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14. OBAMA STRIVES TO "CHANGE" AMERICA

OBAMA'S FOREIGN POLICY


CONTENTS

The "New Look"

Pakistan ... and bin Laden's takedown

NATO troop draw-down in Afghanistan

The "Arab Spring" of 2011

Benghazi

Growing problems with Putin's Russia

Growing problems with Xi's China

"Improved" relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran


The textual material on this webpage is drawn directly from my work
        America's Story – A Spiritual Journey © 2021, pages 443-454.

THE "NEW LOOK"

Sounding very much like Jimmy Carter in his first days entering the White House, Obama made it very clear that with himself in the White House a very new look would come to American foreign policy.  Towards Russia he offered a "reset" in Russian-American relations and in Cairo he addressed the Muslim world with much the same message ... although what this new look would actually entail was by no means clearly outlined.  But this new attitude so impressed the Norwegian Nobel Committee that in February (with just a month in office) Obama was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, and in fact the final recipient of that honor that October.  Many stood in amazement, because he had actually done nothing in particular to deserve such a high honor, other than advocate publicly the kind of Idealism that touched the hearts of the "Liberal" world.  But being the head of the world's supreme superpower would require a lot more than nice-sounding language.

Iraq.
  In campaigning for the presidency in 2008, Obama had promised that if he were elected president, he would bring American troops home from Iraq.  And indeed upon entering the White House, he announced that U.S. combat operations would be ended in Iraq by August of the following year (2010) ... and the 142,000-troop level there would also be reduced to 30,000-50,000 by that date.  Those remaining would serve only as trainers and advisors.  And all troops would be gone by the end of 2011.  And indeed, he was able to keep to this timetable, having problems only with negotiating an understanding with the new Iraqi government as to the status of American troops remaining as advisors.

Meanwhile Iraqi "democracy" made little headway in resolving the 
Sunni anger at the loss of power to the Shi'ites.  The Nouri al-Maliki government continued to represent the hard-core Shi'ites, despite American efforts to promote the more moderate Ayad Allawi and his party – which had actually gained a slightly larger vote in the March 2010 elections, although both groups were unable to operate without going into coalition with other parties.

Anyway, 
Obama finally decided to simply leave the Iraqis to their own fate.  And as soon as the Americans departed at the end of 2011 al-Maliki issued a warrant for the arrest of the Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi (a Sunni), who fled to Kurdistan to avoid arrest.  Thus with the American departure, Iraqi politics was now allowed to take a more natural Middle Eastern profile!  So much for Bush's extremely expensive "democratic nation-building" in Iraq.

Afghanistan.
  However when it came to the Bush legacy in Afghanistan, Obama met it with a different strategy, attempting a "surge" there, one that had worked so effectively in 2007 in Iraq.  Thus in his first month in the presidency he announced that he intended to deploy an additional 17,000 American troops in Afghanistan.

But increased deployment seemed to take on more the older 
Vietnam profile than the more recent Iraq profile.  Trying to run down the Taliban proved to be pointless, largely because of the Taliban's ability to retreat into Pakistan (where American soldiers dared not go) when the Taliban found itself hard pressed by the American and European troops.

At the same time, America's ally, Afghan President 
Karzai, saw it wiser to undertake negotiations with the Taliban, shocking Americans who saw in this some kind of betrayal of their alliance with his government.  Obviously, those Americans had no idea whatsoever about how Afghan politics worked, and had worked since time immemorial!

Not finding much success in his initial "surge," Obama in December (2009) announced that he would be upping the American military presence in Afghanistan even more, adding another 30,000 troops to the American force there.  But facing growing opposition at home, he also announced that he would be bringing all American troops home by the middle of the next year.  This strange announcement only emboldened the Taliban even more – who, with the promised departure of Western troops, were willing to wait out all of Obama's back and forth military moves.  And it put Karzai in an even tougher position in trying to govern Afghanistan.


PAKISTAN ... AND BIN LADEN'S TAKEDOWN

Meanwhile tensions were rising with America's former ally Pakistan over the protection that the Taliban was finding in that country.  And with Wikileaks publishing thousands of classified U.S. documents, it became quite clear to all that America was very upset over the fact that the Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI) was actively supporting the Taliban.

