the men they were dealing with. It was
a feast day and they were invited to various houses, ostensibly to supply
music at the banquets. Like the rest of their class, they were fond of
wine, and they were plied with it till they drank themselves into a state
of torpor. In this condition they were thrown into wagons and carried off
to Rome. They were left in the wagons all night in the Forum, and did not
recover their senses till daylight surprised them still suffering from
the effect of their debauch. The people crowded round them and succeeded
in inducing them to stay, and they were granted the privilege of going
about the City for three days every year in their long dresses and masks
with singing and mirth; a custom which is still observed. Those members
of the guild who played on solemn occasions in the temple of Jupiter had
the right restored to them of holding their banquets there. These incidents
occurred while the public attention was fixed on two most serious wars.
9.31
The consuls drew lots for their respective commands; the Samnites fell
to Junius, the new theatre of war in Etruria to Aemilius. The Roman garrison
of Cluvia in Samnium, after being unsuccessfully attacked, were starved
into surrender, and were then massacred after being cruelly mangled by
the scourge. Enraged at this brutality, Junius felt that the first thing
to be done was to attack Cluvia, and on the very day he arrived before
the place he took it by storm and put all the adult males to death. Thence
his conquering army marched to Bovianum. This was the chief city of the
Pentrian Samnites, and by far the wealthiest and best supplied with arms.
There was not the same cause for resentment here as at Cluvia, the soldiers
were mainly animated by the prospect of plunder, and on the capture of
the place the enemy were treated with less severity; but there was almost
more booty collected there than from all the rest of Samnium, and the whole
of it was generously given up to the soldiers. Now that nothing could withstand
the overwhelming might of Roman arms, neither armies nor camps nor cities,
the one idea in the minds of all the Samnite leaders was to choose some
position from which Roman troops when scattered on their foraging expeditions
might be caught and surrounded. Some peasants who pretended to be deserters
and some who had, either deliberately or by accident, been made prisoners,
came to the consuls with a story in which they all agreed, and which really
was true, namely, that an immense quantity of cattle had been driven into
a pathless forest. The consuls were induced by this story to send the legions,
with nothing but their kits to encumber them, in the direction the cattle
had taken, to secure them. A very strong body of the enemy were concealed
on either side of the road, and when they saw that the Romans had entered
the forest they suddenly raised a shout and made a tumultuous attack upon
them. The suddenness of the affair at first created some confusion, while
the men were piling their kits in the centre of the column and getting
at their weapons, but as soon as they had each freed themselves from their
burdens and put themselves in fighting trim, they began to assemble round
the standards. From their old discipline and long experience they knew
their places in the ranks, and the line was formed without any orders being
needed, each man acting on his own initiative.
The consul rode up to the part where the fighting was hottest and, leaping
off his horse, called Jupiter, Mars, and other gods to witness that he
had not gone into that place in quest of any glory for himself, but solely
to provide booty for his soldiers, nor could any other fault be found with
him except that he had been too anxious to enrich his men at the expense
of the enemy. From that disgrace nothing would clear him but the courage
of his men. Only they must one and all make a determined attack. The enemy
had been already worsted in the field, stripped of his camp, deprived of
his cities, and was now trying the last chance by lurking secretly in ambush
and trusting to his ground, not to his arms. What ground was too difficult
for Roman courage? He reminded them of the citadels of Fregellae and of
Sora and of the successes they had everywhere met with when the nature
of the ground was all against them. Fired by his words, his men, oblivious
of all difficulties, went straight at the hostile line above them. Some
exertion was needed while the column were climbing up the face of the hill,
but when once the leading standards had secured a footing on the summit
and the army found that it was on favourable ground, it was the enemy's
turn to be dismayed; they flung away their arms, and in wild flight made
for the lurking-places in which they had shortly before concealed themselves.
But the place which they had selected as presenting most difficulty to
the enemy now became a trap for themselves, and impeded them in every way.
Very few were able to escape. As many as 20,000 men were killed, and the
victorious Romans dispersed in different directions to secure the cattle
of which the enemy had made them a present.
9.32
During these occurrences in Samnium the whole of the cities of Etruria
with the exception of Arretium had taken up arms and commenced what proved
to be a serious war by an attack on Sutrium. This city was in alliance
with Rome, and served as a barrier on the side of Etruria. Aemilius marched
thither to raise the siege, and selected a site before the city where he
entrenched himself. His camp was plentifully supplied with provisions from
Sutrium. The Etruscans spent the day after his arrival in discussing whether
they should bring on an immediate engagement or protract the war. Their
generals decided upon the more energetic course as the safer one, and the
next day at sunrise the signal for battle was displayed and the troops
marched into the field. As soon as this was reported to the consul he ordered
the tessera to be given out, instructing the men to take their breakfast,
and after they were strengthened by food to arm themselves for battle.
When he saw that they were in complete readiness, he ordered the standards
to go forward, and after the army had emerged from the camp he formed his
battle-line not far from the enemy. For some time both sides stood in expectation,
each waiting for the other to raise the battle-shout and begin the fighting.
The sun passed the meridian before a single missile was discharged on either
side. At length the Etruscans, not caring to leave the field without securing
some success, raised the battle-shout; the trumpets sounded and the standards
advanced. The Romans showed no less eagerness to engage. They closed with
each other in deadly earnest. The Etruscans had the advantage in numbers,
the Romans in courage. The contest was equally maintained and cost many
lives, including the bravest on both sides, nor did either army show any
signs of giving way until the second Roman line came up fresh into the
place of the first, who were wearied and exhausted. The Etruscans had no
reserves to support their first line, and all fell in front of their standards
or around them. No battle would have witnessed fewer fugitives or involved
greater carnage had not the Tuscans, who had made up their minds to die,
found protection in the approach of night, so that the victors were the
first to desist from fighting. After sunset the signal was given to retire,
and both armies returned in the night to their respective camps. Nothing
further worth mention took place that year at Sutrium. The enemy had lost
the whole of their first line in a single battle and had only their reserves
left, who were hardly sufficient to protect their camp. Amongst the Romans
there were so many wounded that those who left the field disabled were
more numerous than those who had fallen in the battle.
9.33
The consuls for the following year were Q. Fabius and C. Marcius Rutilus.
