9. MIDDLE-CLASS AMERICA TRIUMPHANT

THE COLD WAR TAKES ON A NEW QUALITY

The 1956 Hungarian Crisis.  Apparently, university students in Hungary were also hoping that Khrushchev's New Look indeed meant that Hungary could move out from under Soviet domination, and they began to make demands (street demonstrations) to that effect.  Also U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had been passing the word via the U.S. government's propaganda radio station, Radio Free Europe, assuring Eastern Europeans that America stood with them in their quest for national freedom.

   

   

Of course that was not at all what Khrushchev had in mind with his New Look.  But when things began to quickly get out of hand in the Hungarian capital of Budapest, he hesitated.  What should he do?  To bully Hungary back into submission would completely undercut his Third World strategy of wooing these "emerging nations" with Communism's New Look.

Meanwhile China's rising Communist leader Mao began to taunt Khrushchev about his lack of decisiveness.  In part this heckling of his fellow Communist by Mao was because Mao saw those times as very opportune for China - not Russia - to take the lead in directing the Third World towards his own Maoist version of Communism (or "Social Democracy", as Communism was frequently labeled by the Communists themselves).

The 1956 Suez Crisis.  At precisely the same time (October 1956) that the Hungarian crisis was going very badly for Khrushchev, another crisis was brewing over in Egypt.  Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser was making himself a candidate for leadership within the rising Third World - or at least within the politically divided Arab world - becoming president not of Egypt but of the "United Arab Republic" (which however included at the time only the union of Egypt and Syria).  His goal was to make his Arab Republic a rising industrial power (in competition with other rising Arab leaders and their countries), except that the oil-rich region of the Arab world (Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia) had the monetary resources to do so - resources that Egypt lacked totally.  Nasser lamented that Egypt (and Syria) were among the few Arab countries devoid of the valuable asset of oil.

Also once-friendly Egyptian relations with the West were souring - not only with the Middle-East "protectors" Britain and France but also with America.  America, trying to stay out of the growing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, had cut off arms sales to all the national players of the Middle East, turning Nasser to Russia in 1955 to buy arms for his growing military force - a major "no-no" to Americans.

Still, America had been willing to finance a major project of Nasser's - the building of the huge Aswan Dam across the Nile River in order to generate electrical power for an energy-less Egypt.  But when in 1956 Nasser recognized Mao's instead of Chiang's government as the official Chinese government, Eisenhower was so annoyed that he cut off the funding for the Aswan Dam project.  Thus again, Nasser turned to Russia for help (June 1956) - receiving some, but not enough funding to carry out the project in full.

Early construction of the Aswan High Dam

This is what decided Nasser in July to simply grab the English-run Suez Canal as a revenue producer for Egypt.  A major international crisis now erupted.

America lines up with the Russians against the English and French.  America did what it could to get the British (and French) to come to some kind of deal on the matter (perhaps an international authority governing the canal) - but the effort dragged on for a couple of months with no results.  Actually, unknown to Eisenhower, the British and French (and Israelis) were secretly working on plans to simply retake the canal by force - and in late October all three countries invaded Egypt and quickly took the canal.

But an international outcry resulted over this bullying of Egypt - embarrassing and ultimately angering Eisenhower - who was trying to score propaganda points with the Third World against the Soviets for their bullying behavior with respect to developments in Hungary going on at exactly the same time.  America's allies were behaving no better than the Soviets as far as the Third World - and Eisenhower - were concerned.

Khrushchev crushes the Hungarian Revolt.  Worse, because of the political confusion over the Suez Canal grab, Khrushchev finally felt that he had the opportunity to make a bold move to end the Hungarian uprising, in early November sending in 2,500 tanks and 120,000 soldiers to crush the rebellion.  The results for Hungary were disastrous, with the Hungarian Army doing its best to fend off this massive invading force.  Around 2,500 Hungarians were killed (700 Soviet troops as well), 22,000 Hungarians imprisoned, 350 executed, and about 200,000 chose to flee the country.

Soviet tanks crushing the Hungarian uprising in Budapest, 
November, 1956

There was nothing America could do to help the Hungarians.  But America did help Nasser, coming out strongly against its English and French allies (and Israel) for this act of "imperialism" - actually siding with the Soviets in condemning English and French behavior, and forcing them finally to back out of Egypt and let Nasser keep the Suez Canal. 

