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22.1
Spring was now coming on; Hannibal accordingly moved out of his winter
quarters. His previous attempt to cross the Apennines had been frustrated
by the insupportable cold; to remain where he was would have been to court
danger. The Gauls had rallied to him through the prospect of booty and
spoil, but when they found that instead of plundering other people's territory
their own had become the seat of war and had to bear the burden of furnishing
winter quarters for both sides, they diverted their hatred from the Romans
to Hannibal. Plots against his life were frequently hatched by their chiefs,
and he owed his safety to their mutual faithlessness, for they betrayed
the plots to him in the same spirit of fickleness in which they had formed
them. He guarded himself from their attempts by assuming different disguises,
at one time wearing a different dress, at another putting on false hair.
But these constant alarms were an additional motive for his early departure
from his winter quarters. About the same time Cn. Servilius entered upon
his consulship at Rome, on the 15th of March. When he had laid before the
senate the policy which he proposed to carry out, the indignation against
C. Flaminius broke out afresh. "Two consuls had been elected, but as a
matter of fact they only had one. What legitimate authority did this man
possess? What religious sanctions? Magistrates only take these sanctions
with them from home, from the altars of the State, and from their private
altars at home after they have celebrated the Latin Festival, offered the
sacrifice on the Alban Mount, and duly recited the vows in the Capitol.
These sanctions do not follow a private citizen, nor if he has departed
without them can he obtain them afresh in all their fulness on a foreign
soil."
To add to the general feeling of apprehension, information was received
of portents having occurred simultaneously in several places. In Sicily
several of the soldiers' darts were covered with flames; in Sardinia the
same thing happened to the staff in the hand of an officer who was going
his rounds to inspect the sentinels on the wall; the shores had been lit
up by numerous fires; a couple of shields had sweated blood; some soldiers
had been struck by lightning; an eclipse of the sun had been observed;
at Praeneste there had been a shower of red-hot stones; at Arpi shields
had been seen in the sky and the sun had appeared to be fighting with the
moon; at Capena two moons were visible in the daytime; at Caere the waters
ran mingled with blood, and even the spring of Hercules had bubbled up
with drops of blood on the water; at Antium the ears of corn which fell
into the reapers' basket were blood-stained; at Falerii the sky seemed
to be cleft asunder as with an enormous rift and all over the opening there
was a blazing light; the oracular tablets shrank and shrivelled without
being touched and one had fallen out with this inscription, "MARS IS SHAKING
HIS SPEAR"; and at the same time the statue of Mars on the Appian Way and
the images of the Wolves sweated blood. Finally, at Capua the sight was
seen of the sky on fire and the moon falling in the midst of a shower of
rain. Then credence was given to comparatively trifling portents, such
as that certain people's goats were suddenly clothed with wool, a hen turned
into a cock, and a cock into a hen. After giving the details exactly as
they were reported to him and bringing his informants before the senate,
the consul consulted the House as to what religious observances ought to
be proclaimed. A decree was passed that to avert the evils which these
portents foreboded, sacrifices should be offered, the victims to be both
full-grown animals and sucklings, and also that special intercessions should
be made at all the shrines for three days. What other ceremonial was necessary
was to be carried out in accordance with the instructions of the decemvirs
after they had inspected the Sacred Books and ascertained the will of the
gods. On their advice it was decreed that the first votive offering should
be made to Jupiter in the shape of a golden thunderbolt weighing fifty
pounds, gifts of silver to Juno and Minerva, and sacrifices of full-grown
victims to Queen Juno on the Aventine and Juno Sospita at Lanuvium, whilst
the matrons were to contribute according to their means and bear their
gift to Queen Juno on the Aventine. A lectisternium was to be held, and
even the freedwomen were to contribute what they could for a gift to the
temple of Feronia. When these instructions had been carried out the decemvirs
sacrificed full-grown victims in the forum at Ardea, and finally in the
middle of December there was a sacrifice at the Temple of Saturn, a lectisternium
was ordered (the senators prepared the couch), and a public banquet. For
a day and a night the cry of the Saturnalia resounded through the City,
and the people were ordered to make that day a festival and observe it
as such for ever.
22.2
While the consul was occupied in these propitiatory ceremonies and also
in the enrolment of troops, information reached Hannibal that Flaminius
had arrived at Arretium, and he at once broke up his winter quarters. There
were two routes into Etruria, both of which were pointed out to Hannibal;
one was considerably longer than the other but a much better road, the
shorter route, which he decided to take, passed through the marshes of
the Arno, which was at the time in higher flood than usual. He ordered
the Spaniards and Africans, the main strength of his veteran army, to lead,
and they were to take their own baggage with them, so that, in case of
a halt, they might have the necessary supplies; the Gauls were to follow
so as to form the centre of the column; the cavalry were to march last,
and Mago and his Numidian light horse were to close up the column, mainly
to keep the Gauls up to the mark in case they fell out or came to a halt
through the fatigue and exertion of so long a march, for as a nation they
were unable to stand that kind of thing. Those in front followed wherever
the guides led the way, through the deep and almost bottomless pools of
water, and though almost sucked in by the mud through which they were half-wading,
half-swimming, still kept their ranks. The Gauls could neither recover
themselves when they slipped nor when once down had they the strength to
struggle out of the pools; depressed and hopeless they had no spirits left
to keep up their bodily powers. Some dragged their worn-out limbs painfully
along, others gave up the struggle and lay dying amongst the baggage animals
which were lying about in all directions. What distressed them most of
all was want of sleep, from which they had been suffering for four days
and three nights. As everything was covered with water and they had not
a dry spot on which to lay their wearied bodies, they piled up the baggage
in the water and lay on the top, whilst some snatched a few minutes' needful
rest by making couches of the heaps of baggage animals which were everywhere
standing out of the water. Hannibal himself, whose eyes were affected by
the changeable and inclement spring weather, rode upon the only surviving
elephant so that he might be a little higher above the water. Owing, however,
to want of sleep and the night mists and the malaria from the marshes,
his head became affected, and as neither place nor time admitted of any
proper treatment, he completely lost the sight of one eye.
22.3
After losing many men and beasts under these frightful .circumstances,
he at last got clear of the marshes, and as soon as he could find some
dry ground he pitched his camp. The scouting parties he had sent out reported
that the Roman army was lying in the neighbourhood of Arretium. His next
step was to investigate as carefully as he possibly could all that it was
material for him to know-what mood the consul was in, what designs he was
forming, what the character of the country and the kind of roads it possessed,
and what resources it offered for the obtaining of supplies. The district
was amongst the most fertile in Italy; the plains of Etruria, which extend
from Faesulae to Arretium, are rich in corn and live stock and every kind
of produce. The consul's overbearing temper, which had grown steadily worse
since his last consulship, made him lose all proper respect and reverence
even for the gods, to say nothing of the majesty of the senate and the
laws, and this self-willed and obstinate side of his character had been
aggravated by the successes he had achieved both at home and in the field.
It was perfectly obvious that he would not seek counsel from either God
or man, and whatever he did would be done in an impetuous and headstrong
manner. By way of making him show these faults of character still more
flagrantly, the Carthaginian prepared to irritate and annoy him. He left
the Roman camp on his left, and marched in the direction of Faesulae to
plunder the central districts of Etruria. Within actual view of the consul
he created as widespread a devastation as he possibly could, and from the
Roman camp they saw in the distance an extensive scene of fire and .massacre.
Flaminius had no intention of keeping quiet even if the enemy had done
so, but now that he saw the possessions of the allies of Rome plundered
and pillaged almost before his very eyes, he felt it to be a personal disgrace
that an enemy should be roaming at will through Italy and advancing to
attack Rome with none to hinder him. All the other members of the council
of war were in favour of a policy of safety rather than of display; they
urged him to wait for his colleague, that they might unite their forces
and act with one mind on a common plan, and pending his arrival they should
check the wild excesses of the plundering enemy with cavalry and the light-armed
auxiliaries. Enraged at these suggestions he dashed out of the council
and ordered the trumpets to give the signal for march and battle; exclaiming
at the same time: "We are to sit, I suppose, before the walls of Arretium,
because our country and our household gods are here. Now that Hannibal
has slipped through our hands, he is to ravage Italy, destroy and burn
everything in his way till he reaches Rome, while we are not to stir from
here until the senate summons C. Flaminius from Arretium as they once summoned
Camillus from Veii." During this outburst, he ordered the standards to
be pulled up with all speed and at the same time mounted his horse. No
sooner had he done so than the animal stumbled and fell and threw him over
its head All those who were standing round were appalled by what they took
to be an evil omen at the beginning of a campaign, and their alarm was
considerably increased by a message brought to the consul that the standard
could not be moved though the standard-bearer had exerted his utmost strength.
He turned to the messenger and asked him: "Are you bringing a despatch
from the senate, also, forbidding me to go on with the campaign? Go, let
them dig out the standard if their hands are too benumbed with fear for
them to pull it up." Then the column began its march. The superior officers,
besides being absolutely opposed to his plans, were thoroughly alarmed
by the double portent, but the great body of the soldiers were delighted
at the spirit their general had shown; they shared his confidence without
knowing on what slender grounds it rested.
22.4
In order still further to exasperate his enemy and make him eager to avenge
the injuries inflicted on the allies of Rome, Hannibal laid waste with
all the horrors of war the land between Cortona and Lake Trasumennus. He
had now reached a position eminently adapted for surprise tactics, where
the lake comes up close under the hills of Cortona. There is only a very
narrow road here between the hills and the lake, as though a space had
been purposely left far it. Further on there is a small expanse of level
ground flanked by hills, and it was here that Hannibal pitched camp, which
was only occupied by his Africans and Spaniards, he himself being in command.
The Balearics and the rest of the light infantry he sent behind the hills;
the cavalry, conveniently screened by some low hills, he stationed at the
mouth of the defile, so that when the Romans had entered it they would
be completely shut in by the cavalry, the lake, and the hills. Flaminius
had reached the lake at sunset. The next morning, in a still uncertain
light, he passed through the defile, without sending any scouts on to feel
the way, and when the column began to deploy in the wider extent of level
ground the only enemy they saw was the one in front, the rest were concealed
in their rear and above their heads. When the Carthaginian saw his object
achieved and had his enemy shut in between the lake and the hills with
his forces surrounding them, he gave the signal for all to make a simultaneous
attack, and they charged straight down upon the point nearest to them.
The affair was all the more sudden and unexpected to the Romans because
a fog which had risen from the lake was denser on the plain than on the
heights; the bodies of the enemy on the various hills could see each other
well enough, and it was all the easier for them to charge all at the same
time. The shout of battle rose round the Romans before they could see clearly
from whence it came, or became aware that they were surrounded. Fighting
began in front and flank before they could form line or get their weapons
ready or draw their swords.
22.5
In the universal panic, the consul displayed all the coolness that could
be expected under the circumstances. The ranks were broken by each man
turning towards the discordant shouts; he re-formed them as well as time
and place allowed, and wherever he could be seen or heard, he encouraged
his men and bade them stand and fight. "It is not by prayers or entreaties
to the gods that you must make your way out," he said, "but by your strength
and your courage. It is the sword that cuts a path through the middle of
the enemy, and where there is less fear there is generally less danger."
But such was the uproar and confusion that neither counsel nor command
could be heard, and so far was the soldier from recognising his standard
or his company or his place in the rank, that he had hardly sufficient
presence of mind to get hold of his weapons and make them available for
use, and some who found them a burden rather than a protection were overtaken
by the enemy. In such a thick fog ears were of more use than eyes; the
men turned their gaze in every direction as they heard the groans of the
wounded and the blows on shield or breastplate, and the mingled shouts
of triumph and cries of panic. Some who tried to fly ran into a dense body
of combatants and could get no further; others who were returning to the
fray were swept away by a rush of fugitives. At last, when ineffective
charges had been made in every direction and they found themselves completely
hemmed in, by the lake and the hills on either side, and by the enemy in
front and rear, it became clear to every man that his only hope of safety
lay in his own right hand and his sword. Then each began to depend upon
himself for guidance and encouragement, and the fighting began afresh,
not the orderly battle with its three divisions of principes, hastati,
and triarii, where the fighting line is in front of the standards and the
rest of the army behind, and where each soldier is in his own legion and
cohort and maniple. Chance massed them together, each man took his place
in front or rear as his courage prompted him, and such was the ardour of
the combatants, so intent were they on the battle, that not a single man
on the field was aware of the earthquake which levelled large portions
of many towns in Italy, altered the course of swift streams, brought the
sea up into the rivers, and occasioned enormous landslips amongst the mountains.
22.6
For almost three hours the fighting went on; everywhere a desperate struggle
was kept up, but it raged with greater fierceness round the consul. He
was followed by the pick of his army, and wherever he saw his men hard
pressed and in difficulties he at once went to their help. Distinguished
by his armour he was the object of the enemy's fiercest attacks, which
his comrades did their utmost to repel, until an Insubrian horseman who
knew the consul by sight-his name was Ducarius-cried out to his countrymen,
"Here is the man who slew our legions and laid waste our city and our lands!
I will offer him in sacrifice to the shades of my foully murdered countrymen."
Digging spurs into his horse he charged into the dense masses of the enemy,
and slew an armour-bearer who threw himself in the way as he galloped up
lance in rest, and then plunged his lance into the consul; but the triarii
protected the body with their shields and prevented him from despoiling
it. Then began a general flight, neither lake nor mountain stopped the
panic-stricken fugitives, they rushed like blind men over cliff and defile,
men and arms tumbled pell-mell on one another. A large number, finding
no avenue of escape, went into the water up to their shoulders; some in
their wild terror even attempted to escape by swimming, an endless and
hopeless task in that lake. Either their spirits gave way and they were
drowned, or else finding their efforts fruitless, they regained with great
difficulty the shallow water at the edge of the lake and were butchered
in all directions by the enemy's cavalry who had ridden into the water.
About 6000 men who had formed the head of the line of march cut their way
through the enemy and cleared the defile, quite unconscious of all that
had been going on behind them. They halted on some rising ground, and listened
to the shouting below and the clash of arms, but were unable, owing to
the fog, to see or find out what the fortunes of the fight were. At last,
when the battle was over and the sun's heat had dispelled the fog, mountain
and plain revealed in the clear light the disastrous overthrow of the Roman
army and showed only too plainly that all was lost. Fearing lest they should
be seen in the distance and cavalry be sent against them, they hurriedly
took up their standards and disappeared with all possible speed. Maharbal
pursued them through the night with the whole of his mounted force, and
on the morrow, as starvation, in addition to all their other miseries,
was threatening them, they surrendered to Maharbal, on condition of being
allowed to depart with one garment apiece. This promise was kept with Punic
faith by Hannibal, and he threw them all into chains.
22.7
This was the famous battle at Trasumennus, and a disaster for Rome memorable
as few others have been. Fifteen thousand Romans were killed in action;
1000 fugitives were scattered all over Etruria and reached the City by
divers routes; 2500 of the enemy perished on the field, many in both armies
afterwards of their wounds. Other authors give the loss on each side as
many times greater, but I refuse to indulge in the idle exaggerations to
which writers are far too much given, and what is more, I am supported
by the authority of Fabius, who was living during the war. Hannibal dismissed
without ransom those prisoners who belonged to the allies and threw the
Romans into chains. He then gave orders for the bodies of his own men to
be picked out from the heaps of slain and buried; careful search was also
made for the body of Flaminius that it might receive honourable interment
but it was not found. As soon as the news of this disaster reached Rome
the people flocked into the Forum in a great state of panic and confusion.
Matrons were wandering about the streets and asking those they met what
recent disaster had been reported or what news was there of the army. The
throng in the Forum, as numerous as a crowded Assembly, flocked towards
the Comitium and the Senate-house and called for the magistrates. At last,
shortly before sunset, M. Pomponius, the praetor, announced, "We have been
defeated in a great battle." Though nothing more definite was heard from
him, the people, full of the reports which they had heard from one another,
carried back to their homes the information that the consul had been killed
with the greater part of his army; only a few survived, and these were
either dispersed in flight throughout Etruria or had been made prisoners
by the enemy.