But in the meantime American intelligence had discovered 
bin Laden's location in Pakistan (less than a mile away from the Pakistani Military Academy) and on May 2, 2011, sent two Black Hawk helicopters with a dozen Navy SEALS to take out the hated enemy, and then fly bin Laden's body off to the Arabian Sea to dump him there (after appropriate Muslim burial rites!).  The Pakistanis were furious about this violation of their country's territorial rights.  But there was really little they could do at that point.

And Obama came away from this risky event looking very presidential!  And thus also ended a 10-year-old chapter in American life.


NATO TROOP DRAW-DOWN IN AFGHANISTAN

The draw-down of the Western troops went ahead on schedule, with Obama signing a partnership agreement in 2012 with the Karzai government, promising continuing support despite the withdrawal of the Western or NATO combat troops.  Thus at the end of 2014 a formal withdrawal of the NATO troops finally took place, although staying behind (with even official United Nations approval) would be some 17,000 multinational troops, plus "private" or contract soldiers – their purpose being solely to train Afghan government troops.  Nonetheless, this departure would be the signal for the Taliban to begin their move to retake villages (and punish villagers) that had cooperated with the Western forces.


THE "ARAB SPRING" OF 2011

The "Arab Spring" breaks out in Tunisia (2011).    Part of Obama's "New Look" included his widely watched televised speech "A New Beginning" that he delivered to the Arab world during a visit to Egypt in June of 2009.  In that speech, he emphasized his commitment to helping develop a greater spirit of personal freedom, political democracy and economic development in the Middle East, not exactly a novel ideal for Americans, for that had also been part of Bush, Jr's intent in Afghanistan and Iraq.  In short, America under Obama would remain in the business of supporting nation-building abroad.  Would this work any better than it had for Johnson in Vietnam, Carter in Iran, and Bush, Jr. in Afghanistan and Iraq?  Time would soon tell.

Troubles in the streets broke out in January of 2011, when Tunisian youth came out in huge numbers to protest a broad number of social issues that had them deeply angered.  With this, the "
Arab Spring" got underway.

The protest was characterized by much electronic connect through computers and cell phones, and the active involvement of the media in dramatizing the event.  By the middle of the month Tunisian President Zine ben Ali had fled the country, and it seemed that the youth had achieved a tremendous political victory, although street action continued all the way up to October, when finally elections were held to appoint those who would write Tunisia's new Constitution.

The 
Arab Spring comes to Egypt.  But the rest of the Arab world was watching events in Tunisia closely.  And soon the youth of other Arab states took up the same cause:  to overthrow their long-standing governments, in order to replace them with new similarly "progressive" systems.  Egypt would be hit hard with this rising mood, as Egyptian youth camped out in Tahrir Square in Cairo with the intentions of outstaying the Egyptian police until the nearly 30-year-long regime of Hosni Mubarak was brought to an end (actually the elderly and very sick Mubarak was preparing his son, Gamal, to take over his position as Egyptian president.)

As the Cairo protest dragged on, Mubarak shut down the internet, but also made some efforts to appease the protesters with changes in the Egyptian government cabinet and the appointment of a Vice President (not part of the Mubarak family!).  But this hardly satisfied the protesters, whose numbers gathered in Tahrir Square merely increased (similar to the way things had developed over the days and weeks in Tiananmen Square in Beijing).  Seeing huge troubles developing, the Egyptian military finally stepped in and in mid-February arrested Mubarak and took control of the Egyptian government, promising constitutional reforms.  But still, the protesters remained encamped in Tahrir Square ... their numbers continuing to grow.

Now Egyptians found themselves fighting fellow Egyptians as the days, weeks and then months passed, the level of violence continuing to mount through the summer and into the fall.  Sectarian or religious-cultural violence became a key part of the chaos, as, for instance, Coptic Christians (about 10 percent of the population) became objects of Muslim retribution.  Also Muslim groups themselves turned on each other, as well as against the more culturally secular of the Egyptians.   By the time that elections for the new Constituent Assembly were held in November, Egypt was on the verge of civil war.