Fabius took over the command at Sutrium, and brought reinforcements from
Rome. A fresh army was also raised in Etruria and sent to support the besiegers.
Very many years had elapsed since there had been any contests between the
patrician magistrates and the tribunes of the plebs. Now, however, a dispute
arose through that family which seemed marked out by destiny to be the
cause of quarrels with the plebs and its tribunes. Appius Claudius had
now been censor eighteen months, the period fixed by the Aemilian Law for
the duration of that office. In spite of the fact that his colleague, C.
Plautius, had resigned, he could under no circumstances whatever be induced
to vacate his office. P. Sempronius was the tribune of the plebs who commenced
an action for limiting his censorship to the legal period. In taking this
step he was acting in the interests of justice quite as much as in the
interests of the people, and he carried the sympathies of the aristocracy
no less than he had the support of the masses. He recited the several provisions
of the Aemilian Law and extolled its author, Mamercus Aemilius, the Dictator,
for having shortened the censorship. Formerly, he reminded his hearers,
it was held for five years, a time long enough to make it tyrannical and
despotic, Aemilius limited it to eighteen months. Then turning to Appius
he asked him: "Pray tell me, Appius, what would you have done had you been
censor at the time that C. Furius and M. Geganius were censors?" Appius
Claudius replied that the tribune's question had not much bearing on his
case. He argued that though the law might be binding in the case of those
censors during whose period of office it was passed, because it was after
they had been appointed that the people ordered the measure to become law,
and the last order of the people was law for the time being, nevertheless,
neither he nor any of the censors subsequently appointed could be bound
by it because all succeeding censors had been appointed by the order of
the people and the last order of the people was the law for the time being.
9.34
This quibble on the part of Appius convinced no one. Sempronius then addressed
the Assembly in the following language: "Quirites, here you have the progeny
of that Appius who, after being appointed decemvir for one year, appointed
himself for a second year, and then, without going through any form of
appointment either at his own hands or at any one else's, retained the
fasces and the supreme authority for a third year, and persisted in retaining
them until the power which he gained by foul means, exercised by foul means,
and retained by foul means, proved his ruin. This is the family, Quirites,
by whose violence and lawlessness you were driven out of your City and
compelled to occupy the Sacred Mount; the family against which you won
the protection of your tribunes; the family on whose account you took up
your position, in two armies, on the Aventine. It is this family which
has always opposed the laws against usury and the agrarian laws; which
interfered with the right of intermarriage between patricians and plebeians;
which blocked the path of the plebs to curule offices. This name is much
more deadly to your liberties than the name of the Tarquins. Is it really
the case, Appius Claudius, that though it is a hundred years since Mamercus
Aemilius was Dictator, and there have been all those censors since, men
of the highest rank and strength of character, not one of them ever read
the Twelve Tables, not one of them knew that the last order of the people
is the law for the time being? Of course they all knew it, and because
they knew it they preferred to obey the Aemilian Law rather than that older
one by which the censors were originally appointed, simply because the
former was the last passed by order of the people and also because when
two laws contradict each other the later one repeals the earlier. Do you
maintain, Appius, that the people are not bound by the Aemilian Law, or
do you claim, if they are bound by it, that you alone are exempt from its
provisions? That law availed to bind those arbitrary censors C. Furius
and M. Geganius, who gave us a proof of the mischief which that office
could work in the republic when, in revenge for the limitation of their
power, they placed among the aerarii the foremost soldier and statesman
of his time, Mamercus Aemilius. It bound all the succeeding censors for
a hundred years, it binds your colleague C. Plautius, who was appointed
under the same auspices, with the same powers as yourself. Did not the
people appoint him 'with all the customary powers and privileges' that
a censor can possess? Or are you the solitary exception in whom all these
powers and privileges reside? Whom then can you appoint as 'king for sacrifices'?
He will cling to the name of 'king' and say that he was appointed with
all the powers that the Kings of Rome possessed. Who do you suppose would
be contented with a six months' dictatorship or a five days' interregnum?
Whom would you venture to nominate as Dictator for the purpose of driving
in the nail or presiding at the Games? How stupid and spiritless, Quirites,
you must consider those men to have been who after their magnificent achievements
resigned their dictatorship in twenty days, or vacated their office owing
to some flaw in their appointment! But why should I recall instances of
old time? It is not ten years since C. Maenius as Dictator was conducting
a criminal process with a rigour which some powerful people considered
dangerous to themselves, and in consequence his enemies charged him with
being tainted with the very crime he was investigating. He at once resigned
his dictatorship in order to meet, as a private citizen, the charges brought
against him. I am far from wishing to see such moderation in you, Appius.
Do not show yourself a degenerate scion of your house; do not fall short
of your ancestors in their craving for power, their love of tyranny; do
not vacate your office a day or an hour sooner than you are obliged, only
see that you do not exceed the fixed term. Perhaps you will be satisfied
with an additional day or an additional month? 'No,' he says, 'I shall
hold my censorship for three years and a half beyond the period fixed by
the Aemilian Law and I shall hold it alone.' This sounds very much like
an absolute monarch. Or will you co-opt a colleague, a proceeding forbidden
by divine laws even where one has been lost by death?
"There is a sacred function going back to the very earliest times, the
only one actually initiated by the deity in whose honour it is performed,
which has always been discharged by men of the highest rank and most blameless
character. You, conscientious censor that you are, have transferred this
ministry to servants, and a House older than this City, hallowed by the
hospitality they showed to immortal gods, has become extinct in one short
year owing to you and your censorship. But this is not enough for you,
you will not rest till you have involved the whole commonwealth in a sacrilege
the consequences of which I dare not contemplate. The capture of this City
occurred in that lustrum in which the censor, L. Papirius Cursor, after
the death of his colleague, C. Julius, co-opted as his colleague M. Cornelius
Maluginensis sooner than abdicate his office. And yet how much more moderation
did he show even then than you, Appius; he did not continue to hold his
censorship alone nor beyond the legal term. L. Papirius did not, however,
find any one to follow his example, all succeeding censors resigned office
on the death of their colleague. But nothing restrains you, neither the
expiry of your term of office nor the resignation of your colleague nor
the Law nor any feeling of self-respect. You consider it a merit to show
arrogance, effrontery, contempt of gods and men. When I consider the majesty
and reverence which surround the office that you have held, Appius Claudius,
I am most reluctant to subject you to personal restraint or even to address
you in severe terms. But your obstinacy and arrogance have compelled me
to speak as I have done, and now I warn you that if you do not comply with
the Aemilian Law I shall order you to be taken to prison. Our ancestors
made it a rule that if at the election of censors two candidates did not
get the requisite majority of votes one should not be returned alone, but
the election should be adjourned. Under this rule, as you cannot be appointed
sole censor, I will not allow you to remain in office alone." He then ordered
the censor to be arrested and taken to prison. Appius formally appealed
to the protection of the tribunes, and though Sempronius was supported
by six of his colleagues, the other three vetoed any further proceedings.
