15. THE "ROARING 20s"
AMERICA AND THE WORLD
CONTENTS
The League of Nations: Wilson's utopian project
America's approach to the larger world of global diplomacy
The court martial of General Billy Mitchell
European political developments lead the world in the opposite direction
The textual material on this webpage is drawn directly from my work
America – The Covenant Nation © 2021, Volume One, pages 496-504.
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: WILSON'S UTOPIAN PROJECT |
There had been a number of voluntary diplomatic
councils in Europe's recent history (the Congress of Vienna in the
early 1800s, the various Geneva Conventions on the rules of war during
the 1800s and early 1900s, an Inter-Parliamentary Union in the late
1800s) – but Wilson's dream of having the major countries of the world
joined in a permanent, on-going diplomatic union was quite a dramatic
development. Wilson's hope had been that the world was ready to enter
into a whole new era of diplomatic reason – in strong distinction to
the uncontrolled passions that had so recently driven much of the world
into the Great War. Wilson's hope was that nations would instead first
seek international understanding through negotiations, before letting
the heat of national hurt propel them to take up war against another
nation. It seemed like a very good idea – very sensible and logical.
But as things soon demonstrated it was a quite unrealistic dream.
The concept of collective security
It was hoped that reason would bring
national disputes to settlement. But failing that, it was assumed that
collective security would force war-prone nations to back down and
behave, thus preserving the international status quo or world order.
The supposition was that all nations loved world peace – and would by
instinct come together to gang up on a would-be violator of that peace.
That was the heart of the idea of collective security. But in fact, the
instincts of nations, the way they viewed the international status quo
or world order from their own particular point of view or national
interest, varied quite widely from country to country. As it turned out
there was nothing automatic about how collective security worked –
especially when one or another of the world's major powers was
involved. Nations always tended to decide on the basis of their own
sense of national sovereignty how they wanted to approach a particular
dispute.
By no means was there some single
rational point of view that all nations automatically came to hold when
faced with a dispute. Thus the idea did not work – except in a few
minor cases in the early years of the League when the national
interests of the members were not deeply affected by the dispute. But
as international politics headed into the 1930s things got very tense –
and the League not only was not able to resolve disputes that arose
during that period, in attempting to do so the League nearly always
drove one or another major power to resign from the League.1
The League of Nations was based in Geneva
(Switzerland) and consisted of a number of diplomatic organizations,
the most important of which were the League Assembly and the League
Council. The Assembly was made up of a voting representative of each of
the (50+) members. It could take up for consideration any issue it
chose – and Assembly decisions required only a simple majority for
passage of a League resolution. The League Council however was expected
to be more the enforcer of the peace and was a smaller body at first
with four permanent members (Britain, France, Italy and Japan); it had
been expected that America would be the fifth – but America never
joined the League. Eventually Germany was added to League membership
and became the fifth permanent member. Non-permanent members elected by
the Assembly were at first four in number and eventually expanded to
ten in number, each serving for a three-year term. Decisions of the
Council were understood to be weightier matters and thus a resolution
required the affirming vote of all the members (a unanimous decision)
unless one of the Council members was a party to a dispute – and then
that nation was not entitled to vote.
There was also a Permanent Court of
International Justice set up in The Hague (Netherlands) where cases
could be put before highly trained international judges as a way of
settling disputes. This recourse was used frequently during the 1920s.
But as international disputes took on a more warlike nature the PCIJ
was used less and less in the 1930s. (The PCIJ was nonetheless highly
respected and was one of the several League organizations that was
carried over as part of the new United Nations when it was set up in
1945).
There were also other organizations set
up as part of the League – bureaucracies that were supposed to tackle a
number of distinct problems in the area of labor, health, education,
women's rights, drug trade, slavery and other social conditions and
issues. This idea of government action undertaken by technical
specialists was in keeping with the rising spirit of Progressivism in
America and Socialism in Europe in the early 1900s.
1A
number of major powers party to disputes, in finding decisions going
against their national interests, simply resigned: Japan (1933),
Germany (1933), and Italy (1937). Soviet Russia was expelled by the
League in 1939 when it refused to call off its invasion of Finland.