But hope ran high that elections under the new Egyptian constitution, held in May the following year (2012), would produce the step of Egypt into the world of democracy that 
Obama supported so strongly.  In those elections, Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Morsi won 51.7 percent of the vote, his Secularist opponent Ahmed Shafik coming close at 48.3 percent.  Obama was enthusiastic about the results and congratulated Morsi on this wonderful development.  But a wiser Shafik left the country, just before Morsi put out a warrant for his arrest.  So much for Third-World democracy.

And the chaotic situation in Egypt did not improve any – "forcing" Morsi to take an ever-stronger or dictatorial hand.  The situation grew so bad that finally, with not just Tahrir Square but the very streets of Cairo filled with anti-Morsi protesters, the Egyptian military again stepped in and deposed Morsi, finally bringing Egypt back to order.

Obama was furious over this violation of "democracy."  But he could say little about matters in Egypt when another election was held (with Muslim radicals boycotting the election) and former General / now President Sisi gaining huge Egyptian civilian support for his leadership.

Then 
Syria.  Meanwhile by mid-March of 2011, the mood of youthful protest had moved on to Syria, where protesters gathered in Damascus with their own list of demands for political and economic reform.  But as in Egypt, the demands became increasingly confusing as they intensified, some wanting more secular reform, others more Islamic reform, but deeply divided as well over whether that should take a Shi'ite or Sunni character.  Even more than Egypt, Syria was a complex mix of all sorts of sectarian groups, not only Sunni versus Shiite Muslims, but also Druzes (semi-Muslim), Christians (from various versions of Eastern Orthodox to equally culturally diverse Catholic groups), not to mention long-standing family, clan and tribal loyalties.  And of course there were a huge number of simply Secular Syrians, diverse in character as well.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was a member of the Alawi sect, part of 
Shi'ite Islam, but mostly Secular in political character.  He and his father before him had been holding this fragile social mix together, at times by forceful means.  Actually, at first protests were for simple reforms, not for any end to the Assad presidency.  But with time as the protests radicalized, they did indeed take on an anti-Assad position, which merely provoked an equally militant reaction of Assad supporters.  It was everything Assad could do to keep the country from falling into bitter civil war.

Then Libya.
  There was also the matter of Libya, where the "Arab Spring" had hit that country in February.  Actually, in Libya the rebellion involved no more than a rivalry between the two chief cultural regions that made up the country, regions that had long competed against each other in that part of North Africa (Libya was assembled as a "nation" by the Italians in the early 1900s by lumping these mutually antagonistic regions into a single colonial holding).  Thus the Arab Spring in Libya entailed simply a civil struggle between the groups, one found mostly in the eastern part of the country with its political center in Benghazi and one in the western part of the country with its political base in Tripoli.  Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi held this together by building a strong political base in Tripoli, and keeping the country focused on foreign developments – which Gaddafi involved himself in constantly (and rather flamboyantly and recklessly) in order to keep his people distracted.

In the midst of all this confusion, 
Obama and his NATO allies (notably France) decided that this would be an opportune time to get rid of the very troublesome Gaddafi, and at the same time bring Libya to real democracy.  So they called for a no-fly zone over the country (meaning that Gaddafi could not use air power in the defense of his government), and then "enforced" this decision by flying their own missions in Libya to bomb his forces, and to supply his adversaries, most notably the National Transition Council (NTC).  And thus with considerable NATO (including American) support, the NTC was able to extend its position in Libya, until Gaddafi was trapped, caught and executed on the spot, all graphically displayed to the world.  In Libya, part of the country cheered; part of the country seethed.  But Obama felt well content that America and its NATO partners had just led Libya to the right kind of political dynamics.

The chaos worsens in Syria.  Meanwhile, back in Syria, there too the international community decided that it needed to get involved in helping return Syria to some kind of social order.  Shi'ite Iran decided that it needed to help fellow Shi'ite Assad in crushing the rebellion (which would also bring the reach of Iran all the way up to the Mediterranean Sea).  Russia's President Vladimir Putin noticed the same possibility of finding itself usefully stationed in Syria by offering Assad some military assistance (and thus also achieve in the process the long-sought goal of a Russian position in the eastern Mediterranean).  And the Turks next door were growing increasingly concerned about the violence spilling over into their country and wanted something done to stop the chaos.