Appius continued to hold his office alone amidst universal indignation
and disgust.
9.35
During these proceedings in Rome the siege of Sutrium was being kept up
by the Etruscans. The consul Fabius was marching to assist the allies of
Rome and to attempt the enemy's lines wherever it seemed practicable. His
route lay along the lowest slopes of the mountain range, when he came upon
the hostile forces drawn up in battle formation. The wide plain which stretched
below revealed their enormous numbers, and in order to compensate for his
own inferiority in that respect by the advantage of position, he deflected
his column a little way on to the rising ground, which was rough and covered
with stones. He then formed his front against the enemy. The Etruscans,
thinking of nothing but their numbers, on which they solely relied, came
on with such eager impetuosity that they flung away their javelins in order
to come more quickly to a hand-to-hand fight, and rushed upon their foe
with drawn swords. The Romans, on the other hand, showered down upon them
first their javelins and then the stones with which the ground plentifully
supplied them. Shields and helmets alike were struck, and those who were
not wounded were confounded and bewildered; it was almost impossible for
them to get to close quarters, and they had no missiles with which to keep
up the fight from a distance. Whilst they were standing as a mark for the
missiles, without any sufficient protection, some even retreating, the
whole line wavering and unsteady, the Roman hastati and principes raised
their battle-shout again and charged down upon them with drawn swords.
The Etruscans did not wait for the charge but faced about and in disorderly
flight made for their camp. The Roman cavalry, however, galloping in a
slanting direction across the plain, headed off the fugitives, who gave
up all idea of reaching their camp and turned off to the mountains. For
the most part without arms, and with a large proportion of wounded, the
fugitives entered the Ciminian forest. Many thousands of Etruscans were
killed, thirty-eight standards were taken, and in the capture of the camp
the Romans secured an immense amount of booty. Then the question was discussed
whether to pursue the enemy or no.
9.36
The Ciminian forest was, in those days, more frightful and impassable than
the German forests were recently found to be; not a single trader had,
up to that time, ventured through it. Of those present in the council of
war, hardly any one but the general himself was bold enough to undertake
to enter it; they had not yet forgotten the horrors of Caudium. According
to one tradition, it appears that M. Fabius, the consul's brother-others
say Caeso, others again L. Claudius, the consul's half-brother-declared
that he would go and reconnoitre, and shortly return with accurate information.
He had been brought up in Caere, and was thoroughly conversant with the
Etruscan language and literature. There is authority for asserting that
at that time Roman boys were, as a rule, instructed in Etruscan literature
as they now are in Greek, but I think the probability is that there was
something remarkable about the man who displayed such boldness in disguising
himself and mingling with the enemy. He is said to have been accompanied
by only one servant, and during their journey they only made brief inquiries
as to the nature of the country and the names of its leading men, lest
they should make some startling blunder in conversing with the natives
and so be found out. They went disguised as shepherds, with their rustic
weapons, each carrying two bills and two heavy javelins. But neither their
familiarity with the language nor the fashion of their dress nor their
implements afforded them so much protection as the impossibility of believing
that any stranger would enter the Ciminian forest. It is stated that they
penetrated as far as Camerinum in Umbria, and on their arrival there the
Roman ventured to say who they were. He was introduced into the senate,
and, acting in the consul's name, he established a treaty of friendship
with them. After having been most kindly and hospitably received, he was
requested to inform the Romans that thirty days' provision would be ready
for them if they came into that district, and the Camertine soldiery would
be prepared to act under their orders. When the consul received this report,
he sent the baggage on in advance at the first watch. The legions were
ordered to march behind the baggage, while he himself remained behind with
the cavalry. The following day at dawn he rode up with his cavalry to the
enemy's outposts stationed on the edge of the forest, and after he had
engaged their attention for a considerable time, he returned to the camp
and, in the evening, leaving by the rear gate, he started after the column.
By dawn on the following day he was holding the nearest heights of the
Ciminian range, and after surveying the rich fields of Etruria he sent
out parties to forage. A very large quantity of plunder had already been
secured when some cohorts of Etruscan peasantry, hastily got together by
the authorities of the neighbourhood, sought to check the foragers; they
were, however, so badly organised that, instead of rescuing the prey, they
almost fell a prey themselves. After putting them to flight with heavy
loss, the Romans ravaged the country far and wide, and returned to their
camp loaded with plunder of every kind. It happened to be during this raid
that a deputation, consisting of five members of the senate with two tribunes
of the plebs, came to warn Fabius, in the name of the senate, not to traverse
the Ciminian forest. They were very glad to find that they had come too
late to prevent the expedition, and returned to Rome to report victory.
9.37
This expedition did not bring the war to a close, it only extended it.
The whole country lying below the Ciminian range had felt the effect of
his devastations, and they roused the indignation of the cantons of Etruria
and of the adjoining districts of Umbria. A larger army than had ever assembled
before was marched to Sutrium. Not only did they advance their camp beyond
the edge of the forest, but they showed such eagerness that they marched
down in battle order on to the plain as soon as possible. After advancing
some distance they halted. leaving a space between them and the Roman camp
for the enemy to form his lines. When they became aware that their enemy
declined battle, they marched up to the rampart of the camp and, on seeing
that the outposts retired within the camp, they loudly insisted upon their
generals ordering the day's rations to be brought down to them from their
camp, as they intended to remain under arms and attack the hostile camp,
if not by night, at all events at dawn. The Romans were quite as excited
at the prospect of battle, but they were kept quiet by their commander's
authority. It was about four o'clock in the afternoon when the general
ordered the troops to take food, and instructed them to remain under arms
and in readiness at whatever hour he gave the signal, whether by day or
by night. In a brief address to his men he drew a contrast between the
military qualities of the Samnites and those of the Etruscans, speaking
highly of the former and disparaging the latter, saying that there was
no comparison between them as regarded either their courage or their numbers.