The misfortunes which had befallen the defeated army were not more numerous
than the anxieties of those whose relatives had served under C. Flaminius,
ignorant as they were of the fate of each of their friends, and not in
the least knowing what to hope for or what to fear. The next day and several
days afterwards, a large crowd, containing more women than men, stood at
the gates waiting for some one of their friends or for news about them,
and they crowded round those they met with eager and anxious inquiries,
nor was it possible to get them away, especially from those they knew,
until they had got all the details from first to last. Then as they came
away from their informants you might see the different expressions on their
faces, according as each had received good or bad news, and friends congratulating
or consoling them as they wended their way homewards. The women were especially
demonstrative in their joy and in their grief. They say that one who suddenly
met her son at the gate safe and sound expired in his arms, whilst another
who had received false tidings of her son's death and was sitting as a
sorrowful mourner in her house, no sooner saw him returning than she died
from too great happiness. For several days the praetors kept the senate
in session from sunrise to sunset, deliberating under what general or with
what forces they could offer effectual resistance to the victorious Carthaginian.
22.8
Before they had formed any definite plans, a fresh disaster was announced;
4000 cavalry under the command of C. Centenius, the propraetor, had been
sent by the consul Servilius to the assistance of his colleague. When they
heard of the battle at Trasumennus they marched into Umbria, and here they
were surrounded and captured by Hannibal. The news of this occurrence affected
men in very different ways. Some, whose thoughts were preoccupied with
more serious troubles, looked upon this loss of cavalry as a light matter
in comparison with the previous losses; others estimated the importance
of the incident not by the magnitude of the loss but by its moral effect.
Just as where the constitution is impaired, any malady however slight is
felt more than it would be in a strong robust person, so any misfortune
which befell the State in its present sick and disordered condition must
be measured not by its actual importance but by its effect on a State already
exhausted and unable to bear anything which would aggravate its condition.
Accordingly the citizens took refuge in a remedy which for a long time
had not been made use of or required, namely the appointment of a Dictator.
As the consul by whom alone one could be nominated was absent, and it was
not easy for a messenger or a despatch to be sent through Italy, overrun
as it was by the arms of Carthage, and as it would have been contrary to
all precedent for the people to appoint a Dictator, the Assembly invested
Q. Fabius Maximus with dictatorial powers and appointed M. Minucius Rufus
to act as his Master of the Horse. They were commissioned by the senate
to strengthen the walls and towers of the City and place garrisons in whatever
positions they thought best, and cut down the bridges over the various
rivers, for now it was a fight for their City and their homes, since they
were no longer able to defend Italy.
22.9
Hannibal marched in a straight course through Umbria as far as Spoletum,
and after laying the country round utterly waste, he commenced an attack
upon the city which was repulsed with heavy loss. As a single colony was
strong enough to defeat his unfortunate attempt he was able to form some
conjecture as to the difficulties attending the capture of Rome, and consequently
diverted his march into the territory of Picenum, a district which not
only abounded in every kind of produce but was richly stored with property
which the greedy and needy soldiers seized and plundered without restraint.
He remained in camp there for several days during which his soldiers recruited
their strength after their winter campaigns and their journey across the
marshes, and a battle which though ultimately successful was neither without
heavy loss nor easily won. When sufficient time for rest had been allowed
to men who delighted much more in plundering and destroying than in ease
and idleness, Hannibal resumed his march and devastated the districts of
Praetutia and Hadria, then he treated in the same way the country of the
Marsi, the Marrucini, and the Peligni and the part of Apulia which was
nearest to him, including the cities of Arpi and Luceria. Cn. Servilius
had fought some insignificant actions with the Gauls and taken one small
town, but when he heard of his colleague's death and the destruction of
his army, he was alarmed for the walls of his native City, and marched
straight for Rome that he might not be absent at this most critical juncture.
Q. Fabius Maximus was now Dictator for the second time. On the very
day of his entrance upon office he summoned a meeting of the senate, and
commenced by discussing matters of religion. He made it quite clear to
the senators that C. Flaminius' fault lay much more in his neglect of the
auspices and of his religious duties than in bad generalship and foolhardiness.
The gods themselves, he maintained, must be consulted as to the necessary
measures to avert their displeasure, and he succeeded in getting a decree
passed that the decemvirs should be ordered to consult the Sibylline Books,
a course which is only adopted when the most alarming portents have been
reported. After inspecting the Books of Fate they informed the senate that
the vow which had been made to Mars in view of that war had not been duly
discharged, and that it must be discharged afresh and on a much greater
scale. The Great Games must be vowed to Jupiter, a temple to Venus Erycina
and one to Mens; a lectisternium must be held and solemn intercessions
made; a Sacred Spring must also be vowed. All these things must be done
if the war was to be a successful one and the republic remain in the same
position in which it was at the beginning of the war. As Fabius would be
wholly occupied with the necessary arrangements for the war, the senate
with the full approval of the pontifical college ordered the praetor, M.
Aemilius, to take care that all these orders were carried out in good time.
22.10
After these resolutions had been passed in the senate the praetor consulted
the pontifical college as to the proper means of giving effect to them,
and L. Cornelius Lentulus, the Pontifex Maximus, decided that the very
first step to take was to refer to the people the question of a "Sacred
Spring," as this particular form of vow could not be undertaken without
the order of the people. The form of procedure was as follows: "Is it,"
the praetor asked the Assembly, "your will and pleasure that all be done
and performed in manner following? That is to say, if the commonwealth
of the Romans and the Quirites be preserved, as I pray it may be, safe
and sound through these present wars-to wit, the war between Rome and Carthage
and the wars with the Gauls now dwelling on the hither side of the Alps-then
shall the Romans and Quirites present as an offering whatever the spring
shall produce from their flocks and herds, whether it be from swine or
sheep or goats or cattle, and all that is not already devoted to any other
deity shall be consecrated to Jupiter from such time as the senate and
people shall order. Whosoever shall make an offering let him do it at whatsoever
time and in whatsoever manner he will, and howsoever he offers it, it shall
be accounted to be duly offered. If the animal which should have been sacrificed
die, it shall be as though unconsecrated, there shall be no sin. If any
man shall hurt or slay a consecrated thing unwittingly he shall not be
held guilty. If a man shall have stolen any such animal, the people shall
not bear the guilt, nor he from whom it was stolen. If a man offer his
sacrifice unwittingly on a forbidden day, it shall be accounted to be duly
offered. Whether he do so by night or day, whether he be slave or freeman,
it shall be accounted to be duly offered. If any sacrifice be offered before
the senate and people have ordered that it shall be done, the people shall
be free and absolved from all guilt therefrom." To the same end the Great
Games were vowed at a cost of 333,333 1/3 ases, and in addition 300 oxen
to Jupiter, and white oxen and the other customary victims to a number
of deities. When the vows had been duly pronounced a litany of intercession
was ordered, and not only the population of the City but the people from
the country districts, whose private interests were being affected by the
public distress, went in procession with their wives and children. Then
a lectisternium was held for three days under the supervision of the ten
keepers of the Sacred Books. Six couches were publicly exhibited; one for
Jupiter and Juno, another for Neptune and Minerva, a third for Mars and
Venus, a fourth for Apollo and Diana, a fifth for Vulcan and Vesta, and
the sixth for Mercury and Ceres. This was followed by the vowing of temples.
Q. Fabius Maximus, as Dictator, vowed the temple to Venus Erycina, because
it was laid down in the Books of Fate that this vow should be made by the
man who possessed the supreme authority in the State. T. Otacilius, the
praetor, vowed the temple to Mens.
22.11
After the various obligations towards the gods had thus been discharged,
the Dictator referred to the senate the question of the policy to be adopted
with regard to the war, with what legions and how many the senators thought
he ought to meet their victorious enemy. They decreed that he should take
over the army from Cneius Servilius, and further that he should enrol from
amongst the citizens and the allies as many cavalry and infantry as he
considered requisite; all else was left to his discretion to take such
steps as he thought desirable in the interests of the republic. Fabius
said that he would add two legions to the army which Servilius commanded;
these were raised by the Master of the Horse and he fixed a day for their
assembling at Tibur. A proclamation was also issued that those who were
living in towns and strongholds that were not sufficiently fortified should
remove into places of safety, and that all the population settled in the
districts through which Hannibal was likely to march should abandon their
farms, after first burning their houses and destroying their produce, so
that he might not have any supplies to fall back upon. He then marched
along the Flaminian road to meet the consul. As soon as he caught sight
of the army in the neighbourhood of Ocriculum near the Tiber, and the consul
riding forward with some cavalry to meet him, he sent an officer to tell
him that he was to come to the Dictator without his lictors. He did so,
and the way they met produced a profound sense of the majesty of the dictatorship
amongst both citizens and allies, who had almost by this time forgotten
that greatest of all offices. Shortly afterwards a despatch was handed
in from the City stating that some transports which were carrying supplies
for the army in Spain had been captured by the Carthaginian fleet near
the port of Cosa. The consul was thereupon ordered to man the ships which
were lying off Rome or at Ostia with full complements of seamen and soldiers,
and sail in pursuit of the hostile fleet and protect the coast of Italy.
A large force was raised in Rome, even freedmen who had children and were
of the military age had been sworn in. Out of these city troops, all under
thirty-five years of age were placed on board the ships, the rest were
left to garrison the City.
22.12
The Dictator took over the consul's army from Fulvius Flaccus, the second
in command, and marched through Sabine territory to Tibur, where he had
ordered the newly raised force to assemble by the appointed day. From there
he advanced to Praeneste, and taking a cross-country route, came out on
the Latin road. From this point he proceeded towards the enemy, showing
the utmost care in reconnoitring all the various routes, and determined
not to take any risks anywhere, except so far as necessity should compel
him. The first day he pitched his camp in view of the enemy not far from
Arpi; the Carthaginian lost no time in marching out his men in battle order
to give him the chance of fighting. But when he saw that the enemy kept
perfectly quiet and that there were no signs of excitement in their camp,
he tauntingly remarked that the spirits of the Romans, those sons of Mars,
were broken at last, the war was at an end, and they had openly foregone
all claim to valour and renown. He then returned into camp. But he was
really in a very anxious state of mind, for he saw that he would have to
do with a very different type of commander from Flaminius or Sempronius;
the Romans had been taught by their defeats and had at last found a general
who was a match for him. It was the wariness not the impetuosity of the
Dictator that was the immediate cause of his alarm; he had not yet tested
his inflexible resolution. He began to harass and provoke him by frequently
shifting his camp and ravaging the fields of the allies of Rome before
his very eyes. Sometimes he would march rapidly out of sight and then in
some turn of the road take up a concealed position in the hope of entrapping
him, should he come down to level ground. Fabius kept on high ground, at
a moderate distance from the enemy, so that he never lost sight of him
and never closed with him. Unless they were employed on necessary duty,
the soldiers were confined to camp. When they went in quest of wood or
forage they went in large bodies and only within prescribed limits. A force
of cavalry and light infantry told off in readiness against sudden alarms,
made everything safe for his own soldiers and dangerous for the scattered
foragers of the enemy. He refused to stake everything on a general engagement,
whilst slight encounters, fought on safe ground with a retreat close at
hand, encouraged his men, who had been demoralised by their previous defeats,
and made them less dissatisfied with their own courage and fortunes. But
his sound and common-sense tactics were not more distasteful to Hannibal
than they were to his own Master of the Horse. Headstrong and impetuous
in counsel and with an ungovernable tongue, the only thing that prevented
Minucius from making shipwreck of the State was the fact that he was in
a subordinate command. At first to a few listeners, afterwards openly amongst
the rank and file, he abused Fabius, calling his deliberation indolence
and his caution cowardice, attributing to him faults akin to his real virtues,
and by disparaging his superior-a vile practice which, through its often
proving successful, is steadily on the increase-he tried to exalt himself.
22.13
From the Hirpini Hannibal went across into Samnium; he ravaged the territory
of Beneventum and captured the city of Telesia. He did his best to exasperate
the Roman commander, hoping that he would be so incensed by the insults
and sufferings inflicted on his allies that he would be able to draw him
into an engagement on level ground. Amongst the thousands of allies of
Italian nationality who had been taken prisoners by Hannibal at Trasumennus
and dismissed to their homes were three Campanian knights, who had been
allured by bribes and promises to win over the affections of their countrymen.
They sent a message to Hannibal to the effect that if he would bring his
army up to Campania there would be a good chance of his obtaining possession
of Capua. Hannibal was undecided whether to trust them or not, for the
enterprise was greater than the authority of those who advised it; however,
they at last persuaded him to leave Samnium for Campania. He warned them
that they must make their repeated promises good by their acts, and after
bidding them return to him with more of their countrymen, including some
of their chief men, he dismissed them. Some who were familiar with the
country told him that if he marched into the neighbourhood of Casinum and
occupied the pass, he would prevent the Romans from rendering assistance
to their allies. He accordingly ordered a guide to conduct him there. But
the difficulty which the Carthaginians found in pronouncing Latin names
led to the guide understanding Casilinum instead of Casinum. Quitting his
intended route, he came down through the districts of Allifae, Callifae,
and Cales on to the plains of Stella. When he looked round and saw the
country shut in by mountains and rivers he called the guide and asked him
where on earth he was. When he was told that he would that day have his
quarters at Casilinum, he saw the mistake and knew that Casinum was far
away in quite another country. The guide was scourged and crucified in
order to strike terror into the others. After entrenching his camp he sent
Maharbal with his cavalry to harry the Falernian land. The work of destruction
extended to the Baths of Sinuessa; the Numidians inflicted enormous losses,
but the panic and terror which they created spread even further. And yet,
though everything was wrapped in the flames of war, the allies did not
allow their terrors to warp them from their loyalty, simply because they
were under a just and equable rule, and rendered a willing obedience to
their superiors-the only true bond of allegiance.
22.14
When Hannibal had encamped at the Vulturnus and the loveliest part of Italy
was being reduced to ashes and the smoke was rising everywhere from the
burning farms, Fabius continued his march along the Massic range of hills.
For a few days the mutinous discontent amongst the troops had subsided,
because they inferred from the unusually rapid marching that Fabius was
hastening to save Campania from being ravaged and plundered. But when they
reached the western extremity of the range and saw the enemy burning the
farmsteads of the colonists of Sinuessa and those in the Falernian district,
while nothing was said about giving battle, the feeling of exasperation
was again roused, and studiously fanned by Minucius. "Are we come here"
he would ask, "to enjoy the sight of our murdered allies and the smoking
ruins of their homes? Surely, if nothing else appeals to us, ought we not
to feel ashamed of ourselves as we see the sufferings of those whom our
fathers sent as colonists to Sinuessa that this frontier might be protected
from the Samnite foe, whose homes are being burnt not by our neighbours
the Samnites but by a Carthaginian stranger from the ends of the earth
who has been allowed to come thus far simply through our dilatoriness and
supineness? Have we, alas! so far degenerated from our fathers that we
calmly look on while the very country, past which they considered it an
affront for a Carthaginian fleet to cruise, has now been filled with Numidian
and Moorish invaders? We who only the other day in our indignation at the
attack on Saguntum appealed not to men alone, but to treaties and to gods,
now quietly watch Hannibal scaling the walls of a Roman colony! The smoke
from the burning farms and fields is blown into our faces, our ears are
assailed by the cries of our despairing allies who appeal to us for help
more than they do to the gods, and here are we marching an army like a
herd of cattle through summer pastures and mountain paths hidden from view
by woods and clouds! If M. Furius Camillus had chosen this method of wandering
over mountain heights and passes to rescue the City from the Gauls which
has been adopted by this new Camillus, this peerless Dictator who has been
found for us in our troubles, to recover Italy from Hannibal, Rome would
still be in the hands of the Gauls, and I very much fear that if we go
on dawdling in this way the City which our ancestors have so often saved
will only have been saved for Hannibal and the Carthaginians. But on the
day that the message came to Veii that Camillus had been nominated Dictator
by senate and people, though the Janiculum was quite high enough for him
to sit there and watch the enemy, like the man and true Roman that he was,
he came down into the plain. and in the very heart of the City where the
Busta Gallica are now he cut to pieces the legions of the Gauls, and the
next day he did the same beyond Gabii. Why, when years and years ago we
were sent under the yoke by the Samnites at the Caudine Forks, was it,
pray, by exploring the heights of Samnium or by assailing and besieging
Luceria and challenging our victorious foe that L. Papirius Cursor took
the yoke off Roman necks and placed it on the haughty Samnite? What else
but rapidity of action gave C. Lutatius the victory? The day after he first
saw the enemy he surprised their fleet laden with supplies and hampered
by its cargo of stores and equipment. It is mere folly to fancy that the
war can be brought to an end by sitting still or making vows to heaven.
Your duty is to take your arms and go down and meet the enemy man to man.