Obama decided to "help" Syria (like the help offered Libya), demanding in August that Assad step down in order to allow his country to move to actual democracy (like Iraq?).  He was even more forceful in threatening Assad with "serious consequences" if he crossed a "red line" in the illegal use of chemical weapons and certain categories of bombs in his efforts to crush the rebellion.  But Assad was too busy trying to stop Syria's collapse into complete chaos to pay much attention to 
Obama's threats, and simply ignored them.  An embarrassed Obama ultimately came up with no compelling "consequences" and had to backtrack on his threats, prompting Putin to agree to step into the mess and help "mediate" between Obama and Assad.  But instead Putin moved to full support of Assad, at the same time that Obama (in cooperation with the Saudis) began sending arms, even tanks, to one of Assad's Sunni opposition groups.[1]

But unlike Libya, Obama's intervention did not tip the balance in favor of a "democratic" group able to bring the war to a close by crushing Assad and his supporters.  The intervention simply intensified the violence all the more.

Worse, 
Sunni jihadists who were escaping Shi'ite dominance in Iraq, were able because of the total chaos prevailing in Syria not only to position themselves in the eastern half of the country bordering the Sunni lands of Iraq, but were even able to set up a new caliphate (Sunni Islam's highest religious-political office) as the nucleus of a new jihadist Islamic State, from which they could then cleanse the earth of unbelievers.

As for the vast majority of the 
Syrians, they now found themselves with only one serious alternative if they were to survive at all:  flee to other countries where they could live out at least a very minimal existence in refugee camps, or, if really lucky, possibly escape into Europe.  Millions of Syrians now took flight.  Syria was no longer a place fit for human habitation, thanks in great part to all the outside "help" the culturally-diverse country was getting.

Yet, with Russian and Iranian help, Assad was surviving.  And indeed, both Russia and Iran now found themselves positioned politically in a very strategic location along the Eastern Mediterranean coast.  Furthermore, a very violent form of Islam found itself well-based in the wastes of Eastern Syria and Northwestern Iraq, ready to take on the world.  And as for America, Obama had succeeded only in making America politically a persona non grata (unwanted personage) in what was left of life back in Syria.


[1]Obama’s Saudi allies were of course totally uninterested in seeing Obama-style democracy (whatever that actually meant under the complex cultural circumstances of Syria) put in place in Syria, but instead a strong Sunni government that would replace Assad’s Shi’ite Ba’athist government.


BENGHAZI

Meanwhile now-dysfunctional Libya struggled to contain the mess that followed Gaddafi's downfall. And the next year, 2012, on exactly September 11th, Muslim militants of Ansar al-Shari'a succeeded in attacking and torching the American consulate and the CIA annex located in Benghazi (the capital of the Libyan region Obama had been supporting in the war against Gaddafi), also killing the American Ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens, and three other Americans.

At first the State Department claimed that this tragedy was the result of a spontaneous uprising of local Muslims – because of a video offensive to 
Islam that had just come out.  But very soon it was revealed that Stevens had previously warned the White House of a mounting danger with Islamic militants in the area, had requested extra security, but had failed to receive it, leaving him and his team totally defenseless.  It was clear that this Muslim uprising was not "spontaneous" but instead an action long in development, one which Washington had basically ignored, until it blew up as it did.

With national elections coming up soon (that November) and expectations that the Republicans would run big with the story of the huge blunder, 
Obama answered by announcing the departure of a number of State Department officials, and that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would be stepping down at the beginning of 2013, with Senator John Kerry taking over her position.

From this point forward, America simply looked the other way as the situation in Libya deteriorated even further, leading the Libyan army in 2014 finally to move strongly against the militant Muslim groups.  But in doing so, while they brought an improvement in the Libyan situation, they also succeeded in driving these militant groups off to Iraq and Syria, where they then added to the strength of the Islamic State or Caliphate seeking to overthrow the governments of Iraq and Syria (and elsewhere).