They would learn in time that he had another weapon in reserve, meanwhile
he must keep silence. By these dark hints he made his men believe that
the enemy were being betrayed, and this helped to restore the courage which
had quailed at the sight of such an immense multitude. This impression
was confirmed by the absence of any intention on the part of the enemy
to entrench the ground they were occupying.
After the troops had had dinner, they rested until about the fourth
watch. Then they rose quietly and armed themselves. A quantity of mattock-headed
axes were distributed to the camp-followers, with which they were to dig
away the rampart and fill up the fosse with it. The troops were formed
up within their entrenchments, and picked cohorts were posted at the exits
of the camp. Then a little before dawn-in summer nights the time for deepest
sleep-the signal was given, the men crossed the levelled rampart in line
and fell upon the enemy, who were lying about in all directions. Some were
killed before they could stir, others only half awake as they lay, most
of them whilst wildly endeavouring to seize their arms. Only a few had
time to arm themselves, and these, with no standards under which to rally,
no officers to lead them, were routed and fled, the Romans following in
hot pursuit. Some sought their camp, others the forest. The latter proved
the safer refuge, for the camp, situated in the plain below, was taken
the same day. The gold and silver were ordered to be brought to the consul;
the rest of the spoil became the property of the soldiers. The killed and
prisoners amounted to 60,000. Some authors assert that this great battle
was fought beyond the Ciminian forest, at Perusia, and that fears were
felt in the City lest the army, cut off from all help by that terrible
forest, should be overwhelmed by a united force of Tuscans and Umbrians.
But wherever it was fought, the Romans had the best of it. As a result
of this victory, Perusia, Cortona, and Arretium, which were at that time
the three leading cantons of Etruria, sent to Rome for a treaty of peace.
A thirty years' truce was granted them.
9.38
During these occurrences in Etruria the other consul, C. Marcius Rutilus,
took Allifae from the Samnites. Many other fortified posts and hamlets
were either destroyed or passed uninjured into the power of the Romans.
While this was going on, P. Cornelius, whom the senate had made maritime
prefect, took the Roman fleet to Campania and brought up at Pompeii. Here
the crews landed and proceeded to ravage the territory of Nuceria. After
devastating the district near the coast, from which they could have easily
reached their ships, they went further inland, attracted as usual by the
desire for plunder, and here they roused the inhabitants against them.
As long as they were scattered through the fields they met nobody, though
they might have been cut off to a man, but when they returned, thinking
themselves perfectly safe, they were overtaken by the peasants and stripped
of all their plunder. Some were killed; the survivors were driven helter-skelter
to their ships. However great the alarm created in Rome by Q. Fabius' expedition
through the Ciminian forest, there was quite as much pleasure felt by the
Samnites when they heard of it. They said that the Roman army was hemmed
in; it was the Caudine disaster over again; the old recklessness had again
led a nation always greedy for further conquests into an impassable forest;
they were beset by the difficulties of the ground quite as much as by hostile
arms. Their delight was, however, tinged with envy when they reflected
that fortune had diverted the glory of finishing the war with Rome from
the Samnites to the Etruscans. So they concentrated their whole strength
to crush C. Marcius or, if he did not give them a chance of fighting, to
march through the country of the Marsi and Sabines into Etruria. The consul
advanced against them, and a desperate battle was fought with no decisive
result. Which side lost most heavily was doubtful, but a rumour was spread
that the Romans had been worsted, as they had lost some belonging to the
equestrian order and some military tribunes, besides a staff officer, and-what
was a signal disaster-the consul himself was wounded. Reports of the battle,
exaggerated as usual, reached Rome and created the liveliest alarm among
the senators. It was decided that a Dictator should be nominated, and no
one had the slightest doubt that Papirius Cursor would be nominated, the
one man who was regarded as the supreme general of his day. But they did
not believe that a messenger could get through to the army in Samnium,
as the whole country was hostile, nor were they by any means sure that
Marcius was still alive.
The other consul, Fabius, was on bad terms with Papirius. To prevent
this private feud from causing public danger, the senate resolved to send
a deputation to Fabius, consisting of men of consular rank, who were to
support their authority as public envoys by using their personal influence
to induce him to lay aside all feelings of enmity for the sake of his country.
When they had handed to Fabius the resolution of the senate, and had employed
such arguments as their instructions demanded, the consul, keeping his
eyes fixed on the ground, withdrew from the deputation, without making
any reply and leaving them in utter uncertainty as to what he would do.
Subsequently, he nominated L. Papirius Dictator according to the traditional
usage at midnight. When the deputation thanked him for having shown such
rare self-command, he remained absolutely silent, and without vouchsafing
any reply or making any allusion to what he had done, he abruptly dismissed
them, showing by his conduct what a painful effort it had cost him. Papirius
named C. Junius Bubulcus, Master of the Horse. Whilst he was submitting
to the Assembly of Curies the resolution conferring the Dictatorial power,
an unfavourable omen compelled him to adjourn the proceedings. It fell
to the Faucian cury to vote first, and this cury had voted first in the
years in which two memorable disasters occurred, the capture of the City
and the capitulation of Caudium. Licinius Macer adds a third disaster through
which this cury became ill-omened, the massacre at the Cremera.
9.39
The following day, after fresh auspices had been taken, the Dictator was
invested with his official powers. He took command of the legions which
were raised during the scare connected with the expedition through the
Ciminian forest, and led them to Longula. Here he took over the consul's
troops, and with the united force went into the field. The enemy showed
no disposition to shirk battle, but while the two armies stood facing each
other fully prepared for action, yet neither anxious to begin, they were
overtaken by night. Their standing camps were within a short distance of
each other, and for some days they remained quiet, not, however, through
any distrust of their own strength or any feeling of contempt for the enemy.