It is by doing and daring that Rome has increased her dominion not by these
counsels of sloth which cowards call caution." Minucius said all this before
a host of Roman tribunes and knights, as if he were addressing the Assembly,
and his daring words even reached the ears of the soldiery; if they could
have voted on the question, there is no doubt that they would have superseded
Fabius for Minucius.
22.15
Fabius kept an equally careful watch upon both sides, upon his own men
no less than upon the enemy, and he showed that his resolution was quite
unshaken. He was quite aware that his inactivity was making him unpopular
not only in his own camp, but even in Rome, nevertheless his determination
remained unchanged and he persisted in the same tactics for the rest of
the summer, and Hannibal abandoned all hopes of the battle which he had
so anxiously sought for. It became necessary for him to look round for
a suitable place to winter in, as the country in which he was, a land of
orchards and vineyards, was entirely planted with the luxuries rather than
the necessaries of life, and furnished supplies only for a few months not
for the whole year. Hannibal's movements were reported to Fabius by his
scouts. As he felt quite certain that he would return by the same pass
through which he had entered the district of Falernum, he posted a fairly
strong detachment on Mount Callicula and another to garrison Casilinum.
The Vulturnus runs through the middle of this town and forms the boundary
between the districts of Falernum and Campania. He led his army back over
the same heights, having previously sent L. Hostilius Mancinus forward
with 400 cavalry to reconnoitre. This man was amongst the throng of young
officers who had frequently listened to the fierce harangues of the Master
of the Horse. At first he advanced cautiously, as a scouting party should
do, to get a good view of the enemy from a safe position. But when he saw
the Numidians roaming in all directions through the villages, and had even
surprised and killed some of them, he thought of nothing but fighting,
and completely forgot the Dictator's instructions, which were to go forward
as far as he could safely and to retire before the enemy observed him.
The Numidians, attacking and retreating in small bodies, drew him gradually
almost up to their camp, his men and horses by this time thoroughly tired.
Thereupon Carthalo, the general in command of the cavalry, charged at full
speed, and before they came within range of their javelins put the enemy
to flight and pursued them without slackening rein for nearly five miles.
When Mancinus saw that there was no chance of the enemy giving up the pursuit,
or of his escaping them, he rallied his men and faced the Numidians, though
completely outnumbered and outmatched. He himself with the best of his
riders was cut off, the rest resumed their wild flight and reached Cales
and ultimately by different by-paths returned to the Dictator. It so happened
that Minucius had rejoined Fabius on this day. He had been sent to strengthen
the force holding the defile which contracts into a narrow pass just above
Terracina close to the sea. This was to prevent the Carthaginian from utilising
the Appian road for a descent upon the territory of Rome, when he left
Sinuessa. The Dictator and the Master of the Horse with their joint armies
moved their camp on to the route which Hannibal was expected to take. He
was encamped two miles distant.
22.16
The next day the Carthaginian army began its march and filled the whole
of the road between the two camps. The Romans had taken up a position immediately
below their entrenchments, on unquestionably more advantageous ground,
yet the Carthaginian came up with his cavalry and light infantry to challenge
his enemy. They made repeated attacks and retirements, but the Roman line
kept its ground; the fighting was slack and more satisfactory to the Dictator
than to Hannibal; 200 Romans fell, and 800 of the enemy. It now seemed
as if Hannibal must be hemmed in. Capua and Samnium and all the rich land
of Latium behind them were furnishing the Romans with supplies, while the
Carthaginian would have to winter amongst the rocks of Formiae and the
sands and marshes of Liternum and in gloomy forests. Hannibal did not fail
to observe that his own tactics were being employed against him. As he
could not get out through Casilinum, and would have to make for the mountains
and cross the ridge of Callicula, he would be liable to be attacked by
the Romans whilst he was shut up in the valleys. To guard against this
he decided upon a stratagem which, deceiving the eyes of the enemy by its
alarming appearance, would enable him to scale the mountains in a night
march without fear of interruption. The following was the ruse which he
adopted. Torch-wood gathered from all the country round, and faggots of
dry brushwood were tied on the horns of the oxen which he was driving in
vast numbers, both broken and unbroken to the plough, amongst the rest
of the plunder from the fields. About 2000 oxen were collected for the
purpose. To Hasdrubal was assigned the task of setting fire to the bundles
on the horns of this herd as soon as darkness set in, then driving them
up the mountains and if possible mostly above the passes which were guarded
by the Romans.
22.17
As soon as it was dark, the camp silently broke up; the oxen were driven
some distance in front of the column. When they had reached the foot of
the mountains where the roads began to narrow, the signal was given and
the herds with their flaming horns were driven up the mountain side. The
terrifying glare of the flames shooting from their heads and the heat which
penetrated to the root of their horns made the oxen rush about as though
they were mad. At this sudden scampering about, it seemed as though the
woods and mountains were on fire, and all the brushwood round became alight
and the incessant but useless shaking of their heads made the flames shoot
out all the more, and gave the appearance of men running about in all directions.
When the men who were guarding the pass saw fires moving above them high
up on the mountains, they thought that their position was turned, and they
hastily quitted it. Making their way up to the highest points, they took
the direction where there appeared to be the fewest flames, thinking this
to be the safest road. Even so, they came across stray oxen separated from
the herd, and at first sight they stood still in astonishment at what seemed
a preternatural sight of beings breathing fire. When it turned out to be
simply a human device they were still more alarmed at what they suspected
was an ambuscade, and they took to flight. Now they fell in with some of
Hannibal's light infantry, but both sides shrank from a fight in the darkness
and remained inactive till daylight. In the meantime Hannibal had marched
the whole of his army through the pass, and after surprising and scattering
some Roman troops in the pass itself, fixed his camp in the district of
Allifae.
22.18
Fabius watched all this confusion and excitement, but as he took it to
be an ambuscade, and in any case shrank from a battle in the night, he
kept his men within their lines. As soon as it was light there was a battle
just under the ridge of the mountain where the Carthaginian light infantry
were cut off from their main body and would easily have been crushed by
the Romans, who had considerably the advantage in numbers, had not a cohort
of Spaniards come up, who had been sent back by Hannibal to their assistance.
These men were more accustomed to the mountains and in better training
for running amongst rocks and precipices, and being both more lightly made
and more lightly armed they could easily by their method of fighting baffle
an enemy drawn from the lowlands, heavily armed and accustomed to stationary
tactics. At last they drew off from a contest which was anything but an
equal one. The Spaniards being almost untouched, the Romans having sustained
a heavy loss, each retired to their respective camps. Fabius followed on
Hannibal's track through the pass and encamped above Allifae in an elevated
position and one of great natural strength. Hannibal retraced his steps
as far as the Peligni, ravaging the country as he went, as though his intention
was to march through Samnium upon Rome. Fabius continued to move along
the heights, keeping between the enemy and the City, neither avoiding nor
attacking him. The Carthaginian left the Peligni, and marching back into
Apulia, reached Gereonium. This city had been abandoned by its inhabitants
because a portion of the walls had fallen into ruin. The Dictator formed
an entrenched camp near Larinum. From there he was recalled to Rome on
business connected with religion. Before his departure he impressed upon
the Master of the Horse, not only as commander-in-chief but as a friend
giving good advice and even using entreaties, the necessity of trusting
more to prudence than to luck, and following his own example rather than
copying Sempronius and Flaminius. He was not to suppose that nothing had
been gained now that the summer had been spent in baffling the enemy, even
physicians often gained more by not disturbing their patients than by subjecting
them to movement and exercises; it was no small advantage to have avoided
defeat at the hands of a foe who had been so often victorious and to have
obtained a breathing space after such a series of disasters. With these
unheeded warnings to the Master of the Horse he started for Rome.
22.19
At the commencement of this summer war began in Spain both by land and
sea. Hasdrubal added ten ships to those which he had received from his
brother, equipped and ready for action, and gave Himilco a fleet of forty
vessels. He then sailed from New Carthage, keeping near land, and with
his army moving parallel along the coast, ready to engage the enemy whether
by sea or land. When Cn. Scipio learnt that his enemy had left his winter
quarters he at first adopted the same tactics, but on further consideration
he would not venture on a contest by land, owing to the immense reputation
of the new auxiliaries. After embarking the pick of his army he proceeded
with a fleet of thirty-five ships to meet the enemy. The day after leaving
Tarraco he came to anchor at a spot ten miles distant from the mouth of
the Ebro. Two despatch boats belonging to Massilia had been sent to reconnoitre,
and they brought back word that the Carthaginian fleet was riding at anchor
in the mouth of the river and their camp was on the bank. Scipio at once
weighed anchor and sailed towards the enemy, intending to strike a sudden
panic amongst them by surprising them whilst off their guard and unsuspicious
of danger.
There are in Spain many towers situated on high ground which are used
both as look-outs and places of defence against pirates. It was from there
that the hostile ships were first sighted, and the signal given to Hasdrubal;
excitement and confusion prevailed in the camp on shore before it reached
the ships at sea, as the splash of the oars and other sounds of advancing
ships were not yet heard, and the projecting headlands hid the Roman fleet
from view. Suddenly one mounted vidette after another from Hasdrubal galloped
up with orders to those who were strolling about on the shore or resting
in their tents, and expecting anything rather than the approach of an enemy
or battle that day, to embark with all speed and take their arms, for the
Roman fleet was now not far from the harbour. This order the mounted men
were giving in all directions, and before long Hasdrubal himself appeared
with the whole of his army. Everywhere there was noise and confusion, the
rowers and the soldiers scrambled on board more like men flying from the
shore than men going into action. Hardly were all on board, when some unfastened
the mooring ropes and drifted towards their anchors, others cut their cables;
everything was done in too much haste and hurry, the work of the seamen
was hampered by the preparations which the soldiers were making, and the
soldiers were prevented from putting themselves in fighting trim owing
to the confusion and panic which prevailed amongst the seamen. By this
time the Romans were not only near at hand, they had actually lined up
their ships for the attack. The Carthaginians were paralysed quite as much
by their own disorder as by the approach of the enemy, and they brought
their ships round for flight, after abandoning a struggle which it would
be more true to say was attempted rather than begun. But it was impossible
for their widely extended line to enter the mouth of the river all at once,
and the ships were run ashore in all directions. Some of those on board
got out through the shallow water, others jumped on to the beach, with
arms or without, and made good their escape to the army which was drawn
up ready for action along the shore. Two Carthaginian ships, however, were
captured to begin with and four sunk.
22.20
Though the Romans saw that the enemy were in force on land and that their
army was extended along the shore, they showed no hesitation in following
up the enemy's panic-stricken fleet. They secured all the ships which had
not staved their prows in on the beach, or grounded with their keels in
the mud by fastening hawsers to their sterns and dragging them into deep
water. Out of forty vessels twenty-five were captured in this way. This
was not, however, the best part of the victory. Its main importance lay
in the fact that this one insignificant encounter gave the mastery of the
whole of the adjacent sea. The fleet accordingly sailed to Onusa, and there
the soldiers disembarked, captured and plundered the place and then marched
towards New Carthage. They ravaged the entire country round, and ended
by setting fire to the houses which adjoined the walls and gates. Re-embarking
laden with plunder, they sailed to Longuntica, where they found a great
quantity of esparto grass which Hasdrubal had collected for the use of
the navy, and after taking what they could use they burnt the rest. They
did not confine themselves to cruising along the coast, but crossed over
to the island of Ebusus, where they made a determined but unsuccessful
attack upon the capital during the whole of two days. As they found that
they were only wasting time on a hopeless enterprise, they took to plundering
the country, and sacked and burnt several villages. Here they secured more
booty than on the mainland, and after placing it on board, as they were
on the point of sailing away, some envoys came to Scipio from the Balearic
isles to sue for peace. From this point the fleet sailed back to the eastern
side of the province where envoys were assembled from all the tribes in
the district of the Ebro, and many even from the remotest parts of Spain.
The tribes which actually acknowledged the supremacy of Rome and gave hostages
amounted to more than a hundred and twenty. The Romans felt now as much
confidence in their army as in their navy, and marched as far as the pass
of Castulo. Hasdrubal retired to Lusitania where he was nearer to the Atlantic.
22.21
It now seemed as though the remainder of the summer would be undisturbed,
and it would have been so as far as the Carthaginians were concerned. But
the Spanish temperament is restless and fond of change, and after the Romans
had left the pass and retired to the coast, Mandonius and Indibilis, who
had previously been chief of the Ibergetes, roused their fellow-tribesmen
and proceeded to harry the lands of those who were in peace and alliance
with Rome. Scipio despatched a military tribune with some light-armed auxiliaries
to disperse them, and after a trifling engagement, for they were undisciplined
and without organisation, they were all put to rout, some being killed
or taken prisoners, and a large proportion deprived of their arms. This
disturbance, however, brought Hasdrubal, who was marching westwards, back
to the defence of his allies on the south side of the Ebro. The Carthaginians
were in camp amongst the Ilergavonians; the Roman camp was at Nova, when
unexpected intelligence turned the tide of war in another direction. The
Celtiberi, who had sent their chief men as envoys to Scipio and had given
hostages, were induced by his representations to take up arms and invade
the province of New Carthage with a powerful army. They took three fortified
towns by storm, and fought two most successful actions with Hasdrubal himself,
killing 15,000 of the enemy and taking 4000 prisoners with numerous standards.
22.22
This was the position of affairs when P. Scipio, whose command had been
extended after he ceased to be consul, came to the province which had been
assigned to him by the senate. He brought a reinforcement of thirty ships
of war and 8000 troops, also a large convoy of supplies. This fleet, with
its enormous column of transports, excited the liveliest delight among
the townsmen and their allies when it was seen in the distance and finally
reached the port of Tarracona. There the soldiers were landed and Scipio
marched up country to meet his brother; thenceforward they carried on the
campaign with their united forces and with one heart and purpose. As the
Carthaginians were preoccupied with the Celtiberian war, the Scipios had
no hesitation in crossing the Ebro and, as no enemy appeared, marching
straight to Saguntum, where they had been informed that the hostages who
had been surrendered to Hannibal from all parts of Spain were detained
in the citadel under a somewhat weak guard. The fact that they had given
these pledges was the only thing that prevented all the tribes of Spain
from openly manifesting their leanings towards alliance with Rome; they
dreaded lest the price of their defection from Carthage should be the blood
of their own children. From this bond Spain was released by the clever
but treacherous scheme of one individual.
Abelux was a Spaniard of high birth living at Saguntum, who had at one
time been loyal to Carthage, but afterwards, with the usual fickleness
of barbarians, as the fortunes of Carthage changed so he changed his allegiance.
He considered that any one going over to the enemy without having something
valuable to betray was simply a worthless and disreputable individual,
and so he made it his one aim to be of the greatest service he could to
his new allies. After making a survey of everything which Fortune could
possibly put within his reach, he made up his mind to effect the delivery
of the hostages; that one thing he thought would do more than anything
else to win the friendship of the Spanish chieftains for the Romans. He
was quite aware, however, that the guardians of the hostages would take
no step without the orders of Bostar, their commanding officer, and so
he employed his arts against Bostar himself. Bostar had fixed his camp
outside the city quite on the shore that he might bar the approach of the
Romans on that side. After obtaining a secret interview with him he warned
him, as though he were unaware of it, as to the actual state of affairs.
"Up to this time," he said, "fear alone has kept the Spaniards loyal because
the Romans were far away; now the Roman camp is on our side the Ebro, a
secure stronghold and refuge for all who want to change their allegiance.
Those, therefore, who are no longer restrained by fear must be bound to
us by kindness and feelings of gratitude." Bostar was greatly surprised,
and asked him what boon could suddenly effect such great results. "Send
the hostages," was the reply, "back to their homes. That will evoke gratitude
from their parents, who are very influential people in their own country,
and also from their fellow-countrymen generally. Every one likes to feel
that he is trusted; the confidence you place in others generally strengthens
their confidence in you. The service of restoring the hostages to their
respective homes I claim for myself, that I may contribute to the success
of my plan by my own personal efforts, and win for an act gracious in itself
still more gratitude."