GROWING PROBLEMS WITH PUTIN'S RUSSIA

At the beginning of his presidency, in hoping to push a "restart" in Russian-American relations – in part by relaxing the American military posture in Eastern Europe – Obama ordered the abandoning of plans to place a missile shield in Poland (originally planned as a defense of Europe against a feared attack from Iran) as well as radar intercepts that were supposed to be placed in the Czech Republic.  Obama claimed that American ship-based interceptors ready for service by 2018 would suffice in providing such security.  Russia was delighted at this American step-back in Eastern Europe.  But NATO partners Poland and the Czech Republic were left in a state of shock over the matter, wondering exactly what it meant in terms of their own larger security needs (such as against an aggressive Russia).

Then the "restart" would find itself in trouble with political developments occurring in Ukraine.  This newly-independent Ukrainian Republic (part of the former Soviet Union) was deeply divided culturally and politically between a Ukrainian-speaking majority and a large Russian-speaking minority (the latter located in the eastern provinces of Ukraine).  Ethnically, the two groups were close in character, except that politically a bitter division ran deep.  From 2007 to 2010 Ukraine possessed a Ukrainian-speaking Prime Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko.  But in 2010 she narrowly lost the national elections to Russian-speaking Victor Yanukovych, who, in rather typical "Third World" fashion, found cause in 2011 to have Tymoshenko arrested and imprisoned on "corruption" charges, which in turn set off demonstrations and then riots (Arab Spring style!) in the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, action which only grew more violent over time (termed the "Euromaidan Revolution").

By February of 2014 the action was so bad that 
Yanukovych went into hiding, and Russia's strongman Putin decided that it was time for Russia to act.  Obama warned Putin not to get involved or, again, "serious consequences" would result.  But by this time Putin had no regard for Obama as a strong leader whose word was to be fully respected.  Thus at the end of the month he sent Russian soldiers into eastern Ukraine, wearing no military identifications – and thus termed simply the "little green men!"  They seized the joint Ukrainian-Russian military base at Sevastopol in Crimea, turning it into a solely Russian base, and leading Putin to claim the whole of the Crimean Peninsula as now part of Russia.  But Putin went no further with respect to the rest of the Russian-speaking sections of Ukraine, which now found themselves living in political limbo.

Obama's "serious consequences" ultimately turned out to be whatever action Obama was able to get America's European allies to take, with France and Germany (not America) leading the 2014-2015 Russian-Ukrainian ceasefire talks, and economic sanctions taken up by both America and Europe in reduced trade with Russia (although Europe, especially Germany, remained heavily dependent on Russia's oil and natural gas exports).  In the end, all this changed nothing about the way the situation in Ukraine developed.  But it also ended the "restart" of Russian-American relations.  Putin's Russia would become much more aggressive in opposing America any way it could at this point.


GROWING PROBLEMS WITH XI'S CHINA

Twenty years earlier America had invited China into the world of international trade and finance by favoring the struggling Chinese economy with all sorts of exceptions to the rules of the international economic game as played by the veterans of the West.  The Chinese currency, the yuan or renminbi, was allowed to be offered at well-below market price in order to give the Chinese trading advantages they would need to get their own market economy up and running.  And the results had been phenomenal: around 10 percent annual growth in the Chinese economy as vastly cheaper Chinese goods flooded the world market, improving vastly the Chinese employment picture – at the same time working deep harm on the American producers and their workers, who could not compete with the heavily subsidized Chinese products.[2]

At the same time, Chinese dollar earning from Chinese trade grew so vast that China was able not only to keep its huge workforce employed and allow the country to purchase scarce resources (such as oil) in which it was lacking, it enabled the Chinese to invest abroad in the production and sale of not only scare resources it needed, but also that the world needed.  China was slowly putting itself in a position of market control of various strategic products, as well as bringing a lot of Third World countries into dependency on this Chinese economic "assistance." The West was quickly losing diplomatic as well as economic leverage abroad to the Chinese.

Furthermore, with America running up a huge debt – accelerated greatly under 
Bush, Jr., but continuing at the same rate under Obama – China was able to purchase huge portions of that American debt, which placed America as a debtor nation even more deeply in a state of dependency on China and its economic policies.

Obama tried to renegotiate the economic relationship with 
Xi Jinping's Chinese government ... especially on this matter of currency subsidies which were resulting in a one-way trade program which had Chinese goods flooding America (and the West) – with no significant amount of trade moving in the opposite direction.  Understandably, Xi was not interested in changing the arrangement.  And ultimately, short of some serious muscle applied to China – which was not Obama's style – there was little that China would be willing to do to adjust the situation.  And so things went.