The political fallout for America (and Europe).  Supposedly this was done to put America on the right side of the Third World debate - although time quickly revealed that this position had earned America no political credit from the Third World itself.  But it did put America definitely on very shaky ground with its English and French allies - as well as Germany - which began to question publicly the idea of America as a reliable ally, especially as a NATO ally.<

America had clearly not come to the aid of its NATO allies, France and Britain, in the defense of vital national interests of theirs.  But Americans were unable to understand or even acknowledge the confusion and pain they put the English and French through.  The English would basically accept silently their huge loss in national standing.  The French, soon under General De Gaulle, would not.  In fact De Gaulle would make it a point to work with France's old enemy, Germany, in an effort to squeeze America out of Europe's diplomatic affairs.  Americans seemed at a loss to understand De Gaulle - whom they grew to dislike intensely.

In October of 1957 the Soviet Russians launched into orbit the first satellite (Sputnik I) - indicating that the Russians possessed the means to deliver virtually unstoppable nuclear weapons - a fact that Americans noted with horror.  A month later, the Russians launched into orbit a 7.8-ton Sputnik II - with a dog aboard.   This served to intensify the American horror - and shame at having fallen behind in the technological race with the Russians.  Finally, at the end of January 1958, America responded with the launching of its own satellite, Explorer I.  It helped some to rebuild American confidence - but it certainly did not relieve the fear that with such rocketry available in the Cold War, nuclear war looked more like a possibility than ever.

Models on display in East Germany of the Sputnik (launched
1957) and the more elaborate Sputnik III (launched 1958)
Sovfoto

Laika - space dog, launched into space November 3, 1957
on a one-way trip
Sovfoto

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MORE CRISES IN THE THIRD WORLD

Rising concern about a post-Imperial Third World.  In the latter part of the 1950s, the Cold War contest moved a bit toward the continent of Africa - as the European grip on Europe's African empires began to weaken - and local leaders began to demand national independence from the various French, British, Portuguese and Belgian colonies.

The Algerian Crisis.  This move proved tremendously violent in Algeria - which the French considered not a colony but an integral part of France - so violent in fact that in 1958 it brought to power in France, through basically a military coup against the failing Fourth Republic, former French General De Gaulle.  

Charles De Gaulle takes over French government in 1958 with
the total stalemate in French politics over the Algerian question

1958:  General Charles de Gaulle, being greeted in Algiers
as the savior of the French in Algeria.

The French were hoping that De Gaulle would bring the Algerian crisis to an end ... most of the French expecting him to come down hard on the Algerian rebels.  Much to everyone's surprise - and to the outrage of three million Frenchmen living in Algeria - he took action in early 1962 by simply agreeing to complete independence for Algeria.  To De Gaulle, France had bigger things to do than waste itself on a war with the Arabs of Algeria, a war whose social costs would clearly outweigh greatly any particular social benefits.

   

1961:  Angry French mass outside government headquarters
in Algiers.  They are listening to rebellious French generals
condemning de Gaulle's plan to begin peace talks with
the Algerian (Arab) nationalists.  The military was forced
to back down after four days of resistance.

Algerian Arabs celebrate independence from France
after 132 years - March 1962

Mostly everywhere else in Africa the transition to independence began to occur fairly smoothly as Western-educated African elite began to take the reins of power of their new "nations."

The Congo Crisis.  But the situation in the Belgian Congo did not go so smoothly - as the Belgians had been hesitant to prepare a group of Westernized locals to take over the Congo.  Thus the Congo fell into confusion as regions and tribes put forward their own leaders, hoping to either take over the Congo, or break sections from it (such as the mineral-rich Katanga Province) in order to produce their own independent country.  Ultimately this stirred both Soviet Russian and American interest in seeing things move in the direction of their own particular choosing.  But the chaos made even that fairly impossible.  Eventually the Congo, with much help from America, came under the dictatorship of General Mobutu - and things settled down.  

This would soon be a pattern repeated in other African countries - as "democracy" failed and dictators came to power to bring these African states under some semblance of unity, ancient tribal hatreds within these new states making the task extremely difficult.  In general, America decided that further involvement in Africa was not worth the trouble - and let Africa go its own way (with the exception of South Africa, which continued to interest pro-democracy Americans greatly, in the same way that Dutch Indonesia had once interested them).

Cuba: the problem hits closer to home.  Although America never admitted it, America's relations with its neighbors to the South in Latin America had much the same quality as Europe's imperial positions in Asia and Africa.  America went from a paternalistic instinct to protect its neighbors from the meddling of European powers (the Monroe Doctrine) to a paternalistic interest in seeing its neighbors join America in exemplifying New World Democracy - such as America believed that it itself exemplified.

However such democratic idealism was deeply compromised by the tendency of American businessmen (who generally took the lead in America's relations with its neighbors to the South) to prefer to work with strongmen (dictators, basically) who offered greater possibilities of social stability and economic protection with respect to America's extensive industrial and financial investment in their countries.  This certainly was the case in Cuba - where America supported the very corrupt Batista dictatorship - but somewhat ambiguously, due to his embarrassing behavior.

