10. AMERICA SHIFTS TO THE HUMANIST LEFT

JOHNSON – AND "DEMOCRACY FROM ABOVE"

With the assassination of the young President Kennedy in 1963, Vice President Lyndon Johnson, a quite sophisticated (in his own way) veteran of Capitol Hill politics, now assumed the Presidency.  Johnson did not have Kennedy's good looks and cultural polish, nor his personal charisma – and was well aware of the fact.  He came from Texas good-old-boy cultural stock – and had worked his way up in Washington power through a lot of self-discipline, long hours of work, and political connections he worked hard at cultivating.  He was a behind-the-scenes operator, used to getting things done privately rather than publicly.  And he was very, very good at getting things done in Washington.  That's why he had advanced all the way to being the most powerful man in the U.S. Senate, before accepting the position under Kennedy as U.S. Vice President.

Nice ... but not quite Camelot
Lyndon and Lady Bird Johnson dancing at LBJ's inaugural ball –
January 20, 1965 (Vice President Hubert Humphrey 
and his wife in the background)

Now as President, America could expect Johnson to continue to work according to the "Johnson style" – and get things quickly done politically in Washington, things that Kennedy could only have dreamed of someday maybe actually accomplishing.  Johnson was a political mover and shaker.  And America would indeed be moved and shaken dramatically by Johnson and his government programs.

Sen. Russell having a heart-to-heart (or nose-to-nose) talk
with Johnson! – 1963

Johnson's political goals outwardly were similar to Kennedy's:  a Liberal Democrat who emphasized the importance of American civil rights and also one who understood that Communism was still the greatest threat to America.  However, his political approach in addressing these challenges to America would prove to be drastically different.

A major shift in the idea of American government.   At the time Johnson stepped into the American presidency, "government" meant the Americans themselves.  The Washington, D.C. "state" did not rule.  In fact, at the time of Johnson's arrival to power as President, Washington had more the feel of a comfortable Southern town than that of some imperial metropolis.  But that would quickly change under Johnson.

In any case, in America the people supposedly ruled.  A formal government consisting of the people's representatives existed in Washington solely to service the people and their general will – as the people themselves directed (the power of the voting booth).  The economy also belonged to the people and their private businesses.  Educational policy belonged to the people and their local school boards.  Health care belonged to the people and their doctors.

National government was designed largely to deal with international issues – as had been the intention of the original Framers of the Constitution – and mostly had been the case since then.  There was still little sense that the national government in Washington had any important role to play in the nation's domestic affairs.^[1]

Certainly Roosevelt's New Deal stretched the reach of the Washington government well beyond what the Constitution itself authorized (and got in trouble with the Supreme Court over that) – but at the time it seemed well justified in the hearts of most Americans because of the severity of the Great Depression.  In any case the New Deal would back down after it ran out of projects to pursue – although it would leave a political legacy among some Democrats – Johnson included – that felt that it was quite legitimate to look to the Washington government (and its bureaucracy) for help in promoting progressive social programming.

And then there was World War Two in which quite obviously the Washington government took the lead in all things, from the fighting overseas to the mobilization of American economic power on the home front.  But the end of the war returned things fairly quickly back to the traditional role expected of Washington: lead foreign affairs, yes – take control of America's domestic life, no.

True, there was the huge domestic program, Social Security, a pension fund for the elderly managed by the national government.  But in this the Washington government was considered to be only the caretaker of this huge pension fund, not the owner of it.  Social Security too belonged to the people.

But this traditional understanding of the proper role of the Washington government would change during the five-plus years of Johnson's presidency – change drastically.

In an important way, Johnson was still a Roosevelt New Dealer – having early on taken a lead in the world of American politics as a local administrator in Texas of one of Roosevelt's 1930s New Deal programs.  Johnson remained forever convinced that letting the Washington Establishment take command of the country's affairs New-Deal style was always the best way of going at the nation's challenges.  Nothing would ever change his opinion on that matter. 

Johnson approach to life was undoubtedly shaped by his own personal sensitivities – his concern about the racism he saw around him in Texas, something that deeply distressed him.  He had grown up on a farm in the tiny and remote community of Stonewall, Texas, in a condition of poverty and humble social circumstances.  He attended public school in nearby Johnson City (named after his own ancestors) and went on to Southwest Texas State Teachers College, intending to become a teacher.  He took a year off (1928-1929) to teach Hispanic-American children, touching deeply an old nerve when he found himself in the midst of these children's deep poverty and social discrimination.