The League's Palace of Nations – Geneva

The September 10, 1926
meeting of the
League of Nations on the occasion of Gemany's
entry into the
League. Foreign Minister
Gustav
Stresemann of Germany is addressing
the Assembly with his initial
speech.
AMERICA'S APPROACH TO THE LARGER WORLD OF GLOBAL DIPLOMACY |
American isolationism with respect to entangling alliances
America had refused to join Wilson's League of
Nations. Americans in general had come to feel that there had been a
huge betrayal at the end of the Great War by the Wilson government and
by their English and French allies. Both Wilson and America's allies
had failed to make good the promise of the spread of democracy to the
whole world – and thus of world peace (for why else indeed had
Americans gone to Europe to die?). Consequently, there was virtually an
immovable resolve of Americans never to get involved again in the
dangerous hypocrisies of another European conflict. This isolationist
sentiment with respect to the events in the European Old World seemed
unshakeable.
However … a participant in the world disarmament movement
Americans per se
were not opposed to peace itself – only to entangling alliances that
would compromise the freedom of the nation. This mood therefore did not
mean that America would not participate at all in the matter of
securing a peaceful world. In the post-war 1920s America in fact was
quite active in this regard.
The horrors of the Great War had been so
terrible that a widespread sentiment among many of the victor nations
was that henceforth – except for very dire defensive reasons – war was
virtually unthinkable. This encouraged the utopian reasoning of
European and American Idealists who sincerely believed that indeed the
Great War had ended up being the war to end all wars. Supposedly
peaceful reasoning had developed within world culture to the extent
that passionate militarism was a dead thing of the past. "International
understanding" was now the driving force within the new diplomacy.
Accompanying this general hope was the
widely-held view of the times, both in America and Europe, that the
greatest danger to the peace that the world craved so deeply was to be
found in the heavy militarization of the nations. "Take the weapons
away and the nations will be forced to act peacefully with each other."
Thus the word of the day was disarmament.
When Germany was forced to agree to a
huge cutback in its military as required by the Versailles Treaty, the
Germans were led to believe that this was not intended as punishment
but instead as the first step in a larger disarmament of all nations.
On that basis the German negotiators seemed to be accepting of the
disarmament terms imposed on them.
The Washington Naval Conference (1921–1922)
Seeking the same goal, America during the
winter of 1921–1922 hosted a great disarmament conference at its
capital. This conference was designed to set international standards
and limits on the size and functioning of the navies of the major
powers involved in the politics and diplomacy in East Asia and the
Pacific Ocean, and also other subjects designed to reduce the horrors
of war, such as the outlawing of the use of poison gas. Importantly the
conference was designed both to recognize the role of the Japanese navy
in this region while at the same time to set limits to just that role.
It also set out to prevent any kind of naval arms race from developing
among any of these powers, thus agreeing to limit the building of naval
vessels at a ratio of 5:5:3 for Britain, America and Japan, these
numbers reflecting the relative size of each nation’s maritime activity.
But beyond this naval accord, the powers
were not able or willing to go in reducing the size of their military
forces, France being especially nervous about reducing its military in
the face of a Germany that would surely one day rebuild. Subsequent
protests from the Germans that no serious moves were being made to
bring other countries in line with Germany's level of forced
disarmament ultimately fell on deaf ears.
Instead
another approach was made to the ideal of world peace. In 1925 Germany
was admitted to the League of Nations – recognizing it as a major power
with a permanent seat on the League Council.
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Europeans ascending the
steps
to the U.S. State, War and Navy building in 1921 to begin the Washington
Naval Conference – designed to set limits on naval fleets
National Archives
NA-111-SC-80612

Delegates of the nine nations
participating in the Washington
Naval Conference – 1921-1922
The Locarno Agreement (1925)
And
in that same year Germany was a major participant at a diplomatic
conference held in the Swiss Alpine city of Locarno. The Locarno
Agreement contained the promise of France, Britain, Germany, Italy and
Belgium that they would not resort to war in their relations with each
other, but would resolve their conflicts only by peaceful means.
Locarno thus gave hope that Europeans might be ready to move to more
serious thoughts on military disarmament.
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Signing the Locarno Treaty -1925
The Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928)
In 1928 American Secretary of State Frank
Kellogg met with French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand and signed a
pact agreeing to renounce war as a means of settling conflicts and to
use peaceful means instead. Soon the Kellogg-Briand Pact was joined by
fifty-nine other nations (including Germany, Italy and Japan) –
seemingly indicating that the world was finally coming to its senses.
Never again would a war such as what the world had gone through ten
years earlier ever have to happen again.
Even Italy’s worshiper of aggressive strength,
Mussolini, pledged his country’s support of the ideal – though it would
not be long before Italian, German, Japanese and other supporters of
Fascism were ridiculing the feebleness of such democratic idealism.

Kellogg
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