Fulgencio Batista

Anti-Batista rebellion broke out in the mid-1950s, and Americans (some of them, anyway) took an interest in the colorful rebel lawyer Fidel Castro, who was leading one of the several anti-Batista groups in Cuba. 

Castro in the Sierra Maestra with his rebel band - 1957

Finally in 1958, the US government placed an arms embargo on Cuba – weakening Batista's power considerably.  Then at the beginning of 1959 Batista fled Cuba – and rebel groups, including Castro's, took over the country.  Castro himself soon took control of Cuba – and proceeded to put into action a huge range of socialist policies, confiscating the lands and businesses of the Cuban wealthy in order to pass these assets on to the poorer classes of Cuba. This in turn caused thousands of middle and upper-middle class Cubans to flee to the mountains – then from Cuba itself, many ending up in Florida.

Castro grabs power upon Batista's flight out of Cuba

   

Castro hailed in Cienfuegos, Cuba – January 8, 1959
  after his overthrow of the Batista dictatorship
   

Fidel Castro at the podium – January 8, 1959

Then when Eisenhower refused to lift the weapons ban to Cuba, Castro (like Nasser before him) went to the Soviets instead for arms, thus putting Cuba at the center of the Cold War.  Consequently, Eisenhower ordered an end to the purchase of Cuban sugar and sale of American oil to Cuba.  Here too, the Soviets were quite happy to make up the difference – drawing Cuba deeply into the Soviet economic order.  Then when American oil refiners in Cuba refused to service Soviet oil, Castro simply grabbed the oil companies – and other key American industries located in Cuba.<sup>[2]

At this point Eisenhower authorized the creation of a liberation army made up of anti-Castro Cuban expatriates.  And the CIA, at camps in Honduras and Guatemala, began preparing these troops for an invasion of Cuba.

But Eisenhower finished his term in office (January 1961) just a few months prior to the proposed launch date of this invasion.</sup>

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^[2]Americans have a very hard time understanding that when we try to shut down a society’s political system by cutting off our relations with that country economically as well as politically, we simply give our enemies an opportunity to rush in there and offer themselves as this country’s new ally.  We have done this repeatedly – recently in Syria, Iran and Venezuela – giving the Chinese and Russians (as well as the Iranians themselves) an opportunity to extend their power bases into these same countries.

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THE U-2 INCIDENT

  

<sup>Eisenhower was hoping to finish out his presidency with politics in an upbeat mood – with improved Soviet-American relations pointing to a more peaceful future.  The Americans had been permitted to put on an American National Exhibition in Moscow in July of 1959 – and Vice President Nixon met Khrushchev there to discuss (the famous Kitchen Debate) the differences between American and Soviet society – all conducted in fair humor.  A couple of months later (September) Khrushchev returned the favor with a two-week visit to the United States – to underline the policy of "peaceful coexistence" that was supposed to mark the new international mood.  And a much larger international conference was even scheduled for mid-May in Paris of the next year (1960) to bring America, Russia, England and France together – as a big step in the advancement of world peace.

But two weeks before the event, Khrushchev announced that an American U-2 reconnaissance plane had just been shot down in a flight over the Soviet Union.  This very high-level flight was not a new thing, as U-2 spy planes had been regularly overflying the Soviet Union in an attempt to locate and analyze Soviet nuclear siting and development.  Thus why Soviet leader Khrushchev chose to shoot down one of these planes just two weeks prior to the scheduled Paris summit remains a much speculated on mystery.  Was Khrushchev feeling himself under too much pressure from Eisenhower to make deep concessions, or from party regulars not to make any concessions in the arms race that the Soviets apparently were winning?

In any case, at the news of the downing, Eisenhower, who understood the damage this would do to his summit hopes – but who also believed that the pilot and his plane shot down at that height would not have survived the attack – claimed that the plane was a weather plane that had inadvertently strayed off course, not a spy plane.

However much to America's shock, the plane did not disintegrate – and the pilot, who parachuted from the plane, was captured alive, and paraded before the world as an example of American perfidy.  Not only did the event provide Khrushchev the opportunity to withdraw from the Paris 4-powers summit meeting with Eisenhower, French President De Gaulle and British Prime Minister Macmillan, but Eisenhower's attempt at a coverup gave the Soviets the opportunity to strike a huge propaganda blow against the United States – and the "liar" Eisenhower personally.</sup>

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Go on to the next section:

The Brief Kennedy Era (1961-1963)

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  Miles H. Hodges