But he switched quickly from teaching to politics after only one year of teaching public speaking (!) in Houston (1930-1931), when he became involved in Richard Kleberg's Congressional campaign.  With Kleberg's victory in 1931, Johnson followed him to D.C., where he found it almost natural organizing fellow Congressional aides into something of a political fellowship.  But he also cultivated personal relationships with key politicians such as Vice President Nance Garner and the powerful Speaker of the House of Representatives, Sam Rayburn, a fellow Texan who took a deep interest in Johnson's political career.

Also interested in Johnson was "Ladybird" Claudia Taylor, also of Texas, but with an Alabama aristocratic background as well.  The two of them were to meet in D.C. in 1934, and get married only ten weeks later.  Both of them were very decisive individuals! 

But they were to return to Texas the next year for Johnson to become a key part of Roosevelt's New Deal programming, with Johnson becoming head of the Texas National Youth Administration, most importantly setting up job training programs for Texas youth.  And this would dig itself deeply into the Johnson mentality, as the understanding Johnson would hold as to what the proper role of government happened to be.  It was there to take care of people in need.  Period.

In 1937, financed heavily by his wife, he ran and was elected in a special Congressional election, and would remain a Congressman for the next dozen years.  However, with the mounting appearance of a war before them, he joined the U.S. Naval Reserve in 1940.  When war finally did break out at the end of 1941, he sought active duty.  But Roosevelt instead wanted him to stay on in Washington to look into the matter of how government money was being utilized by American industry to support the American war effort (the same thing Truman was doing in the Senate).  And thus Johnson helped create and then head up a key subcommittee of the House Naval Affairs Committee investigating such matters.

1942 – LBJ in his naval uniform



Johnson as U.S. Senator from Texas

After the war, Johnson was ready to move on to bigger challenges, and in 1948 ran for the position as U.S. Senator, winning the Democratic Party nomination very narrowly (and very questionably).  And thus with Texas still very "Dixiecrat" in political character, running as the Democratic Party's candidate, Johnson easily won also the Senatorial race itself.  Now in the Senate, he continued his role looking into government contracts with private industry.  This in turn caused him to rise in importance within the Democratic Party itself.  And he soon (1951) was chosen to become the Democratic Party Majority Whip (charged with the task of making sure that all Democratic Party members are present for Congressional votes).  He lost the position as "majority" whip in 1953 when the Republicans took over Congress and the White House.  But instead he was elected by his party as its minority party leader, the youngest person to have achieved such political distinction.  And then when in 1954 the Democrats took back control of the Senate, he found himself as Senate majority leader to be one of the most powerful political leaders in D.C. 

Senator Green getting the "Johnson Treatment" – 1957

And what kind of moral-spiritual qualities came with this man of power?  Actually, on his mother's side he was the descendant of a number of Baptist pastors.  But his father was not deeply interested in such a religious life.  But Johnson himself grew up in the Disciples of Christ or "Christian" church, a denomination that tried to rise above Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist, etc. differences, to become broader in its theological character (which becomes denominational itself in time!).  Consequently, although Johnson was non-sectarian in Christian identity, he did indeed enjoy himself in the company of a broad span of Christian pastors, although he seemed to prefer the liturgical character of the Episcopalian and Catholic Churches somewhat.  Consequently as president, he would move around from church to church, keeping the press guessing as to where he would show up the next Sunday.

Nonetheless, the one person who meant most to him personally as a Christian pastor or counselor was Billy Graham – whose contact with Kennedy had been quite minimal.  Graham and Johnson became very close over the years of the Johnson presidency.  Graham was called on to speak at every one of the presidential prayer breakfasts in those years, and Graham met frequently with the president both in the White House and on Johnson's Texas farm, to pray and offer comfort to a personal friend who was well aware of the troubles his presidency had come to encounter.  Johnson even asked him in 1964 as to who he thought would make the best running mate, to which Graham wisely declined to give an answer!  Graham stayed with Johnson the president's last night at the White House, and eventually would be called on to conduct Johnson's funeral service (1973).  But very little of this close relationship was known outside the inner Johnson social-political circle.