Meantime the Romans were meeting with success in Etruria, for in an engagement
with the Umbrians the enemy were unable to keep up the fight with the spirit
with which they began it, and, without any great loss, were completely
routed. An engagement also took place at Lake Vadimonis, where the Etruscans
had concentrated an army raised under a lex sacrata, in which each man
chose his comrade. As their army was more numerous than any they had previously
raised, so they exhibited a higher courage than they had ever shown before.
So savage was the feeling on both sides that, without discharging a single
missile, they began the fight at once with swords. The fury displayed in
the combat, which long hung in the balance, was such that it seemed as
though it was not the Etruscans who had been so often defeated that we
were fighting with, but some new, unknown people. There was not the slightest
sign of yielding anywhere; as the men in the first line fell, those in
the second took their places, to defend the standards. At length the last
reserves had to be brought up, and to such an extremity of toil and danger
had matters come that the Roman cavalry dismounted, and, leaving their
horses in charge, made their way over piles of armour and heaps of slain
to the front ranks of the infantry. They appeared like a fresh army amongst
the exhausted combatants, and at once threw the Etruscan standards into
confusion. The rest of the men, worn out as they were, nevertheless followed
up the cavalry attack, and at last broke through the enemy's ranks. Their
determined resistance was now overcome, and when once their maniples began
to give way, they soon took to actual flight. That day broke for the first
time the power of the Etruscans after their long-continued and abundant
prosperity. The main strength of their army was left on the field, and
their camp was taken and plundered.
9.40
Equally hard fighting and an equally brilliant success characterised the
campaign which immediately followed against the Samnites. In addition to
their usual preparations for war, they had new glittering armour made in
which their troops were quite resplendent. There were two divisions; one
had their shields plated with gold, the other with silver. The shield was
made straight and broad at the top to cover the chest and shoulders, then
became narrower towards the bottom to allow of it being more easily moved
about. To protect the front of the body they wore coats of chain armour;
the left leg was covered with a greave, and their helmets were plumed to
give them the appearance of being taller than they really were. The tunics
of the men with gold plated shields were in variegated colours, those with
the silver shields had tunics of white linen. The latter were assigned
to the right wing, the former were posted on the left. The Romans knew
that all this splendid armour had been provided, and they had been taught
by their generals that a soldier ought to inspire dread not by being decked
out in gold and silver but by trusting to his courage and his sword. They
looked upon those things as a spoil for the enemy rather than a defence
for the wearer, resplendent enough before a battle but soon stained and
fouled by wounds and bloodshed. They knew that the one ornament of the
soldier was courage, and all that finery would belong to whichever side
won the victory; an enemy however rich was the prize of the victor, however
poor the victor might be.
With this teaching fresh in their minds, Cursor led his men into battle.
He took his place on the right wing, and gave the command of the left to
the Master of the Horse. As soon as the two lines came into collision,
a contest began between the Dictator and the Master of the Horse, quite
as keen as the struggle against the enemy, as to whose division should
be the first to win the victory. Junius happened to be the first to dislodge
the enemy. Bringing up his left wing against the enemy's right, where the
"devoted" soldiers were posted, conspicuous in their white tunics and glittering
armour, he declared that he would sacrifice them to Orcus, and, pushing
the attack, he shook their ranks and made them visibly give way. On seeing
this, the Dictator exclaimed, "Shall the victory begin on the left wing?
Is the right wing, the Dictator's own division, going to follow where another
had led the way in battle, and not win for itself the greatest share of
the victory?" This roused the men; the cavalry behaved with quite as much
gallantry as the infantry, and the staff-officers displayed no less energy
than the generals. M. Valerius on the right wing, and P. Decius on the
left, both men of consular rank, rode up to the cavalry who were covering
the flanks and urged them to snatch some of the glory for themselves. They
charged the enemy on both flanks, and the double attack increased the consternation
of the enemy. To complete their discomfiture, the Roman legions again raised
their battle-shout and charged home. Now the Samnites took to flight, and
soon the plain was filled with shining armour and heaps of bodies. At first
the terrified Samnites found shelter in their camp, but they were not able
even to hold that; it was captured, plundered, and burnt before nightfall.
The senate decreed a triumph for the Dictator. By far the greatest sight
in the procession was the captured armour, and so magnificent were the
pieces considered that the gilded shields were distributed amongst the
owners of the silversmiths' shops to adorn the Forum. This is said to be
the origin of the custom of the aediles decorating the Forum when the symbols
of three Capitoline deities are conducted in procession through the City
on the occasion of the Great Games. Whilst the Romans made use of this
armour to honour the gods, the Campanians, out of contempt and hatred towards
the Samnites, made the gladiators who performed at their banquets wear
it, and they then called them "Samnites." The consul Fabius fought a battle
this year with the remnants of the Etruscans at Perusia, for this city
had broken the truce. He gained an easy and decisive victory, and after
the battle he approached the walls and would have taken the place had not
envoys been sent on to surrender it. After he had stationed a garrison
in Perusia, deputations came to him from different cities in Etruria to
ask for a restoration of amicable relations; these he sent on to the senate
at Rome. Then he entered the city in triumphal procession, after achieving
a more solid success than the Dictator, especially as the defeat of the
Samnites was put down largely to the credit of the staff-officers, P. Decius
and M. Valerius. These men were chosen by an almost unanimous vote at the
next elections-one as consul, the other as praetor.
9.41
Owing to his splendid services in the subjugation of Etruria, the consulship
of Fabius was extended to another year, Decius being his colleague. Valerius
was elected praetor for the fourth time. The consuls arranged their respective
commands; Etruria fell to Decius, and Samnium to Fabius. Fabius marched
to Nuceria, where the people of Alfaterna met him with a request for peace,
but as they had refused it when offered to them before, he declined to
grant it now. It was not till he actually began to attack the place that
they were forced into unconditional surrender. He fought an action with
the Samnites and won an easy victory. The memory of that battle would not
have survived if it had not been that the Marsi engaged for the first time
on that occasion in hostilities with Rome. The Peligni, who had followed
the example of the Marsi, met with the same fate. The other consul, Decius,
was also successful. He inspired such alarm in Tarquinii that its people
provided his army with corn and asked for a forty years' truce. He captured
several fortified posts belonging to Volsinii, some of which he destroyed
that they might not serve as retreats for the enemy, and by extending his
operations in all directions he made his name so dreaded that the whole
Etruscan league begged him to grant a treaty. There was not the slightest
chance of their obtaining one, but a truce was granted them for one year.