He succeeded in persuading Bostar, whose intelligence was not on a par
with the acuteness which the other Carthaginians showed. After this interview
he went secretly to the enemy's outposts, and meeting with some Spanish
auxiliaries he was conducted by them into the presence of Scipio, to whom
he explained what he proposed to do. Pledges of good faith were mutually
exchanged and the place and time for handing over the hostages fixed, after
which he returned to Saguntum. The following day he spent in receiving
Bostar's instructions for the execution of the project. It was agreed between
them that he should go at night in order, as he pretended, to escape the
observation of the Roman outposts. He had already arranged with these as
to the hour at which he would come, and after awakening those who were
in guard of the boys he conducted the hostages, without appearing to be
aware of the fact, into the trap which he had himself prepared. The outposts
conducted them into the Roman camp; all the remaining details connected
with their restoration to their homes were carried out as he had arranged
with Bostar, precisely as if the business were being transacted m the name
of
Carthage. Yet though the service rendered was the same, the gratitude felt
towards the Romans was considerably greater than would have been earned
by the Carthaginians, who had shown themselves oppressive and tyrannical
in the time of their prosperity, and now that they experienced a change
of fortune their act might have appeared to be dictated by fear. The Romans,
on the other hand, hitherto perfect strangers, had no sooner come into
the country than they began with an act of clemency and generosity, and
Abelux was considered to have shown his prudence in changing his allies
to such good purpose. All now began with surprising unanimity to meditate
revolt, and an armed movement would have begun at once had not the winter
set in, which compelled the Romans as well as the Carthaginians to retire
to their quarters.
22.23
These were the main incidents of the campaign in Spain during the second
summer of the Punic war. In Italy the masterly inaction of Fabius had for
a short time stemmed the tide of Roman disasters. It was a cause of grave
anxiety to Hannibal, for he fully realised that the Romans had chosen for
their commander-in-chief a man who conducted war on rational principles
and not by trusting to chance. But amongst his own people, soldiers and
civilians alike, his tactics were viewed with contempt, especially after
a battle had been brought about owing to the rashness of the Master of
the Horse in the Dictator's absence which would be more correctly described
as fortunate rather than as successful. Two incidents occurred which made
the Dictator still more unpopular. One was due to the crafty policy of
Hannibal. Some deserters had pointed out to him the Dictator's landed property,
and after all the surrounding buildings had been levelled to the ground
he gave orders for that property to be spared from fire and sword and all
hostile treatment whatever in order that it might be thought that there
was some secret bargain between them. The second cause of the Dictator's
growing unpopularity was something which he himself did, and which at first
bore an equivocal aspect because he had acted without the authority of
the senate, but ultimately it was universally recognised as redounding
very greatly to his credit. In carrying out the exchange of prisoners it
had been agreed between the Roman and the Carthaginian commanders, following
the precedent of the first Punic war, that whichever side received back
more prisoners than they gave should strike a balance by paying two and
a half pounds of silver for each soldier they received in excess of those
they gave. The Roman prisoners restored were two hundred and forty-seven
more than the Carthaginians. The question of this payment had been frequently
discussed in the senate, but as Fabius had not consulted that body before
making the agreement there was some delay in voting the money. The matter
was settled by Fabius sending his son Quintus to Rome to sell the land
which had been untouched by the enemy; he thus discharged the obligation
of the State at his own private expense. When Hannibal burnt Gereonium
after its capture, he left a few houses standing to serve as granaries,
and now he was occupying a standing camp before its walls. He was in the
habit of sending out two divisions to collect corn, he remained in camp
with the third ready to move in any direction where he saw that his foragers
were being attacked.
22.24
The Roman army was at the time in the neighbourhood of Larinum, with Minucius
in command, owing, as stated above, to the Dictator having left for the
City. The camp had been situated in a lofty and secure position; it was
now transferred to the plain, and more energetic measures more in harmony
with the general's temperament were being discussed; suggestions were made
for an attack either on the dispersed parties of foragers or on the camp
now that it was left with a weak guard. Hannibal soon found out that the
tactics of his enemies had changed with the change of generals, and that
they would act with more spirit than prudence, and incredible as it may
sound, though his enemy was in closer proximity to him, he sent out a whole
division of his army to collect corn, keeping the other two in camp. The
next thing he did was to move his camp still nearer the enemy, about two
miles from Gereonium on rising ground within view of the Romans, so that
they might know that he was determined to protect his foragers in case
of attack. From this position he was able to see another elevated position
still closer to the Roman camp, in fact looking down on it. There was no
doubt that if he were to attempt to seize it in broad daylight the enemy,
having less distance to go, would be there before him, so he sent a force
of Numidians who occupied it during the night. The next day the Romans,
seeing how small a number were holding the position, made short work of
them and drove them off and then transferred their own camp there. By this
time there was but a very small distance between rampart and rampart, and
even that was almost entirely filled with Roman troops, who were demonstrating
in force to conceal the movements of cavalry and light infantry who had
been sent through the camp gate farthest from the enemy to attack his foragers,
upon whom they inflicted severe losses. Hannibal did not venture upon a
regular battle because his camp was so weakly guarded that it could not
have repelled an assault. Borrowing the tactics of Fabius he began to carry
on the campaign by remaining in almost complete inaction, and withdrew
his camp to its former position before the walls of Gereonium. According
to some authors a pitched battle was fought with both armies in regular
formation; the Carthaginians were routed at the first onset and driven
to their camp; from there a sudden sortie was made and it was the Romans'
turn to flee, and the battle was once more restored by the sudden appearance
of Numerius Decimus, the Samnite general. Decimus was, as far as wealth
and lineage go, the foremost man not only in Bovianum, his native place,
but in the whole of Samnium. In obedience to the Dictator's orders he was
bringing into camp a force of 8000 foot and 500 horse, and when he appeared
in Hannibal's rear both sides thought that it was a reinforcement coming
from Rome under Q. Fabius. Hannibal, it is further stated, ordered his
men to retire, the Romans followed them up, and with the aid of the Samnites
captured two of their fortified positions the same day; 6000 of the enemy
were killed and about 5000 of the Romans, yet though the losses were so
evenly balanced an idle and foolish report of a splendid victory reached
Rome together with a despatch from the Master of the Horse which was still
more foolish.
22.25
This state of affairs led to constant discussions in the senate and the
Assembly. Amidst the universal rejoicing the Dictator stood alone; he declared
that he did not place the slightest credence in either the report or the
despatch, and even if everything was as it was represented, he dreaded
success more than failure. On this M. Metilius, tribune of the plebs, said
it was really becoming intolerable that the Dictator, not content with
standing in the way of any success being achieved when he was on the spot,
should now be equally opposed to it after it had been achieved in his absence.
"He was deliberately wasting time in his conduct of the war in order to
remain longer in office as sole magistrate and retain his supreme command.
One consul has fallen in battle, the other has been banished far from Italy
under pretext of chasing the Carthaginian fleet; two praetors have their
hands full with Sicily and Sardinia, neither of which provinces needs a
praetor at all at this time; M. Minucius, Master of the Horse, has been
almost kept under guard to prevent him from seeing the enemy or doing anything
which savoured of war. And so, good heavens! not only Samnium, where we
retreated before the Carthaginians as though it were some territory beyond
the Ebro, but even the country of Falernum, have been utterly laid waste,
while the Dictator was sitting idly at Casilinum, using the legions of
Rome to protect his own property. The Master of the Horse and the army,
who were burning to fight, were kept back and almost imprisoned within
their lines; they were deprived of their arms as though they were prisoners
of war. At length, no sooner had the Dictator departed than, like men delivered
from a blockade, they left their entrenchments and routed the enemy and
put him to flight. Under these circumstances I was prepared, if the Roman
plebs still possessed the spirit they showed in old days, to take the bold
step of bringing in a measure to relieve Q. Fabius of his command; as it
is I shall propose a resolution couched in very moderate terms-'that the
authority of the Master of the Horse be made equal to that of the Dictator.'
But even if this resolution is carried Q. Fabius must not be allowed to
rejoin the army before he has appointed a consul in place of C. Flaminius."
As the line which the Dictator was taking was in the highest degree
unpopular, he kept away from the Assembly. Even in the senate he produced
an unfavourable impression when he spoke in laudatory terms of the enemy
and put down the disasters of the past two years to rashness and lack of
generalship on the part of the commanders. The Master of the Horse, he
said, must be called to account for having fought against his orders. If,
he went on to say, the supreme command and direction of the war remained
in his hands, he would soon let men know that in the case of a good general
Fortune plays a small part, intelligence and military skill are the main
factors. To have preserved the army in circumstances of extreme danger
without any humiliating defeat was in his opinion a more glorious thing
than the slaughter of many thousands of the enemy. But he failed to convince
his audience, and after appointing M. Atilius Regulus as consul, he set
off by night to rejoin his army. He was anxious to avoid a personal altercation
on the question of his authority, and left Rome the day before the proposal
was voted upon. At daybreak a meeting of the plebs was held to consider
the proposal. Though the general feeling was one of hostility to the Dictator
and goodwill towards the Master of the Horse, few were found bold enough
to give this feeling utterance and recommend a proposal which after all
was acceptable to the plebs as a body, and so, notwithstanding the fact
that the great majority were in favour of it, it lacked the support of
men of weight and influence. One man was found who came forward to advocate
the proposal, C. Terentius Varro, who had been praetor the year before,
a man of humble and even mean origin. The tradition is that his father
was a butcher who hawked his meat about and employed his son in the menial
drudgery of his trade.
22.26
The money made in this business was left to his son, who hoped that his
fortune might help him to a more respectable position in society. He decided
to become an advocate, and his appearances in the Forum, where he defended
men of the lowest class by noisy and scurrilous attacks upon the property
and character of respectable citizens, brought him into notoriety and ultimately
into office. After discharging the various duties of the quaestorship,
the two aedileships, plebeian and curule, and lastly those of the praetor,
he now aspired to the consulship. With this view he cleverly took advantage
of the feeling against the Dictator to court the gale of popular favour,
and gained for himself the whole credit of carrying the resolution. Everybody,
whether in Rome or in the army, whether friend or foe, with the sole exception
of the Dictator himself, looked upon this proposal as intended to cast
a slur on him. But he met the injustice done to him by the people, embittered
as they were against him, with the same dignified composure with which
he had previously treated the charges which his opponents had brought against
him before the populace. While still on his way he received a despatch
containing the senatorial decree for dividing his command, but as he knew
perfectly well that an equal share of military command by no means implied
an equal share of military skill, he returned to his army with a spirit
undismayed by either his fellow-citizens or the enemy.
22.27
Owing to his success and popularity Minucius had been almost unbearable
before, but now that he had won as great a victory over Fabius as over
Hannibal, his boastful arrogance knew no bounds. "The man," he exclaimed,
"who was selected as the only general who would be a match for Hannibal
has now, by an order of the people, been put on a level with his second
in command; the Dictator has to share his powers with the Master of the
Horse. There is no precedent for this in our annals, and it has been done
in that very State in which Masters of the Horse have been wont to look
with dread upon the rods and axes of Dictators. So brilliant have been
my good fortune and my merits. If the Dictator persists in that dilatoriness
and inaction which have been condemned by the judgment of gods and men,
I shall follow my good fortune wherever it may lead me." Accordingly on
his first meeting with Q. Fabius, he told him that the very first thing
that had to be settled was the method in which they should exercise their
divided authority. The best plan, he thought, would be for them each to
take supreme command on alternate days, or, if he preferred it, at longer
intervals. This would enable whichever general was in command to meet Hannibal
with tactics and strength equal to his own should an opportunity arise
of striking a blow. Q. Fabius met this proposal with a decided negative.
Everything, he argued, which his colleague's rashness might prompt would
be at the mercy of Fortune; though his command was shared with another,
he was not wholly deprived of it; he would never therefore voluntarily
give up what power he still possessed of conducting operations with common
sense and prudence, and though he refused to agree to a division of days
or periods of command, he was prepared to divide the army with him and
use his best foresight and judgment to preserve what he could as he could
not save all. So it was arranged that they should adopt the plan of the
consuls and share the legions between them. The first and fourth went to
Minucius, Fabius retained the second and third. The cavalry and the contingents
supplied by the Latins and the allies were also divided equally between
them. The Master of the Horse even insisted upon separate camps.
22.28
Nothing that was going on amongst his enemies escaped the observation of
Hannibal, for ample information was supplied to him by deserters as well
as by his scouts. He was doubly delighted, for he felt sure of entrapping
by his own peculiar methods the wild rashness of Minucius, and he saw that
Fabius' skilful tactics had lost half their strength. Between Minucius'
camp and Hannibal's there was some rising ground, and whichever side seized
it would undoubtedly be able to render their adversaries' position less
secure. Hannibal determined to secure it, and though it would have been
worth while doing so without a fight, he preferred to bring on a battle
with Minucius, who, he felt quite sure, would hurry up to stop him. The
entire intervening country seemed, at a first glance, totally unsuited
for surprise tactics, for there were no woods anywhere, no spots covered
with brushwood and scrub, but in reality it naturally lent itself to such
a purpose, and all the more so because in so bare a valley no stratagem
of the kind could be suspected. In its windings there were caverns, some
so large as to be capable of concealing two hundred men. Each of these
hiding-places was filled with troops, and altogether 5000 horse and foot
were placed in concealment. In case, however, the stratagem might be detected
by some soldier's thoughtless movements, or the glint of arms in so open
a valley, Hannibal sent a small detachment to seize the rising ground already
described in order to divert the attention of the enemy. As soon as they
were sighted, their small number excited ridicule, and every man begged
that he might have the task of dislodging them. Conspicuous amongst his
senseless and hot-headed soldiers the general sounded a general call to
arms, and poured idle abuse and threats on the enemy. He sent the light
infantry first in open skirmishing order, these were followed by the cavalry
in close formation, and at last, when he saw that reinforcements were being
brought up to the enemy, he advanced with the legions in line. Hannibal
on his side sent supports, both horse and foot, to his men wherever they
were hard pressed, and the numbers engaged steadily grew until he had formed
his entire army into order of battle and both sides were in full strength.
The Roman light infantry moving up the hill from lower ground were the
first to be repulsed and forced back to the cavalry who were coming up
behind them. They sought refuge behind the front ranks of the legions,
who alone amidst the general panic preserved their coolness and presence
of mind. Had it been a straightforward fight, man to man, they would to
all appearance have been quite a match for their foes, so much had their
success, a few days previously, restored their courage. But the sudden
appearance of the concealed troops and their combined attack on both flanks
and on the rear of the Roman legions created such confusion and alarm that
not a man had any spirit left to fight or any hope of escaping by flight.
22.29
Fabius' attention was first drawn to the cries of alarm, then he observed
in the distance the disordered and broken ranks. "Just so," he exclaimed,
"Fortune has overtaken his rashness, but not more quickly than I feared.
Fabius is his equal in command, but he has found out that Hannibal is his
superior both in ability and in success. However, this is not the time
for censure or rebuke, advance into the field! Let us wrest victory from
the foe, and a confession of error from our fellow-citizens." By this time
the rout had spread over a large part of the field, some were killed, others
looking round for the means of escape, when suddenly the army of Fabius
appeared as though sent down from heaven to their rescue. Before they came
within range of their missiles, before they could exchange blows, they
checked their comrades in their wild flight and the enemy in their fierce
attack. Those who had been scattered hither and thither after their ranks
were broken, closed in from all sides and reformed their line; those who
had kept together in their retreat wheeled round to face the enemy, and,
forming square, at one moment slowly retired, and at another shoulder to
shoulder stood their ground. The defeated troops and those who were fresh
on the field had now practically become one line, and they were commencing
an advance on the enemy when the Carthaginian sounded the retreat, showing
clearly that whilst Minucius had been defeated by him he was himself vanquished
by Fabius. The greater part of the day had been spent in these varying
fortunes of the field. On their return to camp Minucius called his men
together and addressed them thus: "Soldiers, I have often heard it said
that the best man is he who himself advises what is the right thing to
do; next to him comes the man who follows good advice; but the man who
neither himself knows what counsel to give nor obeys the wise counsels
of another is of the very lowest order of intelligence. Since the first
order of intelligence and capacity has been denied to us let us cling to
the second and intermediate one, and whilst we are learning to command,
let us make up our minds to obey him who is wise and far sighted. Let us
join camp with Fabius. When we have carried the standards to his tent where
I shall salute him as 'Father,' a title which the service he has done us
and the greatness of his office alike deserve, you soldiers will salute
as 'Patrons' those whose arms and right hands protected you a little while
ago. If this day has done nothing else for us, it has at all events conferred
on us the glory of having grateful hearts."