Johnson never saw the need to personally inspire, through his own spiritual qualities, a "Christian America."  He did not usually talk about his religion publicly, or bring religion into his public arena.  Although he himself personally was a fairly strong Christian, and found himself in personal prayer often over his work, his public working-world was strictly Secular, and would remain that way, even through all the difficulties he would face in trying to lead the nation.

Johnson was fairly quick in getting into action pushing his own Progressive program for America – one unlike Kennedy's (and King's) program that called on the Americans themselves to take up the country's various challenges.  Instead Johnson was going to gather in Washington technical experts of all varieties – and give them the responsibility of designing a vast array of programs (New Deal style) designed to put the finishing touches on America as a "Great Society."  All the Americans themselves had to do was sit back and marvel at what the experts could achieve by way of presenting an expertly-managed America acquire such social perfection that it would knock out the Soviets in the Cold War contest for the hearts of the rising Third World.  In short, he had completely reversed Kennedy's challenge, so that it read something like, "ask not what you can do for your country; ask what your country can do for you!"  The government was going to take care of you.  Expect it.

Thus it was that on May 22, 1964, Johnson took the opportunity, during a graduation address he had been invited by the University of Michigan to deliver, that he announced the particulars of his new Great Society Program.  He began by explaining how today 

we have the opportunity to move not only toward the rich society and the powerful society, but upward to the Great Society.

 

LBJ at the University of Michigan, May 22, 1964 –
announcing the outline of his "Great Society" Program
LBJ Library – University of Texas

He pointed out that it was in three areas in particular that his new program was designed to make improvements in American society:  improved urban infrastructure, protection of the natural environment, and improved education of America's youth.  Clearly this pointed to massive Washington involvement in the internal affairs of America formerly left in the hands of state and local governments closer to the dynamics of America's towns and cities across the nation.  However, he reassured Americans:

While our Government has many programs directed at those issues, I do not pretend that we have the full answer to those problems.

But I do promise this: We are going to assemble the best thought and the broadest knowledge from all over the world to find those answers for America.  I intend to establish working groups to prepare a series of White House conferences and meetings on the cities, on natural beauty, on the quality of education, and on other emerging challenges.  And from these meetings and from this inspiration and from these studies we will begin to set our course toward the Great Society.

The solution to these problems does not rest on a massive program in Washington, nor can it rely solely on the strained resources of local authority. They require us to create new concepts of cooperation, a creative federalism, between the National Capital and the leaders of local communities.

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"DEMOCRACY FROM ABOVE"

"Creative federalism."  What Johnson said in that last statement – "The solution to these problems does not rest on a massive program in Washington" was in fact complete fiction – because that was exactly what he had in mind as he developed his new Great Society Program.  And his understanding of things in creating "new concepts of cooperation, a creative federalism, between the National Capital and the leaders of local communities" was that the local communities would be expected to follow the lead of Washington as it laid out this concept of "creative federalism."  And creative federalism it would be indeed!

He was indicating more accurately what he intended to do in his Great Society Program when he said "We are going to assemble the best thought and the broadest knowledge from all over the world to find those answers for America."

Democracy from above."  Thus it was that Johnson was preparing America to come to the new understanding of "democracy from above."  And as such, he was preparing the Democratic Party to reshape itself around that same idea as to what it would henceforth offer America: a better (or Progressive) government from above.  This would leave the (conservative) Republican Party to continue to defend the idea that government in America rightly belonged to its people, not the "more-enlightened" Washington experts.

The 1964 Civil Rights Act.  There was not much argument in America (angry Southerners and Northern racists excepted) over the issue of whether or not Black civil rights needed "help from above."  That was one area of Johnson's Progressivism that had wide support in America. The front-page newspaper photo of the attacks in Alabama on peaceful Black protesters (May 1963) by Birmingham police and their attack dogs – or Birmingham firemen and their fire hoses cruelly aimed at protesters seated along the street – or Alabama Governor Wallace personally blocking the entrance of Black students to the University of Alabama (June 1963) – outraged most Americans – now quite convinced that waiting for the State of Alabama to do the right thing (actually the Constitutional thing) was not going to happen.

Thus in 1964 Johnson was able to persuade Congress to pass a Civil Rights Act (actually originally authored by Kennedy), outlawing the discrimination by way or race, religion, sex or national origin in voting registration, school segregation, employment or hiring, and in public accommodations (restaurants, hotels, etc.)