They had to provide a year's pay for the troops and two tunics for every
soldier. That was the price of the truce.
While matters were thus quieted in Etruria fresh trouble was caused
by the sudden defection of the Umbrians, a people hitherto untouched by
the ravages of war beyond what their land had suffered from the passage
of the Romans. They called out all their fighting men and compelled a large
section of the Etruscan population to resume hostilities. The army which
they mustered was so large that they began to talk in very braggart tones
about themselves and in very contemptuous terms about the Romans. They
even expressed their intention of leaving Decius in their rear and marching
straight to attack Rome. Their intentions were disclosed to Decius; he
at once hastened by forced marches to a city outside the frontiers of Etruria
and took up a position in the territory of Pupinia, to watch the enemy's
movements. This hostile movement on the part of the Umbrians was regarded
very seriously in Rome, even their menacing language made people, after
their experience of the Gaulish invasion, tremble for the safety of their
City. Instructions were accordingly sent to Fabius, ordering him, if he
could for the time being suspend operations in Samnium, to march with all
speed into Umbria. The consul at once acted upon his instructions and proceeded
by forced marches to Mevania, where the forces of the Umbrians were stationed.
They were under the impression that he was far away in Samnium, with another
war on his hands, and his sudden arrival produced such consternation amongst
them, that some advised a retreat into their fortified cities, while others
were in favour of abandoning the war. There was one canton-the natives
call it Materina-which not only kept the rest under arms but even induced
them to come to an immediate engagement. They attacked Fabius while he
was fortifying his camp. When he saw them making a rush towards his entrenchments
he called his men off from their work and marshalled them in the best order
that the ground and the time at his disposal allowed. He reminded them
of the glory they had won in Etruria and in Samnium, and bade them finish
off this wretched aftergrowth of the Etruscan war and exact a fitting retribution
for the impious language in which the enemy had threatened to attack Rome.
His words were received with such eagerness by his men that their enthusiastic
shouts interrupted their commander's address, and without waiting for the
word of command or the notes of the trumpets and bugles they raced forward
against the enemy. They did not attack them as though they were armed men;
marvellous to relate, they began by snatching the standards from those
who bore them, then the standard-bearers were themselves dragged off to
the consul, the soldiers were pulled across from the one army to the other,
the action was everywhere fought with shields rather than with swords,
men were knocked down by the bosses of shields and blows under the arm-pits.
More were captured than killed, and only one cry was heard throughout the
ranks: "Lay down your arms!" So, on the field of battle, the prime authors
of the war surrendered. During the next few days the rest of the Umbrian
communities submitted. The Ocriculans entered into a mutual undertaking
with Rome and were admitted to her friendship.
9.42
After bringing to a victorious close the war which had been allotted to
his colleague, Fabius returned to his own sphere of action. As he had conducted
operations with such success the senate followed the precedent set by the
people in the previous year and extended his command for a third year in
spite of the strenuous opposition of Appius Claudius who was now consul,
the other consul being L. Volumnius. I find in some annalists that Appius
was a candidate for the consulship while he was still censor, and that
L. Furius, a tribune of the plebs, stopped the election until he had resigned
his censorship. A new enemy, the Sallentines, had appeared, and the conduct
of this war was assigned to his colleague; Appius himself remained in Rome
with the view of strengthening his influence by his domestic administration,
as the attainment of military glory was in other hands. Volumnius had no
cause to regret this arrangement, he fought many successful actions and
took some of the enemy's cities by storm. He was lavish in distributing
the spoil, and this generosity was rendered still more pleasing by his
frank and cordial manner; by qualities such as these he made his men keen
to face any perils or labours. Q. Fabius, as proconsul, fought a pitched
battle with the Samnites near the city of Allifae. There was very little
uncertainty as to the result; the enemy were routed and driven to their
camp, and they would not have held that had more daylight been left. Before
night, however, their camp was completely invested, so that none could
escape. On the morrow while it was still twilight they made proposals for
surrender, and their surrender was accepted on condition that the Samnites
should be dismissed with one garment apiece after they had all passed under
the yoke. No provision had been made for their allies, and as many as 7000
of them were sold into slavery. Those who declared themselves Hernicans
were separated and placed under guard; subsequently Fabius sent them all
to the senate in Rome. After inquiries had been made as to whether they
had fought for the Samnites against Rome as conscripts or as volunteers,
they were committed to the custody of the Latin cities. The new consuls,
P. Cornelius Arvina and Q. Marcius Tremulus, were ordered to bring the
whole question of the prisoners before the senate. The Hernicans resented
this, and a national council was held at Anagnia in what they call the
Maritime Circus; the whole nation thereupon, with the exception of Aletrium,
Ferentinae, and Verulae, declared war against Rome.
9.43
Now that Fabius had evacuated the country the Samnites became restless.