22.30
The signal was given and the word passed to collect the baggage; they then
proceeded in marching order to the Dictator's camp much to his surprise
and to the surprise of all who were round him. When the standards had been
stationed in front of his tribunal, the Master of the Horse stepped forward
and addressed him as "Father," and the whole of his troops saluted those
who were crowding round them as "Patrons." He then proceeded, "I have put
you on a level, Dictator, with my parents as far as I can do so in words,
but to them I only owe my life, to you I owe my preservation and the safety
of all these men. The decree of the plebs, which I feel to be onerous rather
than an honour, I am the first to repeal and annul, and with a prayer that
it may turn out well for you, for me, and for these armies of yours, for
preserved and preserver alike, I place myself again under your auspicious
authority and restore to you these legions with their standards. I ask
you, as an act of grace, to order me to retain my office and these, each
man of them, his place in the ranks." Then each man grasped his neighbour's
hand, and the soldiers were dismissed to quarters where they were generously
and hospitably entertained by acquaintances and strangers alike, and the
day which had a short time ago been dark and gloomy and almost marked by
disaster and ruin became a day of joy and gladness. When the report of
this action reached Rome and was confirmed by despatches from both commanders,
and by letters from the rank and file of both armies, every man did his
best to extol Maximus to the skies. His reputation was quite as great with
Hannibal and the Carthaginians; now at last they felt that the were warring
with Romans and on Italian soil. For the last two years they had felt such
contempt for Roman generals and Roman troops that they could hardly believe
that they were at war with that nation of whom they had heard such a terrible
report from their fathers. Hannibal on his return from the field is reported
to have said, "The cloud which has so long settled on the mountain heights
has at last burst upon us in rain and storm."
22.31
While these events were occurring in Italy, the consul., Cn. Servilius
Geminus, with a fleet of 120 vessels, visited Sardinia and Corsica and
received hostages from both islands; from there he sailed to Africa. Before
landing on the mainland he laid waste the island of Menix and allowed the
inhabitants of Cercina to save their island from a similar visitation by
paying an indemnity of ten talents of silver. After this he disembarked
his forces on the African coast and sent them, both soldiers and seamen,
to ravage the country. They dispersed far and wide just as though they
were plundering uninhabited islands, and consequently their recklessness
led them into an ambuscade. Straggling in small parties, they were surrounded
by large numbers of the enemy who knew the country, whilst they were strangers
to it, with the result that they were driven in wild flight and with heavy
loss back to their ships. After losing as many as a thousand men-amongst
them the quaestor Sempronius Blaesus-the fleet hastily put to sea from
shores lined with the enemy and held its course to Sicily. Here it was
handed over to T. Otacilius, in order that his second in command, P. Sura,
might take it back to Rome. Servilius himself proceeded overland through
Sicily and crossed the Strait into Italy, in consequence of a despatch
from Q. Fabius recalling him and his colleague, M. Atilius, to take over
the armies, as his six months' tenure of office had almost expired. All
the annalists, with one or two exceptions, state that Fabius acted against
Hannibal as Dictator; Caelius adds that he was the first Dictator who was
appointed by the people. But Caelius and the rest have forgotten that the
right of nominating a Dictator lay with the consul alone, and Servilius,
who was the only consul at the time, was in Gaul. The citizens, appalled
by three successive defeats, could not endure the thought of delay, and
recourse was had to the appointment by the people of a man to act in place
of a Dictator ("pro dictatore"). His subsequent achievements, his brilliant
reputation as a commander, and the exaggerations which his descendants
introduced into the inscription on his bust easily explain the belief which
ultimately gained ground, that Fabius, who had only been pro-dictator,
was actually Dictator.
22.32
Fabius army was transferred to Atilius, Servilius Geminus took over the
one which Minucius had commanded. They lost no time in fortifying their
winter quarters, and during the remainder of the autumn conducted their
joint operations in the most perfect harmony on the line which Fabius had
laid down. When Hannibal left his camp to collect supplies, they were conveniently
posted at different spots to harass his main body and cut off stragglers;
but they refused to risk a general engagement, though the enemy employed
every artifice to bring one on. Hannibal was reduced to such extremities
that he would have marched back into Gaul had not his departure looked
like flight. No chance whatever would have been left to him of feeding
his army in that part of Italy if the succeeding consuls had persevered
in the same tactics. When the winter had brought the war to a standstill
at Gereonium, envoys from Neapolis arrived in Rome. They brought with them
into the Senate-house forty very heavy golden bowls, and addressed the
assembled senators in the following terms: "We know that the Roman treasury
is being drained by the war, and since this war is being carried on for
the towns and fields of the allies quite as much as for the head and stronghold
of Italy, the City of Rome and its empire, we Neapolitans have thought
it but right to assist the Roman people with the gold which has been left
by our ancestors for the enriching of our temples and for a reserve in
time of need. If we thought that our personal services would have been
of any use we would just as gladly have offered them. The senators and
people of Rome will confer a great pleasure upon us if they look upon everything
that belongs to the Neapolitans as their own, and deign to accept from
us a gift, the value and importance of which lie rather in the cordial
goodwill of those who gladly give it than in any intrinsic worth which
it may itself possess." A vote of thanks was passed to the envoys for their
munificence and their care for the interests of Rome, and one bowl, the
smallest, was accepted.
22.33
About the same time a Carthaginian spy who for two years had escaped detection
was caught in Rome, and after both his hands were cut off, he was sent
away. Twenty-five slaves who had formed a conspiracy in the Campus Martius
were crucified; the informer had his liberty given to him and 20,000 bronze
ases. Ambassadors were sent to Philip, King of Macedon, to demand the surrender
of Demetrius of Pharos, who had taken refuge with him after his defeat,
and another embassy was despatched to the Ligurians to make a formal complaint
as to the assistance they had given the Carthaginian in men and money,
and at the same time to get a nearer view of what was going on amongst
the Boii and the Insubres. Officials were also sent to Pineus, King of
Illyria, to demand payment of the tribute which was now in arrears, or,
if he wished for an extension of time, to accept personal securities for
its payment. So, though they had an immense war on their shoulders, nothing
escaped the attention of the Romans in any part of the world, however distant.
A religious difficulty arose about an unfulfilled vow. On the occasion
of the mutiny amongst the troops in Gaul two years before, the praetor,
L. Manlius, had vowed a temple to Concord, but up to that time no contract
had been made for its construction. Two commissioners were appointed for
the purpose by M. Aemilius, the City praetor, namely, C. Pupius and Caeso
Quinctius Flamininus, and they entered into a contract for the building
of the temple within the precinct of the citadel. The senate passed a resolution
that Aemilius should also write to the consuls asking one of them, if they
approved, to come to Rome to hold the consular elections, and he would
give notice of the elections for whatever day they fixed upon. The consuls
replied that they could not leave the army in the presence of the enemy
without danger to the republic, it would be therefore better for the elections
to be held by an interrex than that a consul should be recalled from the
front. The senate thought it better for a Dictator to be nominated by the
consul for the purpose of holding the elections. L. Veturius Philo was
nominated; he appointed Manlius Pomponius Matho his Master of the Horse.
Their election was found to be invalid, and they were ordered to resign
office after holding it for four days; matters reverted to an interregnum.
22.34
(216 B.C.)Servilius and Regulus had their commands extended for another
year. The interreges appointed by the senate were C. Claudius Cento, son
of Appius, and P. Cornelius Asina. The latter conducted the elections amidst
a bitter struggle between the patricians and the plebs. C. Terentius Varro,
a member of their own order, had ingratiated himself with the plebs by
his attacks upon the leading men in the State and by all the tricks known
to the demagogue. His success in shaking the influence of Fabius and weakening
the authority of the Dictator had invested him with a certain glory in
the eyes of the mob, which was heightened by the other's unpopularity,
and they did their utmost to raise him to the consulship. The patricians
opposed him with their utmost strength, dreading lest it should become
a common practice for men to attack them as a means of rising to an equality
with them. Q. Baebius Herennius, a relation of Varro's, accused not only
the senate, but even the augurs, because they had prevented the Dictator
from carrying the elections through, and by thus embittering public opinion
against them, he strengthened the feeling in favour of his own candidate.
"It was by the nobility," he declared, "who had for many years been trying
to get up a war, that Hannibal was brought into Italy, and when the war
might have been brought to a close, it was they who were unscrupulously
protracting it. The advantage which M. Minucius gained in the absence of
Fabius made it abundantly clear that with four legions combined, a successful
fight could be maintained, but afterwards two legions had been exposed
to slaughter at the hands of the enemy, and then rescued at the very last
moment in order that he might be called 'Father' and 'Patron' because he
would not allow the Romans to conquer before they had been defeated. Then
as to the consuls; though they had it in their power to finish the war
they had adopted Fabius' policy and protracted it. This is the secret understanding
that has been come to by all the nobles, and we shall never see the end
of the war till we have elected as our consul a man who is really a plebeian,
that is, one from the ranks. The plebeian nobility have all been initiated
into the same mysteries; when they are no longer looked down upon by the
patricians, they at once begin to look down upon the plebs. Who does not
see that their one aim and object was to bring about an interregnum in
order that the elections might be controlled by the patricians? That was
the object of the consuls in both staying with the army; then, afterwards,
because they had to nominate a Dictator against their will to conduct the
elections, they had carried their point by force, and the Dictator's appointment
was declared invalid by the augurs. Well, they have got their interregnum;
one consulship at all events belongs to the Roman plebs; the people will
freely dispose of it and give it to the man who prefers an early victory
to prolonged command."
22.35
Harangues like these kindled intense excitement amongst the plebs. There
were three patrician candidates in the field, P. Cornelius Merenda, L.
Manlius Vulso, and M. Aemilius Lepidus; two plebeians who were now ennobled,
C. Atilius Serranus and Q. Aelius Paetus, one of whom was a pontiff, the
other an augur. But the only one elected was C. Terentius Varro, so that
the elections for appointing his colleague were in his hands. The nobility
saw that his rivals were not strong enough, and they compelled L. Aemilius
Paulus to come forward. He had come off with a blasted reputation from
the trial in which his colleague had been found guilty, and he narrowly
escaped, and for a long time stoutly resisted the proposal to become a
candidate owing to his intense dislike of the plebs. On the next election
day, after all Varro's opponents had retired, he was given to him not so
much to be his colleague as to oppose him on equal terms. The elections
of praetors followed; those elected were Manlius Pomponius Matho and P.
Furius Philus. To Philus was assigned the jurisdiction over Roman citizens,
to Pomponius the decision of suits between citizens and foreigners. Two
additional praetors were appointed, M. Claudius Marcellus for Sicily, and
L. Postumius Albinus to act in Gaul. These were all elected in their absence,
and none of them, with the exception of Varro, were new to office. Several
strong and capable men were passed over, for at such a time it seemed undesirable
that a magistracy should be entrusted to new and untried men.
22.36
The armies were increased, but as to what additions were made to the infantry
and cavalry, the authorities vary so much, both as to the numbers and nature
of the forces, that I should hardly venture to assert anything as positively
certain. Some say that 10,000 recruits were called out to make up the losses;
others, that four new legions were enrolled so that they might carry on
the war with eight legions. Some authorities record that both horse and
foot in the legions were made stronger by the addition of 1000 infantry
and 100 cavalry to each, so that they contained 5000 infantry and 300 cavalry,
whilst the allies furnished double the number of cavalry and an equal number
of infantry. Thus, according to these writers, there were 87,200 men in
the Roman camp when the battle of Cannae was fought. One thing is quite
certain; the struggle was resumed with greater vigour and energy than in
former years, because the Dictator had given them reason to hope that the
enemy might be conquered. But before the newly raised legions left the
City the decemvirs were ordered to consult the Sacred Books owing to the
general alarm which had been created by fresh portents. It was reported
that showers of stones had fallen simultaneously on the Aventine in Rome
and at Aricia; that the statues of the gods amongst the Sabines had sweated
blood, and cold water had flowed from the hot springs. This latter portent
created more terror, because it had happened several times. In the colonnade
near the Campus several men had been killed by lightning. The proper expiation
of these portents was ascertained from the Sacred Books. Some envoys from
Paestum brought golden bowls to Rome. Thanks were voted to them as in the
case of the Neapolitans, but the gold was not accepted.
22.37
About the same time a fleet which had been despatched by Hiero arrived
at Ostia with a large quantity of supplies. When his officers were introduced
into the senate they spoke in the following terms: "The news of the death
of the consul C. Flaminius and the destruction of his army caused so much
distress and grief to King Hiero that he could not have been more deeply
moved
by any disaster which could happen either to himself personally or to his
kingdom. Although he well knows that the greatness of Rome is almost more
to be admired in adversity than in prosperity, still, notwithstanding that,
he has sent everything with which good and faithful allies can assist their
friends in time of war, and he earnestly intreats the senate not to reject
his offer. To begin with, we are bringing, as an omen of good fortune,
a golden statue of Victory, weighing two hundred and twenty pounds. We
ask you to accept it and keep it as your own for ever. We have also brought
300,000 pecks of wheat and 200,000 of barley that you may not want provisions,
and we are prepared to transport as much more as you require to any place
that you may decide upon. The king is quite aware that Rome does not employ
any legionary soldiers or cavalry except Romans and those belonging to
the Latin nation, but he has seen foreigners serving as light infantry
in the Roman camp. He has, accordingly, sent 1000 archers and slingers,
capable of acting against the Balearics and Moors and other tribes who
fight with missile weapons." They supplemented these gifts by suggesting
that the praetor to whom Sicily had been assigned should take the fleet
over to Africa so that the country of the enemy, too, might be visited
by war, and less facilities afforded him for sending reinforcements to
Hannibal. The senate requested the officers to take back the following
reply to the king: Hiero was a man of honour and an exemplary ally; he
had been consistently loyal all through, and had on every occasion rendered
most generous help to Rome, and for that Rome was duly grateful. The gold
which had been offered by one or two cities had not been accepted, though
the Roman people were very grateful for the offer. They would, however,
accept the statue of Victory as an omen for the future, and would give
and consecrate a place for her in the Capitol in the temple of Jupiter
Optimus Maximus. Enshrined in that stronghold she will be gracious and
propitious, constant and steadfast to Rome. The archers and slingers and
the corn were handed over to the consuls. The fleet which T. Otacilius
had with him in Sicily was strengthened by the addition of twenty-five
quinqueremes, and permission was given him to cross over to Africa if he
thought it would be in the interest of the republic.
22.38
After completing the enrolment the consuls waited a few days for the contingents
furnished by the Latins and the allies to come in. Then a new departure
was made; the soldiers were sworn in by the military tribunes. Up to that
day there had only been the military oath binding the men to assemble at
the bidding of the consuls and not to disband until they received orders
to do so. It had also been the custom among the soldiers, when the infantry
were formed into companies of 100, and the cavalry into troops of 10, for
all the men in each company or troop to take a voluntary oath to each other
that they would not leave their comrades for fear or for flight, and that
they would not quit the ranks save to fetch or pick up a weapon, to strike
an enemy, or to save a comrade. This voluntary covenant was now changed
into a formal oath taken before the tribunes. Before they marched out of
the City, Varro delivered several violent harangues, in which he declared
that the war had been brought into Italy by the nobles, and would continue
to feed on the vitals of the republic if there were more generals like
Fabius; he, Varro, would finish off the war the very day he caught sight
of the enemy. His colleague, Paulus, made only one speech, in which there
was much more truth than the people cared to hear. He passed no strictures
on Varro, but he did express surprise that any general, whilst still in
the City before he had taken up his command, or become acquainted with
either his own army or that of the enemy, or gained any information as
to the lie of the country and the nature of the ground, should know in
what way he should conduct the campaign and be able to foretell the day
on which he would fight a decisive battle with the enemy. As for himself,
Paulus said that he would not anticipate events by disclosing his measures,
for, after all, circumstances determined measures for men much more than
men made circumstances subservient to measures. He hoped and prayed that
such measures as were taken with due caution and foresight might turn out
successful; so far rashness, besides being foolish, had proved disastrous.
He made it quite clear that he would prefer safe to hasty counsels, and
in order to strengthen him in this resolve Fabius is said to have addressed
him on his departure in the following terms:
22.39
" L. Aemilius, if you were like your colleague or, if you had a colleague
like yourself-and I would that it were so-my address would be simply a
waste of words. For if you were both good consuls, you would, without any
suggestions from me, do everything that the interests of the State or your
own sense of honour demanded; if you were both alike bad, you would neither
listen to anything I had to say, nor take any advice which I might offer.