Much celebration accompanied the signing (July 1964) of this wide-ranging civil rights law.  But in fact the new law lacked strong enforcement possibilities – and also it was largely disregarded in the South, where attitudes were widespread that Congress had no right to pass legislation concerning purely domestic matters.  Nonetheless, the law did carry enforceable weight in the North, where racist lines still played a role.^[2]

The "War on Poverty."  Ultimately, however, the centerpiece of Johnson's Great Society Program was his "War on Poverty" set up in 1964 and directed by the new Office of Economic Opportunity – overseeing such programs as VISTA – sort of a domestic Peace Corps of volunteers directed to help not Third World countries but instead American communities caught in poverty (inner-city neighborhoods, Indian reservations, rural communities) with job training.  Then there was the Job Corps, a federal employment program modeled along the lines of Roosevelt's CCC, offering the unemployed jobs in Federal Parks and other Federal lands.  Another program was Head Start, setting up early childhood education, health service and parent training for children in poverty areas of the country, to help prepare the children about to enter elementary schooling.  And there were the Community Action Agencies, supporting local programs designed to help people caught in poverty – programs ranging from the local Head Start operations, to food pantries, to utility bill assistance, to other programs local welfare agencies might want to develop.

January 1965 – Johnson in his State of the Union address
before Congress details even further the content of what
he wants to see take shape as his "Great Society" program

Although these programs operated at the local level (obviously, because that is where the challenges were to be found) they were overseen by a Washington bureaucracy that exploded in size over the next few years, as multitudes of individuals flocked to the nation's capital to find employment in this massive governmental enterprise.

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^[2]The 1964 Civil Rights Act would continue to serve as the moral foundation for the future expansion of federal involvement in matters of civil rights of an even widening nature: gender, preferred language and sexual orientation, and even the dismissing of the long-held Christian norms in public affairs.

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VIETNAM

Vietnam:  The domino theory.  Meanwhile the long-brewing crisis in Vietnam had taken on growing significance.  The necessity of acting boldly in Vietnam as well as at home was thus put forward to the American people by Johnson.  In explaining this mounting international challenge facing America as the defender of the Free World, he employed a logical line of argument built on the "domino theory."  This theory was that if America did not take a firm stand against aggression in one place in the region and let that nation fall to Communism, then soon the country next door would fall, then the one next to that, and then next to that – like a line of dominoes.  The presumption was that Communism was a single-minded force ultimately directed from a single command center:  the Kremlin in the Soviet Russian capital at Moscow.

Tragically, the role of nationalism and nationalist varieties within the Communist camp – often in sharp conflict with each other (which Truman wisely exploited) – did not factor into Johnson's presumption of Communism being a single-minded force.  Thus arose the conclusion that America needed to take a rigid stand in Vietnam – lest all the countries in Southeast Asia fall to Communism like a line of dominoes.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (August 7, 1964).  To get America on board with him on his plans for Vietnam, he put before Congress in August two incidents that were reported as having occurred just days earlier – when two American navy destroyers stationed just off the coast of Vietnam were attacked by Vietnamese torpedo boats.  Unknown to America – and Congress – the second attack indeed did not actually occur – and the first attack was likely provoked by attacks of South Vietnamese commandos on the North Vietnamese coast.  In any case it served Johnson well enough – so that he was able to get Congress (almost totally unanimously) to award Johnson special war powers to do what he saw fit about the conflict going on in Vietnam.  Johnson would use these powers widely – supposedly to stop the domino effect of Asian societies falling to Communism. 

The destroyer USS Maddox - which found itself engaged in 
action against several North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the
Gulf of Tonkin ... just offshore from North Vietnam.

The professionalization of the Southeast Asian conflict.  Johnson did not see himself as actually calling the nation to war, as had been the case in World War Two and in Korea. He did not want the Vietnam issue to distract the nation from its more important task of putting his Great Society Program in place.  Rather, he supposed he could simply assign American military units (already in being) to head to Vietnam, go ashore at various points along its long coast, fan out from there as they took ground from the enemy, and quickly bring the country under American control.  It looked quite clear on a map how this was to work.  So, no, America was not going to war.  It was simply going to involve itself briefly in a "police action," one conducted by America's rather professional army.

Lyndon Johnson reviewing American troops

In short, American action in Vietnam would be another variety of "democracy from above" – the American soldiers qualifying as the "experts" who would install democracy in Vietnam for the Vietnamese themselves.