Calatia and Sora and the Roman garrisons there were taken by storm, and
the soldiers who had been taken prisoners were cruelly massacred. P. Cornelius
was despatched thither with an army. The Anagnians and Hernicans had been
assigned to Marcius. At first the enemy occupied such a well-chosen position
between the camps of the two consuls that no messenger, however active,
could get through, and for some days both consuls were kept in ignorance
of everything and in anxious suspense as to each other's movements. Tidings
of this alarming state of things reached Rome, and every man liable to
service was called out; two complete armies were raised against sudden
emergencies. But the progress of the war did not justify this extreme alarm,
nor was it worthy of the old reputation which the Hernicans enjoyed. They
attempted nothing worth mentioning, within a few days they were stripped
of three camps in succession, and begged for a thirty days' armistice to
allow of their sending envoys to Rome. To obtain this they consented to
supply the troops with six months' pay and one tunic per man. The envoys
were referred by the senate to Marcius, to whom they had given full powers
to treat, and he received the formal surrender of the Hernicans. The other
consul in Samnium, though superior in strength, was more hampered in his
movements. The enemy had blocked all the roads and secured the passes so
that no supplies could be brought in, and though the consul drew up his
line and offered battle each day he failed to allure the enemy into an
engagement. It was quite clear that the Samnites would not risk an immediate
conflict, and that the Romans could not stand a prolonged campaign. The
arrival of Marcius, who after subjugating the Hernicans had hurried to
the assistance of his colleague, made it impossible for the enemy to delay
matters any longer. They had not felt themselves strong enough to meet
even one army in the open field, and they knew that their position would
be perfectly hopeless if the two consular armies formed a junction; they
decided, therefore, to attack Marcius while he was on the march before
he had time to deploy his men. The soldiers' kits were hurriedly thrown
together in the centre, and the fighting line was formed as well as the
time allowed. The noise of the battle-shout rolling across and then the
sight of the cloud of dust in the distance created great excitement in
the standing camp of Cornelius. He at once ordered the men to arm for battle,
and led them hurriedly out of the camp into line. It would, he exclaimed,
be a scandalous disgrace if they allowed the other army to win a victory
which both ought to share, and failed to maintain their claim to the glory
of a war which was especially their own. He then made a flank attack, and
breaking through the enemy's centre pushed on to their camp, which was
denuded of defenders, and burnt it. As soon as Marcius' troops caught sight
of the flames, and the enemy looking behind them saw them too, the Samnites
took to flight in all directions, but no place afforded them a safe refuge,
death awaited them everywhere.
After 30,000 of the enemy had been killed the consuls gave the signal
to retire. They were recalling and collecting the troops together amidst
mutual congratulations when suddenly fresh cohorts of the enemy were seen
in the distance, consisting of recruits who had been sent up as reinforcements.
This renewed the carnage, for, without any orders from the consuls or any
signal given, the victorious Romans attacked them, exclaiming as they charged
that the Samnite recruits would have to pay dearly for their training.
The consuls did not check the ardour of their men, for they knew well that
raw soldiers would not even attempt to fight when the veterans around them
were in disorderly flight. Nor were they mistaken; all the Samnite forces,
veterans and recruits alike, fled to the nearest mountains. The Romans
went up after them, no place afforded safety to the beaten foe, they were
routed from the heights they had occupied, and at last with one voice they
all begged for peace. They were ordered to supply corn for three months,
a year's pay, and a tunic for each soldier, and envoys were despatched
to the senate to obtain terms of peace. Cornelius was left in Samnium;
Marcius entered the City in triumphal procession after his subjugation
of the Hernicans. An equestrian statue was decreed to him which was erected
in the Forum in front of the Temple of Castor. Three of the Hernican communities-Aletrium,
Verulae, and Ferentinum-had their municipal independence restored to them
as they preferred that to the Roman franchise, and the right of intermarriage
with each other was granted them, a privilege which for a considerable
period they were the only communities amongst the Hernicans to enjoy. The
Anagnians and the others who had taken up arms against Rome were admitted
to the status of citizenship without the franchise, they were deprived
of their municipal self-government and the right of intermarriage with
each other, and their magistrates were forbidden to exercise any functions
except those connected with religion. In this year the censor C. Junius
Bubulcus signed a contract for the building of the temple to Salus which
he had vowed when engaged as consul in the Samnite war. He and his colleague,
M. Valerius Maximus, also undertook the construction of roads through the
country districts out of the public funds. The treaty with the Carthaginians
was renewed for the third time this year and munificent presents were made
to the plenipotentiaries who had come over for the purpose.
9.44
P. Cornelius Scipio was nominated Dictator this year, with P. Decius Mus
as Master of the Horse, for the purpose of holding the elections, as neither
of the consuls could leave the seat of war. The consuls elected were L.
Postumius and Tiberius Minucius. Piso places these consuls immediately
after Q. Fabius and P. Decius, omitting the two years in which I have inserted
the consulships of Claudius and Volumnius and of Cornelius and Marcius.
Whether this was due to a slip of memory in drawing up the lists or whether
he purposely omitted them, believing them to be wrongly inserted, is uncertain.
The Samnites made forays this year into the district of Stellae in Campania.
Both consuls accordingly were despatched to Samnium. Postumius marched
to Tifernum, Minucius made Bovianum his objective. Postumius was the first
to come into touch with the enemy and a battle was fought at Tifernum.
Some authorities state that the Samnites were thoroughly beaten and 24,000
prisoners taken. According to others the battle was an indecisive one,
and Postumius, in order to create an impression that he was afraid of the
enemy, withdrew by night into the mountains, whither the enemy followed
him and took up an entrenched position two miles away from him. To keep
up the appearance of having sought a safe and commodious place for a standing
camp-and such it really was-the consul strongly entrenched himself and
furnished his camp with all necessary stores. Then, leaving a strong detachment
to hold it, he started at the third watch and led his legions in light
marching order by the shortest possible route to his colleague, who was
also encamped in front of another Samnite army. Acting on Postumius' advice
Minucius engaged the enemy, and after the battle had gone on for the greater
part of the day without either side gaining the advantage, Postumius brought
up his fresh legions and made an unsuspected attack upon the enemy's wearied
lines. Exhausted by fighting and by wounds they were incapable of flight
and were practically annihilated. Twenty-one standards were captured. Both
armies marched to the camp which Postumius had formed, and there they routed
and dispersed the enemy, who were demoralised by the news of the previous
battle. Twenty-six standards were captured, the captain-general of the
Samnites, Statius Gellius, and a large number of men were made prisoners,
and both camps were taken. The next day they commenced an attack on Bovianum
which was soon taken, and the consuls after their brilliant successes celebrated
a joint triumph. Some authorities assert that the consul Minucius was carried
back to the camp severely wounded and died there, and that M. Fulvius was
made consul in his place, and after taking over the command of Minucius'
army effected the capture of Bovianum. During the year Sora, Arpinum, and
Cesennia were recovered from the Samnites. The great statue of Hercules
was also set up and dedicated in the Capitol.
9.45
P. Sulpicius Saverrio and P. Sempronius Sophus were the next consuls. During
their consulship the Samnites, anxious for either a termination or at least
a suspension of hostilities, sent envoys to Rome to sue for peace. In spite
of their submissive attitude they did not meet with a very favourable reception.