As it is, when I look at your colleague and consider what sort of a man
you are, I shall address my remarks to you. I can see that your merits
as a man and a citizen will effect nothing if one half of the commonwealth
is crippled and evil counsels possess the same force and authority as good
ones. You are mistaken, L. Paulus, if you imagine that you will have less
difficulty with C. Terentius than with Hannibal; I rather think the former
will prove a more dangerous enemy than the latter. With the one you will
only have to contend in the field, the opposition of the other you will
have to meet everywhere and always. Against Hannibal and his legions you
will have your cavalry and infantry, when Varro is in command he will use
your own men against you. I do not want to bring ill luck on you by mentioning
the ill-starred Flaminius, but this I must say that it was only after he
was consul and had entered upon his province and taken up his command that
he began to play the madman, but this man was insane before he stood for
the consulship and afterwards while canvassing for it, and now that he
is consul, before he has seen the camp or the enemy he is madder than ever.
If he raises such storms amongst peaceful civilians as he did just now
by bragging about battles and battlefields, what will he do, think you,
when he is talking to armed men-and those young men-where words at once
lead to action. And yet if he carries out his threat and brings on an action
at once, either I am utterly ignorant of military science, of the nature
of this war, of the enemy with whom we are dealing, or else some place
or other will be rendered more notorious by our defeat than even Trasumennus.
As we are alone, this is hardly a time for boasting, and I would rather
be thought to have gone too far in despising glory than in seeking it,
but as a matter of fact, the only rational method of carrying on war against
Hannibal is the one which I have followed. This is not only taught us by
experience-experience the teacher of fools-but by reasoning which has been
and will continue to be unchanged as long as the conditions remain the
same. We are carrying on war in Italy, in our own country on our own soil,
everywhere round us are citizens and allies, they are helping us with men,
horses, supplies, and they will continue to do so, for they have proved
their loyalty thus far to us in our adversity; and time and circumstance
are making us more efficient, more circumspect, more self-reliant. Hannibal,
on the other hand, is in a foreign and hostile land, far from his home
and country, confronted everywhere by opposition and danger; nowhere by
land or sea can he find peace; no cities admit him within their gates,
no fortified towns; nowhere does he see anything which he can call his
own, he has to live on each day's pillage: he has hardly a third of the
army with which he crossed the Ebro; he has lost more by famine than by
the sword, and even the few he has cannot get enough to support life. Do
you doubt then, that if we sit still we shall get the better of a man who
is growing weaker day by day, who has neither supplies nor reinforcements
nor money? How long has he been sitting before the walls of Gereonium,
a poor fortress in Apulia, as though they were the walls of Carthage? But
I will not sound my own praises even before you. See how the late consuls,
Cn. Servilius and Atilius, fooled him. This, L. Paulus, is the only safe
course to adopt, and it is one which your fellow citizens will do more
to make difficult and dangerous for you than the enemy will. For your own
soldiers will want the same thing as the enemy; Varro though he is a Roman
consul will desire just what Hannibal the Carthaginian commander desires.
You must hold your own single-handed against both generals. And you will
hold your own if you stand your ground firmly against public gossip and
private slander, if you remain unmoved by false misrepresentations and
your colleague's idle boasting. It is said that truth is far too often
eclipsed but never totally extinguished. The man who scorns false glory
will possess the true. Let them call you a coward because you are cautious,
a laggard because you are deliberate, unsoldierly because you are a skilful
general. I would rather have you give a clever enemy cause for fear than
earn the praise of foolish compatriots. Hannibal will only feel contempt
for a man who runs all risks, he will be afraid of one who never takes
a rash step. I do not advise you to do nothing, but I do advise you to
be guided in what you do by common sense and reason and not by chance.
Never lose control of your forces and yourself; be always prepared, always
on the alert; never fail to seize an opportunity favourable to yourself,
and never give a favourable opportunity to the enemy. The man who is not
in a hurry will always see his way clearly; haste blunders on blindly."
22.40
The consul's reply was far from being a cheerful one, for he admitted that
the advice given was true, but not easy to put into practice. If a Dictator
had found his Master of the Horse unbearable, what power or authority would
a consul have against a violent and headstrong colleague? "In my first
consulship," he said, "I escaped, badly singed, from the fire of popular
fury. I hope and pray that all may end successfully, but if any mischance
befalls us I shall expose myself to the weapons of the enemy sooner than
to the verdict of the enraged citizens." With these words Paulus, it is
said, set forward, escorted by the foremost men amongst the patricians;
the plebeian consul was attended by his plebeian friends, more conspicuous
for their numbers than for the quality of the men who composed the crowd.
When they came into camp the recruits and the old soldiers were formed
into one army, and two separate camps were formed, the new camp, which
was the smaller one, being nearer to Hannibal, while in the old camp the
larger part of the army and the best troops were stationed. M. Atilius,
one of the consuls of the previous year, pleaded his age and was sent back
to Rome; the other, Geminus Servilius, was placed in command of the smaller
camp with one Roman legion and 2000 horse and foot of the allies. Although
Hannibal saw that the army opposed to him was half as large again as it
had been he was hugely delighted at the advent of the consuls. For not
only was there nothing left out of his daily plunder, but there was nothing
left anywhere for him to seize, as all the corn, now that the country was
unsafe, had been everywhere stored in the cities. Hardly ten days' rations
of corn remained, as was afterwards discovered, and the Spaniards were
prepared to desert, owing to the shortness of supplies, if only the Romans
had waited till the time was ripe.
22.41
An incident occurred which still further encouraged Varro's impetuous and
headstrong temperament. Parties were sent to drive off the foragers; a
confused fight ensued owing to the soldiers rushing forward without any
preconcerted plan or orders from their commanders, and the contest went
heavily against the Carthaginians. As many as 1700 of them were killed,
the loss of the Romans and the allies did not amount to more than 100.
The consuls commanded on alternate days, and that day happened to be Paulus'
turn. He checked the victors who were pursuing the enemy in great disorder,
for he feared an ambuscade. Varro was furious, and loudly exclaimed that
the enemy had been allowed to slip out of their hands, and if the pursuit
had not been stopped the war could have been brought to a close. Hannibal
did not very much regret his losses, on the contrary he believed that they
would serve as a bait to the impetuosity of the consul and his newly-raised
troops, and that he would be more headstrong than ever. What was going
on in the enemy's camp was quite as well known to him as what was going
on in his own; he was fully aware that there were differences and quarrels
between the commanders, and that two-thirds of the army consisted of recruits.
The following night he selected what he considered a suitable position
for an ambuscade, and marched his men out of camp with nothing but their
arms, leaving all the property, both public and private, behind in the
camp. He then concealed the force behind the hills which enclosed the valley,
the infantry to the left and the cavalry to the right, and took the baggage
train through the middle of the valley, in the hope of surprising the Romans
whilst plundering the apparently deserted camp and hampered with their
plunder. Numerous fires were left burning in the camp in order to create
the impression that he wished to keep the consuls in their respective positions
until he had traversed a considerable distance in his retreat. Fabius had
been deceived by the same stratagem the previous year.
22.42
As it grew light the pickets were seen to have been withdrawn, then on
approaching nearer the unusual silence created surprise. When it was definitely
learnt that the camp was empty the men rushed in a body to the commanders'
quarters with the news that the enemy had fled in such haste that they
left the tents standing, and to secure greater secrecy for their flight
had also left numerous fires burning. Then a loud shout arose demanding
that the order should be given to advance, and that the men should be led
in pursuit, and that the camp should be plundered forthwith. The one consul
behaved as though he were one of the clamorous crowd; the other, Paulus,
repeatedly asserted the need of caution and circumspection. At last, unable
to deal with the mutinous crowd and its leader in any other way, he sent
Marius Statilius with his troop of Lucanian horse to reconnoitre. When
he had ridden up to the gates of the camp he ordered his men to halt outside
the lines, he himself with two of his troopers entered the camp and after
a careful and thorough examination he brought back word that there was
certainly a trick somewhere, the fires were left on the side of the camp
which fronted the Romans, the tents were standing open with all the valuables
exposed to view, in some parts he had seen silver lying about on the paths
as though it had been put there for plunder. So far from deterring the
soldiers from satisfying their greed, as it was intended to do, this report
only inflamed it, and a shout arose that if the signal was not given they
would go on without their generals. There was no lack of a general, however,
for Varro instantly gave the signal to advance. Paulus, who was hanging
back, received a report from the keeper of the sacred chickens that they
had not given a favourable omen, and he ordered the report to be at once
carried to his colleague as he was just marching out of the camp gates.
Varro was very much annoyed, but the recollection of the disaster which
overtook Flaminius and the naval defeat which the consul Claudius sustained
in the first Punic war made him afraid of acting in an irreligious spirit.
It seemed as though the gods themselves on that day delayed, if they did
actually do away, the fatal doom which was impending over the Romans. For
it so happened that whilst the soldiers were ignoring the consul's order
for the standards to be carried back into camp, two slaves, one belonging
to a trooper from Formiae, the other to one from Sidicinum, who had been
captured with the foraging parties when Servilius and Atilius were in command,
had that day escaped to their former masters. They were taken before the
consul and told him that the whole of Hannibal's army was lying behind
the nearest hills. The opportune arrival of these men restored the authority
of the consuls, though one of them in his desire to be popular had weakened
his authority by his unscrupulous connivance at breaches of discipline.
22.43
When Hannibal saw that the ill-considered movement which the Romans had
commenced was not recklessly carried out to its final stage, and that his
ruse had been detected, he returned to camp. Owing to the want of corn
he was unable to remain there many days, and fresh plans were continually
cropping up, not only amongst the soldiers, who were a medley of all nations,
but even in the mind of the general himself. Murmurs gradually swelled
into loud and angry protests as the men demanded their arrears of pay,
and complained of the starvation which they were enduring, and in addition,
a rumour was started that the mercenaries, chiefly those of Spanish nationality,
had formed a plot to desert. Even Hannibal himself, it is said, sometimes
thought of leaving his infantry behind and hurrying with his cavalry into
Gaul. With these plans being discussed and this temper prevailing amongst
the men, he decided to move into the warmer parts of Apulia, where the
harvest was earlier and where, owing to the greater distance from the enemy,
desertion would be rendered more difficult for the fickle-minded part of
his force. As on the previous occasion, he ordered camp-fires to be lighted,
and a few tents left where they could be easily seen, in order that the
Romans, remembering a similar stratagem, might be afraid to move. However,
Statilius was again sent to reconnoitre with his Lucanians, and he made
a thorough examination of the country beyond the camp and over the mountains.
He reported that he had caught a distant view of the enemy in line of march,
and the question of pursuit was discussed. As usual, the views of the two
consuls were opposed, but almost all present supported Varro, not a single
voice was given in favour of Paulus, except that of Servilius, consul in
the preceding year. The opinion of the majority of the council prevailed,
and so, driven by destiny, they went forward to render Cannae famous in
the annals of Roman defeats. It was in the neighbourhood of this village
that Hannibal had fixed his camp with his back to the Sirocco which blows
from Mount Vultur and fills the arid plains with clouds of dust. This arrangement
was a very convenient one for his camp, and it proved to be extremely advantageous
afterwards, when he was forming his order of battle, for his own men, with
the wind behind them, blowing only on their backs, would fight with an
enemy who was blinded by volumes of dust.
22.44
The consuls followed the Carthaginians, carefully examining the roads as
they marched, and when they reached Cannae and had the enemy in view they
formed two entrenched camps separated by the same interval as at Gereonium,
and with the same distribution of troops in each camp. The river Aufidus,
flowing past the two camps, furnished a supply of water which the soldiers
got as they best could, and they generally had to fight for it. The men
in the smaller camp, which was on the other side of the river, had less
difficulty in obtaining it, as that bank was not held by the enemy. Hannibal
now saw his hopes fulfilled, that the consuls would give him an opportunity
of fighting on ground naturally adapted for the movements of cavalry, the
arm in which he had so far been invincible, and accordingly he placed his
army in order of battle, and tried to provoke his foe to action by repeated
charges of his Numidians. The Roman camp was again disturbed by a mutinous
soldiery and consuls at variance, Paulus bringing up against Varro the
fatal rashness of Sempronius and Flaminius, Varro retorting by pointing
to Fabius as the favourite model of cowardly and inert commanders, and
calling gods and men to witness that it was through no fault of his that
Hannibal had acquired, so to speak, a prescriptive right to Italy; he had
had his hands tied by his colleague; his soldiers, furious and eager for
fight, had had their swords and arms taken away from them. Paulus, on the
other hand, declared that if anything happened to the legions flung recklessly
and betrayed into an ill-considered and imprudent action, he was free from
all responsibility for it, though he would have to share in all the consequences.
"See to it," he said to Varro, "that those who are so free and ready with
their tongues are equally so with their hands in the day of battle."
22.45
Whilst time was thus being wasted in disputes instead of deliberation,
Hannibal withdrew the bulk of his army, who had been standing most of the
day in order of battle, into camp. He sent his Numidians, however, across
the river to attack the parties who were getting water for the smaller
camp. They had hardly gained the opposite bank when with their shouting
and uproar they sent the crowd flying in wild disorder, and galloping on
as far as the outpost in front of the rampart, they nearly reached the
gates of the camp. It was looked upon as such an insult for a Roman camp
to be actually terrorised by irregular auxiliaries that one thing, and
one thing alone, held back the Romans from instantly crossing the river
and forming their battle line-the supreme command that day rested with
Paulus. The following day Varro, whose turn it now was, without any consultation
with his colleague, exhibited the signal for battle and led his forces
drawn up for action across the river. Paulus followed, for though he disapproved
of the measure, he was bound to support it. After crossing, they strengthened
their line with the force in the smaller camp and completed their formation.
On the right, which was nearest to the river, the Roman cavalry were posted,
then came the infantry; on the extreme left were the cavalry of the allies,
their infantry were between them and the Roman legions. The javelin men
with the rest of the light-armed auxiliaries formed the front line. The
consuls took their stations on the wings, Terentius Varro on the left,
Aemilius Paulus on the right.
22.46
As soon as it grew light Hannibal sent forward the Balearics and the other
light infantry. He then crossed the river in person and as each division
was brought across he assigned it its place in the line. The Gaulish and
Spanish horse he posted near the bank on the left wing in front of the
Roman cavalry; the right wing was assigned to the Numidian troopers. The
centre consisted of a strong force of infantry, the Gauls and Spaniards
in the middle, the Africans at either end of them. You might fancy that
the Africans were for the most part a body of Romans from the way they
were armed, they were so completely equipped with the arms, some of which
they had taken at the Trebia, but the most part at Trasumennus. The Gauls
and Spaniards had shields almost of the same shape their swords were totally
different, those of the Gauls being very long and without a point, the
Spaniard, accustomed to thrust more than to cut, had a short handy sword,
pointed like a dagger. These nations, more than any other, inspired terror
by the vastness of their stature and their frightful appearance: the Gauls
were naked above the waist, the Spaniards had taken up their position wearing
white tunics embroidered with purple, of dazzling brilliancy. The total
number of infantry in the field was 40,000, and there were 10,000 cavalry.
Hasdrubal was in command of the left wing, Maharbal of the right; Hannibal
himself with his brother Mago commanded the centre. It was a great convenience
to both armies that the sun shone obliquely on them, whether it was that
they had purposely so placed themselves, or whether it happened by accident,
since the Romans faced the north, the Carthaginans the South. The wind,
called by the inhabitants the Vulturnus, was against the Romans, and blew
great clouds of dust into their faces, making it impossible for them to
see in front of them.
22.47
When the battle shout was raised the auxiliaries ran forward, and the battle
began with the light infantry. Then the Gauls and Spaniards on the left
engaged the Roman cavalry on the right; the battle was not at all like
a cavalry fight, for there was no room for maneuvering, the river on the
one side and the infantry on the other hemming them in, compelled them
to fight face to face. Each side tried to force their way straight forward,
till at last the horses were standing in a closely pressed mass, and the
riders seized their opponents and tried to drag them from their horses.
It had become mainly a struggle of infantry, fierce but short, and the
Roman cavalry was repulsed and fled. Just as this battle of the cavalry
was finished, the infantry became engaged, and as long as the Gauls and
Spaniards kept their ranks unbroken, both sides were equally matched in
strength and courage. At length after long and repeated efforts the Romans
closed up their ranks, echeloned their front, and by the sheer weight of
their deep column bore down the division of the enemy which was stationed
in front of Hannibal's line, and was too thin and weak to resist the pressure.