Then there was this matter of Obama's proudly proclaimed "Pivot to Asia," in which America would shift some of its diplomatic attention to Asia – thus strengthening America's relations with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, etc.  Obama affirmed that this Pivot was also intended to improve relations with China as well.  But Xi did not see things this way, interpreting this as a move merely to put America in a better bargaining position in its relations with China.

Anyway, Xi had his own "pivot" in mind for Asia: his claim that the 
South China Sea, bordered by many Asian countries, was in fact Chinese territorial waters, not "high seas" as America (and the rest of the world) claimed.  To support this claim, Xi ordered the dredging of coral reefs in the Spratly Islands (close to the Philippines) in order to create new islands whose political goal was kept mysterious, until it finally became apparent that these were to be Chinese naval and air bases, positions from which Chinese sovereignty over the entire sea could be enforced.

In 2014 the Philippines challenged China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague in the Netherlands, resulting in a decision in the Philippines' favor.  But 
Xi had no interest in bowing to such international authority.  To Xi, the South China Sea was Chinese, and it would remain that way.

In 2016 America conducted naval exercises there in order to confirm the South China Sea as international waters.  But in the end it did nothing to change the fact that China was fast establishing itself as the dominator of the region.  Obama could, of course, have dredged and built his own militarized islands in the area – to enforce the understanding that the area belonged neither to China or anyone else.  But in the end, Obama did nothing. The "Pivot to Asia" – like so much of Obama's diplomacy – came with no muscle.


[2]Also the fact that the Chinese were refusing to respect international trademark rights and were producing cheap copies of more expensive Western goods – as well as stealing patent information on products brought into being in the West through costly research and development – was producing in the West growing bitterness about Chinese economic policies.


"IMPROVED" RELATIONS WITH THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

Then there was the matter of Iran, and the distinct possibility that it was attempting to turn itself into a nuclear power. As there was yet in the Middle East no country functioning as a nuclear power (excepting Israel, which might possibly be a nuclear power – although the yes or no concerning that matter has long been held in utmost secrecy) this would put Iran in a hugely dominant position in that part of the world.  However, Iran claimed that its extensive nuclear research and development was merely for the production of new energy sources, which, considering the fact that Iran sits on top of huge oil reserves, made little sense.

In any case, since the Iranian Revolution against the 
Shah in 1979 and the coming to power of the militant Shi'ite Muslim religious party led by the country's ayatollahs, American relations with Iran had been very negative, especially under Iran's constant theme of "death to the Great Satan America."  Things would remain tense between Iran and Obama's America, especially with the 2009 reelection of the fiercely conservative Muslim President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the outcry by many (both in and outside of Iran itself) that those elections been conducted very corruptly. Obama thus continued the American boycott of Iran and its oil sales (Iran's almost sole international income earner), because of Ahmadinejad's brutal hand in putting down the demonstrations against him that were rocking Iran at the time.

But in 2013, Iran succeeded in electing a more "moderate" Muslim cleric Hassan Rouhani as the country's president, who indicated that he wanted to explore the possibilities of improving Iranian-American relations.  The response of both 
Obama and the other leaders of the West was highly positive.  And in 2015 negotiators (Secretary of State Kerry directing the American team) sat down to work out a deal to reopen (gradually) economic and diplomatic relations with Iran, including the gradual releasing of Iran's frozen bank funds held abroad, provided that Iran place its nuclear development under certain internationally monitored limitations guaranteed to keep this development from producing weapons-grade nuclear material.

In January of 2016, with the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, Obama felt he had achieved a great break-through in American diplomacy.  Many Americans were excited about this development, for it seemed to be a big step in the direction of reducing international tensions (especially with Iran playing an ever-bolder hand in Middle Eastern affairs).  But others remained concerned that it left it all too easy for Iran to pull out of the agreement and move to full nuclear military power.  Iran was known to have its own moral rules about dealing with the infidel West, and was never to be trusted.  Here too, only time would tell which group got things right.




Go on to the next section:  Into The Age of Trump


  Miles H. Hodges