The reply they received was to the effect that if the Samnites had not
often made proposals for peace while they were actually preparing for war
negotiations might possibly have been entered into, but now as their words
had proved worthless the question must be decided by their deeds. They
were informed that the consul P. Sempronius would shortly be in Samnium
with his army, and he would be able to judge accurately whether they were
more disposed to peace or to war. When he had obtained all the information
that he wanted he would lay it before the senate; on his return from Samnium
the envoys might follow him to Rome. Wherever Sempronius marched they found
the Samnites peaceably disposed and ready to supply them with provisions
and stores. The old treaty was therefore restored. From that quarter the
Roman arms were turned against their old enemies the Aequi. For many years
this nation had remained quiet, disguising their real sentiments under
a peaceable attitude. As long as the Hernicans remained unsubdued the Aequi
had frequently co-operated with them in sending help to the Samnites, but
after their final subjugation almost the whole of the Aequian nation threw
off the mask and openly went over to the enemy. After Rome had renewed
the treaty with the Samnites the fetials went on to the Aequi to demand
satisfaction. They were told that their demand was simply regarded as an
attempt on the part of the Romans to intimidate them by threats of war
into becoming Roman citizens. How desirable a thing this citizenship was
might be seen in the case of the Hernicans who, when allowed to choose,
preferred living under their own laws to becoming citizens of Rome. To
men who were not allowed which they would prefer, but were made Roman citizens
by compulsion, it would be a punishment.
As these opinions were pretty generally expressed in their different
councils, the Romans ordered war to be declared against the Aequi. Both
the consuls took the field and selected a position four miles distant from
the enemy's camp. As the Aequi had for many years had no experience of
a national war, their army was like a body of irregulars with no properly
appointed generals and no discipline or obedience. They were in utter confusion;
some were of opinion that they ought to give battle, others thought they
ought to confine themselves to defending their camp. The majority were
influenced by the prospect of their fields being devastated and their cities,
with their scanty garrisons, being destroyed. In this diversity of opinions
one was given utterance to which put out of sight all care for the common
weal and directed each man's regards to his own private interests. They
were advised to abandon their camp at the first watch, carry off all their
belongings, and disperse to their respective cities to protect their property
behind their walls. This advice met with the warmest approval from all.
Whilst the enemy were thus straggling homewards, the Romans as soon as
it was light marched out and formed up in order of battle, and as there
was no one to oppose, they went on at a quick march to the enemy's camp.
Here they found no pickets before the gates or on the rampart, none of
the noise which is customary in a camp, and fearing from the unusual silence
that a surprise was being prepared they came to a halt. At length they
climbed over the rampart and found everything deserted. Then they began
to follow up the enemy's footsteps, but as these went in all directions
alike, they found themselves going further and further astray. Subsequently
they discovered through their scouts what the design of the enemy was,
and their cities were successively attacked. Within a fortnight they had
stormed and captured thirty-one walled towns. Most of these were sacked
and burnt, and the nation of the Aequi was almost exterminated. A triumph
was celebrated over them, and warned by their example the Marrucini, the
Marsi, the Paeligni, and the Feretrani sent spokesmen to Rome to sue for
peace and friendship. These tribes obtained a treaty with Rome.
9.46
It was during this year that Cn. Flavius, the son of a freedman, born in
a humble station of life, but a clever plausible man, became curule aedile.
I find in some annalists the statement that at the time of the election
of aediles he was acting as apparitor to the aediles, and when he found
that the first vote was given in his favour, and was disallowed on the
ground that he was a clerk, he laid aside his writing tablet and took an
oath that he would not follow that profession. Licinius Macer, however,
attempts to show that he had given up the clerk's business for some time
as he had been a tribune of the plebs, and had also twice held office as
a triumvir, the first time as a triumvir nocturnus, and afterwards as one
of the three commissioners for settling a colony. However this may be,
there is no question that he maintained a defiant attitude towards the
nobles, who regarded his lowly origin with contempt. He made public the
legal forms and processes which had been hidden away in the closets of
the pontiffs; he exhibited a calendar written on whitened boards in the
Forum, on which were marked the days on which legal proceedings were allowed;
to the intense disgust of the nobility he dedicated the temple of Concord
on the Vulcanal. At this function the Pontifex Maximus, Cornelius Barbatus,
was compelled by the unanimous voice of the people to recite the usual
form of devotion in spite of his insistence that in accordance with ancestral
usage none but a consul or a commander-in-chief could dedicate a temple.
It was in consequence of this that the senate authorised a measure to be
submitted to the people providing that no one should presume to dedicate
a temple or an altar without being ordered to do so by the senate or by
a majority of the tribunes of the plebs.
I will relate an incident, trivial enough in itself, but affording a
striking proof of the way in which the liberties of the plebs were asserted
against the insolent presumption of the nobility. Flavius went to visit
his colleague, who was ill. Several young nobles who were sitting in the
room had agreed not to rise when he entered, on which he ordered his curule
chair to be brought, and from that seat of dignity calmly surveyed his
enemies, who were filled with unutterable disgust. The elevation of Flavius
to the aedileship was, however, the work of a party in the Forum who had
gained their power during the censorship of Appius Claudius. For Appius
had been the first to pollute the senate by electing into it the sons of
freedmen, and when no one recognised the validity of these elections and
he failed to secure in the Senate-house the influence which he had sought
to gain in the City, he corrupted both the Assembly of Tribes and the Assembly
of Centuries by distributing the dregs of the populace amongst all the
tribes. Such deep indignation was aroused by the election of Flavius that
most of the nobles laid aside their gold rings and military decorations
as a sign of mourning. From that time the citizens were divided into two
parties; the uncorrupted part of the people, who favoured and supported
men of integrity and patriotism, were aiming at one thing, the "mob of
the Forum" were aiming at something else. This state of things lasted until
Q. Fabius and P. Decius were made censors. Q. Fabius, for the sake of concord,
and at the same time to prevent the elections from being controlled by
the lowest of the populace, threw the whole of the citizens of the lowest
class-the "mob of the Forum"-into four tribes and called them "the City
Tribes." Out of gratitude for his action, it is said, he received an epithet
which he had not gained by all his victories, but which was now conferred
upon him for the wisdom he had shown in thus adjusting the orders in the
State-the cognomen "Maximus." It is stated that he also instituted the
annual parade of the cavalry on July 15.
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