Without a moment's pause they followed up their broken and hastily retreating
foe till they took to headlong flight. Cutting their way through the mass
of fugitives, who offered no resistance, they penetrated as far as the
Africans who were stationed on both wings, somewhat further back than the
Gauls and Spaniards who had formed the advanced centre. As the latter fell
back the whole front became level, and as they continued to give ground
it became concave and crescent-shaped, the Africans at either end forming
the horns. As the Romans rushed on incautiously between them, they were
enfiladed by the two wings, which extended and closed round them in the
rear. On this, the Romans, who had fought one battle to no purpose, left
the Gauls and Spaniards, whose rear they had been slaughtering, and commenced
a fresh struggle with the Africans. The contest was a very one-sided one,
for not only were they hemmed in on all sides, but wearied with the previous
fighting they were meeting fresh and vigorous opponents.
22.48
By this time the Roman left wing, where the allied cavalry were fronting
the Numidians, had become engaged, but the fighting was slack at first
owing to a Carthaginian stratagem. About 500 Numidians, carrying, besides
their usual arms and missiles, swords concealed under their coats of mail,
rode out from their own line with their shields slung behind their backs
as though they were deserters, and suddenly leaped from their horses and
flung their shields and javelins at the feet of their enemy. They were
received into their ranks, conducted to the rear, and ordered to remain
quiet. While the battle was spreading to the various parts of the field
they remained quiet, but when the eyes and minds of all were wholly taken
up with the fighting they seized the large Roman shields which were lying
everywhere amongst the heaps of slain and commenced a furious attack upon
the rear of the Roman line. Slashing away at backs and hips, they made
a great slaughter and a still greater panic and confusion. Amidst the rout
and panic in one part of the field and the obstinate but hopeless struggle
in the other, Hasdrubal, who was in command of that arm, withdrew some
Numidians from the centre of the right wing, where the fighting was feebly
kept up, and sent them m pursuit of the fugitives, and at the same time
sent the Spanish and Gaulish horse to the aid of the Africans, who were
by this time more wearied by slaughter than by fighting.
22.49
Paulus was on the other side of the field. In spite of his having been
seriously wounded at the commencement of the action by a bullet from a
sling, he frequently encountered Hannibal with a compact body of troops,
and in several places restored the battle. The Roman cavalry formed a bodyguard
round him, but at last, as he became too weak to manage his horse, they
all dismounted. It is stated that when some one reported to Hannibal that
the consul had ordered his men to fight on foot, he remarked, "I would
rather he handed them over to me bound hand and foot.'' Now that the victory
of the enemy was no longer doubtful this struggle of the dismounted cavalry
was such as might be expected when men preferred to die where they stood
rather than flee, and the victors, furious at them for delaying the victory,
butchered without mercy those whom they could not dislodge. They did, however,
repulse a few survivors exhausted with their exertions and their wounds.
All were at last scattered, and those who could regained their horses for
flight. Cn. Lentulus, a military tribune, saw, as he rode by, the consul
covered with blood sitting on a boulder. "Lucius Aemilius," he said, "the
one man whom the gods must hold guiltless of this day's disaster, take
this horse while you have still some strength left, and I can lift you
into the saddle and keep by your side to protect you. Do not make this
day of battle still more fatal by a consul's death, there are enough tears
and mourning without that." The consul replied: "Long may you live to do
brave deeds, Cornelius, but do not waste in useless pity the few moments
left in which to escape from the hands of the enemy. Go, announce publicly
to the senate that they must fortify Rome and make its defence strong before
the victorious enemy approaches, and tell Q. Fabius privately that I have
ever remembered his precepts in life and in death. Suffer me to breathe
my last among my slaughtered soldiers, let me not have to defend myself
again when I am no longer consul, or appear as the accuser of my colleague
and protect my own innocence by throwing the guilt on another." During
this conversation a crowd of fugitives came suddenly upon them, followed
by the enemy, who, not knowing who the consul was, overwhelmed him with
a shower of missiles. Lentulus escaped on horseback in the rush. Then there
was flight in all directions; 7000 men escaped to the smaller camp, 10,000
to the larger, and about 2000 to the village of Cannae. These latter were
at once surrounded by Carthalo and his cavalry, as the village was quite
unfortified. The other consul, who either by accident or design had not
joined any of these bodies of fugitives, escaped with about fifty cavalry
to Venusia; 45,500 infantry, 2700 cavalry-almost an equal proportion of
Romans and allies-are said to have been killed. Amongst the number were
both the quaestors attached to the consuls, L. Atilius and L. Furius Bibulcus,
twenty-nine military tribunes, several ex-consuls, ex-praetors, and ex-aediles
(amongst them are included Cn. Servilius Geminus and M. Minucius, who was
Master of the Horse the previous year and, some years before that, consul),
and in addition to these, eighty men who had either been senators or filled
offices qualifying them for election to the senate and who had volunteered
for service with the legions. The prisoners taken in the battle are stated
to have amounted to 3000 infantry and 1500 cavalry.
22.50
Such was the battle of Cannae, a battle as famous as the disastrous one
at the Allia; not so serious in its results, owing to the inaction of the
enemy, but more serious and more horrible in view of the slaughter of the
army. For the flight at the Allia saved the army though it lost the City,
whereas at Cannae hardly fifty men shared the consul's flight, nearly the
whole army met their death in company with the other consul. As those who
had taken refuge in the two camps were only a defenceless crowd without
any leaders, the men in the larger camp sent a message to the others asking
them to cross over to them at night when the enemy, tired after the battle
and the feasting in honour of their victory, would be buried in sleep.
Then they would go in one body to Canusium. Some rejected the proposal
with scorn. "Why," they asked, "cannot those who sent the message come
themselves, since they are quite as able to join us as we to join them?
Because, of course, all the country between us is scoured by the enemy
and they prefer to expose other people to that deadly peril rather than
themselves." Others did not disapprove of the proposal, but they lacked
courage to carry it out. P. Sempronius Tuditanus protested against this
cowardice. "Would you," he asked, "rather be taken prisoners by a most
avaricious and ruthless foe and a price put upon your heads and your value
assessed after you have been asked whether you are a Roman citizen or a
Latin ally, in order that another may win honour from your misery and disgrace?
Certainly not, if you are really the fellow-countrymen of L. Aemilius,
who chose a noble death rather than a life of degradation, and of all the
brave men who are lying in heaps around him. But, before daylight overtakes
us and the enemy gathers in larger force to bar our path, let us cut our
way through the men who in disorder and confusion are clamouring at our
gates. Good swords and brave hearts make a way through enemies, however
densely they are massed. If you march shoulder to shoulder you will scatter
this loose and disorganised force as easily as if nothing opposed you.
Come then with me, all you who want to preserve yourselves and the State."
With these words he drew his sword, and with his men in close formation
marched through the very midst of the enemy. When the Numidians hurled
their javelins on the right, the unprotected side, they transferred their
shields to their right arms, and so got clear away to the larger camp As
many as 600 escaped on this occasion, and after another large body had
joined them they at once left the camp and came through safely to Canusium.
This action on the part of defeated men was due to the impulse of natural
courage or of accident rather than to any concerted plan of their own or
any one's generalship.
22.51
Hannibal's officers all surrounded him and congratulated him on his victory,
and urged that after such a magnificent success he should allow himself
and his exhausted men to rest for the remainder of the day and the following
night. Maharbal, however, the commandant of the cavalry, thought that they
ought not to lose a moment. "That you may know," he said to Hannibal, "what
has been gained by this battle I prophesy that in five days you will be
feasting as victor in the Capitol. Follow me; I will go in advance with
the cavalry; they will know that you are come before they know that you
are coming." To Hannibal the victory seemed too great and too joyous for
him to realise all at once. He told Maharbal that he commended his zeal,
but he needed time to think out his plans. Maharbal replied: "The gods
have not given all their gifts to one man. You know how to win victory,
Hannibal, you do not how to use it." That day's delay is believed to have
saved the City and the empire. The next day, as soon as it grew light,
they set about gathering the spoils on the field and viewing the carnage,
which was a ghastly sight even for an enemy. There all those thousands
of Romans were lying, infantry and cavalry indiscriminately as chance had
brought them together in the battle or the flight. Some covered with blood
raised themselves from amongst the dead around them, tortured by their
wounds which were nipped by the cold of the morning, and were promptly
put an end to by the enemy. Some they found lying with their thighs and
knees gashed but still alive; these bared their throats and necks and bade
them drain what blood they still had left. Some were discovered with their
heads buried in the earth, they had evidently suffocated themselves by
making holes in the ground and heaping the soil over their faces. What
attracted the attention of all was a Numidian who was dragged alive from
under a dead Roman lying across him; his ears and nose were torn, for the
Roman with hands too powerless to grasp his weapon had, in his mad rage,
torn his enemy with his teeth, and while doing so expired.
22.52
After most of the day had been spent in collecting the spoils, Hannibal
led his men to the attack on the smaller camp and commenced operations
by throwing up a breastwork to cut off their water supply from the river.
As, however, all the defenders were exhausted by toil and want of sleep,
as well as by wounds, the surrender was effected sooner than he had anticipated.
They agreed to give up their arms and horses, and to pay for each Roman
three hundred "chariot pieces," for each ally two hundred, and for each
officer's servant one hundred, on condition that after the money was paid
they should be allowed to depart with one garment apiece. Then they admitted
the enemy into the camp and were all placed under guard, the Romans and
the allies separately. Whilst time was being spent there, all those in
the larger camp, who had sufficient strength and courage, to the number
of 4000 infantry and 200 cavalry, made their escape to Canusium, some in
a body, others straggling through the fields, which was quite as safe a
thing to do. Those who were wounded and those who had been afraid to venture
surrendered the camp on the same terms as had been agreed upon in the other
camp. An immense amount of booty was secured, and the whole of it was made
over to the troops with the exception of the horses and prisoners and whatever
silver there might be. Most of this was on the trappings of the horses,
for they used very little silver plate at table, at all events when on
a campaign. Hannibal then ordered the bodies of his own soldiers to be
collected for burial; it is said that there were as many as 8000 of his
best troops. Some authors state that he also had a search made for the
body of the Roman consul, which he buried. Those who had escaped to Canusium
were simply allowed shelter within its walls and houses, but a high-born
and wealthy Apulian lady, named Busa, assisted them with corn and clothes
and even provisions for their journey. For this munificence the senate,
at the close of the war, voted her public honours
22.53
Although there were four military tribunes on the spot-Fabius Maximus of
the first legion, whose father had been lately Dictator, L. Publicius Bibulus
and Publius Cornelius Scipio of the second legion, and Appius Claudius
Pulcher of the third legion, who had just been aedile-the supreme command
was by universal consent vested in P. Scipio, who was quite a youth, and
Appius Claudius. They were holding a small council to discuss the state
of affairs when P. Furius Philus, the son of an ex-consul, informed them
that it was useless for them to cherish ruined hopes; the republic was
despaired of and given over for lost; some young nobles with L. Caecilius
Metellus at their head were turning their eyes seaward with the intention
of abandoning Italy to its fate and transferring their services to some
king or other. This evil news, terrible as it was and coming fresh on the
top of all their other disasters, paralysed those who were present with
wonder and amazement. They thought that a council ought to be summoned
to deal with it, but young Scipio, the general destined to end this war,
said that it was no business for a council. In such an emergency as that
they must dare and act, not deliberate. "Let those," he cried, "who want
to save the republic take their arms at once and follow me. No camp is
more truly a hostile camp than one in which such treason is meditated."
He started off with a few followers to the house where Metellus was lodging,
and finding the young men about whom the report had been made gathered
there in council, he held his naked sword over the heads of the conspirators
and uttered these words: "I solemnly swear that I will not abandon the
Republic of Rome, nor will I suffer any other Roman citizen to do so; if
I knowingly break my oath, then do thou, O Jupiter Optimus Maximus, visit
me, my home, my family, and my estate with utter destruction. I require
you, L. Caecilius, and all who are here present, to take this oath. Whoever
will not swear let him know that this sword is drawn against him." They
were in as great a state of fear as though they saw the victorious Hannibal
amongst them, and all took the oath and surrendered themselves into Scipio's
custody.
22.54
Whilst these things were happening at Canusium, as many as 4500 infantry
and cavalry, who had been dispersed in flight over the country, succeeded
in reaching the consul at Venusia. The inhabitants received them with every
mark of kindness and distributed them all amongst their households to be
taken care of. They gave each of the troopers a toga and a tunic and twenty-five
"chariot pieces," and to each legionary ten pieces, and whatever arms they
required. All hospitality was shown them both by the government and by
private citizens, for the people of Venusia were determined not to be outdone
in kindness by a lady of Canusium. But the large number of men, which now
amounted to something like 10,000, made the burden imposed upon Busa much
heavier. For Appius and Scipio, on hearing that the consul was safe, at
once sent to him to inquire what amount of foot and horse he had with him,
and also whether he wanted the army to be taken to Venusia or to remain
at Canusium. Varro transferred his forces to Canusium, and now there was
something like a consular army; it seemed as though they would defend themselves
successfully behind their walls if not in the open field. The reports which
reached Rome left no room for hope that even these remnants of citizens
and allies were still surviving; it was asserted that the army with its
two consuls had been annihilated and the whole of the forces wiped out.
Never before, while the City itself was still safe, had there been such
excitement and panic within its walls. I shall not attempt to describe
it, nor will I weaken the reality by going into details. After the loss
of the consul and the army at Trasumennus the previous year, it was not
wound upon wound but multiplied disaster that was now announced. For according
to the reports two consular armies and two consuls were lost; there was
no longer any Roman camp, any general, any single soldier in existence;
Apulia, Samnium, almost the whole of Italy lay at Hannibal's feet. Certainly
there is no other nation that would not have succumbed beneath such a weight
of calamity. One might, of course, compare the naval defeat of the Carthaginians
at the Aegates, which broke their power to such an extent that they gave
up Sicily and Sardinia and submitted to the payment of tribute and a war
indemnity; or, again, the battle which they lost in Africa, in which Hannibal
himself was crushed. But there is no point of comparison between these
and Cannae, unless it be that they were borne with less fortitude.
22.55
P. Furius Philus and M. Pomponius, the praetors, called a meeting of the
senate to take measures for the defence of the City, for no doubt was felt
that after wiping out the armies the enemy would set about his one remaining
task and advance to attack Rome. In the presence of evils the extent of
which, great as they were, was still unknown, they were unable even to
form any definite plans, and the cries of wailing women deafened their
ears, for as the facts were not yet ascertained the living and the dead
were being indiscriminately bewailed in almost every house. Under these
circumstances Q. Fabius Maximus gave it as his opinion that swift horsemen
should be sent along the Appian and Latin roads to make inquiries of those
they met, for there would be sure to be fugitives scattered about the country,
and bring back tidings as to what had befallen the consuls and the armies,
and if the gods out of compassion for the empire had left any remnant of
the Roman nation, to find out where those forces were. And also they might
ascertain whither Hannibal had repaired after the battle, what plans he
was forming, what he was doing or likely to do. They must get some young
and active men to find out these things, and as there were hardly any magistrates
in the City, the senators must themselves take steps to calm the agitation
and alarm which prevailed. They must keep the matrons out of the public
streets and compel them to remain indoors; they must suppress the loud
laments for the dead and impose silence on the City; they must see that
all who brought tidings were taken to the praetors, and that the citizens
should, each in his own house, wait for any news which affected them personally.
Moreover, they must station guards at the gates to prevent any one from
leaving the City, and they must make it clear to every man that the only
safety he can hope for lies in the City and its walls. When the tumult
has once been hushed, then the senate must be again convened and measures
discussed for the defence of the City.
22.56
This proposal was unanimously carried without any discussion. After the
crowd was cleared out of the Forum by the magistrates and the senators
had gone in various directions to allay the agitation, a despatch at last
arrived from C. Terentius Varro. He wrote that L. Aemilius was killed and
his army cut to pieces; he himself was at Canusium collecting the wreckage
that remained from this awful disaster; there were as many as 10,000 soldiers,
irregular, unorganised; the Carthaginian was still at Cannae, bargaining
about the prisoners' ransom and the rest of the plunder in a spirit very
unlike that of a great and victorious general. The next thing was the publication
of the names of those killed, and the City was thrown into such universal
mourning that the annual celebration of the festival of Ceres was suspended,
because it is forbidden to those in mourning to take part in it, and there
was not a single matron who was not a mourner during those days. In order
that the same cause might not prevent other sacred observances from being
duly honoured, the period of mourning was limited by a senatorial decree
to thirty days. When the agitation was quieted and the senate resumed its
session, a fresh despatch was received, this time from Sicily. T. Otacilius,
the propraetor, announced that Hiero's kingdom was being devastated by
a Carthaginian fleet, and when he was preparing to render him the assistance
he asked for, he received news that another fully equipped fleet was riding
at anchor off the Aegates, and when they heard that he was occupied with
the defence of the Syracusan shore they would at once attack Lilybaeum
and the rest of the Roman province. If, therefore, the senate wished to
retain the king as their ally and keep their hold on Sicily, they must
fit out a fleet.