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THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS OF 1964

Behind much of the speed by which Johnson moved to get his Great Society Program planted – and increased American involvement in Vietnam underway – was Johnson's awareness that it had only been months since he assumed office as President, and now similarly only months before the time he would have to face voters in the November 1964 national elections.  He naturally was eager to see himself actually elected by the American people themselves as their President.

Facing him as presidential candidate for the Republicans was Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater – who was so bold as to present himself proudly as a Conservative – even authoring a book in 1960 entitled The Conscience of a Conservative. During the 1964 campaign, Goldwater was quick to point out that Johnson's Great Society program amounted to a huge Washington overreach – and a serious danger to American democracy.

But Johnson conducted an effective campaign depicting Goldwater as a dangerous threat to world peace – because Goldwater, in being pushed by the press corps to give an answer to the question, "would you ever resort to the use of atomic weapons if you saw their need in fighting Communism, even in Vietnam," in essence said 'Yes."  How could Goldwater have said "no?"  That was a politically loaded question, of course.  No one wanted to see those weapons ever unleashed.  But as Truman himself understood, possessing the weapons – but going on record as unwilling to actually use them – destroyed all the deterrent value that came with possessing them.  A leader had to make it clear that he had the guts to use them if necessary.

But the Democratic Party played Goldwater's response hugely, in order to heighten the natural fears of the American voter about any form of a nuclear war.  The Democrats even broadcast a TV commercial ("Daisy") implying the nuclear devastation that would hit the world if Goldwater were allowed to become President.  That stuck in people's mind – more than any other feature of the national elections.  Goldwater stood for war.  Johnson stood for peace.  It was that simple – or so the Democrats convinced the American voters.

The 1964 Democratic Party "Daisy" Ad 
depicting Goldwater as war crazy

Goldwater fought back – pointing out that Johnson's growing focus on Vietnam was devoid of any realistically achievable goal – and would merely end up destroying multitudes of young American soldiers for no particular purpose.  But Americans – at the moment – were well convinced that a strong (but conventional) military stand in Vietnam was needed in order to stop the advance of Communism.   Even on this point Goldwater could make no headway against Johnson.

As a consequence, the November elections turned out to be a huge disaster for the Republicans – and an equally huge mandate for Johnson and his programs both at home and abroad.  Johnson ended up with 61% of the popular vote, to only 38.5% for Goldwater – and with 486 electoral votes to Goldwater's mere 52 electoral votes.  Goldwater won the electoral vote of only his own state Arizona (barely)... and the Solid South – which was beginning to switch its loyalty (since the Civil War) from the Democratic Party to now the Republican Party.

   

Nov. 1964 – Johnson is elected overwhelmingly to the Presidency
and holds that position now by his own right

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THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT

Then when in March of 1965 Alabama state troopers attacked with tear gas, billy clubs, and whips a nationally televised peaceful protest march from the towns of Selma to Montgomery – led by the Rev. Dr. King himself – the vast majority of Americans were convinced that it was time for the Washington government to step in and enforce Blacks' 15th Amendment voting rights^[3], now – not tomorrow or some day in the near future – and by whatever means necessary to enforce the law.

Martin Luther and Coretta King leading a march in Selma, 
Alabama, demanding Black voters' rights – March 1965

Martin Luther King and 25,000 marchers 
from Selma to Montgomery

Police outside of Selma, Alabama, 
attempting to stop this civil rights march

Alabama state troopers attacking civil rights demonstrators

Thus two months later (May of 1965) Johnson was able to get the Senate to approve (77-19) a voters' rights bill – and then in July the House of Representatives to approve the same bill (333-85) – including most certainly the six Black members of the House.  He was then able to sign it into law on August 6th – with the Rev. Dr. King at his side at the well-publicized signing.  Basically, the law made illegal all the "literacy tests" (having to recite the entire Constitution, for instance) imposed on potential Black voters as a means of keeping them off the voting rolls.  Simply as American citizens they were fully entitled to vote in all elections.  There would be no more qualifying tests allowed.

Under federal supervision, Blacks now began to register in huge numbers.  And the South now understood that segregation was about to lose its political grip south of the Mason-Dixon line!  Fair enough!

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^[3]"The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

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Go on to the next section

The Secularizing of American Culture

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  Miles H. Hodges