22.57
When the despatches from the consul and the praetor had been read it was
decided that M. Claudius, who was commanding the fleet stationed at Ostia,
should be sent to the army at Canusium and instructions forwarded to the
consul requesting him to hand over his command to the praetor and come
to Rome as soon as he possibly could consistently with his duty to the
republic. For, over and above these serious disasters, considerable alarm
was created by portents which occurred. Two Vestal virgins, Opimia and
Floronia, were found guilty of unchastity. One was buried alive, as is
the custom, at the Colline Gate, the other committed suicide. L. Cantilius,
one of the pontifical secretaries, now called "minor pontiffs," who had
been guilty with Floronia, was scourged in the Comitium by the Pontifex
Maximus so severely that he died under it. This act of wickedness, coming
as it did amongst so many calamities, was, as often happens, regarded as
a portent, and the decemvirs were ordered to consult the Sacred Books.
Q. Fabius Pictor was sent to consult the oracle of Delphi as to what forms
of prayer and supplication they were to use to propitiate the gods, and
what was to be the end of all these terrible disasters. Meanwhile, in obedience
to the Books of Destiny, some strange and unusual sacrifices were made,
human sacrifices amongst them. A Gaulish man and a Gaulish woman and a
Greek man and a Greek woman were buried alive under the Forum Boarium.
They were lowered into a stone vault, which had on a previous occasion
also been polluted by human victims, a practice most repulsive to Roman
feelings.
When the gods were believed to be duly propitiated, M. Claudius Marcellus
sent from Ostia 1500 men who had been enrolled for service with the fleet
to garrison Rome; the naval legion (the third) he sent on in advance with
the military tribunes to Teanum Sidicinum, and then, handing the fleet
over to his colleague, P. Furius Philus, hastened on by forced marches
a few days later to Canusium. On the authority of the senate M. Junius
was nominated Dictator and Ti. Sempronius Master of the Horse. A levy was
ordered, and all from seventeen years upwards were enrolled, some even
younger; out of these recruits four legions were formed and 1000 cavalry.
They also sent to the Latin confederacy and the other allied states to
enlist soldiers according to the terms of their treaties. Armour, weapons,
and other things of the kind were ordered to be in readiness, and the ancient
spoils gathered from the enemy were taken down from the temples and colonnades.
The dearth of freemen necessitated a new kind of enlistment; 8000 sturdy
youths from amongst the slaves were armed at the public cost, after they
had each been asked whether they were willing to serve or no. These soldiers
were preferred, as there would be an opportunity of ransoming them when
taken prisoners at a lower price.
22.58
After his great success at Cannae, Hannibal made his arrangements more
as though his victory were a complete and decisive one than as if the war
were still going on. The prisoners were brought before him and separated
into two groups; the allies were treated as they had been at the Trebia
and at Trasumennus, after some kind words they were dismissed without ransom;
the Romans, too, were treated as they had never been before, for when they
appeared before him he addressed them in quite a friendly way. He had no
deadly feud, he told them, with Rome, all he was fighting for was his country's
honour as a sovereign power. His fathers had yielded to Roman courage,
his one object now was that the Romans should yield to his good fortune
and courage. He now gave the prisoners permission to ransom themselves;
each horseman at 500 "chariot pieces" and each foot-soldier at 300, and
the slaves at 100 per head. This was somewhat more than the cavalry had
agreed to when they surrendered, but they were only too glad to accept
any terms. It was settled that they should elect ten of their number to
go to the senate at Rome, and the only guarantee required was that they
should take an oath to return. They were accompanied by Carthalo, a Carthaginian
noble, who was to sound the feelings of the senators, and if they were
inclined towards peace he was to propose terms. When the delegates had
left the camp, one of them, a man of an utterly un-Roman temper, returned
to the camp, as if he had forgotten something, and in this way hoped to
free himself from his oath. He rejoined his comrades before nightfall.
When it was announced that the party were on their way to Rome a lictor
was despatched to meet Carthalo and order him in the name of the Dictator
to quit the territory of Rome before night.
22.59
The Dictator admitted the prisoners' delegates to an audience of the senate.
Their leader, M. Junius, spoke as follows: "Senators: we are every one
of us aware that no State has held its prisoners of war of less account
than our own, but, unless we think our case a better one than we have any
right to do, we would urge that none have ever fallen into the hands of
the enemy who were more deserving of consideration than we are. For we
did not give up our arms during the battle from sheer cowardice; standing
on the heaps of the slain we kept up the struggle till close on night,
and only then did we retire into camp; for the remainder of the day and
all through the night we defended our entrenchments; the following day
we were surrounded by the victorious army and cut off from the water, and
there was no hope whatever now of our forcing our way through the dense
masses of the enemy. We did not think it a crime for some of Rome's soldiers
to survive the battle of Cannae, seeing that 50,000 men had been butchered
there, and therefore in the very last resort we consented to have a price
fixed for our ransom and surrendered to the enemy those arms which were
no longer of the slightest use to us. Besides, we had heard that our ancestors
had ransomed themselves from the Gauls with gold, and that your fathers,
sternly as they set themselves against all conditions of peace, did nevertheless
send delegates to Tarentum to arrange the ransom of the prisoners. But
neither the battle at the Alia against the Gauls nor that at Heraclea against
Pyrrhus was disgraced by the actual losses sustained so much as by the
panic and flight which marked them. The plains of Cannae are covered by
heaps of Roman dead, and we should not be here now if the enemy had not
lacked arms and strength to slay us. There are some amongst us who were
never in the battle at all, but were left to guard the camp, and when it
was surrendered they fell into the hands of the enemy. I do not envy the
fortune or the circumstances of any man, whether he be a fellow-citizen
or a fellow-soldier, nor would I wish it to be said that I had glorified
myself by depreciating others, but this I will say, not even those who
fled from the battle, mostly without arms, and did not stay their flight
till they had reached Venusia or Canusium, can claim precedence over us
or boast that they are more of a defence to the State than we are. But
you will find both in them and in us good and gallant soldiers, only we
shall be still more eager to serve our country because it will be through
your kindness that we shall have been ransomed and restored to our fatherland.
You have enlisted men of all ages and of every condition; I hear that eight
thousand slaves are armed. Our number is no less, and it will not cost
more to ransom us than it did to purchase them, but if I were to compare
ourselves as soldiers with them, I should be offering an insult to the
name of Roman. I should think, senators, that in deciding upon a matter
like this, you should also take into consideration, if you are disposed
to be too severe, to what sort of an enemy you are going to abandon us.
Is it to a Pyrrhus, who treated his prisoners as though they were his guests?
Is it not rather to a barbarian, and what is worse, a Carthaginian, of
whom it is difficult to judge whether he is more rapacious or more cruel?
Could you see the chains, the squalor, the disgusting appearance of your
fellow-citizens, the sight would, I am sure, move you no less than if,
on the other hand, you beheld your legions lying scattered over the plains
of Cannae. You can behold the anxiety and the tears of our kinsmen as they
stand in the vestibule of your House and await your reply. If they are
in such anxiety and suspense about us and about those who are not here,
what, think you, must be the feelings of the men themselves whose life
and liberty are at stake? Why, good heavens! even if Hannibal, contrary
to his nature, chose to be kind to us, we should still think life not worth
living after you had decided that we did not deserve to be ransomed. Years
ago the prisoners who were released by Pyrrhus without ransom returned
to Rome, but they returned in company with the foremost men of the State
who had been sent to effect their ransom. Am I to return to my native country
as a citizen not thought worth three hundred coins ? Each of us has his
own feelings, senators. I know that my life and person are at stake, but
I dread more the peril to my good name, in case we depart condemned and
repulsed by you; for men will never believe that you grudged the cost."
22.60
No sooner had he finished than a tearful cry arose from the crowd in the
comitium; they stretched their hands towards the Senate-house and implored
the senators to give them back their children, their brothers, and their
relations. Fear and affection had brought even women amongst the crowd
of men who thronged the Forum. After the strangers had withdrawn the debate
commenced in the senate. There was great difference of opinion; some said
that they ought to be ransomed at the expense of the State, others were
of opinion that no public expense ought to be incurred, but they ought
not to be prevented from defraying the cost from private sources, and in
cases where ready money was not available it should be advanced from the
treasury on personal security and mortgages. When it came to the turn of
T. Manlius Torquatus, a man of old-fashioned and, some thought, excessive
strictness, to give his opinion, he is said to have spoken in these terms:
"If the delegates had confined themselves to asking that those who are
in the hands of the enemy might be ransomed, I should have stated my opinion
in few words without casting reflections on any of them, for all that would
have been necessary would be to remind you that you should maintain the
custom and usage handed down from our forefathers by setting an example
necessary for military discipline. But as it is, since they have almost
treated their surrender to the enemy as a thing to be proud of, and think
it right that they should receive more consideration than the prisoners
taken in the field or those who reached Venusia and Canusium, or even the
consul himself, I will not allow you to remain in ignorance of what actually
happened. I only wish that the facts which I am about to allege could be
brought before the army at Canusium, which is best able to testify to each
man's courage or cowardice, or at least that we had before us P. Sempronius
Tuditanus, for if these men had followed him they would at this moment
be in the Roman camp, not prisoners in the hands of the foe.
"The enemy had nearly all returned to their camp, tired out with fighting,
to make merry over their victory, and these men had the night clear for
a sortie. Seven thousand men could easily have made a sortie, even through
dense masses of the enemy, but they did not make any attempt to do so on
their own initiative, nor would they follow any one else. Nearly the whole
night through P. Sempronius Tuditanus was continually warning them and
urging them to follow him, whilst only a few of the enemy were watching
their camp, whilst all was quiet and silent, whilst the night could still
conceal their movements; before it was light they could reach safety and
be protected by the cities of our allies. If he had spoken as that military
tribune P. Decius spoke in the days of our fathers, or as Calpurnius Flamma,
in the first Punic war, when we were young men, spoke to his three hundred
volunteers whom he was leading to the capture of a height situated in the
very centre of the enemy's position: 'Let us,' he exclaimed, 'die, my men,
and by our death rescue our blockaded legions from their peril'-if, I say,
P.
Sempronius had spoken thus, I should not regard you as men, much less as
Romans, if none had come forward as the comrade of so brave a man. But
the way he pointed out to you led to safety quite as much as to glory,
he would have brought you back to your country, your parents, your wives,
and your children. You have not courage enough to save yourselves; what
would you do if you had to die for your country? All round you on that
day were lying fifty thousand dead, Romans and allies. If so many examples
of courage did not inspire you, nothing ever will. If such an awful disaster
did not make you hold your lives cheap, none will ever do so. It is whilst
you are free men, with all your rights as citizens, that you must show
your love for your country, or rather, while it is your country and you
are its citizens. Now you are showing that love too late, your rights forfeited,
your citizenship renounced, you have become the slaves of the Carthaginians.
Is money going to restore you to the position which you have lost through
cowardice and crime? You would not listen to your own countryman Sempronius
when he bade you seize your arms and follow him, you did listen shortly
afterwards to Hannibal when he bade you give up your arms and betray your
camp. But why do I only charge these men with cowardice when I can prove
them guilty of actual crime? For not only did they refuse to follow him
when he gave them good advice, but they tried to stop him and keep him
back, until a body of truly brave men drew their swords and drove back
the cowards. P. Sempronius had actually to force his way through his own
countrymen before he could do so through the enemy! Would our country care
to have such as these for her citizens when, had all those who fought at
Cannae been like them, she would not have had amongst them a single citizen
worth the name! Out of seven thousand men in arms there were six hundred
who had the courage to force their way, and returned to their country free
men with arms in their hands. The enemy did not stop these six hundred,
how safe the way would have been, do you not think? for a force of almost
two legions. You would have to-day, senators, at Canusium 20,000 brave
loyal soldiers; but as for these men, how can they possibly be good and
loyal citizens? And as to their being 'brave,' they do not even themselves
assert that-unless, indeed, some one chooses to imagine that whilst they
were trying to stop the others from making the sortie, they were really
encouraging them, or that, fully aware that their own timidity and cowardice
was the cause of their becoming slaves, they feel no grudge towards the
others for having won both safety and glory through their courage. Though
they might have got away in the dead of the night, they preferred to skulk
in their tents and wait for the daylight and with it the enemy. But you
will say, if they lacked courage to leave the camp they had courage enough
to defend it bravely; blockaded for several days and nights, they protected
the rampart with their arms, and themselves with the rampart; at last,
after going to the utmost lengths of endurance and daring, when every support
of life failed, and they were so weakened by starvation that they had not
strength to bear the weight of their arms, they were in the end conquered
by the necessities of nature more than by the force of arms. What are the
facts? At daybreak the enemy approached the rampart; within two hours,
without trying their fortune in any conflict, they gave up their arms and
themselves. This, you see, was their two days' soldiership. When duty called
them to keep their line and fight they fled to their camp, when they ought
to have fought at the rampart they surrendered their camp; they are useless
alike in the field and in the camp. Am I to ransom you? When you ought
to have made your way out of the camp you hesitated and remained there,
when it was obligatory for you to remain there and defend the camp with
your arms you gave up camp, arms, and yourselves to the enemy. No, senators,
I do not think that those men ought to be ransomed any more than I should
think it right to surrender to Hannibal the men who forced their way out
of the camp through the midst of the enemy and by that supreme act of courage
restored themselves to their fatherland."
22.61
Although most of the senators had relations among the prisoners, there
were two considerations which weighed with them at the close of Manlius'
speech. One was the practice of the State which from early times had shown
very little indulgence to prisoners of war. The other was the amount of
money that would be required, for they were anxious that the treasury should
not be exhausted, a large sum having been already paid out in purchasing
and arming the slaves, and they did not wish to enrich Hannibal who, according
to rumour, was in particular need of money. When the melancholy reply was
given that the prisoners were not ransomed, the prevailing grief was intensified
by the loss of so many citizens, and the delegates were accompanied to
the gates by a weeping and protesting crowd. One of them went to his home
because he considered himself released from his vow by his pretended return
to the camp. When this became known it was reported to the senate, and
they unanimously decided that he should be arrested and conveyed to Hannibal
under a guard furnished by the State. There is another account extant as
to the fate of the prisoners. According to this tradition ten came at first,
and there was a debate in the senate as to whether they should be allowed
within the City or not; they were admitted on the understanding that the
senate would not grant them an audience. As they stayed longer than was
generally expected, three other delegates arrived-L. Scribonius, C. Calpurnius,
and L. Manlius-and a relative of Scribonius who was a tribune of the plebs
made a motion in the senate to ransom the prisoners. The senate decided
that they should not be ransomed, and the three who came last returned
to Hannibal, but the ten remained in Rome. They alleged that they had absolved
themselves from their oath because after starting on their journey they
had returned to Hannibal under the pretext of reviewing the list of the
prisoners' names. The question of surrendering them was hotly debated in
the senate, and those in favour of this course were beaten by only a few
votes. Under the next censors, however, they were so crushed beneath every
mark of disgrace and infamy that some of them immediately committed suicide;
the others not only avoided the Forum for all their after life, but almost
shunned the light of day and the faces of men. It is easier to feel astonishment
at such discrepancies amongst our authorities than to determine what is
the truth.
How far that disaster surpassed previous ones is shown by one simple
fact. Up to that day the loyalty of our allies had remained unshaken, now
it began to waver, for no other reason, we may be certain, than that they
despaired of the maintenance of our empire. The tribes who revolted to
the Carthaginians were the Atellani, the Calatini, the Hirpini, a section
of the Apulians, all the Samnite cantons with the exception of the Pentri,
all the Bruttii and the Lucanians. In addition to these, the Uzentini and
almost the whole of the coast of Magna Graecia, the people of Tarentum
Crotona and Locri, as well as all Cisalpine Gaul. Yet, in spite of all
their disasters and the revolt of their allies, no one anywhere in Rome
mentioned the word "Peace," either before the consul's return or after
his arrival when all the memories of their losses were renewed. Such a
lofty spirit did the citizens exhibit in those days that though the consul
was coming back from a terrible defeat for which they knew he was mainly
responsible, he was met by a vast concourse drawn from every class of society,
and thanks were formally voted to him because he "had not despaired of
the republic." Had he been commander-in-chief of the Carthaginians there
was no torture to which he would not have been subjected.
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